大学翻译学研究型系列教材

总主编　张柏然

汉语典籍英译研究导引

Selected Readings of Canonical Translation Studies

编　著　刘华文

南京大学出版社

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大学翻译学研究型系列教材

总　序

张柏然

到了该为翻译学研究型系列教材说几句话的时候了。两年前的炎炎夏日，南京大学出版社责成笔者总揽主编分别针对高等院校翻译学本科生和研究生学习与研究需求的研究型系列读本和导引的任务。俗话说，独木难撑大厦。于是，笔者便千里相邀“招旧部”，网罗昔日在南大攻读翻译学博士学位的“十八罗汉”各主其事。寒来暑往，光阴荏苒，转眼两年过去了。期间，大家意气奋发，不辞辛劳，借助网络“上天”，躲进书馆“入地”，上下求索，查阅浩瀚的文献经典，进而调动自己的学术积累，披沙拣金，辨正证伪，博采众长，字斟句酌，终于成就了这一本本呈现在读者面前的教材。

众所周知，教材乃教学之本和知识之源，亦即体现课程教学理念、教学内容、教学要求，甚至教学模式的知识载体，在教学过程中起着引导教学方向、保证教学质量的作用。改革开放以来，我国各类高校组编、出版的翻译教材数量逐年递增。我们在中国国家图书馆网站上检索主题名含有“翻译”字段的图书，检索结果显示，1980 至 2009 年间，我国引进、出版相关著作1 800余种，其中，翻译教材占有很大的比重。近些年来，翻译教材更是突飞猛进。根据有关学者的不完全统计，目前，我国正式出版的翻译教材共有 1 000 多种。* 这一变化结束了我国相当长一段时间内翻译教材“一枝独秀”的境地，迎来了“百花齐放”的局面，由此也反映了我国高校翻译教学改革的深化。

但是，毋庸讳言，虽然教材的品种繁多，但是真正合手称便的、富有特色的教材仍属凤毛麟角。教材数量增多并不足以表明教学理念的深刻转变。其中大多都具有包打翻译学天下的纯体系冲动，并没有打破我国既往翻译教材编写从某一理论预设出发的本质主义思维模式和几大板块的框架结构。从教材建设看，我国翻译理论教材在概念陈设、模式架构、内容安排上存在着比较严重的雷同化现象。这表明，教材建设需要从根本上加以改进，而如何改则取决于我们有什么样的教学理念。

有鉴于此，我们组编了“大学翻译学研究型系列教材”和“大学本科翻译研究型系列读本”这两套系列教材。前者系研究生用书，它包括《中国翻译理论研究导引》、《当代西方翻译理论研究导引》、《当代西方文论与翻译研究导引》、《翻译学方法论研究导引》、《语言学与翻译研究导引》、《文学翻译研究导引》、《汉语典籍英译研究导引》、《英汉口译理论研究导引》、《语料库翻译学研究导引》和《术语翻译研究导引》等 10 册；后者则以本科生为主要读者对象，它包括《翻译概论读本》、《文化翻译读本》、《文学翻译读本》、《商务英语翻译读本》、《法律英语翻译读本》、《传媒英语翻译读本》、《科技英语翻译读本》、《英汉口译读本》、《英汉比较与翻译读本》和《翻译资源与工具读本》等 10 册。这两套教材力图综合中西译论、相关学科（如哲学、美学、文学、语

* 转引自曾剑平、林敏华：《论翻译教材的问题及编写体系》，《中国科技翻译》，2011 年 11 月。

言学、社会学、文化学、心理学、语料库翻译学等)的吸融性研究以及方法论的多层次研究,结合目前高校翻译教学和研究实践的现状进行创造性整合,编写突出问题型结构和理路的读本和导引,以满足翻译学科本科生和研究生教学与研究的需求。这是深化中国翻译学研究型教材编写与研究的一个重要课题,至今尚未引起翻译理论研究界和教材编写界的足够重视。摆在我们面前的这一课题,基本上还是一片多少有些生荒的地带。因此,我们对这一课题的研究,也就多少带有拓荒性质。这样,不仅大量纷繁的文献经典需要我们去发掘、辨别与整理,中西翻译美学思想发展演变的特点与规律需要我们去探讨,而且研究的对象、范畴和方法等问题,都需要我们进行独立的思考与确定。研究这一课题的困难也就可以想见了。然而,这一课题本身的价值和意义却又变为克服困难的巨大动力,策励着我们不惴浅陋,迎难而上,试图在翻译学研究型教材编写这块土地上,做一些力所能及的垦殖。

这两套研究型系列教材的编纂目的和特色主要体现为:不以知识传授为主要目的,而是培养学生发问、好奇、探索、兴趣,即学习的主动性,逐步实现思维方式和学习方式的转变,引导学生及早进入科学研究阶段;不追求知识的完整性、系统性,突破讲授通史、通论知识的教学模式,引入探究学术问题的教学模式;引进国外教材编写理念,填补国内大学翻译学研究型教材的欠缺;所选论著具有权威性、文献性、可读性与引导性。具体而言,和传统的通史通论教材不同,这两套系列教材是以问题组织章节,这个"问题"既可以是这门课(专业方向)的主要问题,也可以是这门课某个章节的主要问题。在每个章节的安排上,则是先由"导论"说明本章的核心问题,指明获得相关知识的途径;接着,通过选文的导言,直接指向"选文"—— 涉及的知识面很广的范文,这样对学生的论文写作更有示范性;"选文"之后安排"延伸阅读",以拓展和深化知识;最后,通过"研究实践"或"问题与思考",提供实践方案,进行专业训练,希冀用"问题"牵引学生主动学习。这样的结构方式,突出了教材本身的问题型结构和理路,旨在建构以探索和研究为基础的教与学的人才培养模式,让年轻学子有机会接触最新成就、前沿学术和科学方法;强调通识教育、人文教育与科学教育交融,知识传授与能力培养并重,注重培养学生掌握方法,未来能够应对千变万化的翻译教学与研究的发展和需要。

笔者虽说长期从事翻译教学与研究,但对编写教材尤其是研究型教材还是新手。这两套翻译学研究型教材之所以能够顺利出版,全有赖各册主编的精诚合作和鼎力相助,全有仗一群尽责敬业的编写和校核人员。特别值得一提的是,在这两套系列教材的最后编辑工作中,南京大学出版社外语编辑室主任董颖和责任编辑裴维维两位女士全力以赴,认真校核,一丝不苟,对保证教材的质量起了尤为重要的作用。在此谨向他(她)们致以衷心的感谢!

总而言之,编写大学翻译学研究型教材还是一项尝试性的研究工程。诚如上面所述,我们在进行这项"多少带有拓荒性质"的尝试时,犹如蹒跚学步的孩童,在这过程中留下些许尴尬,亦属在所难免。作为教材的编撰者,我们衷心希望能听到来自各方的意见和建议,以便日后再版修订,进而发展出更好更多翻译学研究型教材来。

是之为序。

二〇一二年三月二十七日

撰于沪上滴水湖畔临港别屋

前　言

汉籍英译活动自从清朝英美传教士展开以来，一直持续至今。当时汉语典籍的英译主要是为了配合传教士的传教以及汉学的初期研究活动，并且汉籍的英译也主要是由英美国家的传教士实施的。到了眼前的21世纪，尽管中国古代的主要典籍都可以找到英译本，甚至有的典籍还远不止一个英译本，但是，中国人参与其中的程度还远远不够。在中西文化交流日益热络的今天，典籍英译作为中国文化向国外介绍的主要途径之一也越来越受到重视，特别是中国人自己更应该担负起向国外介绍自家文化资源的任务。在这种背景下，我们有必要对从传教士时期开始一直到20世纪末的汉籍英译活动有所了解，汲取翻译经验，加强对汉籍英译这一翻译活动的认识，也可以将过去三个世纪的英译汉籍作为参照，目的是为了更好地让我们中国人自己将中国文化更加原生态地介绍到西方，让西方对中国及其五千年的文明史有一个更为准确的了解和认识。这是编这本书的初衷之一。

当然编这本书的主要目的是希望它作为一本导引教材，能够在英语专业或翻译专业本科高年级学生或研究生中使用。基于这一考虑，编者将本书分为五个部分：第一部分为汉籍英译与中西比较。这一部分主要是从中西方语言之间的对比出发，阐明中西语言在结构、思维方面的差异，借此为随后翻译具体问题的探讨做好铺垫。第二部分为汉籍英译的体裁研究。这一部分主要针对三种文类体裁的汉籍英译进行了研究，其中包括文学典籍、哲学典籍和史学典籍，所选取的文章对三类体裁的英译进行了理论上的观照，这些文章的作者要么本身就是译家要么是翻译的批评者。第三部分所收录的文章是对汉籍英译名家的研究，包括理雅各、韦利和刘殿爵。理雅各翻译的主要是中国古代的哲学经典，韦利除了翻译了《论语》之外还英译了《诗经》等文学经典，而刘殿爵英译的《论语》被称作中国的圣经，在西方负有盛名。第四部分以汉籍英译策略与技巧为专题，收录了三篇国内学者的文章。第一篇的作者为刘若愚，他谈了自己在翻译中国古典诗歌过程中所遇到的问题以及解决这些问题的方法。第二篇作者围绕中国哲学词语的英译建立了自己的一套翻译原则和策略。第三篇主要是针对道家哲学文本具有歧义性和矛盾性的特征给出了相应的翻译处理方案。本书最后一部分则选取了从跨学科视角对汉籍英译进行审视的文章。这些视角包括接受美学、阐释学和比较文学。不

同视角下的理论角度带来了各自不同的对汉籍英译的认识。

本教材在选取英文文章的同时，也收录了相关研究的中文文章。一方面是考虑到汉籍的英译本的受众主要是英语读者，他们对英译汉籍的接受与批评最有发言权，但也应该让中国学者在此领域发出自己的声音；另一方面本书也包括了华裔学者的文章，如刘若愚、叶威廉和欧阳桢，他们都是双语学者，并且也是汉籍的英译者或研究者，但还是不足以代表中国学者在汉籍英译的实践和研究领域发声，所以选取中文文章应是题中之意。

本书每一章都有一个导论，领述该章所收文章的主旨，而每一篇文章都有一段导引文字，对该文章的作者和主要内容予以简单介绍。编者还结合文章内容给出了思考题，供学生读后思考和回答。另外，编者还提供了供学生进一步延伸阅读的相关文章和书目。

这本教材不仅仅是对过去汉籍英译研究的一次回顾和总结，更重要的是，编者希望借助这本书能够对将来的汉籍英译实践及其理论研究起到一种前瞻性的启示作用，能够推动汉籍英译的实践和研究活动，为中国文化在世界的传播助一臂之力。

在本教材的编写过程中，王琰博士帮助搜集素材，并写了个别选文的导言；韩婷婷、樊译慧两位同学承担了文字输入和校对工作。在此对她们一并表示感谢。

刘华文

2012 年 11 月

目　录

第一章　汉籍英译与中西比较

导　论

本章主要从中西方在文化、思维和语言的比较角度探讨古典汉语典籍英译的目的以及可能性。

随着中国打开国门，在西风东渐的同时，中国文化也向西传播。文化传播的方式各种各样，而翻译是主要方式之一。英语作为西方的第一大语言自然而然地成为了汉语典籍翻译最为主要的目的语。不同文化之间既有共性也有异质性。共性提供了不同文化之间对话的可能，而异质性则是翻译这一文化传播方式最为主要的传播内容。中国古代典籍包含哲学、文学和史学在内的经典，承载了中国五千年文明，是中国悠久历史文化的宝库。如果要让西方认识、了解中国文化，中国典籍的译介是一个最佳门径。中国典籍英译的过程跟一般的翻译过程一样也涉及原文本、原作者、译者、译文本。翻译的这些方面都会对中西文化、思维和语言之间的共性和差异性有所体现。典籍翻译的重中之重就是在反映中西文化的共性的同时，尽可能减少翻译对中国文化异质性元素的磨损，尽可能保证在英文中更多地保留中国文化的异质性元素。

文化的背后隐藏着相应的思维方式，思维方式与语言之间又有着互为表里的关系。尽管不能从文化相对主义出发夸大不同文化在思维方式和语言形式上的差异，但是翻译，尤其是承载着丰富文化内涵的典籍翻译，不能一味地求同，而是要在翻译的过程之中充分地认识到思维方式和语言形式之间转换的可能性以及转换程度的高低。具体到古代汉语典籍的英译，从根本上讲，这个过程是一个从汉语的关联思维朝向英语的逻辑思维转换的过程。

就原文本来讲，哲学、文学和史学文本都具有各自特定的文本特性。同类体裁的文本之间也有文本性上的差异。在翻译中，至少需要将原文文本性的主要方面移植到译文文本中。当然，原文文本性的移植过程会受到译者的意图以及对译入语读者来讲译文的可接受性问题的影响。因此，译者需要调和原文文本性、自己的意图性和译文的可接受性之间的关系，才能将原文的文化异质性成功地移入译文文本，成功地让译文读者了解、认识译出语文化。

选 文

选文一 论东西思想法之不同

林语堂

导 言

选文原刊载于林语堂《无所不谈合集》,《共性·个性·视角——英汉对比理论与方法研究》,上海教育出版社,2008年。

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林语堂先生在文中认为中西思想法的差异体现为"直觉"与"逻辑"、"体悟"与"推理"的不同,这也就是对比语言学界现在常说的"悟性"和"理性"的不同。但林语堂还有两个重要的见解。第一,他认为宋明理学是东方的哲学受到佛学——也就是间接的西方思维的影响的结果。第二,一般人讲到中国人的"悟性"常以禅宗作例子,他却以为禅像是变了质的、"曲动至静"的"悟性",已不再是先秦孔子和庄子那种活泼的、生动的悟性。这个观点十分惊人。现在西方的科学主义和东方的理学思想都已碰到了困难,其出路也许在于重新寻找先秦的中国哲学精神。我们未必都同意林语堂的结论,但他的论证分析过程无疑是有启发性的。此外,林语堂对"知"和"道"的对立,"情"和"理"的互补,特别是对西方式抽象名词术语的泛滥现象,也有许多发人深省的议论。

一、中西思想法之不同

少时读亚里士多德,使我不胜惊异的,就是读来不像古代人的文章,其思想、用字、造句,完全与现代西洋文相同,使人疑心所读的不是2 000多年前古代希腊哲学家所写的,而是19世纪或20世纪的西洋论著。亚里士多德的学问,不但是分科的,而且是分析的,对于动植物学、物理学、政治学,甚至对于诗文修辞,都有精细的推论。最重要的是他的逻辑学(organon)定逻辑的形式系统。后来这逻辑系统统治西欧2 000年的学术。西洋学术是出于这系统,所以难怪今日西人思想法与亚里士多德同一面目。后来我回来重读中国经史,就觉得中国思想大不相同。初看时,似乎推理不够精细,立论不够谨严。格言式的判断多,而推理的辩证少。子思言"率性之谓道",怎么"率性",率什么性,子思不肯阐发下去,只由读者去体会罢了。经过几十年的思考,才觉悟这体会之道,与演绎之理,大大不同。这是中西思想法不同之大关键,就是直

觉与推理之不同。直觉就是体会、体悟、妙悟。因这思想法之不同，乃使中西哲学走入不同的趋向。要明白中西哲学思想之精奥，必先明白这思想法之不同，然后可得平衡之论而明白利弊。

单以道字而论，中国所谓道，非西洋所谓真理(truth)。中国人讲天道人道，西洋人也讲天道人道。但是中文道字，西文没有。西文 truth 字讲客观的真理，中文也似乎少这观念。老实说，中国人对客观的确与不确，不大感兴趣。对于行为的是非，乃大感兴趣。中文是非两字包括两层意思，一是客观的事实之真伪，一是行为之是非，含有道德上的评判。英文便分出真伪之 true-false 及是非之 right-wrong。我们所谓"各是其所非，而非其所是"，常常含有道德上之评判，不单是真理之是非。中国之所谓道是要行的，可行之谓道，去行无所谓道。所以孔子说："道不远人。人以为道而远人，不可以为道。"西人言客观的真理，只要是真，虽然远人，为什么不可以为道？这样讲下去，东西思想内容难免就不同了。

大体上，我们可以说：

(一) 西洋重系统的哲学，而中国无之。

系统的哲学就是所谓 systematic philosophy。就是把一条理论，贯串一切，自己成立一理论的大系统，如康德、黑格尔等。在西洋人看来，你没有系统的哲学，就不足当"哲学"二字的名称。系统的哲学，是一种推论的结构，有前提，有证实，有结论的踪迹可寻，如七宝楼台，有轮廓，有基石，有顶层，琳琅满目。中国的哲言，字字珠玑，如夜明宝珠，单独一个，足以炫耀万世。又如半夜流星，忽隐忽现，不知来源，不测去向。爱墨生(Emerson)是美国有名的论文家，所说的都是精深的议论，很近中国式。就有人批评他不足称为哲学家，因为他有雕金削玉的名言，却找不到系统的线索。正要听他阐发论据时，他已经谈到别的题目去，也只让读者自己体会去罢。中国思想，如墨子，如王夫之，有精细详切的推论的极少。

(二) 中国人不重形而上学，因为与身体力行无关。

老庄有形而上学，但是言简意赅，还是令人自己揣摩。子贡问"死者有知乎?"孔子很幽默地答道"等你死后，就知道了"(见《孔子家语》)。一句话把死的问题排开。董仲舒讲阴阳，有天人合一之论，是有形而上学色彩的。后来宋朝周濂溪、张横渠诸人，都有相当清楚的宇宙论，但这些都是受佛学的影响。佛学在中国，能为学人所看重，因为他有这一套形而上学的辩论，是古代中国哲学所无的。世界思想三大系统，一是孔孟思想，二是佛教，三是希腊及西洋思想，而实际上佛学的推论，还是近于亚利安族(Aryan)思想方式，近于西洋，而不能归入东方思想的系统。后来宋儒输入佛家的血脉，成为理学，谈心说性，而根本谈不到佛家的知识论(所谓"意识")，硬把格物致知套上。实际上，程朱等之形而上学，还是谈不过释迦，没有什么特色。

(三) 中国人不注重逻辑，尤不喜爱抽象的术语。

佛家因明之学，不受中国人欢迎。别墨好辩，也是自生自灭。庄生评惠施"其道舛驳"，公孙龙"能胜人之口，不能胜人之心"，庄生言"大言炎炎，小言詹詹"，就是看不起争辩的词汇。现今西洋学术文字，最明显的就是专门抽象名词之多。专门术语就是逻辑的工具。古人之道常隐于荣华，今日之道常隐于专门术语。见道不笃，则荣华术语日多。中国人留学学社会学，哪里是学社会学，常只是学社会学的专门术语而已。凡能深入浅出的人，都不肯靠这些专门术语为学问的华冕。

以上所举三点，是西洋思想之长处，也就是他们的短处。系统的哲学，主见太深。形而上学易入空虚。抽象的名词理论，易脱现实，失了刚健的现实感。

总而言之，中国重实践，西方重推理。中国重近情，西人重逻辑。中国哲学重立身安命，西人重客观的了解与剖析。西人重分析，中国重直感。西洋人重求知，求客观的真理；中国人重求道，求可行之道。这些都县基干思想法之不同。

二、直觉与逻辑

这思想法之不同，简单地讲，可以说是直觉与逻辑，体悟与推理之不同。逻辑是分析的，割裂的，抽象的；直觉是综合的，统观的，象征的，具体的。逻辑是推论的，直觉是妙悟的，体会出来的。西洋逻辑是思想的利器，在自然科学，声光化电的造诣，有惊人的成绩。格物致知，没有逻辑不成。宋人讲格物致知，其实是全盘失败的。宋人讲格物，摸不到门径，结果不得其门而入。王阳明拿凳子坐看园中竹子，想格出竹子之理，格了九天便病了，结果退下来，说"反求本性，便是格物"，实在是很勉强的说法。朱子虽言"凡天下之物，莫不因其已知之理而益穷之，以求至乎其极"，原则上很好，略如西方笛卡儿所说。实际上逻辑辩证法还没有建立，如亚里士多德之 organon 及佛兰瑟·贝根的 novum organon 树立科学的辩证及试验的方法。朱子所谓"因所已知之理而益穷之"，不过是推类至尽的意思，但不同类而要推知其理，就犯上逻辑上的大毛病。程伊川谓"万物皆备于我"，就是犯这毛病。所以宋人格物是失败的，也是中国科学不能条畅发展的原因。

但是逻辑这种利器，也是危险的。行之于自然科学可谓无孔不入，无往不利；用之于人类社会安身立命之道，就是"行不得也幺哥"。凡人伦大端，天地之和，四时之美，男女之爱，父子之情，家庭之乐，都无从以逻辑推知，以论辩证实。温莎尔伯爵夫人最近一本书，叙述她和退位的英国皇帝的恋爱，书名叫"Love Has Its Reasons"，语出巴斯葛的名言，"爱情有他的理由，非理智所能知道的"。这是双关语 Love has its reasons of which reason knows nothing. 不但此也，凡人生哲学的大问题，若上帝、永生、善恶、审美、道德、历史意义，都无法用科学解决。上帝不是一个公程式，永生并非一个三段法，善恶美丑都无法衡量，无法化验。无法化验则无法证实，无法证实则无从肯定或否认。所以，伦理系统建立不起来。今日的社会学家因为要科学，要客观，闭口不言善恶；今日的哲学家闭口不言伦理；今日的存在论家闭口不言人生意义；甚且否定人生意义。今日之大思想家闭口不言上帝。凡逻辑无法处置的问题，都摒诸门外，绝口不谈，一谈就不科学。这是今日西方学术的现象。

所谓直觉，常为人所误会。直觉并非凭空武断，乃其精微之至，可以意会，不可言传。直觉不是没有条理，是不为片面分析的条理所蔽，而能统观全局，独下论断。秘书每长于议论，部长却应有明决之才。此乃直觉与逻辑之辨。女人向称有六感，乃近于部长之才。女人常知某人是真朋友，某人不可交，谓之第六感，而理由说不出来，知其然而不知其所以然。不是没有根据，而是所根据难以分析，在可以意会不可言传之间耳。我们常言某人相貌似广东人或江浙人。这是根据以前的复杂的印象，却难作"广东脸"或"江浙脸"的定义。这样讲，直觉仍是根据经验而来。古者贤君，每有知人之明，先觉之见，就是根据这种经验而为论断。其问貌合神离，或口蜜腹剑之徒，毫厘之差，精微处唯凭孟子所谓眸子而鉴察之。

且凡天下之事，莫不有其理，亦莫不有其情，于情有未达则其理不司通。理是固定的，情是流动的。所以我在《吾国与吾民》书中说：西人断事之是非，以理为足，中国人必加上情字，而言情理，人情人理，始为妥当。因为我们知道，理是定的，推演的；情是活的，须体会出来的。近情

合理始是真知，去情言理，不足以为道。这是中国人思想法之特征，所以生出中国之近情哲学。情字用法，亦西洋所无，大都指变动之情势（参见《论情》篇）。若单言“状况”，指固定的，亦可以英文 condition 表出，若言“情状”则必有深一层的理会。孟子所谓“苟得其情，则哀矜而勿喜”。良吏断狱，亦必廉察其情。凡吾所谓“民情”“军情”“敌情”，都含有形容难以数字表出之情势。耶鲁大学诺尔摄教授常论中西思想之不同，也说中国人所见的宇宙万物，是“未经分析无已进行的动流”。这动流是难以逻辑切开的，抽刀断水水长流。这是精微之处，也只好用体会体悟方法去觉察。这就叫做直觉。

三、逻辑与西洋哲学的困扰

中国人思想法重直感，西洋人的思想法重逻辑；西洋人求知，中国人求道，因此中西思想重点趋向各不同。求道就不能不把知降一格，把行字提高一格，而所谓求知的知也变质了。结果 2 500 年之中国哲学经过任何变化，不离道之一字，而成为实践主义的思想。道就是路，就是子路由也所欲由的路。此地先讲西洋哲学，因为，偏重逻辑所发生的问题，及所遭的困扰，与最近稍为补正之办法。

逻辑之用处在于辩，不辩则无所用乎逻辑。但是辩有个范围，辩也者有不及也。执不可辩而辩之，问题就多起来。弗兰西斯·培根早已看得清楚，说我们认识自然，只能观察自然，不要存在任何成见，也不应离开视察去追求幻想万物之起源（cause）。“哲学之坠落，最大的原因就是要寻找爱神（Cupid）有父母，（按爱神原无父母）……但是哲学家却按辩论的义法，推演出来逻辑及数学的琐屑结论，极平常的意见，及越出自然界的范围，想入非非之见。”（*On Principles and Origins*，1623—1624）这就是庄生所谓好辩之人“非所明而明之，故以坚白之昧终”。昭文鼓琴，师旷技策，艺术之事，父尚不能教其子，师不能教其徒弟，而况天地之奥，宇宙之秘。故非所明而明之，结果沦于饾饤章句，坚白异同之黯昧，及琐屑无足重轻之意见。

这倒成一个大问题。判天地之美，析万物之理，察古人之全，寡能备于天地之美，称神明之容。故哲学家好言度数道术，而结果“各为其所欲焉以自为方”。形而上学的问题，常常辩无终极，而结果莫衷一是。万物本原谈呢？不谈呢？谈则扑朔迷离，不谈则哲学范围日益缩小。逻辑之为物，善于剖窍导窾，分析毫厘，但是功夫愈精，愈近于坚白同异之论。就使不谈本原，单讲事实，但是一加分析，穷究起来，什么叫做事实？这一问题，也就变成哲学的问题。事实是零片的、间断的（术语叫做 atomistic），如剑桥罗素所主张。或者是不可割裂，不能独立，必有关系的，去其关系牵连某时某地之情境，不足知道“事实”之真谛，如牛津勃莱利（F. H. Bradley，1846—1924）所主张。这种精细之分析，讲到几微处，就同于文词上的捉迷藏。历代反对这种诡辩的作风，也不乏人。最近风行的“逻辑的证实主义”（logical positivism）根本就反对平常哲学所用的名词，要给他肃清一下。Wittgenstein（1889—1951）算是其中之发言人，他是奥国人，后入英籍，在剑桥讲学。他就于 1918 年声明放弃哲学，认为哲学是“生根于狂妄”，而那些形而上学的讨论，连他自己的名著《逻辑哲学论》（*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*）在内，都是胡说（nonsense）。我们所以喜欢胡说，就是因为可以在哲学名词上翻筋斗。他实在是一位不可多得的杰出人才，主张哲学的目的，应该在于去疑辨惑，而必须脱去术语，回到语言文字的平常意义。这岂不是同于庄子“为是不用，而寓诸庸”，经过多少困扰辨惑所得到的结论归宿吗？庄子意思是庸者用也，是指实用，又庸是庸常。就是应当回到文字语言平常实用的意义。

辩也者，有不见也。非所明而明之，就要以坚白之昧终。实际上我们读西方哲学，就好像公孙龙复生，而我们所读的连篇累牍，好像就是别墨派坚白同异两可之辞。今日西方哲学，诡辩雄才日以逞，而立身安命之道日以穷。执不可辩而辩之，就可生出不须有的无谓的纷扰。姑举一二例。

中世纪的僧院哲学(scholastic philosophy)就有很多的例子。譬如耶稣死后，三日升天，这三天两夜中耶稣在哪里，就是莫须有而大可不必的争辩。是在地狱，是在天堂，谁也不知道。但是那些和尚纯以理智论断，偏偏知道耶稣是在地狱，而且非常自信，列为信条(使徒信经)。历史上最重要的是"三位一体上帝"之辩。因这争辩，在 11 世纪希腊公教脱离罗马天主教而独立。

"体"是体质(substantia)，"位"是人格(persona)。我想上帝之"体"质大可不必谈吧，以体质人格论神，本来就不应该。但人是有头脑的，有头脑就须把三位上帝弄个清楚。他们用理智断定三位上帝体质是一样的，而人格却是独立的，断然而无疑(见 Athanasian Creed)。今日教会，这项信条还明明地摆着。且必须把三位关系分析停当，然后三位神可以各归入他们的逻辑鸽屋里。这就大费争辩了。三位都是与宇宙俱来，不是创造的，而耶稣独是神父所"生"。但是圣神既非所生，那么，圣神是怎样关系呢？那些僧院学者断定：不是"生"，而是"出"(proceedeth)，这种玩意儿只有学者干得出来。解者自解，听者自听，但是如果你说圣神是上帝所"生"，便是邪道，应驱逐出教。他们是那样心雄万丈，判定上帝的关系了。然而事情尚未完。圣神是直接"出"于神父或是间接"出"于神子？真有这回事，因为这直接间接之争辩，希腊公教脱离天主教而独立，以异端邪教相视了。

再如概念是真实或是虚名(realist and nominalist)之争辩，一直发源于柏拉图之所谓象及亚里士多德之所谓范畴(即分类)。同类同名，是否名同而已；还是别有独立之象在先？一直到 11 世纪 Abelard 之时，那时争辩犹烈。在 Abelard 初办巴黎大学之时，巴黎大学生就为这争辩在街上打架。17 世纪巴斯葛(Blaise Pascal，1623—1662)时，犹争辩未已。19 世纪德国诗人海涅(Heirrich Heine)描写神道学生的争辩，也是如此。海涅是个通人，又是幽默大师，写来真有趣。今日 20 世纪萨尔忒(Sartre)犹汲汲争辩 esse 及 existentia(being and existence)之先后异同，而萨尔忒之所以有资格称为哲学家，就是他在辨"常有""常无"及"存在"的书中 L'Etre et le Néant 能详细剖析这些抽象观念之精意。

西方这种精微的分析，起于逻辑，故重于知。所谓知之辩论，不但指知识论(epistemology)之知，而是广泛的凡事物之理的知。这倾向当然着重于知之是非，及抽象的分析。但是六合之内，圣人论而不议，春秋经世，圣人议而不辩。抽象的辩论愈多，则人生立身安命之道愈丢在脑后。后来这所谓知，即科学真确可以证实之知。凡无法适用科学证实的问题，都闭口不敢言。开其端者是近代哲学始祖笛卡儿(René Descartes，1566—1650)。所以巴斯葛说："我不能原谅笛卡儿。"我也不能原谅笛卡儿。因为他的影响后人，必然削减哲学之区域，凡人生立身安命之大本大经，不能证实的，摈诸门外，不敢谈而不屑谈了(见上第二段)。请问礼义廉耻，国之四维，有什么方法可用逻辑去处置？

总而言之，我们看见(西方人也看见)科学知识之节节前进，虽然常常调整，但是，是一种稳扎稳打的办法，而哲学的悬空理论，几千百年来，讲来讲去，尔是我非，尔非我是，重翻旧案，毫无进展，所以亟思改善，赶上科学的方法。而且治哲学的人，多半是治数学的人。世事茫茫渺渺，惟数学与逻辑为可靠的工具，所以现代哲学思想乃为数学所统制。17 世纪的巴斯葛就是

数学巨擘，笛卡儿出身，也是以科学与哲学合一为职志，近人若罗素及 A. N. Whitehead 更是明显的例子。罗素自身以数学名，他的企图就是要把数学归入逻辑范围，或者整理逻辑，使能容纳数学。数学与逻辑是科学的工具，所以大体上，今日哲学已成为数学的附庸，道跑那里去了？谁管？这是今日西方哲学所以脱离人生的空虚现象。

补救之道，今日哲学有两条恰恰相反之道：一是摒开一大部分不谈，而使哲学纯粹科学化。这是所谓"逻辑的证实主义"。意思是把上帝、永生、灵魂、善恶、爱情这些名词完全摒开。他们以为这些名词，不但混杂含糊，而且了无意义（senseless），应专以科学的"证实"（verifiability）为主。所以，生出现代风行的新的"语意学"（semantics）。这些人专在研究语义之变化范围与构造。另一方向，即所谓存在主义，或有神论（如 Kierkegaard）或明白的无神论（如萨尔忒）。以上走第一条路的人所不谈的，这些人乃大谈特谈。总而言之，又回到人生切身道德问题，而社会人生良心自由乃成为研讨之中心。他们对人生之负责，如萨尔忒、Camus 虽然是无神论，却能使人肃然起敬，而他们所觉得在黑暗里的摸索哀鸣，更使人可怕。

在这混乱场中，有几个人是矫立不倚，形神俱足的，一是 George Santanaya（1863—1952）因为他是主张妙悟的，叫人无法归类。一是美国诗人 Walt Whitman（他说"我就是我"，不像笛卡儿乞求哀怜于他的 Cogito 来证明其有我相）。在哲学上，最近于中国思想的有两位。一是上文已经说到 19 世纪英国唯一的大哲学家勃莱利。他文字佻挞，批评各种支离破碎之论，体无完肤，而重立情感（feeling）在哲学上的地位。又一位是法国柏格森 H. L. Bergson（1859—1941），独创直觉与逻辑对立之说。他的巨著《时间与自由》，在法文原名简直是同于王阳明的"致良知"（Essai Sur les données immediates de la conscience）而能为直觉树立充分的哲学基础。因为法国人头脑有这一点妙语，在我们中国人看来是非常完满可喜的，而实际上是与数学派的哲学家背道而驰的。所以，勃莱利普通人不甚了了，而柏格森煊赫一时，因为他有"创造的天演论"，为人所注意。实际上，他们还不会懂得柏格森。

四、有干劲与无干劲的儒家

我有一句话想说说，儒家正心、诚意、修身、齐家，自然是儒道之中心思想，也是儒道的本源，也是吾国思想系统所以独异于西方哲学，而足以救西方专求知不求道的空疏迂阔之谬。但是西方虽无儒学，却能生出很多的名相干才（如英国维多利亚时代之 Gladstone，Disraeli 及美国之佛兰克林、林肯等），远超过清代以名臣兼名儒著称的朱学者流。如何使儒学适合今日世界，由致虚守寂的静的儒道，变为有作为有干劲的动的儒道而成为一种活的力量。——这倒是应当推求的根本问题。我想孔孟强哉矫哉活泼泼的道理，经过宋儒受佛学的熏陶，由动转人静，而沦于半禅定或准禅定的状态，是个中国的差错。要回复孔孟教人的力量，非夺朱回孔不可。

上文已经说过，中国 2 500 年来的思想，无论如何变化，千锤百炼，不离其宗，总是实践第一，这才是东方思想的本来色彩。做人是第一，文章好不好在其次，读书不读书也是工具，并非目的。弟子入则孝，出则悌，……"行有余力，则以学文"。明明是孔子之明训，人做好了，还有"余力"，才去读书。与朋友交，言而有信，"虽曰不曾读书，我必说他已经读过书"（子夏）。孔门看来，读书不是那么要紧，为什么呢？孔门求可行之道而已，平易笃实，直截了当。孔子不曾讲本体，也不曾讲功夫，更不谈性与天道。后来佛学东渐，晋唐极盛，中国思想，已是禅家的天下，

宋朝大儒，没有一个不是学过禅。虽然立意辟佛，然而既入其室而操其戈，实际上已是援佛人儒。禅家要清心寡欲，我们也来清心寡欲。他们明心见性，我们也来明心见性（“见性”二字本是禅宗“直指本心见性成佛”之语）。他们内视看看自己肚脐眼想我们未出生以前气象，我们也来看看“喜怒未发时气象”。由是不禅定，也已半禅定了。颜习斋所谓“静坐内视论性谈天而国亡”。就使东晋之亡，亡于清谈，南宋之亡，理学独能辞其咎吗？“无事袖手谈心性，临危一死报君王”，心已明了，性已见了，于国家何补？

向来儒家就是儒。至少我少时所看见的村学究，没有一个不是畏首畏尾，跛躇不安，嗫嚅耳语，正襟危坐之辈。哪里知道他们是为要明心见性，“戒慎恐惧”、“常惺惺”，为程朱所教来的？若说这些跛躇不安，嗫嚅喔咿，说话吞吞吐吐，一生不曾看过张口大笑一回的老儒生是孔门的真弟子，我心里就不服。不必说不会踢足球，不会游泳，就是以六艺而论，射箭、骑马都不敢来。是孔子之所长，乃彼辈之所短，孔子之所短，乃彼辈之所长。钓而不网，弋不射宿，可见孔子有钓鱼射箭的相当本领。至于冠者五六人，童子六七人，浴乎阳明山公园，风乎草上路上，唱歌归来，更是孔门中人所不敢为而不屑为的鄙事了。最近澳洲首相虽然浮海而亡，然而他是动的，非静的，这力量哪里来的？也不见得是他们得天独厚，还是教养的不同吧。

大概宋儒理障，曲解儒道有三：

（一）格物致知，转入穷理读书。这本来不能完全怪他们。以今科学眼光，自然不能不说他们格物不得其门而入，是全盘失败的。《大学》格物致知第五章已亡，朱子窃程子之意以补之，补得不好。本来知至而后意诚，在我看接不起来，知是外物之知，意是内心修养，范畴不同，不易联系（不能说地球绕日意就诚，日绕地球意就不诚）。那时大家都以“万物皆备于我”，万物之理相同，给他硬联起来。也不仅是程朱而已，陆象山也是这个想法。但是朱子解为穷理，而穷理只在读圣贤书，由是格物变为读圣贤书，物也可不格了。说格而未尝格，在当时实在是无可奈何的解释，由是朱子之学，重学问，重工夫，也算是很负责，比起空谈心性，当下承当一派，也很可取。李二曲说“晦庵之后，堕于支离葛藤，故阳明出而救之，以致良知，令人当下有得，及其久也，易至于谈本礼而略工夫”（《南行述》）。

（二）明心见性，这种禅宗的道理，是使儒道由动转入静的最大原因，《易经》言万物生生不息，本来是动的。生生不息，无一非动，无时不动。不在动字着想，只求致虚守寂，是背乎人世之常理，禅宗本来是极聪明人的道理，是中国人的智慧碰上印度佛学所引起的反应，不关达摩。达摩面壁，由他面壁，不言之教，无言之辩，庄子早已言之。但是禅宗乃出世之学，非入世之学，以出世之学行人世之道，自然要出毛病。我们知道阳阴变易，生生不息就是动。由动可以见性，喜怒哀乐，喜有喜容，怒有怒容，喜怒未发，有什么“气象”可言，观有何益？陆桴亭评程朱“静中验喜怒哀乐未发气象”说得好，“尝于夜间闭目危坐，屏除万虑以求其所谓‘中’（即未发气象）……或一时强制得定，嗒然若忘，以为此似之矣。然此境有何佳处，而先儒教人为之。……故除却‘戒慎恐惧’，别寻‘未发’，不是槁木死灰，便是空虚寂灭”。圣人何曾教人这个样子？

向来反对这种不务实地做事，谈空说理之人甚多，不必说颜习斋指出程朱教出“弱人、病人、无用人”如“妇人女子”之弱书生，费燕峰说得尤透彻：“后儒所论，唯深山独处乃可行之，……果静极矣，活泼泼地会矣，冲汉无朕至奥，心无时不在腔子里，性无不复，即物之理无不穷……亦止与达摩面壁天台止观同一门庭，何补于国，何益于家，何关于政事，何救于民生？”他们都是明末清初亲感到亡国之痛。所以顾亭林也深感末学之空疏以致亡国之祸，所以坚决排除明心见性之流弊。“今之君子……聚宾客门人之学者数百人，……而皆与之言心言性，舍多

学识以求一贯之方，置四海困穷不言，而终日讲危微精一，是必其道之高于孔子，而其门弟子之贤于子贡也。”“是故性也命也，孔子之所罕言，而今之君子之所恒言也。”

（三）理欲之辨，这更是学佛不成转而学儒者的话，也是宋儒戒慎恐惧由动转入静的大原因，释迦来心理学，所以他们也来心理学，而作为天理人欲之辨，一心求“人欲净尽，天理流行”，仿佛人欲就是人生苦海万劫不复的孽障，欲求天理流行，必先断去人欲，而后涅槃可得也。这话一点也不冤枉程朱。他们最怕心不见理不明，就是因为“物欲”所蔽，求其不蔽，只有静之一法，只有戒慎恐惧，一尘不染，然后能修到老寡妇死水不波的心境，一切无动于衷。这岂是所以应世用世之方？人生岂能无欲，无欲又何必有作有为，生生不息？戴东原极辟理欲为二之谬，而谓圣人必顺人之情，遂人之欲。颜习斋明言，“欲之不存，性将安附？”所以那些去欲言性，或存天理、灭人欲的话，都是犯幼稚的毛病，未曾晓悟情性之为物。王夫之最好，他说：“天理即在人欲之中”。去人欲而言天理，都是寥阔迂谬之谈。依我看来，王夫之最合现代人的心理学。他论性之动最好：“与其专言静也，无宁言动，何也？动静无端者也。故专言静，未有能静者也。性之体静而效动，苟不足以效动，则静无性矣。既无性，又奚所静耶？性效于才，才效于情，才情之效，皆以动也。……故天下之不能动者，未有能静者也。”所以如果说静胜于动“是圈豕贤于人，而顽石飞虫贤于圈豕也”。

总而言之，宋儒的理学在孔学演化中的过程，是一种差错的扭转，使孔门平易孝悌忠信重实行的教训，转为迂阔空疏之谈。朱子之平实笃学，自然可以敬佩，只可惜他不走明道存养的大道，而入伊川冷若冰霜的迂径。影响所及，支杂破碎，遂引起明代心学之反抗，卒使清儒并宋明之学而弃之，而思汉学之复兴。至少在今日“存天理，灭人欲”是万万讲不通的。人欲净尽，不是天理流行，而是寂灭虚空，有违上天好生之德。此话还是现在不要讲的好。若张子西铭，民胞物与，却是有活生生的力量，宋儒也有伟大可喜可佩之处。伊川自言“千年来无真儒”，而他弟兄独得千载不传之秘。其实千年来不曾援佛人儒，援佛人儒自伊川始。岂援佛始可以称真儒？从此而使天理人欲分为二物，儒者一味戒慎恐惧，而戒慎恐惧遂为儒者之特征，所谓“常惺惺”者，结果不免为假惺惺。此儒家之所以不是出家人，而似出家人懦弱无能之真因。

今日的世界是动的世界，是各国称雄并驾，日日改进，时时改进的世界。我们再要半禅定，准禅定，即不足以自存。今日世界也是功利世界，儒家非无利用厚生学以致用之精神，西方文化之压力何在？就是赶我们在利用厚生学以致用着想。我敢相信，亭林复生，不易斯言。颜习斋提出，改“正其谊不谋其利，明其道不计其功”为“正其谊以谋其利，明其道而计其功”，值得我们详细体会。荀子人定胜天之论，也是合于科学实用精神。我常想，荀子“从天而颂之，孰与制天命而用之”是那时科学馆的最好的碑铭。“大天而思之，孰与物而畜裁之”（“裁”字依王念孙改）是那时农林馆最好的碑铭。“望时而待之，孰与应时而使之”是那时水利局的碑碣。“因物而多之，孰与骋能而化之”是那时化学馆的匾额。“思物而物之，孰与理物而勿失之”应该是那时原子炉的箴言，这样驱荀韩，直追孔孟，是可以使儒家恢复本有的力量。

选文二　译入与译出
——谈中国译者从事汉籍英译的意义

潘文国

导　言

本文最初刊载于《中国翻译》,2004年第2期。

潘文国是华东师范大学对外汉语学院教授,学术兴趣有汉英对比研究、西方翻译理论、哲学语言学、对外汉语学等方面。

选文主要探讨了汉籍英译的资格问题。以英国汉学家Graham为代表的国内外一些学者认为,汉籍英译只能由英语译者"译入",而不能由汉语学者"译出"。文章分析了这一主张的三条理由,即① 翻译一般只能是译入母语而不是译成外语;② 由于翻译家翻译的不是自己的母语和母文化,在评论上有必要依靠一部分中国人,但翻译不行;③ 一些中国译者的翻译造成难以忍受的"中国英语"现象。文章从三十年来国际政治与翻译理论、语言学理论的发展出发,对三条理由逐条进行了批评。文章呼吁中国译者应在加强中英语言与文化修养的基础上,理直气壮地从事汉籍的外译工作,为在新世纪弘扬中华文化做出自己的贡献。

汉籍英译从理论上来说,包括了英语译者和汉语译者的工作,但毋庸讳言,目前国内大多数从事这一领域实践的译者更关心的是后者,特别是这一工作能不能得到国际翻译界和学术界的承认。对于他们来说,多年前英国汉学家格雷厄姆(A. C. Graham)说过的一句话总如骨鲠在喉,是一片挥之不去的愁云。格氏的话是这么说的:"……在翻译上我们几乎不能放手给中国人,因为按照一般规律,翻译都是从外语译成母语,而不是从母语译成外语的,这一规律很少例外。"("... we can hardly leave translation to the Chinese, since there are few exceptions to the rule that translation is done into, not out of, one's own language.")(Graham, 1965: 37)这句话其实谈到了从事汉籍英译者的资格问题,如果格氏的话成立,汉籍英译完全是英语译者的事,那汉语译者就无事可做,其工作就失去了存在的价值。可见这问题关系到这一工作的合理性、合法性、必要性和可能性,是需要认真对待的。

对于这样一个问题,从情绪上发泄一通,认为这体现了西方人对中国人的蔑视和西方文化中心主义的思想,是不解决问题的;从西方人译作尤其是格氏自己译文中找出一些错误,以证明中国译者可以比他们做得更好,恐怕也失于简单。

为什么呢?因为格雷厄姆的这一结论,并不是轻率地做出的。格氏是西方一位受人尊敬的汉学家,对中国哲学深有研究,出版过好几本有分量的著作和译作,对传播中国文化起过重要的作用,也应受到中国人的尊敬。他在文学方面的译作仅一本《晚唐诗选》,但他的态度也是相当认真的,他把杜甫的晚年作品归人"晚唐",提出了一个新的"晚唐"概念,即是这本选集在理论上的一个重要特点。在译完本书以后,格氏还写了一篇25页的长序《论中国诗的翻译》,

比较全面地介绍了中国诗的格律，论述了中国语言、特别是诗歌语言的特点和翻译中国诗的种种困难。上面引用的那句话正是出现在这篇长序的最后一段，可以说是他对汉诗英译问题进行思考后得出的一个重要结论。他既然是认真的，我们当然也必须认真地加以对待。

冷静地分析这篇序言，我们发现格氏得出这个结论有三个前提：第一，一般来说，翻译都是从外语"译入"母语，而不是从母语"译出"成外语，很少例外；第二，仿佛预见到有人会批评他对原文的理解会有误，他强调"评论"和"翻译"不是一件事，"评论"是某些中国人做得好，他举了James Liu（刘若愚）的例子，说："精细地批评一种非本族的语言文学带有一定的风险，我们不如将这种研究留给少数如刘若愚这样的中国学者。"（There are obvious dangers in playing at close criticism in a language and literature not one's own; it would be safer to leave such inquiries to a few Chinese, notably James Liu）（同上，37 页）西方译者包括他自己必须认真吸收其中的成果，但"翻译"却不能依赖中国人；第三，他还举了一些具体的译例（如 Wong Man），证明中国译者的译文"不自然"（awkward），"不像英语"（sound more like Chinese poems than anything else in English），"既破坏了英语的句法，又没能教会英语读者汉语的句法"（disrupts English syntax without teaching the reader the syntax of the Chinese），结果造成一种中国腔的英语（Sino-English）（同上，24 页）。要推翻格氏的结论，我们必须从认真分析这三个前提开始。

先说第三条，格氏以一些具体译例的失败为由证明中国人不能搞汉籍英译。我们认为具体译例不能说明任何问题，个别例子不能得出普遍性的结论。在格氏出版《晚唐诗选》的时候（1965 年），汉语学者从事典籍英译的人还不多，质量可能也不很高，这是可以理解的。以当时一些质量不够高的译文而否认中国人从事汉籍外译的资格，这理由是不能说服人的。事实上，即使在当时，英美国家也已经出现了一些中国人翻译的非常出色的中国文学作品，如林语堂的翻译。从那时以来，四十多年过去了，随着中国进入改革开放的新时期，越来越多的中国译者开始探索这一新的领域，一批质量高的或比较高的精品正在逐渐问世，事实上目前在西方各大图书馆可以见到的英译中国文学作品，多数出自海外中国人之手，国内的汉籍英译也取得了引人注目的成就。我们当然不会说中国人现在的译作水平已经很好了，不亚于外国人了，但至少我们可以说我们正以自己的实践证明中国人也可在汉籍英译这一领域占有一席之地。另一方面，就如格氏在他的文章中赞赏 Arthur Waley, Ezra Pound 的某些译文，批评 Herbert Giles, Amy Lowell 等的某些译文一样，在西方译者中也存在着译文质量参差不齐、有的译文不能令人满意的情况（格氏的批评是否正确是另一回事），那么他为什么不因之得出西方人不能译中国古诗的结论呢？这种对西方人和对中国人的双重标准才是格氏观点的真正要害所在。我们认为，正确的态度应该是，中国的译者有译得好的，有译得不好的；西方的译者也有译得好的，有译得不好的；大家应该在同一起跑线上共同竞争。先验地规定谁有资格译谁没有资格译是不可取的。至于在翻译过程中出现的 Sino-English，或我们现在习惯说的 Chinese English, Chinglish 的现象是另一个问题，我们到后面还要说。

其次说第二条，格氏认为翻译同评论不一样，评论可以由中国人做，而翻译要由西方人做。对此我们也不敢苟同。同样，我们认为，评论也不是什么人的专利，中国人可以做，西方学者也可以做。事实上，从目前的实践看来，就中国文学而言，中国人、特别是中国境内的中国人，用中文做的评论多，而用英文做的评论少，许多汉籍英译者热衷于将中国文学作品译成英文而很少用英文对文学作品进行评析，他们对中国文学作品做的研究常常直接体现在译文里。我猜

想他们的心理可能是这样：重要的是将作品的原来面貌提供给外语读者，至于如何欣赏、如何品评那是读者自己的事，译者没有必要越俎代庖。坦白地说，我认为这种想法是不正确的，不利于中外文学和文化的交流。二十世纪以来语言哲学的研究告诉我们，一个理论体系的建立往往伴随着一套术语的建立，而这套术语对这一理论而言往往形成了一种话语控制，也就是说，如果你要运用这一理论，你只有在这套理论提供的术语里面说话。由于历史和文化背景的不同，中国的文艺理论与西方的文艺理论形成了非常不同的两种传统，在各自的话语系统里面说话，各自都可以说得得心应手，例如中国传统理论说"气"、说"韵"、说"象"、说"道"、说"趣"、说"味"，外国人听来往往一头雾水，同样，西方文艺理论说的"现实主义"、"浪漫主义"、"体裁"、"风格"，中国人在理解和运用时与西方的原意可能也大相径庭。这样两种不同传统的文艺理论如何融合，如何取长补短，这是另外一门学问，有许多工作可以做也正在做。目前有一些在海外的中国人已经做出了一些成绩，例如格氏所推崇的刘若愚的研究，此外还有柳无忌、叶嘉莹、叶维廉、孙康宜、余宝莲、欧阳祯等。另外一方面，许多西方学者，在研究中国文论和解释中国文学现象上也取得了不少成就，如华德生（Burton Watson）、白之（Cyril Birch）、卜立德（David Pollard）、宇文所安（Stephan Owen）、梅维亘（Victor Mair）、Anne Birrell 等。这些学者研究的最大特色，是用西方文艺理论的概念去观照和重新阐释中国传统文论，可说是两者的汇融，其中既有中国文论的底子，又有西方文论的面貌，对于中西方的文学研究者来说，都可以得到有益的启示。包括像格雷厄姆提出的新的"晚唐"说，对于中国文学特别是唐诗的研究也不无启示。但是人为地把汉语学者和英语学者的研究分成两拨，并进而把研究与翻译对立起来，认为只有部分中国学者的研究结果可取，而中国学者的翻译不可取，这种做法就很难使人信服。格雷厄姆只推崇刘若愚等少数人，背后还有一个更深层次的崇尚西方话语霸权的问题。如上所说，刘若愚等人在中国传统文论的现代化上作了许多可贵的探索，但从本质上来说，正如西方评论家费罗特（Jeanette L. Faurot）在评论刘若愚的《中国文论》一书时所说："这是运用当代西方方法论原则全面分析中国文学理论的第一部著作。"（James Liu's most recent book, Chinese Theories of Literature, will be welcomed by scholars of Chinese and comparative literature as the fast comprehensive work in any language to analyze Chinese theories of literature using contemporary western methodologies.）（Liu, 1975: back cover）也就是说，这是一种以西方理论为底座的中国文论的重新阐释。刘氏做得如何我们且不说，但格氏有选择地只赞同这样的研究，而不提及中国学者用中文作的更大量的研究，其背后流露出的"西方中心论"色彩就实在是过于浓厚了。依此得出结论，中国的文学研究只有走这样的路子；或进一步的结论，中国人没有必要从事汉籍英译，只要顺着这样的路子，用西方理论来重新阐释中国文学、分析中国文学作品，为西方译者提供参考就可以了。这样的结论就很难令人接受了。

最后我们回到第一条，即翻译只能是译入母语、而不是译出母语的问题。这是格氏立论最重要的依据，也是本文所要着重讨论的问题。

一般来说，这个说法是正确的，从接受美学的角度来看更是如此。不管我们对翻译过程和参与者作如何细致的分析，其最终成品毕竟是用译入语来表达的；甚至可以说，译入语的成功与否，决定了翻译的成功与否。我们不能设想，说这个人的翻译，理解特别准确，翻译的过程考虑得特别周到，但译入语的功夫很差，辞不达意，会是一个成功的翻译。相反我们却看到了不懂原文而译文具有相当可读性的如林纾的翻译。译入的翻译，母语使用者具有天然的优势，因

为他最熟悉、最有发言权、也最理解语言中的一些微妙之处。

但这只是“一般”而言。既然有“一般”，就有非“一般”。我们也可以从另一方面说，不能设想一个译者对原文的理解错误百出，空有一手母语的好本领而能译出成功的作品。这也是林纾的翻译遭到许多人批评的原因。因为翻译毕竟包含原文和译文两种语言、理解和表达两个过程。具有译入语优势的未必具有译出语优势，具有表达优势的未必具有理解优势。最理想的当然是两种优势齐备，这种人才毕竟很少；而在两者不能齐备的情况下我们却不能强调一个方向而否定另一个方向，像格雷厄姆那样走极端是不可取的。翻译必须以“译入”为主只是“一般”情况下的正确说法，并不是金科玉律。究竟怎样对待“译入”和“译出”，还必须从翻译的整体性质和任务着眼。

从《晚唐诗选》出版到现在已经过去了将近四十年。这四十年中，翻译理论与实践的发展发生了翻天覆地的变化，许多原来认为天经地义的清规戒律正在被打破。翻译只能译入、不能译出的说法也受到了挑战。其表现是在国际翻译界第一次出现了“译入第二语言”实即“译出”为译者的外语的研究，如 1998 年美国出版了坎贝尔(Stuart Campbell)著的《译入第二语言》，据我所知，这是国际翻译界关于这个领域的第一部专著。中国在这个问题上起步较早，早在 1990 年就召开了第一届中译英学术会议并出版了论文集，有关汉译英教材和理论著作也陆续出版了不少。但作为“惯例”，非欧美国家的论文或著作如果不是用英文写作、在欧美出版，国际学术界“一般”是不认可的。这从另一方面证明了“译出”的重要性。

国际学术界对“译出”的关注是国际形势变化的结果，也是翻译理论发展的结果。

从国际形势看，由于科学技术的突飞猛进和国际政治格局的变化，经济全球化和文化多元化已成为不可逆转的趋势。这两者都对翻译提出了新的要求。对于前者来说，科技发展和经济全球化的结果使地球变得越来越小，国与国、人与人之间的交往变得越来越密切，人们需要、而实际上也已形成了一种“国际共同语”(global language, international language)，这就是英语。就好像苏联解体后美国“一超独霸”一样，英语在 20 世纪 80 年代后也成了“一超独霸”的国际共同语，不管你是否喜欢。各非英语国家对英语实际上已经不是作为一种“外语”来学习，而是作为一种“国际共同语”来学习，这就是为什么英语同电脑操作技术一样，已成了 21 世纪的入场券，每个受教育者必备的知识结构。而“国际共同语”的客观存在，就提出了各种语言向这一共同语“译入”的问题。坎贝尔的“译入第二语言”其实就是以澳大利亚为例，讨论各民族语言(ethnic languages)向英语译入的问题。事实上，非英语国家的所有一切信息，不管是政治、经济、文化、科学、技术，还是文学、艺术、民俗等等，不译入英语就等于不想为世界所知。而所有这一切，靠以英语为母语的翻译家来帮你做不现实也不可能，因为这个工作量之大是超出想象的。文化的多元化则提出了“译出”的另一个必要性。经济一体化、美国“一超独霸”带来的结果是文化霸权主义和价值观念的单一化。伴随着英语作为国际语在全世界通行，美国文化、美国价值观在全世界渗透，美国生活方式、好莱坞电影、可口可乐、麦当劳、NBA、摇滚乐等等已成了许多年轻人追逐的时尚，各国的民族传统文化越来越失去年轻人的青睐，被当作现代化、国际化的累赘或绊脚石，引起了许多有识之士的关切。要在全球一体化的背景下保持文化多元化，就只有将各种文化“译出”到国际共同语，从而成为全球文化的组成部分。所谓“只有民族的才是世界的”，其前提一是保持民族的本色，二是要译介到世界上去。没有“译出”，就无世界性可言。而这一任务，同样不能仅仅靠以英语为母语的译者来完成。

翻译理论的发展同样导致了对“译出”的诉求。我们知道，到目前为止的翻译理论，都是建

立在三个层面上的。第一个是语言层面，第二个是文学层面，第三个是文化层面。在语言层面上，翻译被理解为语码的转换，同一个意义从一种语言形式的表达转换为另一种语言形式的表达。在文学层面上，翻译被理解为文学作品美的再现。而在文化层面，翻译则被理解为文化的传播。在前两个层面上，“译入”的优势是明显的，第二语言的学习和掌握确实很难达到母语水平。但在文化层面上，选择“译入”还是“译出”，起决定作用的不是语言的纯正或者修辞的高超，而是服从于更广泛的社会变革、文明再造的需要。换句话说，从语言和文学角度，我们也许可以认为“译入”比“译出”更合理、更可接受，而从文化角度，我们就得不出这样的结论。我们当然不必得出“译出”比“译入”更重要的相反结论，但至少可以说，这两者同样重要，同样应该引起重视。因为这背后体现了文化的竞争和文化对翻译的强制干预。20 世纪 90 年代以来，翻译研究实现了文化的转向。正是在这个背景下，才出现了坎贝尔这样的著作。

文化对翻译的干预，至少体现在三个方面。

第一，要不要翻译？文化的传播不是完全无序的，如果说“译入”体现了一种文化对外来文化的选择，“译出”则更体现了一种文化希望实现的对外界文化的干预。比方说，明末清初的科技翻译，我们常看作是“译入”，但如果考虑到当时的翻译基本上采取中外合作方式，而合作者中的中方人士如徐光启、李之藻等均不懂外语，我们就可知道这种翻译其实是西方传教士们的“译出”，译什么不译什么的决定权完全在他们身上。比如说，他们选择译大量的宗教文献以宣传耶稣教义，中国译者就只能配合他们作这样的翻译。科技文献的翻译只是这一宗教输出的副产品，是利玛窦实行宗教输出的一种策略，客观上有利于中国科技的发展。但即使在这个问题上，中国合作者也没有什么发言权。一个例子是当时西方的数学已有了很多新发展，但利玛窦选择翻译古希腊欧几利得的“几何原本”，徐光启就只能接受；《几何原本》有 15 卷，徐光启希望翻译全部，但利玛窦只肯翻译 6 卷，徐光启也只得接受。今天的汉籍英译，如果完全按照“译入”的处理，中国文化的弘扬就完全没有自主权。西方人对中国文化、中国文学的译介有他们的眼光，其翻译作品的总和就形成了西方对中国文化和文学的总体概念。由于对非母语的文化、语言的理解很难做到全面、公正、深刻，就造成了这种总体概念的片面以至歪曲。这中间，有的是有意的，如美国某些人“妖魔化”中国，就是通过有针对性的译介实现的；也有的是因为本身资料或其他方面知识不足，如欧洲相当长一段时间里把中国的三流作品《好逑传》当作中国小说的代表，庞德(Ezra Pound)翻译的《神州集》(*Cathay*)也是如此。在这种情况下，要完整、全面地介绍中国、中国文化和中国文学，就只有通过“译出”进行干预。

第二，译什么？“要不要译”其实也是译什么的问题，但在那里我们讨论的是更大范围的取舍问题，即，译还是不译？从“译入”的角度看，他可以对某些国家、某些国家的文化、某些国家文化的某些领域采取“不译”的态度，从而造成这一国家或民族文化的不完整、片面或扭曲的形象；而“译出”可以从主体的角度，从大处着眼，完整地呈现本国或本民族的形象，或把他人不易觉察的本族的精华提供给国际社会。这是一种“战略”上的“译什么”问题。而这里要讲的是“战术”上的“译什么”问题。我们把范围缩小，回到汉籍英译这个题目上来。在已决定要翻译中国典籍的前提下，怎么作选择的问题，看看在这方面“译入”和“译出”有什么不同的意义。汉籍英译有全译和选译的不同，这里讲的当然是选译。选译就有个选家的眼光的问题。鲁迅说得好：“选本所显示的，往往不是作者的特色，倒是选者的眼光。”梁代昭明太子的《文选》不选“经”、“史”、“子”三大类的作品，其结果是确定了纯文学在中国历史上的地位；明代茅坤编《唐宋八大家文钞》，其结果是开了明代前后七子复古派的先河。在翻译中国文学作品的时候，选

什么作家、不选什么作家，选什么作品、不选什么作品，会造成外语读者对中国文学或作家不同的整体形象。例如大翻译家 Arthur Waley 只喜欢简单明白的作品，在唐诗作者中只喜欢寒山和白居易，结果造成这两人在海外的很大影响，特别是前者，其地位会令国内读者诧异。而 Graham 反其道而行之，在唐诗中专选艰深难读、用典繁多的作家如韩愈、李贺、李商隐等，又造成了另一种印象。20 世纪初 Charles Budd (1912)编了一本《古今诗选》，在所选不多的杜甫诗中，选了《渼陂行》、《陪诸公子丈八沟携妓纳凉晚际遇雨二首》等国内各种选本很少见、国内多数读者也不熟悉的一些作品，这与选老杜的《三吏》、《三别》、《北征》、《自京赴奉先咏怀五百字》等造成的形象肯定也大不相同。由于历史、传统与个人趣味的不同，中外译者对作家作品的理解和爱好有着很大的差异。我们当然尊重国外译者的选择，但要想完整地向外介绍中国文化，中国的选家和翻译家有必要进行文化干预。这就是为什么在重视“译入”的同时，要重视“译出”的又一个原因。

第三，怎么译？大量的实践证明，在翻译的整个过程中，从理解到表达，从内容、风格到语言，中外译者都会表现出很大的不同。从理解的角度看，由于“诗无达诂”加上汉语汉字自身的困难，再高明的西方翻译家，在从事中国古籍英译的时候，不出现错误以至严重错误的情况不多见，因此要达到高质量的翻译，中国学者的参与几乎不可避免。而从风格上看，不少情况只是一种微妙的感觉，说母语者也往往“只能意会，不可言传”，外语学者更是难以体会得到。在同一篇文章中格雷厄姆还说到，诗歌的本质(essence)在于意义，很多其他译者(包括国内译者)也持同一观点，因而往往无视汉语诗词在形式上的特点。其实这都是不懂诗词的皮相之见。我们可以举一个例子。相传有位大臣为慈禧写一幅扇面，抄写王之涣的七绝一首：“黄河远上白云间，一片孤城万初山。羌笛何须怨杨柳，春风不度玉门关。”抄完一看，漏写了一个“间”字。情急之下，他禀告说，臣抄的不是一首诗，而是一首词，接着朗声读道：“黄河远上，白云一片，孤城万初山。羌笛何须怨，杨柳春风，不度玉门关。”中国读者大多都能心领神会，体会到这一“诗”一“词”的味道不同，而对西方译者，这委实太难了。

说到语言，格氏批评中国译者的译文会造成一种 Sino-English，必须竭力反对。这种观点在他那个时代也许还能让人接受，但放到今天，与新的翻译理论潮流实在太格格不入。当代后殖民主义翻译理论，以美国的 Lawrence Venuti 为代表。他考察了 17 世纪以来 200 多年间译成英语的作品(包括文学和非文学)，认为最大问题就是过于“流利”、“自然”、“透明”，而这实际上就是文学作品的被殖民化。针对这种“归化”(domestication)的翻译策略，他针锋相对地提出了另一个翻译策略——异化(foreignisation)。他认为在英语中采用异化译法在今天特别必要，“它是对当今世界事务的一个聪明的文化干预，是用来针对英语国家的语言霸权主义和在全球交往中的文化不平等状态，是对民族中心主义、种族主义、文化自恋主义和文化帝国主义的一种抵制，有利于在全球地域政治关系中推行民主”(Venuti, 1994: 20)。他主张为了保持异国情调，必要时可以故意采用半通不通的句子。从这一理论看来，“Sino-English”不但可以容忍，而且应当鼓励。而从地缘政治学的角度来看，在“经济全球化”、“英语国际化”的过程中，英语在走向世界的同时，自身也在不断被异化。“标准英语”似乎已成明日黄花，牛津英语的风光不再，各种英语变体，以美国英语为首，闯入了标准英语的世袭领地，加拿大英语、澳大利亚英语、新西兰英语、印度英语、加勒比海英语，甚至新加坡英语等，都堂而皇之地成了正规英语。作为语言名称的“English”一词，破天荒地有了复数形式，成了“Englishes”，就是指这些业已被广泛承认的变体。在此情况下，随着中国国际威望的提高及在国际事务中发挥越来越大的作

用，再增加一个变体——“中国英语”，用于表达主要属于中国的事物和概念，似乎也在情理之中。中国典籍（包括古代和当代的）的英译，是造成这种可接受的 Sino-English 的重要途径。

当然，这不是鼓励我们在汉籍英译时采取硬译、死译的办法，而是主张在努力把汉语译成地道英语的过程中，尽量减少损害中国文化的形象。在规范英语和生硬英语中间我们需要准确地把握一个“度”。有的学者主张采用“China English”和“Chinese English (Chinglish)”两个术语来处理汉籍英译过程中产生的中介语现象，前者指可以容许、甚至不妨鼓励的“中国英语”，而后者指在学习和运用时应努力避免的“中国式英语”或“中国腔英语”。这个意见是可取的。

要从事汉籍英译，对我们的英语学习和两种文化的学习也提出了更高的要求。我们说中国学者可以从事这一工作，并不是说每个学了一点英语的中国人都能做。连英译中都是如此更何况是中译英！首先，我们学的英语不能只是为了满足口语交际、为了能在目的语环境下生存的那一点儿英语，而要大大加强英语书面语特别是文学语言的学习，提高书面英语的领悟和表达能力。其次，要努力学习中英两种语言背后的文化，熟练掌握英语文学的知识和技巧。举例来说，要从事中诗英译，除了要懂得中国各种形式的诗词格律之外，还要了解英语的诗歌格律，掌握英诗在语言表达上的种种特点。在译诗的格律派（包括用韵派）与非格律派（包括散化派）的论争中，如果是因为自己不懂诗律而不管三七二十一地对所有诗歌形式诉求表示反对，那就是很难使人信服的了。

总之，汉籍英译不是外国人的专利，中国学者和翻译工作者应该理直气壮地勇于承担这一工作，只要我们刻苦磨练，练好两种语言和文化的基本功，我们就有可能在 21 世纪弘扬中华文化的伟大事业中做出自己的一份贡献！

选文三　Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy, and “Truth”

Chad Hansen

导　言

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Chad Hansen（陈汉生）是美国佛蒙特大学哲学系教授，专门研究中国语言哲学和道家哲学，著有《中国哲学中的道家思想》、《中国古代的语言和逻辑》等。这里选录的是他关于中国语言和中国哲学的文章。他将中国语言和中国哲学置入同西方语言和西方哲学对比的框架中加以审视。文章开始就试图用“格义”的方法为西方哲学中的 truth 一词寻找汉语中的对应词。“格义”本来是为了传播佛教教义而用中国的哲学思想概念去比附佛经中的概念。这个做法后来被西方传教士用来翻译西方宗教中诸如 God, spirit 和 sin 等词语。尽管“格义”的方法不能完全传达所译对象的意义，但是在先秦哲学中实在难以为truth找到一

个对应词。这一现象就自然牵引出中国语言和西方语言、中国哲学和西方哲学之间的差异来。萨丕尔-沃尔夫假设认为语言对思想有着制约作用。那么，汉语中 truth 的对应词的缺席说明了中西方思想哲学形态存在着不同。汉语中不存在 truth 的对应词表明汉语是一种实用性语言。反过来讲，对语言所采取的实用性态度以及为这种态度所驱使而形成的形而上学、认识论和心脑理论都无法容纳与 truth 相类似的概念，让这一概念发挥作用。在陈汉生看来，西方哲学一般用实在论的、柏拉图式的方式论述语言，以形而上学和认识论为重心；西方人把哲学看成是对思维如何表征实在的研究。相比而言，中国哲学用实用性的、儒家式的方式论说语言，重心放在了如何发展出一套社会心理技巧来塑造符合社会道德伦理规范的个体情操上。藉此，如果把中国古代汉朝之前的哲学典籍译成英语就不能基于西方的真值观，否则就会掩盖中国哲学的实用性特质。

符号学家皮尔士曾经从三个方面讨论语言：关涉世界的语言，这是以语义为重心的语言；关涉自身的语言，这是以句法为重心的语言；关涉社会语境的语言，这是以语用为重心的语言。像英语这样的西方语言是以语义为重心的，汉语则是以语用为重心。两类语言的中心差异具体体现为：英语为句子语言，汉语是词语语言。因为相对来讲，句子具有自足性，强于储存反映实在的信息；汉语的表达单位是词语，就会相应地损失掉逻辑的自洽性和信息的自足性，需要借由言外的言语行为语境和社会语境才能圆满地传达出信息来。依据中西哲学理念之间、中西语言之间的差异，将中国的哲学典籍翻译成英语等西方语言，势必会在翻译过程中发生从词语形态到句子形态、从实用重心到语义重心的转换，同时也要克服这些差异所带来的跨语转换困难。

The twentieth century, like the second, finds those involved in cross-cultural interpretation of *tao*[a] (comparative philosophers) engaged in *ko i*[b] concept matching. Chinese missionaries first used *ko i*[b] to promote the understanding of Buddhism-matching concepts of Taoism and Buddhism. Western missionaries, too, looked for counterparts of their hallowed primitives—God, spirit, sin. The analytical phase follows the missionary phase. When the first task—popularization—has been completed, the emphasis shifts to analyzing the differences between concepts or to noting their absence. Western philosophers have many candidates for "most important concept of the tradition," but "truth" is likely to make everyone's short list. Surprisingly, however, Western analysis of Chinese thought has not focused primarily on the concept of truth—as if one could not conceive of a philosophical tradition worthy of the name that did not include truth-based reasoning. Some interpreters of Chinese thought, however, have hinted at precisely such a possibility, though they have pulled back from boldly asserting that Chinese has no concept of truth. Donald Munro has observed that Chinese and Western philosophical practices differ in respects relevant to truth: "In China, truth and falsity in the Greek sense have rarely been important considerations in a philosopher's acceptance of a given proposition; these are Western concerns."(Munro, 1969: 55)

If accurate, Munro's observation will strike students of Chinese thought as shocking. We normally assume that accepting true doctrines and rejecting false ones have survival value, and Chinese culture bows to none in longevity. Several explanations surface. Perhaps Chinese philosophers shun practical affairs or think only about "doctrines" and "propositions" that have little possible practical use. However, Chinese philosophers embarrass their Western counterparts in this comparison. The typical Chinese philosopher eschews abstract impractical theorizing—that characteristic of most of Western philosophy. Chinese philosophers, Confucians in particular, were typically men of practical action, government functionaries. An alternative explanation suggests, on the contrary, that Munro has been overly cautious. Perhaps, instead of suggesting that they had a concept of truth but thought that it was unimportant, we should theorize that classical Chinese philosophers had no concept of truth at all. Of course, for Chinese (philosophers and laymen) the truth of a doctrine did make a difference, and, in general, Chinese did reject false propositions and adopt true ones. However, they did not "use a concept of truth" in philosophizing about what they were doing. Classical Chinese *philosophical theories* about how to evaluate doctrines do not depend on a distinction that matches up with our familiar true/false dichotomy.

A. C. Graham, too, has touched briefly and cautiously on the subject of "truth," and he equally cautiously flirts with a similar view. In the neo-Mohist works on logic, he observes no simple counterpart of truth: "The Mohist does not use a single term corresponding to English 'true.' A name or complex of names applied to an object either fits (*tang*) or errs (*kuo*)." (Graham, 1970:39)

Generalized to all of Chinese philosophy, Graham's conclusion nevertheless is not the same as Munro's thesis. It may well be that no single *pair* of characters in the Chinese language corresponds precisely to the true/false pair in English, yet truth may still be important, even theorized about in standard philosophical discourse. For example, Hu Shih arguably expresses the views of most scholars of Mo Tzu when he refers to an important passage in the *Mo Tzu* (see sect. 4) as "requiring tests of truth" (Hu Shih, 1963:76). But no single word in the passage would be appropriately translated as "true." Furthermore, Hu Shih, like Graham, assumes that the later Mohists did logical theory—a philosophical activity that is hard to imagine without some, perhaps complex, counterpart of the true/false dichotomy (ibid.:75).

I shall argue for the less cautious position. Munro's assessment is correct and Graham's can be freed from the single character limitation and generalized to all of pre-Buddhist Chinese philosophy. Chinese philosophy has no concept of truth.

In this article I want to examine the claim, show that it is nontrivial, intelligible, and plausible. It is not a straightforward empirical claim capable of direct textual confirmation. Accordingly, what follows is not a standard textual argument, that is, I will not produce strings of Chinese text accompanied by strings of English which do not contain the word

"truth." That a string expression has such and such a meaning is not a simple empirical proposition. When we learn classical Chinese, we do not "see" the meaning as a feint aura around the character. We learn instead a conventional theory of how to relate elements of our languages (whether modern Chinese or English) to elements of classical string expressions. Since, in part, I am evaluating that conventional theory, such an argument would beg the question. All that standard textual "arguments" can show is that certain translations are possible (and they typically do this only by appealing to our conventionally learned intuitions about classical Chinese).

Even if empirical textual arguments did not beg the question, they could not prove the intended conclusion; such an argument form would be weak. Since my claim is a negative one, even a proof consisting of an exhaustive translation of every extant string of the corpus would not rule out the possibility that a lost text contained the concept in question.

"Chinese philosophy has no concept of truth" is a theoretical interpretive claim about the general character of pre-Han philosophical activity. The argument is for the conclusion that a pragmatic (nontruth-based) interpretation explains the general character of the corpus better than does one that attributes to Chinese thinkers the philosophical concerns characteristic of traditional Western (truth-based) philosophy. In part, the theory will state how classical Chinese language explains the adoption of a pragmatic rather than a semantic interest in language.

Parts of my argument, therefore, will strike some as a version of linguistic determinism—the currently unfashionable Whorf-Sapir hypothesis that language constrains thought makes certain thoughts unthinkable. The similarity is superficial but the contrast provides important instruction on how arguments about the relation of language and philosophy should be constructed. The conclusion is not about what can or cannot be said in classical philosophical Chinese, but about what was said. Interpretation, not thought, is the issue. An interpretation is a theoretical model for a corpus whose aim is to make the corpus intelligible. The question is which interpretation is best—most plausible, most explanatorily powerful and elegant. The starting point of argument, that many interpretations are empirically possible, is precisely the opposite of constraint. I make the realist assumption that one of the possible ones is correct. The task, then, is to argue which of two (or several) interpretations is the most plausible. I argue that given the structure of the actual claims made by classical philosophers, an interpretive theory attributing primarily pragmatic theoretical concerns is more plausible than one attributing semantic or metaphysical concerns.

An interpretation is an explanatory theory logically akin to other scientific theories. The best interpretation will explain the phenomenon (the texts) more coherently than its rivals. Different interpretative theories have different consequences. If we accept interpretation A, then P follows. If we accept interpretation B, then Q follows. Which consequence should we accept? The one that we can best explain.

How we explain the production of texts is, in principle, totally open. Where we assume texts are philosophical, we must include among the explanations the claim that the authors had reasons or grounds for making the claims they make. The act of interpretation assumes that we can recognize good reasons when we see them. When I make psychological claims, they are of this sort, namely, the authors had reasons (other beliefs or grounds for beliefs) for constructing this doctrine.

Among the reasons for adopting a particular theory of language is the most natural account of the features of the languages (note the plural) with which one is familiar. Western theories, for example, tend to treat written language as totally parasitic on spoken language—ancient Chinese did not. That Western languages are written phonemically and Chinese is not a causal, explanatory, psychological explanation of the production of the theories of language found in the texts; it does not say that they could not have expressed other doctrines than those for which they had reasons. Thus the Chinese language does not "limit" thought, but it does give grounds for different beliefs and attitudes about language than those that we attribute to thinkers in the Indo-European tradition.

One further assumption, due to Wittgenstein, not Whorf, is that implicit and explicit theories about language explain other philosophical theories—especially in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. Since our beliefs about language are motivated, in part, by the features of language, this is the kernel of truth in Wittgenstein's dictum that philosophy is the bewitchment of intellect by grammar. In this way, one can show a causal connection between features of a language and philosophical doctrines which does not imply that thought is constrained by language.

I shall argue that given the structure of doctrines in the philosophical texts of the period, a pragmatic interpretation of classical Chinese is a more explanatorily coherent theory than a semantic (truth-based) alternative. That is so, in part, because we can explain the adoption of pragmatic theories of language by reference to structural features of pre-Han philosophical Chinese.

A concept is a role in a theory. If the theories of language were pragmatic, and the metaphysics, epistemology, and theory of heart-mind motivated by that attitude toward language, then there would be no role for a concept of truth. In that case, it would never be justified to translate any character or string of characters as "true." So the statement "Chinese philosophy has no concept of truth" amounts to saying that the most explanatorily coherent account of the texts attributes to classical philosophers philosophical theories which do not include the theoretical role played by semantic truth.

I shall offer one sort of textual illustration. At the end of this article, I shall analyze what Hu Shih and others thought of as a Mohist doctrine of three tests of truth in order to show how the assumption that classical doctrines are truth-based explains that passage poorly, that is, distorts the structure of the argument and the formulation of Mo Tzu's theory. The argument form is this: We can more coherently explain the adoption of

pragmatic than semantic theories, given certain features of classical philosophical Chinese, and assuming their projects are pragmatic more coherently explains the actual structure of their expression of their theories. We ought to accept the most coherent theory of the text. According to that theory, doctrines with a truth role are absent; hence there is no such role, no concept of truth.

In sum, "Chinese philosophy has no concept of truth" is not a simple claim about the existence of some character; it is a claim about the fundamentally contrasting nature of Chinese intellectual activity.

Translation and Concepts

Some caution is still in order. In our formulation we must avoid the fallacy that "English is the only real language." Our concern is not whether the English word "true" can ever be used in a translation, but whether the philosophically important concept (role) of semantic truth occurs. Graham's statement correctly reflects that the roles of "truth" in English are many. Some of the roles might be played by a host of separate characters, compounds, or phrases. For example, one role of "true" and "false" in English is the expression of assent and dissent. Classical Chinese writers use *shih*[c] and *fei*[d] to the same purpose, and they could, therefore, appropriately be translated as "true" and "false." The translation would be misleading, however, for the same reasons that translating modern Chinese responses to questions as "yes" and "no" are. (Modern Chinese questions are structurally choice-type questions between positive and negative verbal expressions. The answer to, say, the question "Have you eaten?" is "Eaten" or "Not eaten." The idiomatically correct translation of "eaten" as "yes" obscures this structural feature of Chinese.) Similarly, if a translator were to translate *shib*[c] as "true!" the translation would not, strictly speaking, be impossible, but a reader would expect, in Wittgenstein's sense, to be able to "go on" from that assertion to ask how one knows it is true, if one can prove it, and so forth. The translation allows both the translator and the reader to ignore the fundamental differences in philosophical style. I do not claim that "true" as a translation of such expressions is theoretically impossible, rather I do claim that such a translation frequently misleads readers about the overall character of Chinese thought.

How we "go on" in using a term depends not only on grammar but on the broader context of social practices that employ language. If we look at religious practices, for example, we might expect heresy trials. In legal matters, we might ask about oaths and perjury. In everyday morals, we might look for a counterpart to the injunction "tell the truth," and so on. My interest is primarily in philosophical theorizing—the social practice of employing people who are clever verbally to create doctrines, to write, and to talk about them. In Western culture, these people use "truth" primarily in their doctrines about language, logic, knowledge, belief, and reality (it mostly causes problems in ethics). Pre-

Han Chinese thinkers spent notoriously little energy on theories of metaphysics, yet they were singularly interested in language. If they have no concept of truth, they should theorize about language differently. Chinese ways of "going on" in linguistic theory should differ from Western truth-based ways.[1]

The dialectical schools also developed theories of knowledge and logic. I translate the claim that there is no concept of truth into the claim that Chinese ways of theorizing about language, logic, and knowledge differ radically from those of the West. Western philosophy discourses about language in a realistic, Platonic way, focusing on metaphysics and epistemology. We conceive of our philosophical activity as the study of how to represent reality in our minds. In contrast, Chinese philosophers discourse about language in a pragmatic, Confucian way, focusing on social-psychological techniques for shaping inclinations and feelings that direct behavior in accordance with a moral way. Finally, in my analysis of the Mohist three tests, I will argue that, far from being a counterexample, the passage illustrates my claim that truth-based translation of pre-Han doctrines obscures the pragmatic features of Chinese philosophical activity. Assuming that Mo Tzu's tests are tests of truth distorts the structure of the argument and obliterates many interesting insights in the passage.

Philosophy of Language

The contrast between Platonic and Confucian philosophy formally parallels a modern contrast in attitudes toward the study of language. Charles Peirce brought to the theory of language a distinction between three ways of theorizing about language (Hartshorne and Weiss: 2. 227 - 229). When we talk about language we may: relate it to the world ("semantics," the relation of language and states of affairs); relate it to itself ("syntax," the relation of strings of language symbols to other strings of language symbols); or relate it to its social context ("pragmatics," the relation of language and the users of language). Semantics uses terminology such as "meaning," "concept," and "designation" as well as "truth." Syntax typically includes talk of word classes, rules, and characterizations of sentencehood. Pragmatics focuses on speech as an activity, on the emotive force of words, and on the roles of social conventions.[2]

The fact that Chinese philosophers "goon" primarily in pragmatic rather than in semantic ways justifies the interpretive claim that "truth" is absent from Chinese philosophy of language. When Chinese philosophers did raise semantic issues, they did not formulate them in ways that used the notion of the compositional sentence (the unit to which "truth" applies) as semantically significant, as distinct, that is, from mere strings of "names." Thus, although there were both pragmatic and semantic theories of names, any issues about language above the level of names were primarily analyzed pragmatically rather than semantically. Furthermore, one sees this pragmatic focus on philosophy of language reflected

in the structural features of ancient Chinese. It marks sentential or propositional boundaries less clearly than do European languages, and it makes minimal use of explicit distinctions between imperative and indicative mood. The theoretical activity that most directly involves "truth"—semantics—and the syntactic object on which truth may be predicated—indicative sentences—are both less central in that tradition. I shall examine both steps in detail. First, why did philosophical accounts of language not distinguish word classes or deal with sentences? Second, why did pragmatic focus dominate semantic focus in discourse about language?

Words and Sentences

Classical Chinese philosophy shows little reticence on the subject of names. Confucius discussed the rectification of names; Lao Tzu denied that any names were constant names; the so-called Logician school was known in Chinese as the School of Names. When philosophy of language became a specialized activity in neo-Mohism, and then in the writings of Chuang Tzu and Hsun Tzu, names were always made the main analytical object. The neo-Mohists and Hsun Tzu (84/22/39) both discussed *tz'u*[f] (phrases), but they understood *tz'u* merely as strings of names; they never analyzed *tz'u* as a composition of different grammatical word types. In use, *tz'u* denoted noun-phrases, verb-phrases, and compound terms as well as sentences. The sentence, as such, never received special theoretical treatment. Further, Chinese philosophers did not structure their disputes in terms of the sentence counterparts that informed Western philosophy, for example, beliefs, judgments, or ideas.

The explanation of this feature of Chinese philosophy of language is reasonably straightforward. The fact that Chinese is not written in ordinary (subject-predicate) sentences has become a virtual Sinological cliche: "... there is nothing in Chinese composition that corresponds to the sentence as the fundamental element of composition. Its place is taken by the clause or phrase ..." (Dubs, 1927:200).

Homer Dubs's statement of the point slightly confuses linguistic facts and linguistic theory. There are Chinese sentences, but ancient Chinese philosophical writers did not theoretically distinguish between sentences and other meaningful strings of characters. A sentence in classical Chinese may freely omit terms that precede the main verb—both subject terms and instrumental terms. Thus a free-standing string or expression that we interpret sententially frequently consists of only a predicate or verb phrase. Graham details the way Chinese description of these facts differs.

Throughout the Canons and Explanations, a sentence is assumed to be simply a name or string of names, and *wei*/call *chih* /obj. *niu*/ox is used where we should choose the wording "say it is an ox." The difference was first appreciated by the author of Names and Objects. One might say that this distinction, which Western logic could take for granted from the

beginning, was the last and most difficult of the Mohist discoveries.[3]

We naturally ask, "What makes this distinction a more difficult 'discovery' for the Mohists?" Dubs's analysis implies that the grammar of Chinese (the absence or difficulty of a distinction between sentences and other strings) explains this feature of the Chinese theory of their language. He goes on to say that

> Relations are expressed simply through position. Hence the relational aspects of language are obscured by the structure of the Chinese language, especially the literary language, and it is not surprising that Confucius thought of the comparatively fixed nouns and verbs as the fundamental elements in knowledge and hence in action. (Dubs, 1927:200)

Rather than claiming that Chinese "obscures" relations, we might more accurately describe the matter in this way. Inflected languages force the user's attention to the complex functional, compositional nature of the sentence. The Chinese language, lacking inflections for parts of speech, does not. Thus, Chinese does not so much obscure sentence relations as omit to signal them overtly. Graham's observation that the discovery of the sentence was "difficult," by the same argument, amounts to the claim that the awareness of the sentence as a compositional unit (and of nouns and verbs as functionally distinct) would not be as "obvious" to competent speakers of ancient Chinese as it was to competent speakers of English. (See appendix for a discussion of Graham's claim that the neo-Mohists discovered the sentence.)

Let me formulate the conclusion of this analysis carefully to calm anyone who is shocked by the merest hint of linguistic determinism. I choose not to use terms such as "difficult" because I want to avoid suggesting that language controls thought. I am not making a claim about what cannot be thought, but about what was not written. My reference to features of language are intended to explain why certain terms and distinctions were not used in doctrines. One explains a philosopher's omission of a distinction by showing that she lacked beliefs (or good grounds for beliefs), which are reasons for introducing the distinction. If the reasons Western philosophers give for making truth claims involve features of Western languages which Chinese lacks, then the counterpart features of Chinese explain why Chinese philosophers would not use the concept in their reasoning. This kind of explanation does not entail that language constrains theorizing. If someone were to read Plato and become a Platonist, she would be able to express her theory in Chinese-classical or modern. Language is not, in that sense, a limitation. Language does explain, however, why only a textual transmission from Greece would motivate Chinese philosophers to talk about Greek concepts. Features of language make certain lines of argument more obvious and forceful. If one were constructing philosophical theories in Chinese, one could more easily "get away with" a theory that makes no distinction between sentences and other strings of words and makes no distinctions among "parts of speech."

Note the reasons why one could not get away with such a theory in English, that is, the reasons one might expect a reasonably astute theoretical opponent to present.

1. Not any string of words makes a sentence. In particular a "complete" sentence must be a complex of subject and predicate (terms and predicates). For example, the predicate "founded an empire" calls for something to complete it (and it must be completed with terms from a particular inflectional class).

2. Only words from a particular inflectional class can function as subject or as terms, and only other words can function as predicates (or relations). "Foundation of an empire" must play a different role from "founded an empire."

3. Western languages require grammatical agreement among the functional units of the sentence. The case, tense, gender, or number of different functional components forces the other components within the sentence boundary to take a particular inflectional shape: "Jack and Jill fall" vs. "Jack falls." Grammatical inflection draws attention to the interaction of components in a syntactic unit. Inflected languages force our attention to the functional composition of sentences.

Similar considerations would not undermine a Chinese philosopher's confidence in his understanding of the structure of his language, even if his theory made no reference to the sentence. Consider the contrasts with the Chinese language—contrasts that diminish the force of each objection, that is, make it easier to "get away with" what one would otherwise regard as a naive syntactic theory.

1. Since one graph (a one-place verb or an adjective) can constitute a Chinese "sentence" (free standing utterance), one might easily avoid the conclusion that "complete" expressions must be composites.

2. Nouns, too, can stand as sentences with the addition of the "empty" particle *yeh*^{g} that converts a term into a predicate.[4] Further, if writers use *yeh*, mere changes in word order produce sentences that are quite distinct. For example *ma pai yeh*^{i}"[it is the case that] the horse is white" and *ma pai yeh*^{i}"[it is a] white horse" are both grammatically correct sentences of ancient Chinese.

3. Most terms play one sentential role more frequently than they play another (e. g., *chih*^{k}"know" is more frequently a verb than a noun), but almost all terms exhibit syntactic mobility. For example, *chih*^{k} "know" is sometimes a noun (*shih chih yeh*^{l} "This is knowledge"), sometimes an adjective (*chih jen*^{m} "knowledgeable person"). Verbs and adjectives may function without inflection as subjects whereas, in English, adjectives used as nouns require abstract inflection. Most graphs can, in appropriate contexts, fill the grammatical roles of terms, one-place or two-place predicates.

4. The Chinese language marks sentence boundaries irregularly and does not generate a context that requires inflectional agreement. There are sentence final particles (see above), but, for two reasons, the final particles give no reason for abandoning the "string of names" conception of standing expressions. First, as noted above, Chinese may order the graphs

within an expression followed by, for example, *yeh*[9] in a variety of ways. Second, Chinese writers mark topics and embedded noun phrases by using the "final" *yeh* within what we interpret as sentences. Traditional Chinese grammars describe this class of particles as "empty graphs." Consider now the syntactical grounds an English speaker would give for distinguishing names from other word classes and for rejecting the view that all words are names.

1. A name, being logically singular, should be distinguished from a general noun. Names pick out unique objects. That is, a formal semantic model would assign one object from the universe of discourse to each name—although it could be a curious "object," say, a discontinuous stuff such as water or rice. Western grammar reflects this logical aspect of names in that names, unlike common nouns, do not have singular and plural forms. Further, names function alone as terms whereas common nouns must combine with other grammatical elements (such as articles, numbers, or demonstratives) before they can be used in term positions. We may substitute "a flower" or "this mug" in most grammatical contexts for "Bilbo" and "Pegasus, "but not "flower" or "mug."

2. Both names and common nouns should be distinguished from adjectives. Adjectives have no plural, do not take articles, and function only in the predicate or as modifiers. Formal semantic theory interprets adjectives as it does common nouns—mapping them onto sets of objects in the universe of discourse. By contrast, however, adjectives have neither the semantic property of identity nor individuality, that is, English has neither a concept of "same old" and "same hard" nor a concept of "one old" and "one white."

3. Verbs are a third major category. All predicate expressions require a verb. Nouns and adjectives function in predicates only with the use of a verb such as "to be." Verbs, unlike nouns and adjectives, have a complex system of temporal inflections. Verbs also set up an agreement structure with nouns which operates within sentence boundaries.

We would feel no need to have word classes other than *ming*[n] "name" if we theorized only in and about ancient Chinese. The reasons follow.

1. The grammar of ordinary nouns is much closer to that of logically singular terms such as English mass nouns. Ordinary nouns of Chinese exclude pluralization. They can be used alone as terms, and they are logically singular. A semantic model for Chinese might parallel the syntax by assigning an object to all nouns (objects would include stuffs such as water and rice).[5]

2. Adjectives, one-place verbs, and common nouns function uninflected and alone as terms. Translators render these nominal uses of verbal graphs as abstract terms, gerunds, infinitives, and so on, depending on the requirements of English. In ancient Chinese grammatical theory, however, all graphs count simply as *ming*[n] "names."[6] Western students of Chinese know the grammatical differences between Chinese adjectives and nouns. Those differences, however did not draw the theoretical attention of ancient Chinese philosophers of language (Graham, 1978:25 makes a similar point). The third major traditional word class

is verbs. Most verbs function in one-place or two-place predicates. Chinese language textbooks assimilate adjectives and one-place verbs. Since there is no "to be" verb, one-place verbs and adjectives behave alike syntactically. Furthermore, nominal predication (as noted above) is minimally distinguished from verbal predication.

3. Two-place verbs are, of course, a distinct class, but nouns, adjectives, and one-place verbs can function as two-place verbs in propositional and other intentional contexts. That is, where F is a noun, adjective, or one-place verb, "S F's x" can be translated as "S believes that x is F." Virtually any term, since it may conceivably be in such a propositional context, can function syntactically as a two-place verb.

Chinese does not have grammatical inflections, which in Western languages, draw attention to the sentence as a compositional unit. The theory that *tz'u* "phrases" are merely strings of names is neither naive nor obviously subject to refutation. Chinese strings indeed had specific compositional properties that can be defined in the language of word classes. They should have, and they did (see Graham, 1978), notice that word order made a difference in strings. Chinese theorists remarked minimally about the functional nature of sentence positions, for example, they saw that boundaries, pauses, and starts influenced tz'u[f]. These influences, however, do not distinguish phrases, compounds, and so on from sentences. Chinese theories of language did not concentrate on sentences because, simply, classical Chinese sentencehood is not syntactically important.

These observations about the differences between Chinese and English syntax explain (from a Chinese point of view) why *we* place so much emphasis on the sentence, or (from our point of view) why Chinese philosophers do not. Either of two morals can be drawn: Chinese thinkers have a blind spot or we have an obsession. Taking a Western perspective for granted, we have explained why Chinese philosophers of language could "get away with" a theory that treats all words as names and treats compound terms, phrases, sentences, and so on as mere strings of names. Having said something was *shih*[c], Chinese philosophers would go on to talk of names. Having called something "true" we would go on to talk of sentences or sentence counterparts. Going on about *shih-fei*[s] would involve talk about the acceptability of names and strings of names rather than talk about proof, knowledge, or beliefs.

Epistemic Contexts: Belief and Knowledge

Besides talking about the semantics of sentences, one philosophically important role played by expressions such as "is true" is in epistemology. We use "is true" (with other criteria) to distinguish belief from knowledge. We not only speak of true and false sentences, but of true and false beliefs, judgments, and opinions. These functions for "true" are related to its sentential role inasmuch as we use sentences to express judgments, opinions, and beliefs (e. g. , "John believes Peter is home"). If the sentence expressing the

belief "Peter is home" is true, we say the belief is true. The epistemic role of truth helps to explain its importance in ancient Greek thought. Philosophers in ancient Greece, like those in ancient China, talked more about names than about sentences. Plato, for example, wrote as much of words and their semantics as the Mohists did, yet he stands as an historical archetype of philosophical concern with absolute truth. Truth is central because of Plato's distinction between belief (*doxa*) and knowledge (*episteme*). Thus, although in some respects it lacked modern concern with sentences, Greek philosophy dealt with sentence substitutes such as belief, opinion, judgment, premise, and proposition. The relative importance of "is true" in each tradition reflected, in part, the importance and *the nature* of its epistemology.

I shall argue that classical Chinese philosophy had a different conception of both knowledge and belief. The classical Chinese grammatical structures that we translate as belief expressions were simple two-place predicates-action expressions. I call the expressions "term-beliefs" contexts. Where Western philosophy of mind dealt with the input, procession, and storage of content (data, information), Chinese philosophers portrayed heart-mind as consisting of dispositional attitudes to make distinctions in guiding action. Sentential belief statements represent a relation between a person and a sentence believed, term-belief statements characterize a personas having a disposition to use a certain term of some object. Term-belief, in Chinese, represents a way of responding rather than a propositional content.

No single character or conventional string of ancient Chinese corresponds in a straightforward way to "believes that" or "belief that." No string or structure is equivalent to the word "believe" or "belief" in the formal sense that it takes sentences or propositions as its object. Where English would use a structure such as "King Wen believes that Ch'ang An is beautiful," pre-Han Chinese employed two different structures. The simplest uses the descriptive predicate term as the main verb, "King Wen beautifuls Ch'ang An."

This belief structure of ancient Chinese language signals a different philosophy of mind as well as a different epistemology. It does not generate a picture of some "mental states" with a sentential, propositional, or representational content. Corresponding to King Wen's "belief" is a disposition to discriminate among cities. He discriminates among cities in such a way that Ch'ang An falls on the beautiful side. "Beautiful-ing" a city involves both linguistic and nonlinguistic dispositions, for example, King Wen's disposition to classify and distinguish things, to issue orders to his bearers, court artists, and so forth. The most straightforward evidence that he discriminates is his tendency to utter "beautiful" when the dialogue context makes Ch'ang An the topic of discussion. If we think of speech acts rather than beliefs, we will grasp the action-oriented implications of term-belief structure. Students of Chinese learn to talk about the structure as having either a "causative" or a "putative" reading. We are taught to translate the sentence discussed above as either "King Wen beautified Ch'ang An" or as "King Wen regards Ch'ang An as beautiful," depending on the

context.

A second, more complex grammatical form also acts as a belief context. An English propositional belief context (S believes that x is F) could be rendered either by using the structure described above (S F's x) or a more complex structure—"S i^t x wei^u F" (S with regard to x makes: deems {it} F). This structure also has an action oriented, term-belief interpretation. The subject of the embedded sentence (the object of it "with") can be deleted. The structure requires only the predicate term. *Wei* may be translated as either "make" or "deem." The more complex i-wei^v structure, like the simple one, can be read either as "S makes x F" or as "S deems X to be F" Hence both these structures revolve around predication more than assertion and both have an active tone. Deeming ... to be beautiful or "beautiful-ing" are things we do. They are not merely the "having" of some mental "content." The dispositional analysis more naturally reflects the syntax of either term-belief structure than does the mental content analysis.

If, in talking of term-belief, we have correctly analyzed Chinese belief-like contexts, then we would predict that philosophical disputes would be cast in the language of distinction making rather than representation of fact. The *Chuang-tzu* confirms the prediction. It adopts a dispositional, distinction-making analysis of philosophical dispute. *Pien*^{w} is the central term Chuang-tzu uses in presenting his skeptical relativism. Translations of the *Chuang-tzu* usually render *pien*^{w} was "argument" or "dispute." The character for *pien*^{w} consists of two identical elements separated by a "word" radical. The character has a virtual twin, pien^x, with the same elements separated by a "knife" radical. The latter *pien*^{x} is straightforwardly translated as "discriminate," or "distinguish." Chuang-tzu represents philosophical disputes as arising from conflicting. linguistic discriminations.

Western philosophy, of course, also has a modern pragmatic tradition of analyzing beliefs as "habits of action." Critics of pragmatism insist that the pragmatic analysis fails precisely because it cannot capture the "content" component of belief. That component figures centrally in inference-especially conditional inference. The account of belief development by inference requires something like "truth." We capture an important difference between the two traditions in noting that for Chinese (unlike for English) the pragmatic, dispositional analysis would be perfectly adequate. It renders the ordinary Chinese locutions isomorphically. For precisely that reason, we say the Chinese locutions are not, strictly speaking, belief contexts. We can comfortably translate them using "believe," however, because a dispositional analysis of belief does work for a wide range of ordinary uses.

The term-belief structure further explains the concentration on names rather than sentences in Chinese philosophy of language. It similarly helps explain why Chinese philosophy of mind does not treat mind as a repository of propositional contents, but as the faculty of making and acting on distinctions. Rather than talking about "beliefs," Chinese philosophers discussed our dispositions to divide or classify things using *ming*^{n}. Because

their philosophy of language, their epistemology, and their philosophy of mind differ in these respects, "is true" is an implausible translation in Chinese philosophical writings. The concept of truth is both unnecessary and discordant with their linguistic focus on *ming*[n] "names" rather than on sentences. No truth theorizing occurred because no theorizing about things to which "truth" applies occurred. They did not discuss sentences, beliefs, propositions, and so forth.

I have suggested analyzing the claim that there was no "concept" of truth as the claim that Chinese thinkers would "goon" in different ways after using any purported counterpart, for example, *shih-fei*[s]. Specifically, I have argued that they would have gone on (did go on) to discuss using names, and making distinctions. They did not address the semantics of sentences or sentence counterparts such as "beliefs." There was, however, semantic theory in ancient Chinese philosophy. It dealt with the reference of terms and term compounds (single and compound "names"). Problems about the reference of single and compound "names" had a major role in the School of Names philosophy. On the other hand, they discussed anything that went beyond term reference in pragmatic terms, such as what to permit or treat as appropriate usage (as *k'o*[gg]). The same features of Chinese theories of language that explain the absence of "truth" as a philosophical issue also explain this contrasting, pragmatic emphasis. When words, rather than sentences, command our attention, we naturally stress the social, coventional nature of language. We learn words. Each word (word-type) in the first sentence of this paragraph was introduced into my repertoire from a finite, socially accepted set of words. We use social, conventional criteria to evaluate word use.

1. You may criticize my use of a term (e. g. , "pragmatic")if it does not conform to the way the coiner (Peirce) used it.

2. You may criticize my usage if it fails to conform to the way my linguistic community uses it.

3. You may criticize my usage as serving no purpose.

By contrast, we seldom evaluate sentences in such ways. I can hardly be said to have learned the first sentence of this paper somewhere. I cannot be said, in the same sense, to have a fixed repertoire of sentences that I have learned to produce in appropriate circumstances. In using a word, I typically intend to refer to the same thing someone else referred to using that word. Except when reciting, I do not typically intend to use the same sentence as someone else.

1. I do not, in using a sentence, usually intend to state the same proposition as some past figure (except when giving interpretations). To accept or reject a sentence because of its historical pedigree would be to miss an important difference between sentences and words.

2. Similarly, if I use a word to mark a different distinction from that which my linguistic community recognizes, I make myself unintelligible. If I use a sentence to express a proposition that differs from the expressions of others in my linguistic community, I

intelligibly disagree with them. I am being original, provocative, or novel.

3. While you may criticize my use of a sentence for failing to serve any social purpose, I employ a conventionally powerful defense if I respond that it is nonetheless true.

The pragmatic, social-practice focus of Chinese theories clearly befits the focus on names and distinctions as opposed to sentences and beliefs.

Still another feature of Chinese sentences reinforces this pragmatic tendency in theory of language. The "predicate only" strings discussed above can be understood either as assertions or as imperatives.[7] Pre-Han philosophical writing rarely uses explicitly evaluative verbs such as English "ought" or "should." Instead, virtually any string may be viewed as having an imperative role. This routinely imperative potential of complete strings contributes to what I have called the "regulative" function of language (Hansen, 1983). Chinese philosophers, Confucians cheering, Taoists wailing, all tended to view language as a tool for shaping behavior. They held a pragmatic, manipulative view of the role of language.

The discussion of compounding developed the Mohist's extensional term semantics but they made no further attempt to expand the analysis and give a sentential semantics. In the "Name and Objects" section of the Mohist dialectical chapters, social concerns lead the Mohists to deny that a simple analysis can be given for *tz'u* "phrases." "Robbermen are men ... but killing robber men is not killing men."[8]

Truth Counterparts in Chinese Semantics

The Mohists, in theorizing about the semantics of compound terms, test their claims by embedding the compounds in larger expressions. Such a method of discussion seems to require some terms of assent and dissent, for example, "true," "right," and "correct." Of course, neo-Mohists used assent terms in their philosophy of language, but mostly they borrowed the terms from action evaluation. All have pragmatic connotations. Before looking at terms that function in the way that "true" does in affirming expressions, let us look at one that the Mohists do not use—the term that is normally translated as "true"—*chen*. The graph, *chen*[e] "true," is the modern counterpart of "is true." Unquestionably Chinese philosophical vocabulary included that term, and we typically translate it as "true." That translation, I maintain, lacks precision and misleads students of pre-Han philosophy. It is imprecise because in English "true" is ambiguous; in its philosophically important semantic use, it figures in a theory of the relation between sentences (or sentence counterparts such as statements, propositions, judgments, opinions, and beliefs) and reality. However, it has a host of no semantic uses as well. We talk of true scholars, true friends, true aims, true churches, true statesmen, and so on. Pre-Han concordanced texts virtually always used the graph, *chen* "true," in the no semantic sense.[9] For example, Taoists use *chen-jen*[dd] "true-person" in the sense of "sage." Chuang Tzu doubts that there is a *chen-chin*[ee] "true-ruler." Other uses of *chen* "true" become highly paradoxical if treated as a counterpart of semantic

truth, for example, Chuang Tzu's mentions of *chen-chih*[ff] "true-knowledge" (15/6/4, 58/22/24) invite us to make an unintelligible contrast with "false knowledge" if we were to take *chen* as corresponding to semantic truth. For most of these uses, Graham purposes the translation "authentic" for *chen* rather than "true"(Graham, 1970).

The existence of a graph such as *chen*[e] allows us to underline the distinction between linguistic determinism and theoretical interpretation. I do not argue that Chinese lacks the linguistic resources necessary to express the idea of truth: *chen* is just such a resource. The point is that a concept is a role in a theory. If there are no theories with that "conceptual role" as an integral part, then there is no such concept whatever graphs the language contains. I know of no convincing argument that any language inherently could not develop any given theory. In developing any given theory, philosophers would change the meanings of the words used in that language and would introduce new "concepts." To say there was no concept of truth is not to say that the language was incapable of formulating such theories. It is to say that no theories of a sufficiently similar type actually were developed. We can go on to explain why other language theorists developed the theories they did rather than those we developed. In doing that we may cite the fact that they assumed things about language which were plausible give the actual structure of their language. Thus, given that the Mohists were motivated to construct semantic theories, the absence of rudimentary grammatical theories helps explain the absence of a specifically Western kind of semantic theory. Language functions in this way in the explanation of the absence of those theories—but not by citing mere lexical "gaps."

In the case of China, when Buddhism imported the kinds of philosophical issues that motivated an interest in truth, translators easily adapted *chen*[e] "true" to a semantic use.[10]

Pre-Han language theorists did not use *chen* "true" as a term of assent to expressions. *K'o*[gg] "admissible"—a straightforwardly pragmatic term—most frequently played the assent role in the Mohist canon, in the Kung-sun Lung-tzu, the Chuang Tzu, and the Hsun Tzu. Pre-Han language theorists approached longer expressions pragmatically, not semantically, that is, instead of asking whether an expression containing a compound was *chen* "true," they asked whether it was *k'o*. A name or compound term could be *k'o* in the context of a larger expression or could be *k'o* "permissible to use" of some object or situation.

Post-Buddhist philosophical commentary in Chinese and Western interpretations, with their emphasis on the descriptive function of language, have distorted this striking feature of pre-Han thought. The Bible says, "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." "If names are not rectified ... people will not know how to move hand or foot" is a nearly opposite, pragmatic, Confucian counterpart (Analects, 13: 3). The difference is fundamental. The Western picture is one of the one-on-one communication of "truths" from outside nature which are freely accessible to rational individuals. The Chinese picture is one of a system of social practices that promote harmonious social behavior. Chinese philosophers showed more interest in the pragmatic "behavioral implications" of words than they did in the

semantic truth of sentences.

Ancient Chinese Theories of Language

This fascination with language as a stimulant of social harmony was by no means an esoteric concern of schools specializing in names. Every major philosophical school in ancient China had a theory of names that lay at the heart of their social-political theories (Chan, 1963:40 - 41). Each had an additional common assumption that a system of names instills shared social attitudes via inclining people to discriminate in similar ways. In fact, philosophers of the entire classical period cast their central ethical arguments in the language of "names" and "distinctions" and its effects on social behavior. Confucian conventionalism advocated deliberate social monitoring (rectification) of the distinctions marked by names. If society rectified the names, that is, if society made everyone discriminate in the same way, then order could be achieved without laws or punishments. Mo Tzu agreed. However, he argued that rather than blindly instilling conventional distinctions, society should use only those distinctions that maximized utility—*li*[ai]. Mencius sought to defend Confucianism against such anti-conventional criticisms by arguing that inclinations to make conventional distinctions to *shih-fei* ("this, not this") were innate. Chuang Tzu replied that even if *shi-fei* activity were innate, people have a variety of *shih-fei* patterns that is potentially infinite to choose from, and judging between *shih-fei* patterns presupposes still another *shih-fei* system.

The most detailed, thorough, and explicit theory of language, however, was buried in the least understood section of the least frequently read book of the period—the Canon of Mohism. The Canon's analysis of names is the most realistic of the pre-Han period. However, as Graham has argued, the framework of Mohist analysis is still pragmatic, that is, concerned with the role of names in influencing behavior, and the analysis still focused on names rather than on sentences. "According to the Canon, a *ming*[n] 'name' is any word that *chli*[hh] 'picks-out' a/some substance or reality." (Graham, 1978:478 - 482) The Mohist divide names into private, kind, and universal according to the scope of their "picking out." Private terms pick out "this substance." Kind terms pick out a similarity based *lei*[bb] "kinds." Universal terms pick out any or all stuff. Primarily Mohist theory explains: (1) how to treat kind terms and kinds; and (2) how to analyze the semantics of compound *ming*[n] "names" based on the semantics of the component terms (see Hansen, 1983).

Lei [bb] "kinds" link the semantic and pragmatic concerns. Humans base both their actions and their evaluations on kinds. The Mohists appreciated Chuang Tzu's point that we generate our "kinds" by making distinctions (Graham, 1978:203 - 206). But they wanted to insist that there were real similarities and differences that made some classification *sk*[gg] "permissible" *lei* and others *k'uan*[ii] "wild" *chü*[hh] "pickings-out."[12]

Neo-Mohist realism ultimately flounders on its inability to give an account of kinds that

answer the relativist's argument that all things are similar in some respects and all things are different in some respects.[13] The Mohists failed, that is, to give a realist account of similarity classification, and both Chuang Tzu and Hsun Tzu pointedly concluded that mere coventional practices fix the similarity judgments which give rise to distinctions of kind. Chuang Tzu, therefore, regards rival discourse systems with contrasting discriminative judgments as equally "natural," equally valid from the point of view of the universe. Even distinctions shared by all humans indicate merely the relative prejudice of a species in favor of certain similarity criteria. Hsun Tzu regards conventional distinctions as pragmatically necessary for survival (Chuang Tzu, 1956: 2/6/66 - 70; Hu Shih, 1963: 22/83/16). Both presuppose that names and kinds are conventional aspects of language and that distinctions have regulative, social functions. Neither takes the claims of realism seriously.

The neo-Mohists also tried to explain the semantics of compound terms. Straightforward modification in Chinese and in English may be represented as altering the scope or extension of the component terms. If "white" has a given scope and "horse" has a given scope, then "white horse" takes that part of the scopes of "white" and "horse" which coincide (the intersection) as its scope. The neo-Mohist problem arises because Chinese has not one, but two, extensional modes of compounding. Some compound terms have as their scope the combined scopes of their components; for example, *t'ien-tih*[ii] "heaven-earth" is the compound term for "the cosmos." The Mohists identified the two modes as "hard-white" compounding and "ox-horse" compounding—the compounds that work as English adjective—noun structures do are "hard-white" compounds, and those compounds that work as English phrases do, such as cats 'n dogs, are "ox-horse" compounds.

Kung-sun Lung's "White-Horse" paradox is the most notorious example of a discussion of whether an expression is *k'o*. Interpreting the paradox presents many problems, but most interpreters err primarily in their assumption that Kung-sun Lung claims that the phrase *pai ma fei ma*[kk] "white horse not horse," is true. The evidence is clear, first, that his views are intimately related to the provisional themes and technical terms (hard-white and ox-horse compounding) of the neo-Mohists, and, second, that he claimed merely that the expression "white horse not horse" is *k'o*[gg] "permissible" (for a detailed argument on these points and an interpretation of the paradox, see Hansen, 1983).

Because Kung-sun Lung used the pragmatic concept *k'o*[gg] "assertible" in stating the paradox, Chuang Tzu was able to respond that the whole issue was an unimportant manifestation of the conventionality of language. He observed that if one has conventions that *k'o*[gg] is an expression, it is *k'o*[gg] "assertible." So, Chuang Tzu suggested, Kung-sun Lung need not have argued so elaborately to prove that "white horse not horse" is permissible; he might as well have noted directly that the conventions might have been such that horse is not horse(Chuang Tzu, 1956: 5/2/40 - 41).

Pragmatic concepts like *k'o*[gg] "assertible" may be applied to both verbal expressions and to behavior. We can *k'o*[gg] words, compounds, phrases, sentences, discourse, doctrines, and

behavior. Since a pragmatic view of language views speech as a form of action, this makes *k'o*[gg] "assertible" a particularly appropriate term of analysis. Language is both a form of social behavior and something that regulates that behavior.

The Mohist Canon includes several fragments that deal with linguistic paradox. They discuss one puzzle that is a close relative of the liar paradox—a topic for which a concept of truth seems necessary. Consider "All sentences are false," the English sentence. It is necessarily false. "All language distorts the Tao," the tempting formulation of primitive Taoism, has the same analysis. The Mohists analyze the puzzle in the general form, "*all yen*[ii] 'words: language' is *pei*[mm] 'perverse.'" They define *pei*[mm] "perverse" in terms of its pragmatic assertibility—as *pu-k'o*[nn] not—assertible.[14] One might make the point of the fragments with the concept of self-contradiction, of course, but the Mohist chooses the pragmatic formulation: "'All language is perverse' is perverse." The argument proceeds along otherwise familiar lines except that it uses *k'o*[gg] "assertible" where a Western version would use "is true." Interpreters of Taoism frequently say that Chinese thinkers did not object to contradiction. That cliche is *de dictum* true. Chinese thinkers did not use a distinct and explicit concept of truth-functional contradiction. However, it is false *de re*—they did not countenance actual contradictions. They objected to all actual contradictions, characterizing them as self-defeating action guides, such as going to Yueh today and arriving there yesterday or flying in a coffin (see Leslie, 1964).

Awareness of how contradiction is treated reinforces the conclusion that the pre-Han theory of language emphasizes the regulative use of language rather than the informational use. Criticisms of contradictions did not represent contradictory statements as giving information that was necessarily false, but as giving impractical or impossible directions. Hence, as Graham (1978) observes, the Mohists use *hai*[oo] "harm" where one would like to use the translation "inconsistent" (p. 188).

Ch'ang[pp] "constant" is a familiar pragmatic concept in Chinese philosophy of language. *Ch'ang* appears in the famous opening lines of Lao Tzu's *Tao-te Ching* as well as in the less famous discussion of language and behavior in the main text of the Mo Tzu[15] Expressions—words, phrases, sentences, and doctrines—and behavior may be characterized as *ch'ang*[pp] "constant," or "not constant." "Constant" behavior, verbal and social, might be thought of as behavior that promotes and sustains organic order-homeostasis.[16] Mo Tzu's pragmatic standard for language concludes that if *yen*[ll] "words" promote good behavior we *ch'ang*[pp] "constant" it, that is, strive to perpetuate it (Mo Tzu, 80/46/37). The *Tao-te Ching* opens with a denial that any *tao*[a] "doctrines" or *ming*[n] "names" are *ch'ang*[pp] "constant."[17] Hsun Tzu characterizes a gentleman as one who taos (advocates) what is *ch'ang*[pp] "constant" (Hsun Tzu, 63/17/27) and says *lun*[rr] "theories" are classified as either *ch'ang*[pp] "constant" or not (ibid., 93/25/37).

Think of *ch'ang*[pp] "constant" in a pragmatic way first. The constancy of a name might refer to the consistency of the pro or con attitude taken toward the stuff delineated by

contrasting terms.[18] A *tao*[a] "doctrine," a ming[n] "name," or *yen*[ll] "word" is constant if the system of attitudes it creates tends to endure. A usage endures (or ought to) if it promotes behavior that brings about social stability, order, or peace.

As applied to names, we can also think of *ch'ang*[pp] "constant" as having a semantic component. A *ming*[n] "name" is constant if used with a constant scope or denotation. Taoist skepticism, especially in the *Chuang Tzu*, attacks the claim that there can be any such semantic constancy. Chuang Tzu makes the attack more persuasive because he concentrates on the semantics of indexicals.[19] Chuang-tzu takes the indexical pronouns *shih*[c] "this" and *pi*[yy] "that" to stand for any pair of names. All naming rests on our ability to make a distinction between what the name applies to (this) and what it does not apply to (other). All distinction making is discrimination between this and that (this and other or this and not-this). All judgment of what is this or is that is relative to a perspective, and therefore all distinction making using names is relative to a perspective. Chuang Tzu thus broadens the conclusion and analyzes *shih*[c] "this" and *fei*[d] "not-this," the standard terms of assent and dissent, as similarly relative to the standpoint of the utterer. Chuang Tzu celebrates the context dependence of language, epitomized by *shih*[c] "this: right: approve" and its opposites, in terms of *ch'ang*[pp] "constancy": "*Yen*[ll] 'words: language' never had *ch'ang*[pp] 'constancy'" (Chuang Tzu, 5/2/25).

Translations influenced by Buddhist and Western epistemology and metaphysics have obscured the role of *ch'ang*[pp] "constancy" in Taoism. Indian metaphysics held, as did that of ancient Greece, that reality must be permanent. Epistemologically, we can know only the real—and things that change are unknowable and therefore unreal. Semantically, linking ontic reality and permanence led to a Buddhist prejudice in semantic theory, to wit, that terms in a language presuppose unchanging objects or bearers.

Traditional interpretations of Chinese thought have followed this Buddhist line of reasoning in speaking of Taoism, thereby obscuring a crucial difference between Chinese and Indo-European thought. Chinese classics made no such assumption about reality. Constancy was not regarded as a requirement of a thing's reality or of one's ability to know a thing or to talk about it. The term *ch'ang*[pp] "constant," as we have seen, is used not in metaphysical theory but in pragmatic theory of language. According to Taoist theory, language guides discrimination and thereby shapes practical behavior. Confucianism aimed to build a prescriptive system (a *tao* consisting of names) that rectified the names so that people would know how to "move hand and foot." Confucians thus treated constancy as a pragmatically desirable aspect of linguistic practice, not as a mark of reality. Taoists claimed, against both the Confucians and Mohists, that no constant way to fix names and behavior—no constant *tao*—can be constructed. No *tao* is constant because no name is constant. There were two Taoist theories of why no names are constant. Lao-tzu suggested that any evaluation connected with a name might be reversed while Chuang Tzu implied that, since all distinctions are relative to others in the perspective, no neutral, presupposition less account

of "real" distinctions is possible. There is no way to establish a constant relationship between names and prescriptive distinctions.

As far as Chinese metaphysics is concerned, reality does change. Chinese realists did not see that as a shocking philosophical conclusion. Only in Buddhist readings of Taoism does the view emerge that since nothing is constant, only *wu*[tt] "nothing" is real. That view assumes the non-Chinese theory that only the permanent is real. Nothing in either the *Chuang Tzu* or the *Lao Tzu* entails that metaphysical conclusion.

The Mohist *Canon* uses several other terms of language analysis that have a pragmatic flavor, for example, *chü*[uu] "choose: distinguish," *chih*[vv] "grasp: cling to" (Graham, 1978: 178). Other terms teeter between being pragmatic and semantic concepts. I have already mentioned *chü*[hh], which may be translated as pragmatic "pick-out" or as semantic "denote." For comparison with "truth," the most interesting term is *tang*[ww] "hit-on." I shall argue that Graham is right to consider *tang* "hit-on" as close as Mohist theorizing came to speaking of truth, and that it is not, in the end, a counterpart of "truth."

Tang "hit-on" is used in the Mohists' discussion of *pien*[w] "distinction." The character for *pien*[w] symbolizes distinction in language. When people disagreed, they were held to have drawn distinctions in different ways; consequently Chinese theory of language came to use *pien*[w] "distinction" in an extended sense as a general term for "dispute." The neo-Mohists eventually used the term for the study of language as a whole. The Canon develops a definition of such disputes in which one party must always *sheng*[xx] "win."

The Mohist definition of a *pien*[w] "distinction" built in the law of excluded middle so that one alternative must always be correct. The Mohists did this by introducing a technical sense of *pi*[yy] "other."[20] *Pi* is the complement range for any term—any *shih*. As a result, the important canon A74, tells us that the winning distinction is *tang*[ww]. We know one side must tang[ww] because the dispute is over "ox" and its *pi*[yy] "other," "non-ox." In the case where the distinctions are not opposites—"ox" and "horse"—it could be that neither *tang*s.[21]

Tang[ww] "hit-on" functions roughly like a Chinese term for semantic "satisfaction." An object satisfies a predicate if the sentence formed by the predicate and a subject term that designates the object is true. This horse satisfies the predicate "... runs fast." The context in which the Mohists discuss *tang*[ww] "hit-on," involving the logical principle of excluded middle, suggests such a semantic interpretation. "Is satisfied by" is theoretically close to "is true." Philosophical use differs mainly in that we use "is true" of sentences and "satisfied" of predicates.[22] One could say that, given that Chinese sentences are so commonly "open sentences," that is, predicate expressions with terms missing, *tang* (satisfied-by) comes as close to a concept of truth as we would expect—especially given the grammar of Chinese and the background philosophical theories.

We are not, however, required to treat *tang*[ww] "hit-on" as a semantic concept. It can still be interpreted in a form that is consistent with the dominant pragmatic emphasis of the other terms of analysis. Instead of associating *tang* with "is satisfied by" we may render it as "is

(appropriately) predicable of." Then, if we allow that *chü*[hh] "picks-out" may similarly be interpreted as a pragmatic term, there would be no necessity to interpret any of the technical terms of the Canon as purely semantic terms of analysis.[23]

Conclusion

Writing in a language and in a cultural setting that contrasted in significant ways with its Western counterparts, classical Chinese philosophers did not focus on a distinct notion of semantic truth. I argue (1) that the significance of the claim about truth lies in Chinese philosophical focus on pragmatic rather than semantic issues, and (2) that salient properties of the Chinese language explain the pragmatic focus and the beliefs about language which reinforced it. The absence of sentence function marking, the syntactic mobility of typical graphs, the mass—like grammar of nouns, and the use of predicate—only sentences contribute to viewing all words as having only a naming function and to the failure to distinguish the sentence as a functional composite linguistic form. The Chinese term *tz'u*[f] "phrase" does not distinguish the sentence as a unit of organization distinct from phrases or compound names.

The grammar of epistemic (belief) contexts further explains the focus on pragmatic issues. Action-oriented, term-belief grammatical structures of classical Chinese are the closest counterparts of sentential belief contexts of English. Chinese theories of names and their effects on human behavior treat the disposition to utter a word or phrase or to discriminate and act in ways that are conventionally associated with uttering the word or phrase as the important "human" impact of language. My analysis reflects the focus on words as opposed to sentences and eliminates any motivation to discuss the truth of beliefs. Instead Chinese thinkers represent disputes as disagreements about which distinctions (*pien*) are appropriate or assertible (*k'o*).

Pragmatic concepts such as *pien*[w] *k'o*[gg], and *ch'ang*[aa], formed the background for the classical theories of language. The Canon of the Mohists, the most semantic of any text from the period, reflects this practical, action-guiding emphasis. The Mohists use *tang*[ww] in a way that comes close to a semantic concept of truth. It functions semantically and could at times be appropriately identified with "satisfies" and at other times with "true." So *tang* "hit-on" should be thought of as the concept of truth appropriate to the language and philosophy of language of pre-Han China. However, *tang* could also be interpreted as a pragmatic concept, that is, as warranted predicability. Interestingly, tang was not widely used in Mohist theorizing. Most notably, Mohists did not use it in the context where we would expect the concept of truth to be of most importance—in the evaluation of inference rules. Instead the discussion of inferences (entitled "Names and Objects") is based on the syntactic and pragmatic features of sentences.

Other doctrines, such as Mo Tzu's three standards of language, reflect the dominance of

the cultural concern with the appropriateness of names (predicates) and distinctions. We obscure the interesting structure of those arguments when we treat them as based on a concern with the truth of beliefs. Mo Tzu's three standards are much more plausible proposals about appropriate distinctions in a language than they are proposals about which statements of belief are true.

Finally, the moral ideal of "telling the truth" is shown to be absorbed, along with promise-keeping, into the virtue *hsin*[av] "trustworthiness." *Hsin* is understood as correspondence between words and intention. There are, however, differences in moral view between China and the West. These differences involve the concept of a person and the "dignity" of persons as free rational agents. Contrasting views in the West are plausibly tied to truth-telling as a paradigm moral rule. Chinese moralists reflect different (rather more utilitarian) intuitions. Certainly part of the contrast between Chinese and Western views of the concept of a person may be explained by the pragmatic, regulative view of the function of language. It either generates or rein-forces similar views of the relation of the mind, emotions, and behavior. The Chinese version of behaviorism combines views about the social, conventional basis of language and views about the role of language in shaping human nature. However, these different moral intuitions do not appear to derive directly from the absence of a concept of semantic truth.

My reflections on truth in Chinese thought reveal a broad range of fundamental differences in the languages of philosophy. The differences pervade the entire spectrum of philosophical views. East, while being East, may meet West, but the two do not carry the same baggage.

Notes:

1. I am not dealing explicitly with the question of how ancient Chinese theories on these matters might have differed from those of ancient Greek, ancient Egyptian, or ancient Mayan philosophy. There is, of course, an historical chain that links certain Greek terms and phrases and the modern phrase "is true." Nevertheless, the domain of this article is the interpretation of ancient Chinese philosophy to a modern Western audience, not the comparison between it and other possible or actual civilizations. It may, of course, turn out that the Greek philosophical ancestor of "is true" functioned much like *shih*[c] "this" or *chen*[c] "true" in Chinese. Then I would be interested in another story—the ways in which this particular philosophical concept changed between ancient Greece and the modern West (a story best told by a scholar of Greek). That story would show that a culture without a modern concept of truth might develop one, but it would not show that either ancient civilization had one.
2. I include as pragmatic aspects of language phenomena ranging from its role in conventional, social practices (the emotive force of language, speech acts) all the way to the slightly pragmatic aspects of semantics (context dependence, indexicality). I am less concerned to argue that these latter phenomena are all appropriately classified as pragmatic than I am to argue that in China the pragmatics-cum-social-practices view of language and the emphasis on pragmatic aspects of semantics may both be understood as linked to relativism in ancient philosophical Chinese.

3. Graham (1978:25) shows only that the Mohists began to discuss *tz'u*[f] (phrases) and to show an awareness that word order is important. He does not show that they had a clear notion of a sentence as distinct from compound terms and phrases (in which word order is also significant) or any theory of the compositional roles of a sentence (subject, predicate). Significantly, the Mohists title the chapter in question "Names and Objects"(see appendix).
4. Sentence final particles such as *yeh* and *i*[z] do mark the boundaries of certain kinds of phrases, and the restrictions on their use force our theory of Chinese to recognize word classes. *Yeh* is required when terms are used as predicates; *i*[z] is used only with verbs. A parallel distinction must be drawn between the negatives *pu*[h] and *fei*[d]. But since *yeh* is optional after verbs and after adjectives and one-place predicates, Chinese theories tend to treat it as an optional "empty" graph. Pre-Han linguistic theories ignored it.
5. See my argument in Hansen 1983. Given Chinese noun syntax, *ming*[n] is properly translated as "name," although Chinese writers use it with a denotive range closer to "word."
6. The neo-Mohist Canon develops this appealingly simple analysis. They treat adjectives such as *pai* (white) and *chien*[p] (hard) as substantives. These adjectival stuffs differ from normal substances, i. e., *t'i*[q] (bodies). Adjectival stuffs can interpenetrate (see Hansen, 1976, 1983). Taoist skepticism undercuts this analysis. We cannot, the Taoists argue, give stable substantive interpretation for adjectives such as *tar* "large." However, they do not use such examples to propose an alternative word class, rather to argue for skepticism of semantics in general.
7. Chinese writers can avoid this ambiguity, of course. The sentence finals *yeh*[g] and *i*[z] normally mark indicative sentences. The graph *ch'ing*[aa] is used in modern Chinese to mark requests or the imperative mood.
8. Mo Tzu, 1974:45/78/16 - 17. See appendix for a discussion of Graham's claim that the Mohists did in fact discover the sentence.
9. There are interesting borderline cases. Some uses of *chen* "true" by Chuang Tzu come close to semantic uses, e. g., when he asks what makes a *tao*[a] "doctrine: way" *chen*[e] "authentic" or *wei*[cc] "artificial" (see Chuang Tzu:4/2/25).
10. Cheneis used in translating the Three Treatise school's distinction between "worldly" and "higher" doctrine (see Takakusu:100).
11. Grahamdivides the canon into four sections that correspond to four categories of knowledge -name, thing-kind, union, and action (Graham, 1978:sect. 1/1/2/2).
12. Mo Tzu:B63. A Western scientific account typically gives a causal criterion of a "natural kind" (see W V 0. Quine, "Natural Kinds," in Schwartz, 1977: 155 - 175).
13. Tradition attributes this argument to Chuang Tzu's dialectician friend, Hui Shih (Chuang Tzu, 1956:93/33/22). It is also reflected in the Mohist canons B86, 87. The Mohist defense of realism seems to be that some kinds of similarities, e. g., those of place, are not *lei*[bb] "kind" similarities. However, when the Mohists try to specify what would not count as being similar at all, lei turn out to be categories rather than classes in the philosophical sense, i. e., objects to which the same predicates do not meaningfully apply (canon B6).
14. See Graham, 1978:445 - 446 (canon B71). Whether *pei*[mm] "perverse" applies only to sentences, or to terms as well, is unclear. An especially difficult choice is posed by canon B34. Graham (pp. 199 - 200) translates *pei*[mm] "perverse" as "contradictory," a term that belongs in a truth-based conceptual structure. *Pei* is clearly defined as *pu- k'o*[nn] "nonassertible." I would take the argument in the explanation seriously The conclusion follows, indeed only follows, when we read *pei*[mm] "perverse" as the pragmatic opposite of

k'o[gg] "assertible."

15. The link between these two passages was brought to my attention in Hu Shih, 1919.
16. The assumption that a *tao*[a] "doctrine: way" ought to be constant reflects an insight familiar to modern students of normative ethics. Rawls (*A Theory of Justice*) argues that a correct theory of justice is self-reinforcing, i. e., its social acceptance and perception of its public acceptance and use should tend to strengthen both our sense of justice and social conformity with its requirements. Similarly, C. S. Peirce justifies his use of the pragmatic scientific method of fixing belief because "no doubts of the method, therefore, necessarily arise from its practice" (C. S. Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief," in C. S. *Peirce Essays in the Philosophy of Science*, ed. Vincent Tomas, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957, p. 25).
17. The Ma Wang Tui manuscripts use *heng*[qq] "constant." *Ch'ang*[pp] "constant" appears to have been substituted when *heng*[qq] "constant" was tabooed.
18. Lao Tzu, *Tao Te Ching*, Chap. 1, begins with parallel claims about the constancy of *tao*[a] "doctrine" and *ming*[n] "name." Lao Tzu recommends reversing the conventional attitude to show that the attitudinal component of a name is not *ch'ang*[pp] "constant."
19. See Graham, 1970. I owe a great deal to Graham's analysis of the essay, though my way of putting the point differs slightly from his.
20. Graham, 1978: 317 - 319 (canon A73). Graham emends *pi*[yy] "other" to *fan*[zz] "opposite," a move that makes the Mohist position much clearer but simultaneously removes the important connections with Chuang Tzu's arguments employing *pi*[yy] "other."
21. Those interested in potentially significant coincidences of graphic similarity, rhyme groups, and so on, will note the close relation of tang "'hit- on' and ch'ang 'constant.'"
22. *Tang*[ww] "hit-on" as used in the example, applies only to terms or predicates (ox, non-ox) although some examples, e. g., A14, are vague. *Yen*[ll] "words: language" may be said to *tang*[ww] "hit-on." One canon using *tang*[ww] certainly makes sense with "true" as the translation. In B35 a sentence-like utterance is described as "necessarily not *tang*." The use in B71 could similarly be most intelligibly rendered as "true."
23. I owe this insight to Philip Kitcher. My thinking on *tang* has been influenced by his criticisms of an earlier version of this paper.

【延伸阅读】

[1] Hansen, C. *Language and Logic in Ancient China*. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1983.

[2] Schwartz, B. I. *The World of Thought in Ancient China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.

【问题与思考】

1. 在陈汉生看来，truth 一词在汉语中难以找出对应词的原因是什么？
2. 从语言形态上讲汉籍英译尤其是哲学典籍的英译的主要障碍是什么？

第二章　汉籍英译体裁研究

导　论

本章将汉籍主要分为三类：文学、哲学和史学，介绍了三类体裁的汉籍英译研究情况。

在汉籍英译作品中，文学类数量最多。在接受英译的文学典籍中诗歌、小说和戏剧所占比重最大，诗歌尤其如此，从《诗经》开始一直到清朝的诗歌都是英译对象。译者进行诗歌翻译时要在四个方面做到与原文的对应，即诗式、诗意、诗性和诗质。因为汉语和英语在形式上难以通约，所以就很难用英语还原汉语古典诗歌的形式，原来整齐划一的绝句就会被翻译成英语的"长短句"，而汉语的词体诗歌的英译文也无法同绝句诗体的英译文区分开来。至于诗意、诗性和诗质三个要素又受到从三维汉语到二维英语转换的影响。汉语从汉字开始就是由言、象、意三个维度构成，其中"象"起到了指意的中枢作用，于是古典汉语诗歌特别强调意象。但是"意象"在跨语转换过程是最容易受到影响的元素，其翻译的成功与否直接影响译诗对原诗意、诗性和诗质的还原。

中国古典叙事文学也接受了广泛的英译。从魏晋时期的《世说新语》到唐代的志怪小说，从明代的三言二拍到清代的《聊斋志异》，都出现过英译本。这些文言叙事文学的时代感在英译本中无法呈现和还原。中国古代四大奇书《金瓶梅》、《三国演义》、《水浒传》和《西游记》都有英译本，甚至不止一种译本。叙事文学有着较为固定的叙事结构，翻译对叙事结构不会有太多的作为。但是，译者会根据特定的目的对叙事文本进行翻译。比如，上述四大奇书包括《红楼梦》在内都有至少两种英译本，并且其一是普及性的译本，其一是供学术研究用的全译本。普及性的译本大多以缩译面世，如 Arthur Waley 的《西游记》缩译本 *Monkey*、王际真的《红楼梦》的节译本 *Red Chamber Dream*。这些译本都会在一定程度上反映译者的叙事审美诉求，值得翻译研究者去探讨。

除了古典文学之外，中国古代的哲学典籍也是英译的重点对象。文学文本的翻译注重的是对原文文本文学性的保持，而哲学文本的翻译则要注重对原文文本哲学性的保持。安乐哲(Roger T. Ames)同罗思文(Henry Rosemont, Jr.)英译了《论语》，同郝大维(David L. Hall)英译了《中庸》和《道德经》，这些译本的书名中都特别注明了是哲学的翻译或阐释。这说明了译者对这些文本哲学性的重视。在对《中庸》的翻译中，安乐哲和郝大维还专门探讨了如何对《中庸》的哲学性进行识别，这样才能对其进行文本性定性，从而将这一文本性在翻译中充分体现出来。中国古代哲学典籍的英译还存在一个难点。这些典籍文本不能笼统地被识别为哲学性文本，更重要的是这些文本分属不同的哲学流派，即儒、释、道三家，而如何在译文中将这些哲学派别反映出来是摆在译者面前的一个棘手问题，因为儒、释、道所

对应的哲学范畴体系很难在英语中找到可以相互区隔又同时对应这三家思想的范畴体系。于是，哲学典籍的英译者们在哲学术语和范畴的英译转换上都予以了充分思考，并且也往往会做出详细的说明。

选　文

第一节　文学典籍的英译

选文一　The Convergence of Languages and Poetics

Wai-lim Yip

导　言

本文选自 *Chinese Poetry: An Anthology of Major Modes and Genres*，美国杜克大学出版社出版，1997。

作者叶威廉现为美国加利福尼亚州立大学教授，是著名华裔学者和诗人，致力于中国诗歌的译介和中西诗学比较研究，著有《东西比较文学模子的运用》、《比较诗学》、*Diffusion of Distances: Dialogues between Chinese and Western Poetics*、《道家美学与西方文化》、《中国诗学》等著作。这篇文章是他的 *Chinese Poetry: An Anthology of Major Modes and Genres* 一书的前言。这本书是他所做的中国古典诗歌的选译诗集。叶威廉从两个层面探讨了中国古典诗歌英译的困难。首先，从句法层面上讲，汉语句法的灵活度要远远大于英语句法。北宋诗人苏东坡的诗句“潮随暗浪雪山倾”就可以回文成“倾山雪浪暗随潮”。如果翻译成英文，这种表现为回文的句法灵活性就无法体现出来。句法在灵活性上面的差异不能只止于语法的层面去为其寻找解释。还要更深一步，从处于不同文化之中的人对世界的感知模式的差异上寻找答案。那么这样就关系到中西美学旨趣上的差异了。叶威廉非常强调中国古典诗歌的特异性。尽管在翻译中无法完整地在译文中还原这些特异性，但是翻译者也需要意识到它们。首先，中国诗歌更具有空间容纳性。诗人主体在诗歌中往往是句法缺席的，读者可以将自己自由地代入进诗歌所描绘的场景空间中，选择不同的角度去自由地定位自我与空间的关系。其次，汉语是缺乏时态标记的，诗歌中的事件、行为不局限在一个特定的时间框架内，而是获得了时间的无限性，抵制了框限“现象”的时间概念。但是，当汉语诗歌转译成英文后，这种时间的无限性就遭到取消，被限制在一个特定的时间范围之内了。

汉语古典诗歌翻译成英语后，由于空间上单一视角的限制，再加上时间上的局限，西方对存在的概念化处理遮蔽了汉语诗歌的存在样态。英语中的这种对时空的语言表达将读者

从“现象”中意象和事件的具体性所具有的魅力引开，阻止读者与他们进行直接的接触。叶威廉借助电影艺术的表达形式形象地说明了中国古典诗歌在直接性的呈现上更接近电影，而被译成英语之后，这种直接性以及由此带来的读者的代入感遭到了不同程度的破坏。为了能够保持中国古典诗歌的“原生态”，叶威廉在这部中国古典诗歌的英译选集中采取了两种翻译方式，相应地，几乎每首诗歌在这本选集中都有两个译文：第一个译文基本上是直译，从中可以看出译者对中国诗歌美学的尊重；第二个译文多多少少屈从了英语的语法形态对译诗的干扰，但是这种屈从也是在节制的状态下实施的。

Concrete examples before abstractions. First, a short poem by the eighth-century Chinese poet Meng Hao-jan, laid out according to the original order of appearance and graphic impression of the Chinese characters. Beside each character are given word-for-word dictionary annotations plus some bare indications of their grammatical function (i. e., using tentative English classifications). The poem runs:

line 1 移 move (v.)
舟 boat(n.)
泊 moor (v.)
烟 smoke (n./adj.)
渚 shore (n.)
line 2 日 sun (n.)
暮 dusk (n.)
客 traveler (n.)
愁 grief (n.)
新 new (adj./v.)
line 3 野 wild/wilderness
旷 wilderness/far-reaching/empty
天 sky (n.)
低 low (v./adj.)
树 tree/s (n.)
line 4 江 river (n.)
清 clear(adj.)
月 moon (n.)
近 near (v./adj.)
人 man (n.)

How is an English reader to respond to this poem? I mean by an English reader one whose language habits are those that demand rigid syntactical cooperation between and among parts of speech, such as: a subject leads to a verb to an object; articles govern certain nouns; past actions cast in past tenses; third person singular asks for a change in verb endings, etc. How is he to respond to a poem written in a language in which such rigid

syntactical demands are sparse, if not absent? Is he to supply some of the missing links between the characters? This is perhaps the first question any reader will attempt to answer. Many readers and translators simply go ahead and do it without reflecting a bit whether such an act is legitimate, aesthetically speaking. Before examining closely some of these attempts, it is perhaps useful for us to see the degree of syntactical freedom open to the user of the classical Chinese language. Let us use an emphatic example, a palindrome by Su Tung-p'o (1036—1101). This is a seven-character, eight-line regulated poem which can be read backward with different meaning. One line from this poem should suffice:

a.		b.	
tide/s	潮	pour-fall	倾
follow	随	mountain/s	山
dark	暗	snow	雪
wave/s	浪	wave/s	浪
snow	雪	dark	暗
mountain/s	山	follow	随
pour-fall	倾	tide/s	潮

a. Tide/s pursue dark waves, snow mountain/s fall

b. Mountain-pouring snow-waves darkly follow tides

The line reads forward and backward perfectly naturally. To do this in English is unimaginable. The examples in English such as "Madam, I'm Adam" and "Able was I ere I saw Elba" are not really doing what the Chinese language can do. Translated into English, the syntactical demands (precise grammatical function allotted to each word) become obvious. Which brings us to conclude that the Chinese language can easily be free from syntactical bounds, although one must hasten to add that this does not mean Chinese is without syntax. This freedom from syntactical rigidity, while it no doubt creates tremendous problems for the translator, provides the user with a unique mode of presentation. (Or perhaps we should say it is the unique mode of perception of reality of the Chinese which has occasioned this flexibility of syntax.) Try two lines by Tu Shen-yen (between seventh and eighth centuries):

1.1		1.2	
Cloud/s	云	plum/s	梅
mist/s	霞	willow/s	柳
go-out	出	cross	渡
sea	海	river	江
dawn	曙	spring	春

Are we to read these lines as:

Clouds and mists move out to the sea at dawn

Plums and willows across the river bloom in spring.

There is something distorted in this version when compared to the original order of impressions. What about reading them in the following manner?

Clouds and mists
Out to sea
Dawn
Plums and willows
Across the river
Spring

And on aesthetic grounds, what kind of perception has this order of words promoted? This leads us to exploration of some of the central questions of Chinese poetics.

Returning to Meng Hao-jan's poem, we can now ask some more specific questions: Who moves the boat to moor by the smoke-shore? How are we to arbitrate this? Shall we assume, as with most of our Chinese translators, that the speaker "I" is always crouched behind the poetic statement or image? What is the difference between putting the "I" into the poem and not putting it there? Is it possible not to have the personal pronoun? To have it thus is to specify the speaker or agent of the action, restricting the poem, at least on the linguistic level, to one participant only, whereas freedom from the personal pronoun universalizes the state of being or feeling, providing a scene or situation into which all the readers would move, as it were, to take part directly.

This poem contains a number of actions. Actions take place in time, but the classical Chinese language is tenseless. Why tenseless? Shall we cast these actions into the past, as evidenced by some of the following examples? The fact is: if the Chinese poet has avoided restricting actions to one specific agent, he has also refrained from committing them to finite time. (Or shall we say, the mental horizon of the Chinese poets does not lead them to posit an event within a segment of finite time.) The past, present and future tenses in Indo-European languages set time and space limits even on the linguistic level, but the Chinese verbs (or verb elements) tend to return to Phenomenon itself, that undifferentiated mode of being, which is timeless, the concept of time being a human invention arbitrarily imposed upon Phenonmenon.

We have seen the ambiguous grammatical roles some Chinese characters can play. In this poem, two verbs in line 3 and 4 assume, as it were, a double identity. How are we to determine the syntactical relation between the objects before or after "low" or "lowers" and "near" or "nears?" Is it the vastness of the wilderness that has lengthened the sky, lowering it to the trees, or does the breadth of the stretch of the trees seem to pull the sky to the wilderness? If we read the word 低 (low) not as a verb, but as an adjective, the line becomes three visual units: vast wilderness/sky/low trees. What choice are we to make, which syntactical relation should we determine? Or should we determine at all?

Enough exposition has now been given to the multiple levels of possibilities for the poem as enhanced by flexible syntax and other unique features of the Chinese language. The questions I pose here are not for mere grammatical exercise; they are reflected as critical problems in many examples of translations. (Italicized words indicate the translator's

insertion to supply what he believes to be the missing links; words in bold type indicate the translator's interpretation or paraphrase of the original images.)

Giles (1898):
I steer *my* boat to anchor
by the mist-clad river eyot
And **mourn** *the* dying day *that brings me*
nearer to my fate.
Across the woodland wild *I see*
the sky **lean** on the trees,
While close to hand the *mirror* moon
floats on the shining streams.[1]

Fletcher (1919):
Our boat *by the* mist-covered islet *we tied.*
The sorrows *of absence* the sunset *brings* back.
Low breasting the foliage the sky loomed black.
The river *is* bright *with the* moon at our side.[2]

Bynner (1920):
While my *little* boat moves on its mooring mist,
And **daylight wanes, old memories begin...**
How wide the world was, how close the trees to heaven!
And how clear in the water the nearness of the moon![3]

Christy (1929):
At dusk *I* moored *my* boat *on* the banks of the river;
With the oncoming of night my friend is depress*ed*;
Heaven itself seems to cover over the gloomy trees
of the wide fields.
Only the moon, shining on the river, is near man.[4]

Jenyns (1944):
I move *my* boat and anchor in the mists *off* an islet;
With the setting sun the traveler's heart grows
melancholy once more.
On every side is a desolate expanse of water;
Somewhere the sky comes down to the trees
And the clear water **reflects** a neighboring moon.[5]

Other experimental attempts:[6]
(a) Moving boat, mooring, smoke-shore.
Sun darkening: new sadness of traveler.

Wilderness, sky lowering trees.
Limpid river: moon nearing man.

(b) Boat moves to moor mid shore-smoke.
Sun sinks. Traveler feels fresh sadness.
Wilderness
Sky
Low trees
Limpid river
Moon nears man.

(c) A boat slows, moors by beach—run in smoke.
Sun fades: a traveler's sorrow freshens.
Open wilderness.
Wide sky.
A stretch of low trees.
Limpid river.
Clear moon close to man.

Reading all the above translations against the original with which we are now familiar (I will not comment on the experimental versions; they are here for contrast and will figure in my argument later), we find that they are secondary elaborations of some preliminary form of experience, the unfolding of some schemata into separate parts. All the translators, starting with Giles, must have been led by the sparseness of syntax in the original to believe that the Chinese characters must be telegraphic — in the sense that they are shorthand signs for a longhand message — and so they took it as their task to translate the shorthand into longhand, poetry into prose, adding commentary all along to aid understanding, not knowing that these are "pointers" toward a finer shade of suggestive beauty which the discursive, analytical, longhand unfolding process destroys completely. The fact is: these images, often coexisting in spatial relationships, form an atmosphere or environment, an ambience, in which the reader may move and be directly present, poised for a moment before being imbued with the atmosphere that evokes (but does not state) an aura of feeling (in this case, grief), a situation in which he may participate in completing the aesthetic experience of an intense moment, the primary form of which the poet has arrested in concrete data.

It is obvious that we cannot approach this poem and most other Chinese poems with the arbitrary time categories of the West, based as they are on a casual linearity imposed by human conceptualization. The western concept of being conceals being rather than exposing it; it turns us away from the appeal of the concreteness of objects and events in Phenomenon rather than bringing us into immediate contact with them. The capacity of the Chinese poem to be free from Western arbitrary temporal constructs and to keep a certain degree of close harmony with the concrete events in Phenomenon, can be illustrated by the way film handles

temporality, for film is a medium most felicitous in approximating the immediacy of experience. Without mulling over the complex use of time and space in the art of film, let us get down to the fundamentals. For our purpose, a passage from Stephenson-Debrix's introductory book, *The Cinema as Art* (Penguin, 1969), will make this clear. Cinema has:

... a natural freedom in temporal construction ... the lack of time prepositions and conjunctions, tenses and other indications ... can leave the film free to reach the spectator with an immediacy which literature is unable to match. (p. 107)

Time prepositions and conjunctions such as "*Before* he came ... *since* I have been here ... *then* ... " do not exist in a film, nor do they in actual events in life. No tense in other case. "When we watch a film, it is just something that is happening—now" (p. 100).

Similarly, the Chinese line

野 旷 天 低 树

Vast-plains sky low tree

When translated into "As the plain is vast, the sky lowers the trees," immediately loses its cinematic visuality promoted by what I once called "spotlighting activity"[7] or what the filmmakers called "mobile point of view" of the spectator, loses the acting-out of the objects, the nowness and the concreteness of the moment. (By this example, I do not mean to imply that the Chinese do not have time-indicators at all. They do, but they are often avoided, aided by the flexibility of syntax.) We can now see that the experimental versions of this line, in their somewhat nave way (i. e., viewed from the cultural burden of the English language), have perhaps brought back more of this cinematic directness of the moment.

(1) Wilderness
    Sky
    Low trees

(2) Open wilderness
    Wide sky.
    A stretch of low trees.

and the approximation of Tu Shen-yen's lines into:

Clouds and mists
    Out to sea:
    Dawn
Plums and willows
Across the river:
    Spring

is perhaps not entirely out of order.

Much of the art of Chinese poetry lies in the way in which the poet captures the visual events as they emerge and act themselves out before us, releasing them from the restrictive concept of time and space, letting them leap out directly from the undifferentiated mode of existence instead of standing between the reader and the events explaining them, analyzing

them. To say that the Chinese have no time and space categories or to say that Chinese poetry has no space for commentary would be overstating the case, but it is also true that they are infrequently and seldom extensively used. They would not force the perspective of the ego as a means of ordering the Phenomenon before them. The lack of the use of personal pronoun is not just some "curious habit of mind;" it is in tune with the Chinese concept of losing yourself in the flux of events, the Way (*Tao*), the million changes constantly happening before us.[8]

With this perspective in our mind, we can now understand more fully the asyntactical or paratactical formation of many of the Chinese lines.

First, a normal syntactical type that most resembles the English subject-verb-object structure:

(A) s-v-o

a. 孤灯燃客梦
寒杵捣乡愁
岑参:客舍

lone/lamp/burn/traveler('s)/dream
cold/pounding-stick-/pound/home/-sickness
(for-washing-clothes)
—Tsen Ts'an (graduated 744)

b. 云迎出塞马
风卷度河旗
沈佺期:送友人北征

clouds(s)/receive/go-out-of-the-Pass (adj.)/horse
wind(s)/roll/crossing-the-river (adj.)/flag
—Shen Ch'uan-chi (d. ca. 713)

There is little difficulty in reading and translating lines of this structure into English, except for the usual consideration of the correct choice of words. The examples of asyntactical or paratactical lines which abound in Chinese poetry are the ones that trouble the English (and European) translators the most. And it is here the perspectivism outlined above can easily come to our aid. Let us look at some concrete examples:

(B) Phase Ⅰ— PhaseⅡ(and sometimes Phase Ⅲ)

星临万户动
杜甫:春宿左省

star(s)/come/ten-thousand/house(s)/move
—Tu Fu (712—770)

Compare it with:

While the stars are twinkling above the ten-thousand
Households ... .

—William Hung[9]

The translation here has changed the visual events into statements about these visual events. "Stars come" could perhaps be interpreted as temporal, but it is time spatialized, which is what an event means: an event takes (time) place (space). But when "while" is added, the translator ignores the inseparability of time and space. Similarly, in the line:

月落乌啼霜满天

张继:枫桥夜泊

Moon/set/crow(s)/caw/frost/full/sky

(Moondown:crows caw. Frost, a skyful)

—Chang Chi (graduated 753)

"Moondown" is at once a space-fact and a time-fact in the form of a visual event. Hence, when rendered into "As the moon sets," etc., the significance and the concreteness of the event is relegated to a subordinate position. Consider not only the visuality of the event but also the independence of each visual event, so as to promote a kind of spatial tension among, and coexistence with, the other visual events. To translate these lines:

星垂平野阔

月涌大江流

杜甫:旅夜书怀

Star(s)/dangle/flat/plain/broad(ens)

Moon/surge(s)/big/river/flow(s)

—Tu Fu

Into

The stars lean down from open space

And the moon comes running up the river

—Bynner[10]

Stars drawn low by the vastness of the plain

The moon rushing forward in the river's flow.

—Birch[11]

is to ignore the spatial coexistence of these events and, in doing so, the translators have denied the capacity of the reader-view to move in among them—even though one still finds great beauty in the translated lines—beauty of a direct order of impressions from the original. Equally significant is the order of the appearance of these visual events. The order of noticing—in Meng Hao-jan's poems (like the camera movement), first the "vast wilderness," then moving backward to include the "sky" within our ken before zooming in upon the "low trees"—mimics the activities of our perceiving act, hence enabling the reader-viewer to relive the life of the poetic movement. Measuring this against the translations of this line given earlier, the loss is too obvious to need comment here. Similarly, we allow the following version of the line "moon/surges/big/river/flows" (noticing gleaming brightness before noticing movement of the river) into "Le Grand Fleuve s'ecoule, aux remous de la

dune"[12] only at the risk of falsifying the authenticity of the life of the moment. We can see here that poets whose perceptual horizons emphasize the miming of the activities of the perceiving act by tuning the visual events according to the gradations of color and light in the total makeup of the growth of the moment, poets such as Wang Wei (701—761) and Meng Hao-jan, suffer the most in English translations. Let us look at just one such violation:

空山不见人

Empty/mountain/not/see/man

—Wang Wei

Becomes, in Bynner's hand,

There seems to be no one on the empty mountain.[13]

The analytical or explanatory "There seems to be no one" represents, of course, the translator's interference in the direct contact of the "empty mountain" with the view-reader, and to put "no one" ahead of "empty mountain" violates the life of the moment: we notice the *emptiness*, the *openness* first before we are aware of the other state of being.

Wang Wei is prized for his ability to turn language into miming gestures of the perceiving act. It is instructive to scam a few examples. I offer here very literal renderings, for illustrative purposes:

白云回望合

青霭入看无

White clouds—looking back—close up

Green mists—entering to see—nothing

There are changing perspectives in these lines: "white clouds" (shot one, from a distance); "looking back" (shot two, viewer coming out from opposite direction, turning his head back); "close up" (shot three, viewer retiring to same position as shot one). The visual events are accentuated the way a mimer, in order to reflect a event that is not visible, forms gestures and moments, highlighting them to suggest the energy flow that originally supports that event. Arm Zaslove, in a demonstration-lecture in The Project of Musical Experiment at the University of California, San Diego, in January 1973, gave an example that articulates the curve of energy flow of the moment most clearly. He said:

Supposing a man is carrying a heavy suitcase with both of his hands. (He proceeds to place both of his hands on the imaginary handle and lift the imaginary suitcase.) You will find that your whole body has to bend sideways toward your right to balance off the weight. If the mimer should at this point bend toward the left, the while miming act is false and becomes unrecognizable.

Words, as signs, function at the maximum when they capture the life-mechanism of the moment of the experience in ways similar to those described by Zaslove. In Wang Wei, Li Po (701—762), Li Shang-yin (812? —858) and many others, the tendency is to reproduce visual curves of the events, emphasizing different phases of perception with a mobile point of view or spotlighting activities. Here are some more examples that need no further comment:

大漠孤烟直

Vast desert: lone smoke, straight

—Wang Wei

孤帆远影碧空尽

Lone sail, (a) distant shade, lost into the blue horizon

(literally: blue/sky/end [v.])

—Li Po

沧海月明珠有泪

Dark sea. Bright moon. Pearls with tears

—Li Shang-yin

With the last one, we pass from the objective, physical world into a possible dream state in which time is cut off from its normal flux and becomes absolute in the sense that objects thus presented may become coexistence with one another. As usual, the visuality is remarkable. The unity here is one of shape and color, not casual relation of any kind.

Now a few complete poems of the authenticity of the perceiving act (I give here close approximations):

Dried vines, an old tree, evening crows;

A small bridge, flowing water, men's homes;

An ancient road, west winds, a lean horse;

Sun slants west:

A heart-torn man at sky's end.

—Ma Chih-yuan (ca. 1260—ca. 1341)

This poem operates pictorially rather than semantically. The successive shots do not constituent a linear development (such as *how this leads to that*). Rather the objects coexist, as in a painting, and yet the mobile point of view has made it possible to temporalize the spatial units. And witness this poem:

A thousand mountains—no bird's flight.

A million paths—no man's trace.

Single boat. Bamboo-leaved cape. An old man.

Fishing alone. Ice-river. Snow

—Liu Tsung-yuan (773—819)

We need little orientation to notice that the camera-eye from a bird's eye-view with which we can at once take possession of the totality of the scene on a cosmic scale as in all the Chinese landscape paintings—zooms in upon one single object, an old man in the midst of the vast frozen river surrounded by snow. Unlike the film which often focuses in events to be strung together with a story line, the cinematic movement here reproduces the activities of the perceiving act of an intense moment, the total consciousness of which is not completed until all the visual moments are presented simultaneously—again as in our perception of a classical Chinese painting. The spatial tensions here—the immeasurable cosmic coexisting

with a speck of human existence—put us in the center of Phenomenon, allowing us to reach out to the circumference.

We mentioned earlier the fact that Chinese poets would not force the perspective of the ego upon Phenomenon. This is most obvious in Chinese landscape painting in which we either should say there is no perspective in it (the artist having become the objects in Phenomenon) or there are revolving perspectives, viewing totality from different angles simultaneously. This happens also in Chinese poetry. We have seen, in almost all the examples given above and in the last quoted poem in particular, how the viewer-reader is made to move into the total environment to experience the visual events from different spatial angles. More intriguing are the following lines from Wen Ting-yun (ninth century).

1.1. 鸡 cock (n.)
声 crow (n.)
茅 straw (n.)
店 inn (n.)
月 moon (n.)

1.2. 人 man (n.)
迹 trace (n.)
板 plank (n.)
桥 bridge (n.)
霜 frost (n.)

These are selected details, objects in their purest form, given to us at one instant to constituent an atmosphere, an environment. It is an environment in which we move about rather than viewing it from a fixed distant angle because we can never be certain as to where, in the background, we should put the cock, the moon, the bridge: Are we to visualize these as "(At) cockcrow, the moon (is seen above) the straw inn/ footprints (are seen upon) the frost (covering) the plank bridge (?)." There are other ways of locating these details: The moon need not be "above" the inn; it could very well be just barely seen above the horizon. Without determining the definite spatial relationships of the objects, without allotting them fixed positions as viewed from chosen perspectives, as any translation of these lines into English would be tempted to do, we are liberated to see them from different perspectives. As a result, we are enabled to cross the limits of words into the realm of sculpture, toward the act of perceiving a piece of sculpture whose total existence depends on out viewing it from different angles as we move around it.

This sculpture quality is superbly approximated in Wang Wei's "Mount Chung-nan":

The Chungnan ranges verge on the Capital
Mountain upon mountain to sea's brim. I
(viewer on level ground looking from afar—Moment I)
White clouds—looking back—close up
(viewer coming out—Moment II)

Green mists—entering—become nothing
(viewer entering—Moment III)
Terrestrial divisions change at the middle peak
(viewer atop peak looking down—Moment IV)
Shade and light differ with every valley
(viewer on both sides of Mount simultaneously—Moment V)
To stay over in some stranger's house—
Across the water, call to ask a woodcutter
(viewer down on level ground Moment VI)

In one of the volunteer sessions on the structure of the Chinese characters held in an American grade school, after I had finished explaining how some of the Chinese characters are pictorially based, how the signs match the actual objects, one boy proceeded naively to pose a sagacious question: "All these are nouns, how are they to form ideas?" It seems legitimate to pose the same question regarding many of the Chinese lines above. I believe the question is answered, in part, in my earlier analysis of a Liu Tsung-yuan poem, in which the spatial tensions and relationships between the immeasurable cosmic scene and a speck of human existence in the figure of an old man fishing, project out, *without comment*, a meaning of the condition of man in nature. All the other lines can be understood in a similar light.

Returning to the boy's question: I answered him by bringing out another category of Chinese character structures. The two characters I chose were 时 and 言. The etymological origin of 时 (time) consists of the pictograph of 日 (sun) and, the latter being a pictograph developed from an ancient picture of a foot touching the ground which came to mean both *stop* (the modern form of which is 止) and *go* (the modern form of which is 之). Thus, the earliest Chinese viewed the stop-and-go of the sun, the measured movement of the sun, as the idea "time." The earliest pictographic stage of 言 was, denoting a mouth blowing a flute (the tip of a Chinese flute). This character now means "speech," "expression," "message," which, to the people of the first harmony, was to be in rhythmic measure. Here, in both cases, two visual objects juxtapose to form an idea. As we may now recall, this structure principle of the Chinese character inspired Sergei Eisenstein to conceive the technique of montage in the film.[14] The same structural principle continues to be at work in Chinese poetry. One line from a Li Po poem which I discussed in great detail in my book *Ezra Pound's Cathy* (Princeton, 1969) was:

浮云游子意
Floating cloud(s): wanderer's mood

Let me quote the relevant parts:

Does this line mean, syntactically, "floating clouds *are* a wanderer's mood"... or "floating clouds are like a wanderer's mood"... ? The answer is: it does and it does not at the same time. No one would fail to perceive the resemblance of a wanderer's drifting life ... to

the floating clouds. But there is a flash of interest in the syntactically uncommitted resemblance which the introduction of "are" and "are like" destroys. In this case, we actually see the floating clouds and the wanderer (and the state of mind he is in) simultaneously. The simultaneous presence of two objects, like the juxtaposition of two separate shots, resembles (in Eisenstein's words) "not so much a simple sum of one shot plus another shot—as it does a *creation*. It resembles a creation—rather than a sum of its parts—from the circumstance that in every such juxtaposition *the result is qualitatively* distinguished from each component element viewed separately."[15]

Similarly, we have the following lines that by the sheer fact of montage using independent but juxtaposed visual events, point to an idea without allowing into the presentation the interference of the rhetoric of commentary. In the line,

国破山河在

empire/broken/mountain/river/exist(remain)

The reader feels, without being told, the contrast and tension in the scenery so presented, and the introduction of explanatory elaboration will destroy the immediate contact between the viewer and the scene, as in the case of this typical translation and many others:

Though a country be sundered, hills and rivers endure

(italics mine)

—Bynner[16]

Whether using montage or mobile points of view in the perceiving act, the Chinese poets give paramount importance to the acting-out of visual objects and events, letting them explain themselves by their coexisting, coextensive emergence from nature, letting the spatial tensions reflect conditions and situations rather than coercing these objects and events into some preconceived artificial orders by sheer human interpretive elaboration. In a line like Li Po's,

凤去　　台空　　江自流

Phoenix gone, terrace empty, river flows on alone

(shot 1)　　(shot 2)　　(shot 3)

Do we need any more words to explain the vicissitude of time versus the permanence of Nature? Or in these lines from Tu Fu's "Autumn Meditation,"

玉露凋伤枫树林

巫山巫峡气萧森

江间波浪兼天涌

塞上风云接地阴

Jade/dew/wither v. /wound v. /maple/tree/grove

Wu/mountain/Wu/gorges/air/grave—desolate

river/middle/waves/—/embrace(include)/sky/surge v.

Pass/top/wind(s)/clouds/connect/ground/shadow(s)

[A. C. Graham's translation:

Gems of dew wilt and wound the maple trees in the wood:
From Wu mountains, from Wu gorges, the air blows desolate,
The waves between the river banks merge in the seething sky,
Clouds in the wind above the passes touch their shadows on the ground.
—*Poems of the Late T'ang* (Penguin, 1962), p. 52]

Where the curves of the external climate coincide with the curves of the internal climate of the aging poet, do we need to falsify their identity by turning them into puppets of some Grand Idea?

Notes:

1. *Selected Chinese Verses*, trans. by Hebert A. Giles and Arthur Waley (Shanghai, 1934), p. 22. This book consists of two parts: poems translated by Giles and those by Waley. It offers a good chance for comparison of the styles of these two early translators.
2. W. J. B. Fletcher, *More Gems of Chinese Poetry* (Shanghai, 1919), p. 150.
3. Witter Bynner, *The Jade Mountain* (New York, 1929). The poem can be located conveniently in the paperback edition (Anchor, 1964), p. 85.
4. Arthur Christy, *Images in Jade* (New York, 1929), p. 74.
5. Soame Jenyns, *A Further Selection from the Three Hundred Poems of the T'ang Dynasty* (London, 1944), p. 76.
6. These versions were done in a workshop by my student in a seminar on the theory and practice of translation, University of California, San Diego.
7. See my *Ezra Pound's Cathay*, pp. 38, 147 - 148, 159 - 162 or my *Modern Chinese Poetry* (Iowa, 1970), "Introduction."
8. Commenting on Chuang Tzu's idea of change, the Kuo Hsiang text (third century A. D.) has this to say. "The sage roams in the path of a million changes—a million things, a million changes—and thus, he changes in accordance with the law of a million changes." And the Taoist-oriented neo-Confucianist Shao Yung (1011—1077), in the introduction to his collection of poems "Beat the Earthen Chime," elaborates from Lao Tzu the following view that has dominated Chinese art and literature since early times:

   ... the one:
   to view Human Nature through the Way
   Mind through Human Nature
   Mind through Mind
   Things through Body
   (Control, yes, there is,
   But not free from harm)
   Is unlike the other:
   to view the Way through the way
   Human Nature through Human Nature
   Mind through Mind
   Body through Body
   Things through Things
   (even if harm were intended,

Can it be done?)

9. William Hung, *Tu Fu: China's Greatest Poet* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), p. 105.
10. Bynner, *The Jade Mountain*, p. 122.
11. Birch, ed., *An Anthology of Chinese Literature* (New York, 1965), p. 238.
12. The translation is by Tch'eng Ki-hien and J. Dieny. See Paul Demieville, ed., *Anthologie de la poesie*.
13. Bynner, *The Jade Mountain*, p. 153.
14. Sergei Eisenstein, *Film Form and Film Sense*, trans. Jay Leyda (New York, 1942). Chap. 3, "The Cinematographic Principle and the Ideogram," p. 28.
15. Ezra Pound's *Cathay*, p. 22. Quote from *Eisenstein*, *Film Form and Film Sense*, p. 7.
16. Bynner, *The Jade Mountain*, p. 119.

选文二 Translating Six Dyansties "Colloquialisms" into English: the *Shih-shuo hsin-yu*

Richard B. Mather

导 言

本文选自 Eugene Eoyang 和 Lin Yao-fu 主编的论文集 *Translating Chinese Literature*，美国印第安纳大学出版社出版，1995。

作者 Richard B. Mather(马瑞志)是美国资深的汉学家，《世说新语》的英译者。文章先从《世说新语》的总体风格入手说明了这部经典作品的语言特征。作者认为这部经典一改汉语在《春秋》成文时期成型的修辞特点，即简约到几近隐晦的程度，为了让语言表达更为细致的意义，《世说新语》进行了相应的形式变化，例如更多地使用双字词、增加功能性的字词等。这种文风是受到了魏晋时期文人雅士崇尚清谈之风的影响。在清谈的过程中，人们注重节奏均匀的句子组织方式，多用四字格或六字格，并且崇尚表达意义或情感的细腻的层次感。这篇文章尽管谈论的是《世说新语》中一些口语体表达式的英译，但是这种口语体也具备上述魏晋时期的清谈风格。马瑞志运用语境化论述的方式，将所讨论的汉语字词置放在它们出现的语境当中。首先讨论的是《世说新语》中出现的、仍然在现代汉语中使用的字词，如"初不见"、"都"、"了了"、"是"等。作者不仅将这些字词放在它们各自所出现的句子中，而且还还原这些字词在其中出现的整个故事，如孔融和李膺之间的发生的一段轶事。上述字词因为仍然在现代汉语中使用，所以理解起来并不困难，马瑞志对它们所现身的语境的还原并不是很彻底，而只是提供了一个大致的故事脉络。当文章涉及到那些在现代汉语中已经废弃的字词的时候，作者给出了两种类型的语境：一种是上面使用的笼统语境，另一种则是更为直接具体的语境。比如，对"将无"、"便"等的理解就是在一个小语境中进行的。它们出现的小语境分别是"如此，将无归"、"将无伤"、"便各使四坐通"等。

It is with considerable fear and trembling that I approach this subject, for I realize that "colloquialisms" are not easy to identify in the first place, especially when they occur in a language other than one's own. And when they are imbedded in a literary text some fifteen hundred years old, the problem is only the more compounded. Since no one ever tap-recorded the conversations that have been encoded in the relatively terse but nevertheless elegant Middle Chinese of the conversational portions of the anecdotal collection *shih-shuo hsin-yu* 世说新语, compiled by the Liu-Sung prince Liu I-ch'ing 刘义庆 (403—444), we will never know exactly what was said in the first place, let alone how "colloquial" or "literary" the resulting text should be considered.

It is well known that classical (i. e., pre-Han) texts seem bare and almost abbreviated in comparison with later writings. The fourth-century B. C. *Tso-chuan* 左传 commentary on the *Spring and Autumn Annals* (*Ch'un-ch'iu* 春秋) is a prime example of terseness, carried in some instances almost to the point of unintelligibility. The style of the *Shih-shuo*, on the other hand, marks the beginning of a trend toward greater subtlety in shades of meaning and feeling, through the addition of disyllabic expressions and new functional words and particles, including new meanings for old ones. One reason for the rise of this subtler style during the Six Dynasties (roughly A. D. 200—600), which has been suggested by the late Japanese sinologist Yoshikawa Kojiro 吉川幸次郎, was the popularity among the leisured classes during this period of drawing-room debates on abstruse topics, an activity known at the time as "pure conversation" (*ch'ing-t'an* 清谈). In these debates, two qualities were held in very high regard: rhetorical skill—the ability to make sententious statements in balanced cadences (which often resulted in phrases of four or six syllables)—and the ability to modulate one's speech to convey fine gradations of meaning or feeling. According to Yoshikawa, these practices resulted in an increase in disyllabic expressions to replace the staccato of monosyllables and a corresponding expansion in the use of function words.[1]

In this essay I shall attempt to illustrate some of these features, especially as they appear in the conversational portions of the *Shih-shuo*. The *Shih-shuo hsin-yu* is something of a pastiche, based on earlier written sources from the third and fourth centuries, most of which have been lost but fragments of which have been incorporated in Liu Chun's 刘峻 (462—521) commentary. In spite of this, it has its own consistent and recognizable style in which it records incidents and remarks attributed to historical persons who lived between about 150 and 430. The anecdotes are separated into thirty-six chapters, each illustrating a particular trait of character or style of life, progressing from the exemplary (the first eight chapters) to the cautionary (the last thirteen). I propose to cite a few pertinent passages illustrating various aspects of what I deem to be colloquial style in this rich source and to render them in what I hope to be appropriately colloquial English. At the same time I will discuss some of the problems involved in such an attempt.

Expressions Still Found in Colloquial Mandarin

Let us begin with the most obvious cases, namely, expressions that are still used colloquially in Mandarin in very much the same form they had in Middle Chinese. Since these expressions occur only in conversation and occasionally deviate from the standard literary style, it seems safe to conclude that they were indeed colloquial.

Take the familiar interrogative adverb *na* 哪 of the Mandarin exclamation *Na'rh-de hua* 哪儿的话, "Where (did you hear) that nonsense?" In the *Shih-shuo*, *na* 哪, used alone or in combination, as in *na-te* 那得, or *na-k'e* 那可, introduces a rhetorical question meaning something like "How come?" "Why on earth ... ?"

The story is told of the Eastern Chin statesman Hsieh An 谢安 (320—385) that his wife, Madame liu 刘夫人, once asked him, "*Why on earth* is it that *I've never even once* seen you instructing our son (*Na-te ch'u-pu-chien chun chiao-erh* 那得初不见君教儿)?"[2] With an air of injured innocence, Hsieh replied, "But I'm *always* naturally instructing our sons (我常自教儿)!" He meant, that he was setting them a fine example and that nothing he said would speak louder than his actions. We might note in passing that in Madame Liu's question there was another Six Dynasties idiom, *ch'u-pu* 初不 (literally, "from the start, not even once"), which is glossed in the revised *Tz'u-yuan* 辞源 of 1979 as *i-tien-yeh-pu* 一点也不, "not in the slightest."

Another familiar modern colloquial expression that crops up frequently in the *Shih-shuo* is the adverb *tou* 都, "altogether," "entirely." There is a curious story in the *Shih-shuo* involving the Kashmiri missionary Sanghadeva (僧伽提婆), who came to Chien-k'ang (modern Nanking) in the year 397 and began a series of lectures on the Abhidharma (阿毗云), or philosophical presuppositions, of the Sarvastivada School. The layman Wang Mi 王弥, after listening to the first lecture for a few minutes, got up from his seat and announced confidently, "I already understand it *completely* (*Tou-i-hsiao* 都已晓)." Whereupon he marched out of the lecture hall with a few like-minded friends and in a separate room expounded everything in his own words. According to a monk who followed him out, his exposition was "essentially correct," give or take a few superficial details.[3]

Still another Six Dynasties expression, which appears to be a forerunner of the modern demonstrative pronoun *che* 这, "this," was the disyllabic word *a-che* 阿堵, used where one might normally expect *tz'u* 此 or *tzu* 兹. The story is told of the general Yin Hao 殷浩 (306—356), who, after a disastrous defeat in a failed attempt by the Eastern Chin to retake the north, was exiled to western Chekiang, where he became a devout student of the Buddhist scriptures. Once when he observed a sutra lying on a table he pointed to it and said, "The truth must also be in this (*Li I ying a-che shang* 理亦应阿堵上)."[4]

A-che was also used adjectivally, as the following story will demonstrate. The rather impractical and otherworldly grand marshal Wang Yen 王衍 (256—311), who is often

blamed for the loss of North China to barbarian rule in the years following 311 when lo-yang fell, was, appropriately, married to a very worldly-wise woman (some were unkind enough to call her "avaricious"), Madame Guo 郭. Wang had made a vow never to utter the sordid word "cash" (*ch'ien* 钱), so his wife decided to put him to the test. She had a slave girl surround his bed with cash while he was sleeping. When he awoke and saw what she had done, he immediately called in the slave girl and ordered her, "Pick up this stuff and get it out of here (*Chu-ch'ueh a-che wu* 举欲阿堵物)!"[5]

I offer one more example of "proto-Mandarin" in the *Shih-shuo*, where *shih* 是, normally the demonstrative pronoun "this," is used as a copula in equational sentences. The poet K'ung Jung 孔融 (153—208), one of the "Seven Masters of the Chien-an Era," was only nine years old when he decided to pay a visit completely on his own to Li Ying 李膺, the commandant of the Eastern Han capital province, and arrived unaccompanied at the front gate of the latter's mansion in Lo-yang. No person was ever granted entry unless they could demonstrate that they were blood relatives of the commandant or otherwise very prominent figures. K'ung Jung confidently announced to the gatekeeper, "I *am* a relative of Commandant Li (*Wo shih Li fu-chun ch'in* 我是李府君亲)."

Since the remainder of the narrative is also of interest as an example of colloquial style, I shall continue the story. The gatekeeper was duly impressed by Jung's statement, and the ushered into the presence of his host in a room full of very prestigious guests. Amused at Jung's temerity, Li Ying asked, "And what relation, pray, do you have with me?" (*Chun yu p'u yu ho-ch'in* 君与仆有何亲)?" Jung explained that his ancestor Confucius (K'ung Chung-ni 孔仲尼) had once studied the rites with Li's ancestor Lao-tau (Li Po-yang 李伯阳). "*This means*," he continued, "that you and I have been close friends for generations (是仆与君亦世为通好也)!"

Naturally Li and all those present thought that explanation was pretty clever for a nine-year-old, so when another guest arrived shortly afterward, someone reported K'ung Jung's *bon mot* to him. The new arrival snorted and said, "Just because he's clever when he's little doesn't necessarily mean he'll amount to anything when he grows up (小时了了,大未必佳)." K'ung Jung snapped right back, "I imagine when you were little, you must have been clever (想君小时,必当了了)!"[6]

If we were to add up the fragments of dialogue I have just quoted from this single anecdote from chapter two, the translation would come to some sixty English words, representing exactly thirty-eight Chinese characters. Of course, if these were turned into modern colloquial Chinese, the contrast would not be so striking. But one cannot help wondering how many words actually were spoken during the original incident—amusing, of course, that the whole story is not pure fiction.

Expressions No Longer Found in Colloquial Mandarin

Turning now from the expressions which have left faint echoes in contemporary speech, let us examine examples in the *Shih-shuo* which appear to have been early colloquialisms that have since dropped out of the spoken language. In this murky domain I feel even more insure than before, but with the guidance of reputable scholars such as Yoshikawa Kojiro of Japan and Hsu Shih-ying 许世英 and Chan Hsiu-hui 詹秀惠 of Taiwan[7], I will cite a few cases that I believe qualify as such.

One of the most celebrated passages in the entire book is an expression of three words: *chiang-wu t'ung* 将无同. The man who coined the phrase won instant fame as the "Three-word Aide" (*san-yu yuan* 三语掾). Perhaps the reason the expression is so celebrated is that it is quite ambiguous. At least interpreters over the years have differed drastically in clarifying what it meant. In the eleventh century the poet Su shih 苏轼 (1036—1101) explained it as *ch'u-wu t'ung* 初无同, which is glossed in the *Tzu-yuan* as *ko-pu hsiang-t'ung* 各不相同, "dissimilar in every respect," "altogether different." Four centuries later, the Ming scholar Yang Shen 杨慎 (1488—1559) said it meant *pi-ching t'ung* 毕竟同, "in the last analysis similar," "basically the same" or, possibly, "Aren't they the same?" The latter implies that the speaker believes they're the same but is not interesting on it. One could also translate it as "Perhaps they're the same."[8] To test the validity of the last expression (which I favor), I will first quote the complete context of the original story of the "Three-word Aide" and follow with other incidents in the *Shih-shuo* where the expression *chiang-wu* occurs at the beginning of a statement, to see if this interpretation works in all cases. Here is the story of the "Three-word Aide."

> Since Juan Hsiu 阮修 (ca. 270—312, a nephew of Juan Chi 籍 of Bamboo Grove fame) had an excellent reputation, the grand marshal Wang Yen 王衍 (the same man who never let the word "cash" (*ch'ien*) pass his lips) called him in for an interview and asked, "The teaching of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu, and those of the Sage (Confucius)—are they the same or different?" (*t'ung-I* 同异)
>
> Juan replied, "*Aren't they the same* (*Chiang-wu t'ung*)?"
>
> The granted marshal liked his answer and appointed him his aide.[9]

If we were to accept the notion that Juan's three-word answer meant either "They're exactly the same" or "They're altogether different," there would be no clue as to why Wang Yen liked it. As a very vocal advocate of the current mode of "Mysterious Learning" (*hsuan-hsueh* 玄学), Wang would have welcomed an ambiguous answer and shied away from one which would have bound him to any absolute position. "Yes, of course," he would be thinking, "they are *basically* the same—both the Taoist philosophers and Confucius believed in the *Tao* (the basic principle by which things are what they are), but while Confucius

embodied the *Tao*, Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu just talked about it. So, no, they aren't quite the same, either."[10]

Now let us compare this incident with other cases in the *Shih-shuo* where statements were introduced by the expression *chiang-wu*.

Wang Jung 王戎 (234—305, one of the "Seven Worthies of Bamboo Grove") once said, "Although Wang Hsiang 王祥 (185—269, known for his filial devotion to a cruel stepmother) lived during the Cheng-shih Era (240—249, which produced many famous conversationalists), he himself was never numbered among the able talkers. Yet whenever anyone conversed with him, his reasoning went right to the center of the Pure and Remote. *Wasn't this* a case of his speech have been overshadowed by his virtue (*chiang-wu i-te yen ch'i-yen* 将无以德掩其言)?"[11]

Here I think the implied answer is "Yes, you're right, he was more famous for his virtue than for his speech, but perhaps he himself didn't want to be known as a conversationalist." The same kind of ambiguity is present in the next example.

Hsieh An 谢安 (whom we met earlier defending his "wordless" instruction of his sons) was once enjoying an outing on a lake near his hermitage in K'uai-chi 会稽 (in Chekiang) with several of his friends. A sudden squall came up and the wind was beginning to whip up the waves to alarming levels. While his companions were scrambling about the boat in a panic, urging that they return to shore, Hsieh seemed utterly oblivious and was whistling and chanting poems as if nothing were amiss. The boatman, observing Hsieh's serenity, continued to row the boat farther out into the lake. Finally, Hsieh began to be aware of his companions' panic and said very calmly, "If things are like this, *perhaps we should go back* (*Ju-tzu*, *chiang-wu kuei* 如此,将无归)?"[12] The force of this remark was "If you fellows are so panicky, I guess we should go back, but isn't it too bad to end such a wonderful outing?"

The next example also involves Hsieh An, but under very different circumstances. It seems he was very fond of gambling, and soon after his arrival in Chien-k'ang after many years of idyllic hermitage in the hills of K'uai-chi, he found himself no match for the fast crowd in the capital and promptly lost both his ox and his carriage in a game of *chaupar* (*shu-p'u*), an Indian dicing game that was in fashion there. Hobbling home on foot, leaning on his staff, he happened to run into his brother-in-law, Liu T'an 刘惔 (ca. 311—347), who was riding in a carriage. When Liu recognized him, he called out in evident concern, "An-shih 安石 (Hsieh's courtesy-name), *are you all right* (*chiang-wu shang* 将无伤)?" Stated literally, the question would read, "*Have you been hurt*?" It is the ambiguity introduced by the *chiang-wu* which conveys the sense of anxiety. Very relieved to see a friend, Hsieh climbed into Liu's carriage and rode back home with him. We are not told what he said to his wife when he got there.[13]

Some expressions carried over from classical times developed a slightly different function in the Six Dynasties. Such, for example, was the word *pien* 便, which in Han texts usually meant "instantly." In the *Shih-shuo* it had become a very weak connective, meaning "and

then," very much like modern *chiu* 就. In chapter four there is an account of a *ch-ing-t'an* session, where a sizable group of "able talkers" had gathered at the home of Wang Meng 王濛 (309—347) for a conversation. They had picked chapter 21 of the *Chuang-tzu*, "The Old Fisherman" (*yu-fu* 渔夫), as the focus of their discussion. The *shih-shu* text goes on to say:

> Hsieh An looked at the title, *and then* had each in turn make an explication of it (*pien ko shih ssu-tso t'ung* 便各使四坐通).[14]

Another case is the adverb *hsiang* 相, which in older texts always implied some kind of mutuality or reciprocity. In the *shih-shuo* it is often untranslatable and seems merely to imply that more than one person is involved. As an example, let us look at a story in chapter one concerning Hua hsin 华歆 (mentioned earlier in connection with the abdication of the last Han emperor) and Wang Lang 王朗 (d. 228). In the year 190, as they were fleeing by boat from Lo-yang at the time of Tung Cho's 董卓 (d. 192) removal of the Eastern Han capital to Ch'ang-an (modern Xi'an), they were accosted by another refugee needing transportation. Wang insisted, over Hua's objections, on taking him on board. Later they were pursued by bandits, and precisely for this reason that I hesitated in the first place. But since we've already acceded to his request, how can we now *abandon* him in an emergency (*ning-k'o i-chin hsiang-ch'I yeh* 宁可以急相弃耶)?"[15] In this case, one can't help feeling that the cadence of the six-word sentence demands an extra syllable before the verb, *ch'I* 弃. The final interrogative particle, *yeh* 耶, serves merely as punctuation.

The same seems to be true for the adverb *fu* 复, which normally means, "again," or "once more." In the *Shih-shuo* it is, indeed, also used with this meaning. But there are many cases where it seems merely to be an untranslatable space filler. One such case is found in chapter three, where chancellor Wang Tao 王导 (276—339) of the newly established Eastern Chin regime in Chien-k'ang (the old capital of the Wu Kingdom), in an effort to cement friendly relations with both the native Wu population and foreign visitors from the west, held a grand reception in his residence. Seeing a certain guest from Lin-hai 临海 (in Chekiang) named Jen Yung 任顒 looking alone and uncomfortable, he came over and greeted him warmly: "When you came here to the capital, Lin-hai was when left *without any people* (*Chun ch'u, Lin-hai pien wu-fu jen* 君出,临海便无复人)!"[16] Besides the rather bad pun on the man's name, *Jen* 任, and *jen* 人, "people," we find the word *fu* tucked between *wu* and *jen* in a grammatically anomalous function.

Another example of a seemingly superfluous *fu* can be found in the story cited above about the *ch'ing-t'an* discussion of "The Old Fisherman" chapter of *Chuang-tzu*. At the end of the discussion, after everyone had said his piece and felt satisfied that there wasn't anything more that could be said, Hsieh An raised a few "general objections" on the basis of which he went on to set forth from his own interpretation in over ten thousand words.

> (Afterwards, the monk) Chih Tun 支遁 (314—366) said to Hsieh, "You

rushed ahead without stopping, *and so it was just* naturally superb, that's all (*ku-fu tzu-chia erh* 故复自佳耳)!"[17]

One of the nuances preserved in most other Indo-European languages but lost in modern English is the degree of intimacy conveyed by the form of the second personal pronoun—the difference between *vous* and *tu* in French and *Sir* and *du* in German. Middle Chinese was equipped with similar distinctions, plus a good many more special pronominal substitutes suitable for particular situations. In the case of royalty vis-à-vis commoners, the distinctions were obvious, as in the following incident.

> When Emperor Wen of Wei (Ts'ao P'i 曹丕, r. 220—226) accepted the abdication of the last Han ruler (Emperor Hsien, r. 190—220), Ch'en Ch'un 陈群 (who had served under the formal dynasty) had a grieved expression on his face. The emperor said to him, "We (*chen* 朕) received the mandate in the response to Heaven. Why are you (*ch'ing* 卿) unhappy?"
>
> Ch'un replied, "Your vassal (*ch'en* 臣) and Hua Hsin 华歆 (another Han loyalist) cherish the former dynasty in our hearts, and today, although we rejoice in (your) sage rule (*sheng-hua* 圣化), still the old loyalty shows in our faces."[18]

There were many terms for addressing the emperor. "Sage" (*sheng* 圣) may have been excessive; it was used in this case somewhat sardonic effect. The most common address was *pi-hsia* 陛下, "Your Majesty"[literally, "(the ground) beneath the steps to your throne" — the highest a point a suppliant dared raise his eyes in addressing the throne].

But we expect such conversations in formal court language. What distinctions were observed between ordinary people? *Chun* 君, "my lord," "sir," was polite and deferential; *ch'ing* 卿, "you," was informal and familiar. *Erh* 尔 and *ju* 汝 were condescending, sometimes insulting. There were only a few of the possibilities. Chan Hsiu-hui 詹秀惠, following the lead of Hsu Shih-ying 许世英, has conveniently assembled all the pronouns and pronominal substitutes that occur in the *Shih-shuo* in the handbook *Shih-shuo hsin-yu yu-fa t'an-chin* 世说新语语法探究 (*Researches into the Grammar of the* Shih-shuo hsin-yu). I list a few of these here, realizing that some appear only once and were appropriate only to a particular situation.

For the first person: *wu* 吾, *yu* 余 and *yu* 予, "I"; *chen* 朕, "We" (royal); *shen* 身, "myself"; *min* 民, "this subject" (to a superior); *ch'en* 臣, "your vassal" (to a ruler); *pu* 仆, "your servant" (polite, to someone of comparable rank); *ku* 孤, "I, the Orphan" (royal, used by the successor); *kua'jen* 寡人, "I, the Deficient" (royal, or facetious); *Hsiao-jen* 小人, "this petty person"(humble); *chien-min* 贱民, "this humble subject" (to superiors); *hsia-kuan* 下官, "this lowly official" (to superiors); *ti-tzu* 弟子, "your disciple" (to Buddhist clergy); *p'in-tao* 贫道, "this indigent monk" (to a layman); *hsin-fu* 新妇, "this bride" (by a wife to her husband, or members of his family); *ch'ieh* 妾, "your concubine" (by a wife to her husband).

For the second person: *kung* 公, "your lordship" (to a superior); *tzu* 子, "you" (neutral); *tsun* 尊, "honorable sir" (to a superior); *tsu-hsia* 足下, "your excellency" (to one of equally status); *fu-chun* 府君, "governor" (to a superior officer); *hsien-sheng* 先生, "prior-born" (to a teacher or religious leader); *fu-tzu* 夫子, "Master" (to a revered teacher); *tao*-ren 道人, "reverend" (to a monk); *a-nu* 阿奴, "kid" (to a younger brother); *lao-tsei* 老贼, "you old rascal" (affectionate within the family); *Hsiao-lang* 小郎, "young master" (for young men of good families).[19]

Our English heritage provides us enough terms as least to approximate these subtle social distinctions, even though most Americans try to think that hierarchical class terms are archaic. But it is obvious even from the incomplete sampling I have given that a strain is being placed on the so-called English equivalents that are available.

I will close with two stories which illustrate rather nicely some of the gradations already mentioned. The first involves Wang Jung 王戎 (mentioned earlier as one of the "Seven Worthies of Bamboo Grove") and his wife, whose name, alas, is not known.

> Wang Jung's wife always addressed him with the familiar pronoun, "you" (*ch'ing* 卿). Wang said to her, "For a wife to her husband as 'you' is considered disrespectful in the rites. Hereafter, kindly do not do so again."
>
> His wife replied, "But I'm intimate with you and I love *you*—so I call *you* '*you*!' If I didn't *call you* '*you*', who else would *call you* '*you*' (亲卿爱卿,是以卿卿。我不卿卿,谁当卿卿)?"After that he always permitted it.[20]

As for the condescending terms *erh* 尔 and *ju* 汝, there is another story in the *Shih-shuo* about the last ruler of the Kingdom of Wu 吴 in the southeast, Sun Hao 孙浩 (r. 264—280). When the Chin Emperor Wu (Ssu-ma Yen 司马炎, r. 265—290) conquered Wu in 280, in a playful attempt further to humiliate the vanquished king, he said to Sun Hao, "I hear you southerners like to sing 'Y'all songs' (*erh-ju ko* 尔汝歌). Could you sing one for us?"

> Hao, who was just in the midst of drinking, raised his wine cup and toasted the emperor with the following song (in which he used the denigrating pronoun, *ju*, in every line):
>
> "Yesterday I was *y'all*'s neighbor; 昔与汝为邻
> But today one of *y'all*'s underlings. 今与汝为臣
> I pledged *y'all* a cup of wine, 上汝一杯酒
> And wish *y'all* ten thousand springs!" 令汝寿万春
> The emperor regretted having asked him.[21]

Notes

1. See Yoshikawa kojiro 吉川辛次郎, "Sesetsu shingo no bunsho" 世说新语の文章 (The Style of the Shih-shuo hsin-yu), Toho gakuho 东方学报 10. 2 (1939), 86 - 109 (reprinted with revisions in *Chugoku sambun ron* 中国散文选, Tokyo, 1949, 66 - 91); translated by Glen Baxter in *Harvard journal of Asiatic Studies*

18 (1955), 124 - 141.

2. *Shih-shuo hsin-yu* 世说新语 (hereafter, *SSHY*) Ⅰ, 36; Yu Chia-shsi 余嘉锡, *SSHY chien-shu* 笺疏, Peking, 1983, 38(hereafter, Yu); Richard Mather, trans., *SSHY: A New Account of Tales of the World* (Minneaspolis, 1976), 18(hereafter, Mather).
3. *SSHY* Ⅳ, 64 (Yu, 242; Mather, 125).
4. Ibid., Ⅳ, 23 (Yu, 214; Mather, 104).
5. Ibid., Ⅹ, 9 (Yu, 557—558; Mather, 281).
6. Ibid., Ⅱ, 3 (Yu, 56; Mather, 26).
7. Yoshikawa, op. cit.: Hsu Shih-ying 许世英, "*Chin-shih hsia-chi kuan-li tui shang-chi tzu-ch'eng yueh 'min'*" 晋时下级官吏对上级自称曰民 (On Low-ranking Officials Calling Themselves "This Subject" When Addressing Superiors), *Ta-lu tsa-chih* 大陆杂志 27. 9 (1963), 273 - 282; (same author), *T'an - t'an SSHY "chien"-tzu te t'e-shu yung-fa* 谈谈世说新语见字的特殊用法 (On the Special Use of *chien* in the *SSHY*), *Ta-lu tsa-chih* 25. 10 (1961), 297 - 303; (same author), *SSHY-chung ti-i-shen ch'eng-tai-tzu yen-chiu* 世说新语中第一身称代词用法 (A Study of the First-personal Pronouns in the *SSHY*), *Tanmkang Review* 淡江学报 2(1963), 1 - 24; Chan Hsiu-hui 詹秀惠 *SSHY yu-fa t'an-chiu* 世说新语语法探究 (*Researches into the Grammar of the HHSY*), Taipei, 1972.
8. Chan Hsiu-hui, op. cit., 322 - 326.
9. *SSHY* Ⅳ, 18 (Yu, 201 - 209; Mather, 101).
10. See the similar conversation between Wang Pi 王弼 (226—249) and P'ei Hui 裴徽 (fl. 230—249) in *SSHY* Ⅳ, 8 (Yu, 199; Mather, 96).
11. *SSHY* Ⅰ, 19 (Yu, 22; Mather, 11).
12. Ibid., Ⅵ, 28 (Yu, 3692; Mather, 190).
13. Ibid., ⅩⅩⅢ, 40 (Yu, 753; Mather, 385).
14. Ibid., Ⅳ, 55 (Yu, 237; Mather, 120).
15. Ibid., Ⅰ, 13 (Yu, 14; Mather, 8).
16. Ibid., Ⅲ, 12 (Yu, 175; Mather, 86).
17. Ibid., Ⅳ, 55 (Yu, 237 - 238; Mather, 120 - 121).
18. Ibid., Ⅴ, 3 (Yu, 281; Mather, 147).
19. Chan, op. cit., 1 - 104.
20. Ibid., ⅩⅩⅩ, 6 (Yu, 922; Mather, 488).
21. Ibid., ⅩⅩⅤ, 5 (Yu, 781; Mather, 402).

选文三　Translating Ming Plays: *Lumudan* (*The Green Peony*)

Cyril Birch

导　言

本文选自 Eugene Eoyang 和 Lin Yao-fu 主编的论文集 *Translating Chinese Literature*，美国印第安纳大学出版社出版，1995。

作者 Cyril Birch(白之)为伦敦大学中国文学博士，后执教于美国加州大学伯克利分校，

教授中国文学和比较文学，退休后任该校名誉教授；论著、译著和编著有 *Mistress and Maid: Jiaohongji.* (2000), *Scenes for Mandarins: the Elite Theater of the Ming* (1995), *Studies in Chinese Literary Genres* (1974), *Anthology of Chinese Literature from Earliest Times to the Fourteenth Century* (1967), *Anthology of Chinese Literature* (1965—1972), *Chinese Communist Literature* (1963), *Chinese Myths and Fantasies* (1961), *Stories from a Ming Collection: Translations of Chinese Short Stories Published in the Seventeenth Century* (1958)等。当下选择的文章是白之对自己翻译的明代吴炳的剧作《绿牡丹》所做的说明。《绿牡丹》是一部喜剧作品，讲的是谢英和车静芳、顾粲与沈婉娥两对富有才华的青年男女的婚姻经过，揭露了明代科场的弊端，讽刺了不学无术的纨袴子弟车尚公、柳五柳。戏剧有着明确的人物身份、角色关系和情节线索。所以，在接受翻译时，剧作中的对白、唱词在译文中仍要反映原文中的这些内容。这就跟诗歌翻译有很大的不同。《绿牡丹》中出现了一些诗歌，其中包含的意象、意蕴与诗歌作者的社会身份和性别身份都是契合的。这种契合关系译文中也必须得到充分的体现。白之还强调了戏剧批评对翻译的重要性，认为"批评对翻译之所以重要，是因为包括总体的格调到翻译者在文本给定之处所做出的具体选择在内的翻译的本质，都会受到最初对作品题材类型评估的影响"。对戏剧批评的参照有助于戏剧的翻译。白之对戏剧批评的参照方式具体表现为将《绿牡丹》同莎士比亚的剧作《无事生非》进行了类比。这两出戏无论是在人物设置、情节结构、整体风格上都极其相似。这些类比不仅可帮助白之理解《绿牡丹》这出戏剧的方方面面，同时对他的翻译也提供了译入语文化中的相关理据。

文章最后又回到了《绿牡丹》的作者明代剧作家吴炳的身上。这位剧作家所处的时代正逢明末。此时满清入关，明朝溃塌。吴炳是出于一种对明王朝的忠心创作了这出戏。他利用讽刺的手法表达了对科举制度的不满，但是这种不满又是建立在"怒其不争、哀其不幸"的心态之上的。白之在翻译这部剧作时联系这个时代背景和作者心态来体味剧作的讽刺风格，并试图将这种风格传达给英语读者。

One of the practical issues that I raised in my keynote address to this conference (see "Reflections of a Working Translator" in this volume) was the question of partial translation or abridgment. As a test case I put forward some of those long, rambling, and often quite uneven *chuanqi* plays of the late Ming-early Qing period. While it may be reasonable to expect a superb masterpiece like Tang Xianzu's *Mudanting* or Hong Sheng's *Changshengdian* to prove attractive to the Anglophone reader, there are simply too many plays of the second rank that would surely turn out to be, as I suggested, oppressively pedantic, repetitious, and boring. Yet the delights to be found among these works should not be allowed to stay hidden forever. Perhaps the day will come when the entire oeuvre of a dramatist such as Wu Bing will be available in English translation to a public which has acquired sufficient familiarity with the life and culture of traditional China to enjoy them. But I believe this day is not yet here, and meanwhile I propose the translation of selected scenes as a worthwhile stopgap solution.

In the later part of my "Reflections" I briefly described two of Wu Bing's five plays.

Xiyuanji (*The West Garden*) is, I believe, of a nature and quality to merit complete translation, the sooner the better; *Lumudan* (*The Green Peony*) is a different matter. It contains much wit and beauty and some scenes of hilarious comedy both high and low; but it is, in my view, too specifically aimed at a particular feature of late Ming life, the abuse of the examination system of official selection, to be enjoyable to readers who have not to some degree specialized in the study of Chinese history and Literature. What I propose would be to translate a single scene or a selection of scenes and to attempt to make this small sampling of the play intelligible and enjoyable for the general reader by providing the appropriate kind of introductory material. This essay presents a draft translation of one scene from *The Green Peony* (Scene 18, "Alcove Quiz") preceded by the kind of introductory comments I believe to be needed for its enjoyment.

The first requirement is to define the mode of the play. This is in fact about the last decision critics make, since it relies on their conception of the entire play and a process of comparison with various other plays known to them. They get little help from traditional criticism in this regard, since Chinese plays were usually categorized either by theme type or by (subjectively determined) lyrical quality. In defining *The Green Peony* as a stylish romantic comedy with a strong component of satire, I draw on a rough comparison with the nearest play in English, *Much Ado about Nothing*. Parallels among the comic devices used are interesting but not nearly as illuminating as the total dissimilarity in the nature of the villains. The clownish "villains" of *The Green Peony* are in fact the butts of the satire; they reveal the author's underlying purpose to be the attack on abuses of the examination system.

To introduce an extract, a synopsis of the action of the whole play is no doubt helpful, but since this is also the most boring thing one can do, it should be done as briefly as possible. The new Chinese Encyclopedia (*Zhongguo Da Baike Quanshu*; Beijing and Shanghai, 1983) contains an excellent brief synopsis, and this I borrow, modifying my translation by identifying the role types of the dramatis personae. This permits me then to exhibit the overall structure of the action as a pattern of pairs and triangles, a kind of complicated minuet in which the leading characters evolve from three pairs of friends into two triangles of potential material partners.

Wit, as in *Much Ado*, is the prime criterion of the pairing of the lovers of *The Green Peony*, but the preoccupation with examination prowess means that wit must be defined here as poetic ability. One of the outstanding literary features of the play is indeed the way in which the poems composed by the protagonists stand as surrogates for these young people, who, under the kind of segregation common to late Ming households, have never set eyes on each other. The importance of these poems to the pattern of action and to the total impact of the play requires that they be translated and analyzed in detail, even for the purpose of introducing a single scene in which the only poem to appear is a piece of almost senseless doggerel.

The ideal introduction would include some trenchant comments on the traditional

examination system itself; for the present purpose I substitute a brief reference to Wu Bing's own experience of and concern with this dominant feature of his society.

To begin, then, with our brief synopsis: Shen Zhong (*wai*, or FATHER), scholar of the Hanlin Academy, forms a literary club in order to select a husband for his daughter Wan'e (*xiaodan*, or COMPANION). In a club meeting held in the format of a literary examination, each member composes a quatrain on the set topic, "the green peony." Liu Wuliu (*jing*, or VILLAIN) deputes his resident tutor, Xie Ying (*sheng*, or HERO), to supply his poem for him, while Che Shanggong (*chou*, or CLOWN) asks his sister Jingfang (*dan*, or HEROINE) to ghostwrite his; only Gu Can (*xiaosheng*, or FRIEND) composes his own poem. HERO and HEROINE fall in love upon reading each other's poems, but for much of the action HEROINE confuses the identities of HERO and VILLAIN. After viva voce examination, the machinations of VILLAIN and CLOWN are exposed. HERO and FRIEND pass high on the list of the official examinations, and in the finale HERO and HEROINE and COMPANION are joined in marriage.

This simple synopsis shows us seven principals. If we exclude the FATHER we are left with six young people who in the course of the action perform an elaborate minuet of groupings. There are, first of all, three pairings in terms of the traditional role types of Chinese opera. HERO (juvenile lead) and FRIEND (secondary male character) are *sheng* and *xiaosheng*; HEROINE and COMPANION are *dan* and *xiaodan*, and VILLAIN and CLOWN are *jing* and *chou*. In each of these pairs the person listed first takes the leading position. HERO must mate ultimately with HEROINE, FRIEND with COMPANION; and in the machinations of the negative characters the initiative is taken always by VILLAIN while CLOWN plays the sidekick part. In this way we get two new pairings, of the marital kind, while the VILLAIN-CLOWN combination remains unchanged and through to the end of the play, which finds them appropriately dishonored and discomfited.

The six young people form also, it will readily be seen, two triangles, the VILLAIN, as chief negative character, has set his sights on the female lead, the HEROINE, so that we have a triangle of HERO-HEROINE-VILLAIN. The CLOWN, since the HEROINE is his own sister, must center his desires on the secondary female figure, the heroine's COMPANION, which gives us a second triangle of FRIEND-COMPANION-CLOWN. We may diagram the pattern of these groupings as follows:

Pairs of friends



Triangles of marital partners



At this point we may look more closely at the boy-girl pairings. The matches of the

lovers are made on the quality of their wit, as displayed in poetic composition. Significantly, their status as wits, and therefore as lovers, is exactly the reverse of the social position they occupy at the beginning of the play. HERO XIE Ying might in fact be described as a refugee, the scion of a family displaced from the Northern Song capital of Bianjing (modern Kaifeng) by the "crossing to the south" when the dynasty retreated to Linan (Huangzhou), yielding up most of the lands north of the Yangzi to the Jin dynasty of the Jurchen invaders. Xie Ying now occupies the unenviable position of a poor dependent tutor in the household of the rich wastrel Liu Wuliu (VILLAIN). Our HERO is thus on a distinctly inferior social level tot that of his FRIEND, Gu Can. This young literatus is associated with Xie Ying only by virtue of shared interest in fine writing, but he is an old family friend of the distinguished Hanlin academician Shen Zhong (FATHER in our schema).

As with the men, so with the young women. HEROINE Che Jingfang is presented to us merely as the improbably sister of the CLOWN Che Shanggong. Their parents are deseased, and although Che Shanggong is evidently rich enough to keep up with Liu Wuliu, his companion, in the classic pursuits of drinking, gambling, and whoring, Liu himself reflects (in a monologue early in Scene 16) that Che Jingfang would not compare with COMPANION Shen Wan'e as a material catch. Again, the supreme social ranking is that of FATHER Shen Zhong. Like the HERO, our HEROINE Che Jingfang also must rely on superior literary skill rather than social status to justify her leading part in the action of the play.

Since the exercise of wit in poetic composition is the determining factor in the pairing of these lovers, it is clear that anyone wishing to present this play to English readers would have to be very careful in translating the poems composed by the lead characters. I should like now to give my translation of a few brief extracts from the play to illustrate my point.

A series of poems carries the identities of the principals, acting as it were as surrogates for them when social proprieties prevent them, boy and girl, from meeting in person. The first of these poems is composed at her father's request by the *xiaodan*, Shen Wan'e, as follow:

SHEN ZHONG: Since you are so enamored of it, why not dash off a little verse, in the manner of Xie Daoyun hymning the snow?

WAN'E: (Tune: Yu baodu)

Dust gathers on brush and instone
lax for so long to prepare silk for writing.

(Aside):

Concerned lest verse composed at this moment of spring's approach
Should tease my idle heart to the brink of sorrow;
yet how today should both remain silent,
fair bloom and seductive maid, no word from either?
Then must I perforce
study the hawk-cuckoo and bewail the spring!

SHEN ZHONG: Have you finished your poem?

WAN'E (recites her composition):

A sip of wine among the flowers,
choice lines press their claim,
But impatience yields to shame, to lack
the gifts of the poetess Xie.
Springtime blouse declines
to compete with flowers' finery
green sleeves henceforth
will show a special cut.

SHEN ZHONG: Distinction in the aspect of the flower, distinction in the feeling of the verse; no verse but this could match this flower, no flower but this could inspire this verse. Delightful! Phoenix, another cup of wine!

As is normal in Chinese verse, no pronoun, whether "it" or "she," appears in Wan'e's quatrain. Obviously the first couplet relates to the poet herself; it is she who is drinking and she who laments the inferiority of her own talent to that of the third-century poetess Xie Daoyun (the Xie of the scene's title, Xie yong, "Ode in the Xie Manner:" it is part of the playwright's feminist ploy, surely, that the HERO Xie Ying shares the surname of one of the most celebrated women poets in China's history). But the light spring blouse, with its green sleeves, of lines three and four is both the dress Wan'e herself is wearing or will wear and a metonymy for the peony which is her subject. The woman who is composing the poem becomes the green peony itself, which cannot match the reds and yellows for gorgeousness but has its own "special cut."

Though not quite the equal of the supremely talented HEROINE Che Jingfang, Shen Wan'e here demonstrates her gift for composition, just as later, in Scene 6, "Clandestine Critique," she shows herself a discerning judge of poetry. It is this latter scene that sets before the audience the hard evidence for ranking HERO Xie Ying and HEROINE Che Jingfang as the prime pair of lovers, with FRIEND Gu Can and COMPANION Shen Wan'e herself subordinated to them. The contest has taken place, the ghostwriters have made their contributions, and FATHER Shen Zhong has ranked the three entries. Now Shen Wan'e reads out the poems of the three contestants which she has found on her father's desk:

WAN'E (reads out Liu Wuliu's poem [which is actually the work of Xie Ying]):

Profusion of blooms from the hands of Yao and Wei
vie to be first to open,
But this is sought in vain
in the Temple of Mercy gardens.
Roll up the blind when the rain stops
to enjoy the clearing sky—
Surely it is the freshness of moss

Reflected in this flower!

[Several varieties of peony took their names from their cultivators, the Yao and Wei families of the city of Luoyang, which was famous for its flowers. The Temple of Mercy, Ci'ensi, was founded in the Tang capital of Chang'an. Though its gardens contained both the earliest- and the latest-blooming varieties, the green peony, as the poem indicates, was not to be found there.]

This is the most wonderful verse-making in the world; no wonder my father ranked it number one.

(She reads out Che Shanggong's poem [which is actually the work of Che's sister Jingfang]):

If not the scion of prized blooms
that grow on Tianpeng Mountain
Would it challenge the red and purple
in contests of the fragrant?
In vase of slender neck
the color of rain-washed sky
A single stem might well suit
a coiffure of "green clouds."

No less charming than the previous piece, this can only be placed second.

(She reads out Gu Can's poem):

Jade-green as the light sea-swell,
emerged as mountain mist,
A flower that wears so fair a face
must know how it is loved,
As if the name it bears
should still be remembered
Though Li Bo, the "Green Lotus Master,"
Chose the wrong hues to praise!

[Syntactic inversion in the fourth line does not make this poem any easier to read. Gu Can alludes to the same story already cited by Shen Wan'e in Scene 3, quoted above, of Li Bo's composition on imperial command. Li's verses praised red, purple and white peonies but missed the green, even though his own cognomen was "Master of Green Lotus."]

Powerful in concept, evidently an expert literary talent, an injustice to relegate him to third place...

(Tune: Yi chun le)

Making clandestine judgment
Silently I ponder:

The line about the "freshness of the moss reflecting in the flower" seems to soar in such a natural way—how could I ever match that?

Women, you must graciously accept defeat!

The line in my own poem, "Green sleeves henceforth will show a special cut," is authentically feminine; but the line in the second-place poem, "A single stem that might well suit a 'coiffure of green clouds'"—this too smacks a little of paint and powder!

If not a dweller in maiden's chamber
how came so subtle a concept to tease this poet?
First the image of emerald sleeves' new mode
and then, to match, "green clouds" of woman's hair!
(She laughs:)
Smart scholar,
filching a line from the boudoir
for his own skillful use.
And I do not think the third-place poet is in any way less gifted than the other two!

(Tune: Xue shi jie cheng)

A scatter to bright pearls flung in the face—
no easy task to find a match!
The first two answers
by chance won favor with my connoisseur father—
yet you should not be bringing up the rear!
Willing to be placed third
when ranking is so difficult
you'll stay for now in lowly state.

We have reached only the sixth of the thirty scenes of the play, not one of the four young people has yet set eyes on his or her future partner, and yet the love affinities are already crystal clear. Two facts strike us at once. First, no matter who claims to have authored the poems (and, of course, a major part of the fun of the play arises from the business of ghostwriting, as hero and heroine stand in for villain and clown at examination time), two of the four are obviously of feminine origin. When in Scene 7 the academician Shen Zhong claims Wan'e quatrain as his own work, Gu Can immediately protests that the author must be female—and young. The self-comparison with the "poetess Xie (Daoyun)" and the self-identification with flower in green-sleeved blouse make the case clear. Turning to the second of the three poems recited in Scene 6, there is feminine air to the phrase "contests of the fragrant" (which could refer to competition between pretty women as well as flowers), and boudoir touches in the images of the slender-necked vase and the cloud-style coiffure (each suggestive of the allure of the poet herself).

The second obvious fact is the close affinity between the first and second poems of Scene 6, which are indeed the quatrains by HERO and HEROINE respectively. Each of the two quatrains opens with a couplet proclaiming the rare quality of its subject, the green peony not to be found even in the gardens, famous for their peony collection, of the Temple of Mercy

in Chang'an, but surely descended from the green variety listed by the Song poet Lu You in his catalogue of peonies at Tianpeng Mountain in the southwestern province of Sichuan. By this time we should be receptive to the notion that in each poem the flower that is the topic stands for the poet's own itself, put forward as a rare prize in the marital stakes. But the truly remarkable correspondence between the first- and second-ranked poems is in the identical comparison of the flower's color with the pale turquoise green of the sky after rain. Though the color is the same, the two poets use different phrasing to define it and pursue different associations from it. The male poet, the HERO Xie Ying, looks upward and outward from his study window to "enjoy the clearing sky": his action and attitude are evidently symbolic of his aspirations for his career, which in the old cliché will place his feet above the clouds once examination success has secured a place for him in the official world. The woman who composes the second poem, the HEROINE Che Jingfang, in contrast looks downward and inward to the vase in her boudoir. She in her imagination sees the flower as bloom: hers is the claustrophobic feminine view, not the sweep of vision which in the brilliantly original figure of the first poem sees the moss of the path reflected from the sky upon the petals of the green peony, the subject image which unifies the whole quatrain.

The one poem we have not yet considered, the quatrain by the FRIEND Cu Can which is placed in the third ranking in Scene 6, is more contrived than the first two, more far-fetched and at the same time less original in its imagry. The images are undoubtedly appropriate to a male poet, outdoor vision of sea waves and mountain mists, and the poet's aspiration is daring enough as he summons up the revered figure of Li Bo in the last line. Gu Can, like the two women poets, personifies the flower as a beautiful woman in his second line, but he does not identify himself with it; rather, he may be seen as delicately suggesting his own readiness to attach his affections to the work of the COMPANION Shen Wan'e who will be his choice as bride.

As mentioned, if one were looking for a possible parallel to *Lumudan* from English dramatic literature one might settle on *Much Ado about Nothing*. But why should one be looking for anything of the kind? My answer would be that the comparative perspective can be helpful to critical evaluation. Even in a crude kind of analogue study like the one I am suggesting now between totally unrelated works, I at least find it a comfort to be able to move in on a new and unfamiliar well for a long time and that shows a number of similar feature and devices.

And just as an incidental comment: Shakespeare provides a handy resource for this kind of purpose. He has so many advantages: close in historical time, protean in the range of his art, analyzed through the centuries with microscopic care, performed all the time everywhere so that one can consider his plays from the aspect of stage as well as study. Better drama criticism has flowed from Shakespeare studies, no doubt, than from any other area; and criticism is important to the translator, because the nature of a translation, from its overall tone down to the specific choices the translator will make at given points of the text, will be

affected by the estimate originally made of the work's generic type.

So we will consider *Lumudan* as a comedy of wit along the lines of *Much Ado*, noticing first the clear parallel in the matter of the pairing of lovers. Cu Can and Shen Wan'e, more elevated in social standing but with distinctly inferior poetic gifts, parallel the rather colorless couple Claudio and Hero, while Che Jingfang and Xie Ying are the Beatrice and Benedict of *The Green Peony*. This is why Jingfang and Xie Ying fill the type roles of heroine and hero, dominating the action just as Beatrice dominate *Much Ado* (which has at times, indeed, been known by their names rather than by the title Shakespeare gave it).

Then, as we turn from the successful lovers to the would-be gallants, villain and clown, we become more and more aware of correspondences in the comic structure of the two plays. Liu and Che, negative characters, in their fruitful pursuit of the gifted and beautiful young ladies, must present themselves as scholarly men of outstanding merit. The means they choose to perpetrate this swindle are the classic devices of comedy; we are in the world of mistaken identities, impostures, and deliberate falsifications familiar to us from *Much Ado* and the whole tradition of Italian comedy from which it stems.

We may list in short order some noticeable parallels: both plays being comedies of wit, the negative characters among their dramatis personae will be by definition include specimens of witlessness to offset the principals. In *Much Ado* these include the celebrated manglers of words, the pre-Malaprop perpetrators of malapropisms, Dogberry and Verges; in *The Green Peony*, the negative characters, Liu Wuliu and Che Shanggong, are themselves the prize ignoramuses, whose first display of verbal incompetence is the gross misreading of the topic set for the poetry contest (in Scene 2).

As for impersonation, in Scene 9, "Seeking the Handsome One," the go-between nurse Qian puts some pointed questions to Xie Ying under the misapprehension that he is Liu Wuliu. Xie, amused by the woman's evident matchmaking intent, for no apparent reason allows the error to stand, which of course leads to further complications. Similarly, in *Much Ado* Don Pedro's undertaking to impersonate Claudio is weakly motivated in terms of rationale, but useful to the dramatist for comic plotting purposes; again, where Shakespeare inserts a masked ball into his action to facilitate a whole series mistaken identities, Wu Bing has his characters attach false names to their literary composition, with similar consequences in terms of comic misunderstanding; one result of such misunderstandings is the kind of talk at cross purposes which runs all through the masked ball scene, and is found in *The Green Peony* in Scene 18, when Liu Wuliu insists that he is truly the author of the atrocious doggerel that Xie Ying has cooked up for him. As examples of deliberate misinformation, we could cite from *Much Ado* the Friar's plan to announce the death of Hero and from *The Green Peony* the false report of examination results engineered by Liu and Che in Scene 29.

But when we look more closely at Liu and Che we see them as quite different in kind from the negative characters, Don John and Borrachio and the others, of *Much Ado*. Though we have used the term *villain* for Liu Wuliu, we must stress that this is only a coarse,

general translation for the role type *jing*, which more precisely indicates something like "leading character of the pair *jing-chou*, often negative, possibly violent, occasionally villainous." Liu Wuliu is certainly not a villain in the sense of Don John, the very type of the Shakespearean bastard consumed with envy of those more fairly favored. Liu and Che are more fools than knaves. Nothing in *The Green Peony* comes close to melodrama; there is no parallel to the vile traducement of Hero, the threat of Hero's death, or the order Beatrice gives Benedict to assassinate his friend.

For now we must stress the fundamental difference in intent of Wu Bing's comedy. Wu Bing is not writing of love threatened by spiteful envy, nor of love denied by scornful wits who by the end of the play will have their eyes opened even as their pride is humbled. For Wu Bing's characters, love means the recognition and reward of talent; but the real purpose of his writing is not so much to celebrate love as to castigate the self-love of foolish imposters. Where for Shakespeare satire constitutes merely one element, the substance of the Beatrice and Benedict subplot, for Wu Bing satire is the fundamental justification of his play. The primary and specific target of the satire is the abuse of the examination system by shallow men with deep pockets, men who could afford to bride examiners, to pay surrogates, to buy their way into the ranks of the scholar-officials who ran the country and monopolized social prestige.

Even the briefest consideration of Wu Bing's life history will explain this concern. He is honored by Chinese scholars as a Ming loyalist. He was styled Wu Shiqu, "Stone Gully," and used the pen name Canhua zhuren, "Bright Flower Master." He was born in Yixing in the east coast province of Jiangsu in 1595, developed poetic skills as a boy, and passed the third degree examination of *jingshi* at the age of twenty-four. For twenty-five years he served as a Ming official, rising at one time to the important position of superintendent of schools for Jiangxi province. Evidently his knowledge of examination procedures and their abuse was the fruit of years of experience. He wrote five major plays, of which the best known is not *The Green Peony* but a romantic comedy, *Xiyuanji* (*The West Garden*), whose ghostly lovers owe much to Tang Xianzu's *Peony Pavilion*. When Wu Bing was close to fifty, in 1644, the Manchu invasion reduced the Ming dynasty to abortive attempts at revival in the south and west of the country. Wu Bing continued his service to the dynasty at the court of the prince Yongming in the south, taking the rank of secretary of the Board of War and scholar of the Eastern Cabinet. He was taken prisoner in a mop-up operation by the Manchus in 1647, and the following year he died of starvation, supposed to have been self-imposed in demonstration of his unshaken loyalty to the native dynasty.

It is a far cry from the light satirical comedy of *The Green Peony* to the loyalist martyr's suicide, and we should do wrong to take Wu Bing's "villains" too seriously. Still, it is clear that for much of his life Wu Bing watched his beloved Ming imperial order being undermined by worthless and corrupt place seekers and pseudoscholars until it was shaky enough to collapse at a push from the new Manchu power. In *The Green Peony* he works his revenge on

a breed of rich idlers with absurd pretensions to learning and taste. As models for such men he established Liu Wuliu and Che Shanggong as his *jing-chou*, or villain-clown combination, of these two, Liu is the more cunning rogue, Chet hr slow-witted hanger-on; both are vain, self-indulgent, and fundamentally stupid. They dominate the major comic scenes, which follow their adventures as candidates for examination in pursuit of the hand of the heiress Shen Wan'e. And here I come at long last to my point in all this, which is that precisely the problem with the play for a modern English reader is the monotonously reiterated satire of this whole series of examination scenes.

I will end my comments on the play with a brief mention of three scenes, strategically placed through the action, which are basic to the characterization of Liu and Che and in this way central to Wu Bing's satiric purpose. All are examination scenes. Ostensibly they depict friendly literary contests held under club rules in a domestic setting; in fact the audience is perfectly aware of the parallel with the official halls of examination, in the provincial or national capital, where the prize will be not the hand of a local beauty but entrance into the imperial bureaucracy with its open avenues to wealth and fame.

Scene 5, "Club Meeting," sets the pattern for the chicanery of Liu Wuliu and Che Shanggong, as their servants smuggle into the examination room the poems their surrogates have composed for them. Scene 25, "Examination by the Rules," is essentially a repeat performance, with the difference that on this occasion the rules against leaving the room or communicating with outsiders are strictly enforced.

Scene 18, "Alcove Quize," is the central major comic scene in which the essential stupidity of Liu and Che is exposed, and this is the single scene I would choose to present in translation to the English reader as representative of the entire play. The scene turns poor Liu Wuliu inside out. He is onstage throughout, most of the time seated at his examination desk, where he shows every sign of embarrassment and discomfort. He is a rich idler, overfed and overdressed, ill fitted to the confines of the scholar's desk. Being totally incapable of literary composition, he can only stretch and yawn, drum his fingers, and pretend to be humming his lines over; in fact he is dividing his time between waiting for his crony to bring him the answer Xie has promised to write for him and trying to crane his neck round the curtain to catch a glimpse of the deletable Che Jingfang, his examiner and intended bride.

Behind the curtain Miss Che is accompanied by her old nurse. Miss Che, as is only proper, never leaves the privacy of her alcove, but the nurse emerges from time to time to bully poor Liu, especially at the point where he is strutting and mincing round his half of the stage in the absurd attempt to impress the young lady with his elephantine "elegance."

The comings and goings from the alcove to the "examination hall" proper are complicated also by Miss Che's brother, Che Shanggong, the clown who is Liu's crony. He serves as a sort of go-between in this scene, smuggling in the crib to the hapless examinee, skulking onstage and off in vain, the virtues of Liu's ghosted poem before his sister. By the

end of the scene even Che Shanggong has given up on Liu, who is left alone on stage completely discomfited.

All in all, the construction of the alcove scene is a fine example of Chinese dramaturgy, where, in the absence of sets and scenery of any kind beyond a couple of poles supporting a simple curtain, the groupings and movements on stage are skillful orchestrated for maximum comic effect, until in the climatic concluding lines of the scene the heroine Che Jingfang finally condescends to read out loud the absurd "poem" which the hero has conned the hapless villain into submitting as his own work.

第二节 哲学典籍的翻译

选文一 Translating Chinese Philosophy

Roger T. Ames

导 言

本文选自 Chan Sin-wai 和 David E. Pollard 主编的 *An Encyclopaedia of Translation: Chinese-English · English-Chinese*，香港中文大出版社，2001。

安乐哲现为美国夏威夷大学哲学系教授、夏威夷大学和美国东西方亚洲发展项目主任、《东西方哲学》主编、《国际中国书评》主编。他的学术贡献主要包括中国哲学经典的翻译和中西比较哲学研究两大部分，研译了中国哲学经典如《论语》、《中庸》、《道德经》、《孙子兵法》等。

他在文章中认为翻译中国哲学文本的难度不在于句法的处理，而是体现在对词汇的迻译上。如果用西方哲学中的术语、概念和范畴来置换中国哲学的术语、概念和范畴，那么就会让中国哲学词汇负载上西方的宇宙论，从而导致文化的简约主义。这种翻译的简约主义是造成西方没有把中国哲学同西方哲学等量齐观的原因之一。

安乐哲持有一种假定，那就是在一个文化概念系统背后都隐藏着特定的世界观。那么，中国哲学的概念系统背后也一定隐藏着与西方哲学不同质的世界观。翻译要避免异质性世界观之间的相互替代。在西方哲学内部，哲学家们为了对抗过去的或传统的哲学，会通过使用有别于先前的概念系统来实现这种对抗图谋。比如，为了抵御西方传统的形而上学二元论倾向，有些西方现代哲学家就是从制定新的一套语言概念开始的。怀特海和皮尔斯企图利用新造概念绕过传统的哲学假设；现象学家为了阻止隐在的形而上学假设而提出了一套显在的方法论体系；阐释学派则挑战所谓的"方法"自身，寻求揭示"所给物的神话"。可见，语言概念系统对于哲学观念的决定作用非常之大，西方哲学内部各流派之间的对峙都是依靠语言概念作为武器的。那么，在翻译哲学文本时，翻译者更应该慎之又慎地处理哲学概念和范畴的翻

译问题，否则，哲学概念和范畴的表面对等，实质上背后深藏的是整个异质性哲学前提的置换。

安乐哲据此建议在翻译中国哲学文本之前，西方译者要充分意识到他们所面对的是一个完全不同的世界观。所以，在翻译中要保持一种阐释的敏感度，避免草率的类比。中国哲学词汇离西方哲学的语汇和概念系统越远，用西方语言去论说的恰切性就越小。每一种语言都是为了其所表述的文化特质量身定做的，文化之间的差异越大，用各自的语言表述对方的难度也就越大。西方哲学遵循一种首要的不变的原则，假定了事物本源的存在。这种超验的原则是从上往下的，维持着万事万物的秩序，不管这个本源是外在于我们的神灵还是内在于我们的本性。这种将永恒的本质看作比变动不居的现实更为真实的假定使得西方哲学呈现二元论的组织模式。如上帝/世界、实在/表象、知识/判断、理性/经验、精神/肉体、形式/实质等等，这些概念总是以前者统领和宰制着后者的组织秩序在西方哲学体系内部运作着。

相比较而言，中国哲学中的概念则具有变动性和当下生成性，概念与主体之间有着相互构成性。如果在翻译中对中西哲学概念只是简单地进行类比置换，这些特点就会被抹杀掉。因此，安乐哲试图在中国哲学文本的翻译中抵抗这种因概念置换而带来的哲学基本前提的置换。他以《中庸》的“天命之谓性，率性之谓道，修道之谓教”的英译为例，指出了两位译者在处理其中概念的翻译时都存在置换中西哲学前提之虞。这两位译者的翻译存在着一个悖论：用西方概念置换中国哲学概念的初衷都是为了将原文的意义明晰化，最后却适得其反，遮蔽了原文所表达的中国哲学理念。安乐哲提供了自己的译文，目的就是把原文具有中国哲学特质性的内容识别并表达出来，以免其消融在西方哲学理念所主导的阐释和表述中。

In reflecting on where we are in the translation of the Chinese tradition into Western languages, I want to begin from a blind that has impeded progress on this front from our first sustained encounters with China in the seventeenth century, and which continues to block our way in the present moment.

From the outset, and particularly over the last century, the classical Chinese corpus has been carefully studied by philosophically trained translators with adequate, and sometimes exceptional, language skills. Philosophy as a discipline, however, has not entertained the Chinese tradition as “philosophy,” and has made its contribution to the introduction of the Chinese tradition to the West only in fits and starts. As a consequence, the major problem confronted by the Western humanist in attempting to use the translated materials lies not as much in the syntax of the translated materials as in the lexicon which forms it—the semantic content of the core philosophical vocabulary is not well understood. Simply put, our existing formula of terms for translating the core philosophic vocabulary is freighted with a cosmology not its own, and thus perpetuates a pernicious cultural reductionism.

There is a circle. The twentieth century Western philosopher's ambivalent attitude toward the Chinese tradition and the reluctance of the discipline to legitimize it as an area of philosophical inquiry, is traceable to the translator's impoverishment of its lexicon. And the

inadequacy of the lexicon is an important measure due to the marginalization of culture and history entailed in the positivist's program, which precluded professional philosophical interest in the Chinese tradition. The Chinese texts are neither interesting nor philosophically important when reduced to the cultural importances of our own tradition. Uncritical assumptions about "humanity" as a category and the fear in some quarters that too much difference leads to incommensurablitity, has disguised and obscured the radical degree of difference we owe the Chinese in observance of their distance from us as an exotic and radically different order of humankind. An alternative inventory of presuppositions has been at work in the growth and elaboration of Chinese civilization, and the failure on our part to excavate and acknowledge this difference in our translations has rendered the Chinese world view deceptively familiar. And when an alternative philosophical tradition is made familiar, and at the same time, is adjudicated on standards of rigor and clarity foreign to it, it can only be an inferior variation on a Western theme.

To *begin* translating Chinese philosophy into Western languages, we must recognize this problem of reductionism, and formulate a strategy for avoiding it. The purpose of this essay is modest: it is only to try to persuade sinologists that we do in fact have a problem.

The degree of this philosophic difference (and indifference) can be anticipated historically. The civilizations that share the Indo- European group of languages are certainly many and diverse, but by virtue of trade, war, population movements, and the imperceptible dissemination of ideas entailed by such context, they have over past millennia developed a cultural family resemblance. The movement among these cognate Indo-European languages lulls us into a sense of shared conceptual ground that is illusory when addressing the more exotic tradition.

Philosophers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger return to the conceptual clusters of pre-Socratic Greek as a strategy for getting behind the dualistic metaphysics dominant in the received Platonic-Aristotelian-Christian tradition, and for recovering alternative philosophical possibilities. Both philosophers are persuaded that a particular world view is sedimented in the languages of a culture and the systematic structure of its concepts, encouraging certain philosophical possibilities while discouraging others. As Nietzsche speculates,

> The strange family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and German philosophizing is explained easily enough. Where there is an affinity of languages, it cannot fail, owing to the common philosophy of grammar—I mean, owing to the unconscious domination and guidance by similar grammatical functions—that everything is prepared at the outset for a similar development and sequence of philosophical systems; just as the way seems barred against certain other possibilities of world-interpretation. (Nietzsche, 1996)

In translating Chinese philosophy, we need to guard against universalizing assumptions prompted by what we are members of only one language family, take to be the nature of

language itself.

Other Western thinkers who have been self-conscious about side-stepping the underlying dualistic tendencies of Western philosophy have produced alternative linguistic strategies. Whitehead and Pierce invented neologistic categories which could be defined in such a way as to skirt traditional presuppositions. The phenomenologists proposed an explicit methodology for precluding implicit metaphysical assumptions. The hermeneuticists, in challenging "method" itself, have sought to expose "the myth of the given."

The Chinese, having developed the technology to explore the world earlier than the European powers, have been resolutely centripetal and parochial—a "stay-at-home" culture. For them, the Great Wall has over the millennia served as a man-made reiteration of mountain, desert and sea to isolate their sub-continent—serving them as much as a cultural screen as a physical barrier against foreign invasion.

The prominent French sinologist, Jacques Gernet, argues that when the two civilizations of China and Europe, having developed almost entirely independently of each other, first made contact in about 1600, the seeming inaptitude of the Chinese for understanding Christianity and the philosophic edifice that undergirded it was not simply an uneasy difference in the encounter between disparate intellectual traditions, but a far more profound difference in mental categories and modes of thought, and particularly, a fundamental difference in the Chinese conception of human agency (Gernet, 1985). Much of what Christianity and Western philosophy had to say to the Chinese was, for the Chinese, quite literally nonsense—given their own philosophic commitments, they could not think it. And the Jesuits interpreted this difference in ways of thinking quite specifically as ineptness in reasoning, logic and dialectic (Gernet, 1985).

The west feared little better in its opportunity to appreciate and to appropriate Chinese culture. In fact, it fared so badly that the very word "Chinese" in the English language has come to denote "confusion," "incomprehensibility," "impenetrability"—a sense of order inaccessible to the Western mind. The degree of difference between our dominant sense of order and that prevalent in the Chinese world view has plagued our encounter with this antique culture from the start. With Eurocentric savants seeking corroboration for our own universal indices in the seventeenth century, we idealized China as a remarkable and "curious land" requiring the utmost scrutiny (Mungello, 1985). The engine of the industrial revolution altered this image utterly. Europe and America, accelerating full speed into the nineteenth century under the banner of inevitable progress, lost all esteem from China. The earlier versions of an exotic Shangri-La plummeted from "Cathay" idealizations to the depths of disaffection for the inertial of what, in the comparison with our own industrial and commercial growth, was cast as a moribund, backward-looking and fundamentally stagnant culture.

To begin translating Chinese philosophy, then, we will, at the very least, have to recognize that we are dealing with a fundamentally different world view. As such, we will

certainly require a vigilant hermeneutical sensitivity to stave off facile comparisons. And the more distant the lexicon of Chinese philosophy is from our own vocabulary and conceptions, the more likely it is that our own languages will have difficulty in accommodating our discussion of it. After all, each of the world's languages is "specialized" in saying particularly well those things necessary to address unique features of its own natural and social conditions, and hence, the greater degree of difference among cultures, the greater degree of difference in translating among the languages that express them.

In our recent study, *Thinking through Confucius*, David Hall and I elaborated a discussion between a logical and aesthetic sense of order. The distinction has been useful in bringing into contrast certain features of the dominant Indo-European world view and Chinese alternative to it, and can be extended to focus important differences between dualistic and correlative modalities of thinking, and the kinds of "reasoning" that attends them. While some scholars will take exception to the necessary simplification entailed in making the broad characterizations which follow, I would argue that the only thing more dangerous than making cultural generalizations, is failing to make them.

To establish a working contrast, the gross lines of our own sense of order can be sketched in the following terms. Our own cultural experience, going back to ancient Greece, was to deny the reality of change, and to pursue the permanent *arche* behind the transitory. In Plato, this productivity separated an immortal soul from the temporality of physical, sensual existence; it separated the universal and objective form of beauty and justice and all things good from their shadowy reflection in particular phenomena; it separated rational principle as an Archimedean point in the changing world of experience; it separated and elevated "scientific" knowledge (*theoria*) over practical and productive knowledge. With the melding of Greek philosophy and the Judeo-Christian tradition, the immortality of the soul was guaranteed, the universal principles of truth, beauty, and goodness came to reside in God-head, and a rational theology promised that an understanding of the world constructed by the light of reason was consistent with and a complement to that higher knowledge available through revelation and faith. In this tradition, just as God's punishment imposed on human beings for their initial sin was mortality and change, so His reward for obedience is permanence.

The signal and recurring feature of the "archic" sense of order which emerged to dominant the development of our philosophical and religious thought was the presumption that there is something permanent, perfect, objective and universal which, existing independent of the world of change, disciplines it and guarantees natural and moral order—an eternal realm of Platonic *eidos* or "ideas," the One True God of the Judeo-Christian universe, a transcendental strongbox of invariable principles or laws. Behind a seemingly random Nature are the unchanging natural laws that control it. Behind the changing and culturally variable moral standards are unchanging moral principles. Behind the ambiguity of both natural and moral order is an unalterable principle of reason that enables us to pursue

clarity and intelligibility. The model of a single-ordered world in which the unchanging source of order stands independent of, sustains, and ultimately provides explanation for the sensible world, is a familiar if not often an unconscious assumption in our tradition.

The pervasiveness of this world view is easily demonstrated. Take, for example, the many different ways we organize and categorize historical data to explain our past. The many alternative periodizations we use to make historical distinctions—Christian, Marxist, Hegelian, or that of modern science—share one feature in common. They are teleological, presupposing some cosmic meaning and design. They assume some determinative beginning and a linear process whereby we achieve some inevitable end.

Our sense of order, then, tends to be cosmogonic, assuming an initial beginning and privileging the primal, unchanging principle that causes and explains that origin and everything that issues from it. There is implicit in this world view a primacy given to some transcendent principle: it is a top-down, disciplining order which can be discerned as unity and intelligibility, whether it exists external to us as Deity or internal to us as the hardwiring of our essential nature. It is a determinative "given"—a source of order independent of our own actions.

The ontological disparity between the transcendent source of order and the world that it orders—the assumption that what is permanent is more real than what changes—generates the familiar dualistic categories through which philosophical reflection has largely been pursued in our tradition: God/world, reality/appearance, knowledge/opinion, reason/experience, mind/body, cognitive/affective, form/matter, essence/accident, nature/nurture, and so on. In each of these paired distinctions, the former member owns a place of privilege and stands independent of the second, explaining the second member while not itself being explained by the second. The shadowy world of experience is dependent on reality for its explanation, but appearances, far from explaining reality, distort and obfuscate it.

Hehel, himself committed to this familiar notion of a transcendent order, was typical of nineteenth century Western thinkers when in his *Philosophy of History* he said of China

> its distinguishing feature is that everything which belongs to Spirit—unconstrained morality, in practice and theory, Heart, inward Religion, Science and Art properly called—is alien to it. (Hegel, 1956)

What would possess Hegel, unquestionably one of the greatest philosophers and intellectuals of our tradition, to revile China in such blunt and deprecatory terms? In his account of the Chinese world view, Hegel(1956) continues:

> Moral distinction and requirements are expressed as Laws, but so that the subjective will is governed by these Laws as by an external force. Nothing subjective in the shape of disposition, Conscience, formal freedom, is recognized. Justice is administrated only on the basis of external morality, and Government

exists only as the prerogative of compulsion ... Morality is in the east likewise a subjective of positive legislation, and although moral prescriptions (the *substance* of their Ethics) may be perfect, what should be internal subjective sentiment is made a matter of external arrangement ... While we obey, because what we are required to do is confirmed by an *internal* sanction, there the Law is regarded as inherently and absolutely valid without a sense of the want of this subjective confirmation.

This perception of China as a culture internally inert and hence externally animated, is hardly obsolete. In Paul Cohen's *Discovering History in China*, his basic argument is that although more subtly framed, this same perception is very much present in our recent generation of historians who describe China's halting emergence into the modern world as a reaction to the imposed Western challenge (Cohen, 1984). Cohen takes critical exception to contemporary historians who would apply Western conceptual models such as "impact-response," "tradition-modernity," "undeveloped-imperialist," and so on, as "overarching intellectual constructs," unknowingly inflating our cultural importances to become what is more important for the Chinese experience. That is, Cohen's position is not to deny the relevance of Western pressures, which are real enough, but to call for a balanced assessment of this period which gives significance to the more exotic internal dynamics at work in China's challenging dispositions.

How do we escape our own presuppositions, then, to discern and articulate the internal impetus that gives definition to both change and order in the traditional Chinese world view? Jacques Gernet(1985), in comparing the two cultural experiences, observes:

According to Aristotle, it is normal for all things to be at rest, whereas for the Chinese, in contrast, universal dynamism is the primary assumption.

In describing the largely failed encounter between the Jesuit missionaries and the Chinese intellectuals, Gernet ascribes the mutual misunderstanding to this contrast between externally exposed order assumed in our tradition, and the Chinese assumption that order is immanent in and inseparable from a spontaneously changing world. It is for this reason that the Chinese had no need of a willful God-head:

Believing that the universe possesses within itself its own organizational principles and its own creative energy, the Chinese maintained something that was quite scandalous from the point of view of scholastic reason, namely that "matter" itself is intelligent—not, clearly enough, with a conscious and reflective intelligence as we usually conceive it, but with a spontaneous intelligence which makes it possible for the yin and the yang to come together and guides the infinite combinations of these two opposite sources of energy.

The Confucian assumption traditionally has been that personal, societal, political, and cosmic order are coterminous and mutually entailing, and further, from the human

perspective, this order is emergent in the process of one's own self-cultivation and articulation.

Importantly, the Chinese world view is dominant by a "bottom-up" sense of order. Rather than beginning from some originative principle, it starts from a welter of disparate and competing details, and registers order as it emerges from their interrelationships. It is "anarchic" in the sense that it does not posit the existence of some independent *arche*, some pre-assigned design in explanation of natural order. As a tradition, it is not fundamentally metaphysical in the way so familiar to us from the classical Greeks, assuming as they did that the most basic questions and the highest knowledge is dependent upon a science of first principles. The traditional Chinese world view can in contrast be described as an aestheticism, concerned for the artful way in which particular details can be correlated efficaciously to produce the *ethos* or character of concrete historical events and cultural models. Order like a work of art begins with always unique details, from this's and that's, and emerges out of the way in which these details are juxtaposed and correlated. As such, the order is resolutely immanental—the striations in stone, the coloration that differentiates the various layers of earth, the symphony of the morning garden, the veins in the leaf of plant, the wind piping through the orifices of the earth, the rituals and roles that constitute a communal grammar.

The Chinese sense of order is captured and represented by several images in the classical tradition. The term, "harmony" 和, describes a situation in which the myriad of unique things correlate themselves in interdependent relationships such that each of these things, maintaining its own integrity, construes itself in such a manner as to enhance the other environing members of the complex while at the same time benefiting from their contributions.

The relative absence in the Chinese tradition of Western-style teleology has encouraged the perception among Western historians that the Chinese, with libraries of carefully recorded yet seemingly random detail, are inadequate chroniclers of their own past. From the perspective of our more rationalistic world view, the penalty paid for the absence of that underlying metaphysical infrastructure necessary to guarantee a single-ordered universe is the large measure of intelligibility and predictability assumed by Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. The compensation for this absence is a sense of the immediacy and wonder of change, and one's complicity in it—the motive for revering the *Book of Changes* as the ultimate defining statement of the tradition.

Order is not imposed from without, but is inherent in the process of existence itself, as are the rights of the tree trunk, the veins of the stone, the cadence of the ocean. "Causes" are not external to act upon an inert world, but internal to a dynamic process of change in which "that which causes" and "that which is caused" is not a legitimate distinction. If "reasoning" is the discovery of reasons or causes, how does it work in such a world? And how is it different from our own? It is essential we ask this question if only to rescue the

Chinese tradition and its corpus from the inadvertent "rationalization" in has suffered from the first substantive contacts between our Western cultures and the Chinese world.

Having attempted to make explicit certain presuppositions distinguishing Western and Chinese cosmology, we can now turn to the project of translating Chinese philosophical texts and reflect on the consequences of having failed to acknowledge this difference. David Mungello in exploring the origins of European sinology contrasts the first Western translation of the opening lines of the *Zhongyong* 中庸, one of the Confucian *Four Books*, edited by the Jesuits Philippe Couplet *et al.* in their *Coufucius Sinarum Philosophus* (1969), with his own rendering of the same passage. I want to take Mungello as my example here not because of weakness, but because of deserved strength. By current sinological standards, his work is beyond reproach. It is not the work of Mungello, but the current sinological standards, that I take as the object of my critique.

> *Philippe couplet*:
>
> That which is placed into man by Heaven (*t'ien ming* 天命) is called the rational nature (*hsing* 性). Because this is fashioned by means of nature and imitates it, it is called a rule (*tao* 道) or is said to be in harmony with reason. Repetition to the point of diligently practising this rule (*hsiu tao* 修道) and one's own regulating of it is called education (*chiao* 教) or the learning of virtue.
>
> *David Mungello*:
>
> That which is mandated by Heaven is called one's inherent nature. Fulfilling one's inherent nature is called the *Tao* (the way). Cultivating *Tao* is called philosophy/religion.

There is no question Mungello's translation attemptd to avoid the rationalistic assumptions of the seventeenth century Jesuits, but I would suggest even Mungello's translation, while syntactically accurate and certainly representative among responsible contemporary English versions, is still burdened by a set of essentialistic presuppositions which are not only alien to the Chinese world view, but which distort it beyond recognition. What is the translator's responsibility to the reader? Mungello's translation is not wrong; it is misleading. In what he conveys to his reader, his translation is far closer to the Jesuits whom he critiques than to what the *Zhongyong* itself is trying to say.

Implicit in Mungello's language is a teleological conception of "human nature" which conjures forth in the mind of the non-specialist student of Chinese culture a potentiality/actuality distinction and the Judeo-Christian conception of soul. The tendency will certainly to be interpret 性 broadly as, quoting Donald Munro, "a 'given' that exists from birth" that "cannot be altered through human action." (Munro, 1979) Benjamin Schwartz, in his support for the conventional interpretation of 性 as "a 'heavenly endowed' or 'heavenly ordained' tendency, directionality, or potentiality of growth in the individual," is encouraged by what he perceives to be a "striking resemblance" between 性 and the Greek

Phuo (to grow) and the Latin *nascor* (to be born). (Schwartz,1985) But it is precisely the absence of cosmogonic beginning in the classical Chinese conception of creativity that renders just such a seeming resemblance deceptive. By formulistically translating 人性 as "human nature," we will prompt in our readers what we generally mean in our tradition by "human nature"— the genetically given.

I have argued elsewhere that the prevailing interpretations of 性 have been inappropriately skewed in favor of what is continuous, general, and enduring about the human being at the expense of what is novel, particular and creatively achieved. (Ames, 1991) That is, the interpretative prejudice has stressed an historical "given" as opposed to what the human being makes of himself. A more adequate interpretation of 性 will necessarily reflect the appropriate distance between the familiar conception of human nature as a psychobiological starting point—an internalized, universal and objectifiable notion of human being—and 性 as an historically, culturally and socially emergent definition of person. For classical Confucianism, one's humanity is not decidedly precultural, but preeminently and distinctively a cultural construction. Said another way, 性 dose not have primarily a labelling or reference function, but rather requires explanation culturologically as something defined and enacted in community. We can only redress this interpretative problem by highlighting the existential, historical and cultural aspects of 性 which have been undervalued in our standard reading of this conccept.

In the translation of 天 as "Heaven," there is an implicit separation between transcendent Creator and creature. Again, the unsuspecting reader, in the absence of any caution, is encouraged to read capitalized "Heaven" as "God." How then, do we import the classical Chinese term, 天,into our vocabulary?

In reconstructing 天, I want to try to recover what has been lost in conventional translation. In studying the Chinese corpus, the translator consults dictionaries that encourage one to believe that many if not most of the characters such as 天 have "multiple" alternative meanings from which one, informed by the context, is required to select the most appropriate. This approach to the language, so familiar to the translator, signals precisely the problem I am most concerned about.

I would suggest that with appearance of any given term in the text, with varying degree of emphasis, the full seamless range of meaning is introduced. And our project as interpreters and translators is to negotiate an understanding and rendering that is sensitive to both context and to this full undifferentiate range of meaning. 神, for example, does not sometimes mean "human spirituality" and sometimes "divinity." It always means both, and moreover, it is our business to try and understand philosophcially how it can mean both. What are the implications of this particular range of integrated whole and to fathom how the character in question can carry what for us might well be a curious, often unexpected, and sometimes even incognition of difference. The inseparability of "human spirituality" and "divinity" would suggest an alternative to transcendent, "independent" Deity is at work

here, and would also suggest the possibility of themorphism: the ascent of the human being to divine status.

In the *Shuowen* 说文 lexicon, 天 is defined paranomastically as 颠, "top of the head," "the highest." Etymologically, it is either explained as a "combined-meaning" 会意 character— "the one great"—大, or, from the oracle bones and bronzes, as a pictograph of an anthropomorphic deity.

The standard English translations for 天 are: (1) the material heavens, the firmament, the sky; (2) the weather; (3) a day; (4) Heaven, Providence, God, Nature; (5) husband; (6) indispensable. They contrast rather starkly with those provided by the Morohashi: (1) the sky; (2) 气; (3) the movement and pattern of the heavens; (4) the sun; (5) the spiritual/divine 神; (6) nature, what is so-of-itself; (7) rule 君; (8) father; (9) indispensible; (10) a period of time; (11) a day; (12) 阳 (as opposed to 阴); (13) one's lot; (14) one's entire process of growth 性, one's person 身; (15) great.

On the basis of these sets of meanings, we can make several observations that reinstate aspects of 天 that tend to be concealed by the translation, "Heaven."

First, the association between 天 and the sky encourages proper notice of the profound temporality and historicity that attends this notion. 天 is inextricably linked to the processs of change. 天 futher is a patterned sky. Deity is thus defined as the "day" and the "skies" under which culture accumulates rather than as some more disjunctive atemporal and aspatial "other."

Secondly, 天 as 气 is psychophysical, making it a hylozoistic deity. 天 is neither pure spirit, nor a material firmament. Rather, it is a psychosomatic sea in which the processes of life are played out.

A third point is that 天 is both *what* our world is and *how* it is. It is both cosmos itself and order of the cosmos; both creator and the field of creatures. There is no apparent ditinction made familiar in related notions of the Daoist 道 and the Buddhist *dharma*. On this basis, then, 天 can be described as an immanental, emergent order negotiated out of the dispositioning of the particulars that are constitutive of it.

Fourthly, 天 is categorial—it is self-so-ing. While it might be argued that it is in some sense cosmological, it is definitely not cosmogonic. There is nothing antecedent to it; there is no beginning to it or end of it. There is no distinction between nature and its power of organization and generation.

Fifth, 天 is anthropomorphic, suggesting an intimate relationship with the ancestor euhemerization that grounds Chinese ancestor worship, and which is the ultimate source of the Shang dynasty's 帝. There seems to be sufficient reason to assume that 天 is consistent with the claim of the anthropologists. Sarah Allan and Emily Ahern, that Chinese gods are dead people. (Allan, 1979; Ahern, 1981) It is not surprising, then, that the relationship between *mythos*, *logos* and *historia* is radically different from our tradition. Culturally significant human beings—persons such as Confucius—become 天, and 天 is itself made

determinate in their persons.

A six point is that 天 is not only culturally specific, but also geographic. The discovery of a new and sophisticated culture would anticipate the discovery of a 天 representative of that culture. One would expect other cultural traditions to have a 天 of their own.

Finally, 天 does not speak, but communicates effectively although not always clearly through oracles, through perturbations in the climate, and through alterations in the natural conditions of the human world. Given the interrelatedness and interdependency of the orders defining the Confucian world, what affects one affects all. A failure of order in the human world will automatically be reflected in the natural environment. Although 天 is not a "personal" deity responding to individual needs, as in the Christian world, it would seem that 天 functions almost automatically and impartially to maximize the possibilities of emergent harmony at all levels.

Mungello, in translating 道 as "the *Tao*" using a definite article and then capitalizing *tao* introduces a notion of univocal Truth which does not belong to the classical Chinese world view on which he is reporting.

道 is not to be "metaphysicalized" as some single, objective and universal truth which one satisfies in the shaping of one's character. The intelligible pattern that can be discerned from each different perspective in the world is 道—a pathway which can in varying degrees be traced out to make one's place and its context coherent. Rather than a spatial form, it is the determinacy of a temporal flow inherent in the process of change. 道 is, at any given time, both *what* the world is, and *how* it is; *what* is ordered, and *how* it is ordered. In this tradition, there is no final distinction between some independent source of order, and what it orders. There is no determinative beginning. The world and its order at any particular time is self-causing, so-of-itself 自然. For this reason, explanation does not lie in the discovery of some antecedent agency or the isolation and disclosure of relevant causes. Rather, any particular event or phenomenon can be understood by mapping out the conditions which collaborate to sponsor it. Importantly, these same conditions, once understood, can be manipulated to anticipate the next moment. It is for this reason Confucius would say that "it is the person who extends order in the world 道, not order that extends the person." Truth, beauty and goodness are not "givens"—they are something done.

Mungello's translation of the *Zhongyong* passage, while foregrounding our philosophical importances, pays the unacceptable penalty of concealing precisely those meanings which are most essential to an appreciation of its differences. This penalty is unacceptable because it is surely the possibility of identifying and appropriating what is not already ours that motivates the translation in the first place. The irony is that we serve clarity in highlighting what makes sense in our own conceptual vocabulary only to bury the unfamiliar implications which in themselves are the most important justification for the translation. My concern, then, is that through the process of translation, we must identify and lift to the surface those peculiar features of Chinese philosophy that are in danger of

receding in our reading and interpretation of the texts. Arendering which, although contesting our present lexicon and the kind of formulistic translation that it encourages, is more responsible to the underlying Confucian assumptions outlined above, might be:

> The constitutive relationships between human beings and their world are what is meant by the nature and character of human life; according with and developing this character is called making one's way; and the shaping of one's way is called learning. (Ames, 1991)

In this essay, I have attempted to recover some of those dimensions of the classical terms, 性,天,and 道 that have concealed by the conventional translations, "human nature," "Heaven," and the *Tao*, respectively. From this exercise, it becomes clear at least that a formulistic translation of these term puts at risk a great deal that is philosophically significant. Our choices of how to resolve this translation problem are several, and yet all seem inadequate. The easiest and most common move has led to our present predicament—we search our inventory of philosophical terms and select that equivalent recommended by our own experience. What has not been properly noticed is this approach often resolves ambiguity at the expense of equivocation and cultural chauvinism. A second option is to muddle through, attempting to do justice to as many of the different connotations as possible by providing novel terminological equivalents. This effort usually leads to clumsy neologisms. On the positive side, given the relative unfamiliarity of these new terms, they sound a warning that we have entered distant and exotic philosophical terrain. If we can rely upon our readers to exercise their imaginations, these neologisms might even bring some novel complex of meanings into relief. More likely, however, such attempts will impress our impatient readers only as mystifications. Finally, we may try to avoid begging the question by simply retaining the original language in the form of a transliterate symbol of the word or character in question as we do with 道,风水,气,and so on. Can we communicate classical Greek philosophy without the bare minimum of *logos*, *phusis*, *nous*, *nomos*, and so on?

While the resolution to the translation problem remains beyond the ambitions of this essay, my purpose has been served to the extent that I have alerted those who must read the Chinese tradition through even the most acclaimed and authoritative of the Western language sources to the very real limitations of this exercise. Until the translators are ready to abandon the current lexicon, and to recognize that, like it or not, we cannot avoid interpreting the Chinese tradition in our translation projects, any such reading in the Chinese corpus can only be an invitation to a tentative understanding. Only by devising strategies to self-consciously factor the basic differences recoverable from the philosophical presuppositions of the respective traditions into the work of translation can we begin to put the myth of "objectivity" behind us.

选文二　中国哲学文本的诠释与英译——以《齐物论》为例

沈清松

导　言

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对中国哲学文本的正确理解与诠释,是研究与翻译中国哲学的基础。解析中国哲学文本,需用严谨的诠释方法来处理,也要让文本自身说话。本文首先讨论作者对于中国哲学文本的诠释原则,随后再以评析 Burton watson 和 Angus Graham 对于《庄子·齐物论》的英译例释之。作者将"动态的脉络主义"(dynamic contextualism)看作是解读中国原典的原则,并认为文本的写作与阅读皆是某种语用的动作。据此作者提出了四项循序渐进的一般性诠释原则:文义内在原则、融贯一致原则、最小修改原则、最大阅读原则,其中较后的原则是以假定了已实现较前的原则为前提的。换言之,虽然文本总会邀请读者对其进行哲学思索,而读者也总可以凭借各种理论与方法对某一文本作"最大阅读",然总须依序尊重"文义内在"、"融贯一致"与"最小修改"等原则。在此四项一般原则下,还须尊重中国哲学文本的特性,尤其是其中喜好运用"隐喻"与"叙事"的特点(虽然不乏概念与论证),用以表达"形象—观念"之关系,而后者与其默观、艺术、道德与历史经验不可分割。最后,针对特定文本,还需留意该文本作者或学派本身提供的诠释原则。

根据上述原则,并依据《庄子·齐物论》本身文本的语用的动态发展,作者将《庄子·齐物论》区分为七大段落,并逐段讨论其义理与 Burton Watson 和 Angus Graham 的英文译本之优劣,整体说来,是在讲庄子时评译文,在评译文中讲庄子,借其相互照明,以阐发作者的哲学见解。

一、引言:中国哲学与文本诠释

有关中国哲学原典的阅读、诠释与翻译的问题,涉及中国哲学研究与西方汉学研究的基本问题。诚然,关于"中国哲学"一词的指涉范围,吾人不能仅抱持唯有研究中国哲学史或传统中国哲学题材的活动与成果,才堪称为中国哲学的想法。所谓"中国哲学"应可指谓中国人基于对本有传统的继承与批判,针对一般哲学问题、传统哲学题材和当前世界问题,所做之基础性、整体性、批判性的研究和思考。其间虽可运用不同方法与理论,但总会涉及对于传统中国哲学文本的诠释。

换言之,中国学者或西方汉学家对于中国哲学的研究,无论其性质如何,都会涉及他们对于中国哲学原典的理解与诠释。至于中哲原典的外文译本,其本身往往就是译者研究成果的

表现。此外，有许多外文的中哲研究，往往是建立在一些被认可的译本上。也因此，外文的各种中哲研究，都会涉及译本及原文解读的问题。本来，翻译就是一种诠释的过程。“诠释”一词的希腊文 Hermeneuia 的原意包含了“说出”(to say)、解释(to explain)、翻译(to translate)三层意思。西方近代诠释学的发展，也和翻译有密切的关系，举例来说，诗莱玛赫(F. Schleiermacher，一译施莱尔马赫)的诠释学，和他以德文翻译柏拉图作品有密切关系。在本文中，我首先要提出我对诠释一般哲学文本的四项原则，中国哲学文本的特性，以及庄子原典提供的文本类型，并据此来解读《庄子·齐物论》，以之作为释例，顺便也要针对 Burton Watson 和 Angus Graham 的英译①，略做检讨。

诚然，“诠释”活动并不限于“翻译”。对于任何形式的意义表达，无论是图像、音声、说话或书写，都涉及理解与诠释的基本活动；至于“翻译”则涉及在不同语言与文化系统的脉络下，运用另种语言(例如英语)来传述某一原属语言(例如中文)产出的文本，以说出其对该文本的理解与诠释。不同语言与文化系统之间的交流，需要相互理解与相互诠释，而后者需能用自己的语言来说出。文化与思想的交流涉及我所谓的语言获取(language appropriation)与相互外推(mutual strangification)，在其中不同文化与思想的人走出自己熟悉的本地风光，用对方可以懂的语言来说自己的思想与文化，或用自己人可以懂的语言来获取对方的语言与文化。为此，我将翻译置于语言获取与相互外推的脉络中。正是在这一点上，翻译的工作功不可没，也是在这一点上，我同许多非汉语的中国哲学工作者一样，都对 Burton Watson 和 Angus Graham 的英译甚为钦佩。不过，就中国哲学研究而言，基本工夫在于对中国哲学文本的理解与诠释，这也是翻译中国哲学文本所必须具备的，翻译的成功与否也与此息息相关；然而，研究中国哲学不止于翻译，这是不辩自明的。

就诠释学而言，翻译与真正的理解与诠释之间往往仍有差距，对此，高达美(H. - G. Gadamer，一译伽达默尔)在《真理与方法》(*Truth and Method*)中言之甚详。高达美甚至表示，“当有必要翻译之时，必须虑及原本文字的精神与其译作之间的差距……理解一种外国话表示我们无 需将之翻译为我的语言。当我们真能掌握一种语言时，便无须翻译——事实上，任何翻译都似乎是不可能的”②。我本人虽承认此一差距，但我没有高达美对翻译这般悲观。值得注意的是，高达美说这话时，是以“交谈”作为诠释的范式来思考的，并不能完全符合“文本”研究的特性。我曾论述由海德格尔经高达美到吕格尔(P. Ricoeur，一译保罗·利科)的诠释范式的转变，并详加评述，凸显以文本为范式的吕格尔诠释学的重要性。③由于篇幅所限，不再冗赘。由于文本有其客观性与结构性，晚近诠释学再度温习了诗莱玛赫的遗产。在本文中，我试图接续吕格尔的思路，并重读诗莱玛赫的诠释学手稿，以之为论述之资。就中国哲学研究

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① 我所针对的是 *Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, translated by B. Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); *The Seven Inner Chapters and Other Writings from the Book Chuang tzu*, translated by A. C. Graham (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981; reprint by Hackett Publishing Company, 2001)。本文随后对此二种译本之引用，分别在两位译者名后加上页码以作标识。

② Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hermeneutik I, Wahrheit und Methode, Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck: 1990), S. 388. 须注意，高达美是以交谈为范式，认为最适当的语言是交谈，至于文本，高达美认为书写本身就包含了自我异化。在我看来，文本有其成为固定符号以后的沉淀，会阻碍读者把它还原为一种交谈的关系，并不一定能达成亲临性的理解。文本有由于符号固定化而产生的距离，不能完全用交谈中的亲临性来处理或要求亲临的理解。

③ 参见沈清松：《吕格尔》(台北：东大图书公司，2000)，页 71—90。

而言，对于中哲文本的理解与诠释，是中哲研究与翻译的基础，为此，以下先讨论我对中哲文本的诠释原则，随后再评析 Burton Watson 和 Angus Graham 对于《庄子·齐物论》的英译，在讲庄子时评译文，在评译文中讲庄子，借其相互照明，以例释我对中国哲学研究方法论的哲学见解。

二、动态的脉络主义与一般文本诠释四大原则

首先，我对解读中国哲学原典有一根本主张，我称之为"动态的脉络主义"(dynamic contextualism)，意思是在一篇中哲文本中，一词、一句、一段落的意义，须从与其他词、句、段落的互动以及在字与词、词与句、句与段、段与全文等的动态进展脉络中来解读。就某种意义言，这是在中哲文本中，将"整体与部分"的诠释循环，加以动态操作化的结果。所谓"整体与部分"的诠释循环，是出自诗莱玛赫诠释学的启发。诗莱玛赫提出所谓"普通诠释学"(general hermeneutics)，其中"文法的诠释"涉及在语句中了解语词，在段落中了解语句，并认为其间有一种循环关系，所谓"越了解部分，就越了解整体；越了解整体，就越了解部分"①。好比说柏拉图的《对话录》，读者若能对其中一字、一句越了解，则他对整个《对话录》也就会越了解；若对整个《对话录》越了解，也就会越了解其中的一字、一句等。如果他又能多了解柏拉图的其他著作甚或古希腊哲学的其他著作，那么他对《对话录》的了解又会更多。

如此注意文本的整体运动的阅读方式，不同于只注意关键词(key words)或关键概念(key concepts)或关键句(key sentences)的读法，后者是借由选取重要语词、语句，来主导整段文本的诠释。在只留意什么是文本中的关键概念与关键句之时，往往会忽略整个文本的语用运动，甚或忽略了文本的层次脉络。早期儒家的"断章取义"，较近于关键概念与关键句的读法，例如孔子读《诗》，往往取其关键句以显示要旨。比如在《孔子诗论》中，论及《大夏》之时，曰："'怀尔明德'，曷？诚谓之也。'又命自天，命此文王。'诚命之也，信矣。孔子曰：'此命也乎。文王唯裕也，得乎？此命也。'"②全篇诗章仅取"怀尔明德"、"又命白天，命此文王"数句，以之为关键句，加以诠释和评论，说出了对文王之德的赞颂，并表现文王之德是其承受天命的主体依据。又如《论语》中子曰："诗三百，一言以蔽之，曰思无邪。"(《论语·为政》)其中"思无邪"一语原取自《诗经·鲁颂·駉》："駉駉牡马，在坰之野。薄言駉可者……以车绎绎。思无邪，思马斯徂。"其中"思"乃语助词，意乃吆喝之声，而非动词"思想"之意。孔子不但从中断章取义，而且赋予了创造性的意义。由此可见，儒家的诠释学可以导向一种创造性的读法，赋予了原来文本没有的意思。然而，就思想史而言；我们须具备道家"物各付物"的精神，注意文本的整体运动的阅读方式，让文本呈现其自身整体的意义及其动态的进行。为了达此目的，且让我先就阅读原典的方法，提出几个原则。这些一般性的诠释原则适用于任何文本，并不仅限于中国哲学。这可以说是本人的一般诠释学原则。以下四项原则是循序渐进的，其中较后的原则是以假定了已实现较前的原则为前提。

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① 例如其文法诠释的第二法条："一段落中每一语词的意义必须在其出现的脉络中决定。"F. Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics: The Handwriting Manuscripts* (Montana: Scholars Press, 1977), pp. 127—129.

② 《孔子诗论》，收入《上海博物馆藏战国楚竹书》(上海：上海博物馆，2001)，第1册，页134。

(一) 文义内在原则(principle of intra-textuality)

我们针对文本所要寻找的意义,应该都是在文本之中,而且只在文本之中。以《庄子》为例,如果要了解其中所呈现的哲学意义,只能从文本中读出,不能强加之以文本中没有的道理或意义。如果是因为文本脱落或朽毁,必须对某一文本加以增补或修订,也必须有其他文本为据(无论是新发现的或有其他脉络的文本参证)始得为之,不得任意强加文本以外之意或文句于某文本之上。我想,只有先假定了文义内在原则,才能有克里斯提娃(J. Kristeva)所谓的"文际性"(intertextuality),及文本的横的与纵的关系。克里斯提娃认为,"每一文本都是由众多引述的拼图构成的","而且都是对其他文本的吸收与转换"。每一文本都是作者、理想读者和外在文本持续的交谈的结果,可由横轴(作者与读者)与纵轴(先前文本传统)来予以阅读。[①] 其实,到底如何决定依文本的文际性及适当的横纵关系,仍需依赖文义内在原则。

(二) 融贯一致原则(principle of coherence)

基于读者主观的善意,与文本客观上的价值,一个哲学家著作之所以值得读,一定是有其内在一贯的想法。所谓融贯一致,在消极上要能避免自相矛盾或相互对立的歧见;在积极上则文本中所含的观念与命题,必须能环环相扣,形成一个内在融贯的义理整体。我们可以假定,有着融贯一致性的哲学文本,要比一篇自相矛盾或歧见百出的文本有哲学上的价值,尤其一篇能垂之久远、千锤百炼的文章,更须有其融贯一致性。当然,如果一篇文章本身就是片断无序、意见分歧甚或前后矛盾,那就还它一个无序、分歧或矛盾,不可硬要读出其融贯一致;不过,一篇矛盾、分歧、无序的文本在哲学价值上(但并不一定是在历史价值上)便不如一篇融贯一致的文本。不但是为了读者主观的善意,也是为了像《庄子》这类文本的价值,诠释者必须尽力在文本中读出融贯一致的意义。如果我们的解读使它零碎化或自相矛盾,除非文本本身如此,由于文义内在原则,或有其他文本的强力支持,否则不但会违反善意原则,也是在减损文本的价值。

且举一例。Burton Watson 将"重言十七,所以已言也,是为耆艾"译为"These repeated words which make up seven tenth of it are intended to put an end to argument. They can do this because they are the words of the elders" (Watson,页 303)。这样的译法,将重言的"所以已言"诠释成是引用耆艾的权威以"终止别人说话(论辩)",而不是将之读为"已说过的话",这就违反了庄子"平等"、"两行"与"以明"的精神。其实,所谓的"重言",是针对"已经被说过"而在时间中较为久远的话,无论其为先圣先贤之言或为传统的记载,加以重新引述。重言亦即《天下篇》所谓"谬悠之说",须先重述在时间中久远的传统或长辈之言,始能进而加以倚重,借以显示真理,见信于人,此即"以重言为真"之意。重言对于先圣先贤或传统典籍的引述,并不是要重复照抄,却是要将之放置在一个创造性诠释的脉络中,以揭示真理的历史性。

(三) 最小修改原则(principle of minimum emendation)

除非必要,不依主观意见随便修改文本。如果文本所述与我们的理论或我们根据某理论

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① Julia Kristeva, "Word, Dialogue and Novel, " in *The Kristeva Reader*, edited by Toril Moi (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 36 - 37. 注意克里斯提娃所谓 "*à* la place de la notion d'intersubjectivité s'installe celle *d'intertextualité*, et le langage poétique se lit, au moins, comme *double*"。Cf. Julia Kristeva, "Le mot, le dialogue et le roman," in Recherches *pour une sémanalyse* (Paris: éditions du Seuil, 1969), p. 146.

对于某文本的想像之意不一致，应该修改的是我们的理论或我们对文本的想像，而不是文本本身。

相反最小修改原则的例子，可见于 Graham 的庄子英译。例如，Graham 认为《庄子·齐物论》是一篇 obscure，fragmented 的文本，为了补救于此，他甚至会调动原文的段落，这其实没有必要。例如"大块噫气，其名为风"的寓言，按迄今接受的版本，是终止于"咸其自取，怒者其谁邪！"在我读来觉得颇为完整，文义清楚，但 Graham 却觉得十分片断，或许他觉得南郭子綦对于学生所提"天籁"的问题并未好好解答，于是就把《天运》篇的开端段落，转移到"咸其自取，怒者其谁邪！"之后，当作是在回答天籁的问题，并视之为南郭子綦与学生此段交谈的结论（Graham，页 49）。他所转加于此的文字是："天其运夫？地其处夫？日月其争于所乎？孰主张是？孰维纲是？……孰嘘吸是？孰居无事而披拂是？"①

在我看来，Graham 如此大肆改动文本，其实是违反了最小修改原则。为什么一位大师级的老师对于弟子问的傻问题，一定要完全予以回答呢？颜成子游说"地籁则众窍是已，人籁则比竹是已，敢问天籁？"一方面将南郭子綦"大块噫气"、"众窍怒号"等隐喻性论述，会成了对宇宙、大地、人文的声音的描述性论述，另一方面更断定众窍便是地籁，而比竹是为人籁，于是进而追问天籁，这可以说是问错了问题。按照前面所言动态脉络主义看，其实大块噫气之喻，是与随后一段"大知闲闲，小知闲闲；大言炎炎，小言詹詹……"之间有一义理的推展，表现我所谓的"文本的语用运动"（pragmatic movement of text）。大块噫气，其名为风，刮在不同大小、形状有异的树穴，便发出种种声音，可以视为一隐喻性论述，而不是对宇宙、大地、人文的声音的描述性论述。此一隐喻所要说的是：就如同风吹在不同形状大小的树穴，会产生不同的声音，同样的，构成有别、深浅有异的自我主体，也会形成并表现不同的言论和知识。就此而言，"人籁"在文脉中所要喻指的是人类争相提出的种种知识体系和言说，并无论述人文音乐之意。颜成子游未解人籁，便要敢问天籁，对此，像南郭子綦这样一位高明的老师并没有必要回答。就此而言，Graham 大改原文，假定了在此必定要有一个关于天籁的答案以为结论，实无必要。更何况《天运》首段对于"天运"的疑问——全段是终之以"敢问何故？"——究竟是否旨在回答"天籁"，颇有疑问。

（四）最大的阅读原则（maximum reading）

在符合以上文义内在原则、融贯一致原则、最小修改原则等先行原则之后，我们就可以在义理的理解和诠释上做最大的阅读，亦即最富有充实的义理的解读，可以开始在文本上从事哲学思索。我所谓"充实"是依据我所谓"意义的饱沃原则"（principle of saturation of meaning）来说的，也就是指在哲学思索上达致最恢弘而合理的义理，而在人的心灵对于意义的需求上，达致最大的满足感。若是进行哲学史的研究，至少要遵行文义内在原则、融贯一致原则、最小修改原则，但若要在文本上进行哲学思索，一定要发挥最大的阅读原则。

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① Angus Graham 的翻译是："Heaven turns circles, yes! Earth sits firm, yes! Sun and moon vie for a place, yes!... Who breathes them out, who breathes them in? Who is it sits with nothing to do and weeps between and over them?"（Graham，页 49）注意其中庄子问题语句皆被 Graham 译为带惊叹号的肯定句。Graham 此一移植，切掉了最后一句"敢问何故？"并因此忽视了整段的疑问性质。此外，Graham 更认为应当将此段移植于此，"The fit is so neat that it can be located here with some confidence"（Graham，页 50）。在我看来是很值得商榷的。

三、尊重中国哲学文本的特性：隐喻与叙事

我们在阅读一份相当完整的文本时，与其将之区分为不同的意义单位，不如说是有多层动态展开的意义层面：由“字词”到“语句”，到“段落”，到由数段形成的“大段落”，到“整篇”，到此篇文本与他篇文本的关联，到全部的“作品”(work，oeuvre)，到与其他人、其他时代作品的关联等等。在我看来，写作与阅读本身既是思想表达与诠释的过程，也可视为是一语用运动的历程，并且作者与读者透过这两重虽相关而有别的语用运动过程来诠释与创造意义，使所涉及的语词、语句、段落、大段落、全篇、作品等等，在层层的部分与整体的辩证过程中，有一动态的发展，并借此形成了有意义的开放的整体。

在前述的一般诠释原则之下，中国哲学文本有其特性，研究时必须进一步加以注意。大体说来，相对于西洋哲学喜欢运用“概念”(concept)，中国哲学文本喜用“隐喻”(metaphor)；相对于西洋哲学喜用“论证”(argumentation)，中国哲学喜用“叙事”(narrative)。不过，中国哲学文本中的“隐喻”和“叙事”也是在说、写和读的行动或语用过程中创造并展示意义的运作，为此也必须要放在动态的过程中予以了解。中国哲学家在体验终极实在或实在本身之时，总想透过较为根源性的“形象—观念”(Idea—Image)揭露之；后者是某种介于“纯粹观念”与“形声之象”之物，借以保留意义开显的全貌，显示人对于实在本身的直观，虽不能穷尽其万般丰饶，只能浸淫于隐喻之间。哲学家经由默观理性，亲证终极实在或掌握实在本身，无论视之为“天”、为“道”、为“诚”、为“心”、为“空”、为“理”等，皆是既表现观念，又联系形象，作为对终极实在或实在本身的某种诠释。至于艺术创作，则是借由诗性的转化(poetic transformation)与想像的创造(creative imagination)，使“形象-观念”成为具体的音与形的律动与表现，并借此赋予它以材质。在道德行动中，实践理性将“形象-观念”带入对于人间事件的判断，以行动介入事件的生发与流程，并为此而承担责任。在历史理性的运作中，终极实在借着事件、行动以及布局而成的故事而开显，以揭露人的存在的历史性及其实存意义。说我们的故事，并为彼此说故事，将可带来希望；因为其中隐藏实存意义并揭露终极实在，虽然这种揭露仅只是隐喻性的(metaphorical)。“形象-观念”相较于原初实在本身的显示，仅拥有“宛如”的结构，是为隐喻，透过默观、诗化、实践与历史，让我们得以亲近终极实在或实在本身，进而参赞其实现历程。

在我看来，西方哲学在先苏(Pre-Socratic)时期有关太初(Arché)的问题，泰勒斯(Thales)说是“水”，阿那克西美尼(Anaximenes)说是气，赫拉克利特(Heraclitus)说是“火”等等，仍是以具象之物表达理念，与原始“形象—观念”保有密切关系。但自巴门尼德(Parmenides)、柏拉图(Plato)之后的西方哲学主流，却将“形象—观念”推进为“纯粹观念”(Pure Ideas)，进而给予智性的定义，将之概念化，并且使概念与其他概念运用逻辑关联起来。概念有意地与形象、事件、事物脱离，进入逻辑的描述与论证形式之中。概念与论证可襄助人类心灵发展其理性功能，突破个别形象、事物和事件的限制，专注于抽象思考。就人对普遍性的要求与理性的结构而论，概念与论证的有效性会被过度重视，事实上，它们只能使我们看到实在与其结构之抽象面。至于隐喻，虽不同于抽象概念与结构完整的论证，然在多数情况下，隐喻、诗的语言与故事三者彼此相关，故能保留与具象及事件的密切关系，得其整全。

人对于经验中的开显，可以透过隐喻的诠释作用，作为“观念—形象”的表达。隐喻表达经由直观的获取所开显的终极实在或实在本身，可视为一种诠释，即视 X 为 Y 或说 X 如同 Y。

中国哲学往往透过诠释来揭露实在本身，常用隐喻来传递“观念—形象”，并用叙事来传达实现历程的曲曲折折；最佳的例子莫过于《庄子》，后者往往透过隐喻、寓言与故事，将某些对终极实在及其实现历程的经验传达出来。

隐喻是指言说“此”而意指“彼”。隐喻之所以能够以“此”说“彼”，是因为两者具有某种类比的关系。尽管隐喻理论只强调能喻与所喻的相似性，但我认为隐喻的成立在于能喻与所喻之间的类比关系，其间存在着相似与差异的对比张力。我所谓的对比是一种差异与互补、连续与断裂的结构关系与动态进展，借以显示经验的成长、历史的进展与存有的开显。由于其“以此喻彼”的诠释作用，隐喻并不限于语词层次，亦可出现于语句与段落与作品的层次，呈现一“宛如”的世界，借着喻指真际而组成一意义世界。由于隐喻可接受多重诠释，也因此在逻辑上较不精准，但比起概念与描述性或论证性的语句，隐喻能够沟通更丰富的意义，但我们并不能要求之以检证或否证的功能。

以《庄子》为例，首篇《逍遥游》一开始说：“北冥有鱼，其名为鲲。鲲之大，不知其几千里也。化而为鸟，其名为鹏。鹏之背，不知其几千里也；怒而飞，其翼若垂天之云。”[①]其中将生命视为宛若“鱼”与“鹏”的运动变化，“鱼”乃水中自由之生命，然其自由为有条件之自由，却可化而为鹏；“鹏”乃空中自由之生命，较水中之自由为高，且可奋发向上，怒而飞，直上九万里高空，甚至改变方向，直抵天池。鲲鹏之喻透过鲲、鹏的变化与运动，以喻解生命的自由及其条件，与自由的提升与扩大。就此而言，注解的时候不宜将之读为描述性的语言，只确认鲲鱼是哪一种鱼、北冥位于何处等等无济于事，因为这是一段隐喻性的语言，而非描述性的语言。

庄子借鲲鹏之喻以说自由及其条件与自由的提升与扩大，进而评述由惠施到宋荣子到列子的生命自由之性质及其限制，直到说出“若夫乘天地之正，而御六气之辩，以游无穷者，彼且恶乎待哉”（郭庆藩，页 17）。从有条件的自由，发展到无条件的自由，鲲鹏之喻于焉完整，进而提出达此无条件自由的人之典范，是至人、神人、圣人：“故曰，至人无己，神人无功，圣人无名。”（同上）按照我的阅读，在《逍遥游》尔后的文本里，庄子先用了一些“重言”，如许由与尧的对话，来讨论“圣人无名”；以肩吾与连叔的对话，来讨论“神人无功”；并进而透过庄子与惠施的对话，来讨论“用”的问题；然而并未清楚论及“至人无己”。虽然如此，这其中文本的语用运动仍是十分清楚的。

然而，对“至人无己”的发挥是到了《齐物论》首段才开始出现。就此而言，《齐物论》应与《逍遥游》一起阅读，且其间有文本与义理上的连续性。文本在语用上的运动，使我们了解到它们之间的连贯性及问题意识的接续与转换。《齐物论》始于“南郭子綦隐机而坐，仰天而嘘，苔焉似丧其偶……”（同上，页 43）虽然说“苔焉似丧其偶”的“偶”也有“寓寄”之意，但若以身为寄，其意好似南郭子綦丧失或超越了他的身体层面的存在；若果如此这段文意便不能与下面的文本相接续，所以我不采取这样的阅读。因为南郭子綦的弟子颜成子游说“形固可使如槁木，而心固可使如死灰”，显然表示其师已经超越了形和心。为此，南郭子綦点出“今者吾丧我”，说出“至人无己”的宏旨，接续了《逍遥游》未竟之意。南郭子綦之“丧我”或“无己”，是无论身体层次的自我和心理层次的自我都予以超越了。换言之，其所无之“己”、所丧之“我”，是与物有对待，或说有主客对待的自我。就此而言，成玄英谓“偶，匹也……物与我为偶也”（同上）。可谓

① 郭庆藩：《庄子集释》（台北：顶渊文化事业有限公司，2005），页 2。本文随后对此书之引用，以在编辑者郭庆藩名后加上页码作标识。

得其旨。显然，南郭子綦所超越的是有对待的、相对的我。①

以上表明了字、句与篇章之间，篇章与篇章之间，皆在文本的语用运动中既有其连贯性的意义，以承接意义之运动，也有断裂性的跃进，以呈现新颖的意义。我们若从《逍遥游》读到《齐物论》，从《齐物论》的大块噫气之喻到其后大知小知、大言小言的论述，在庄子文本的语用运动之中皆有其连续性，并不是片断的。Graham 将此一文本读成片段，认为找不出整体，他在所译 *Inner Chapters* 第二章《齐物论》"The Sorting which Evens Things Out"的引言中指出，《齐物论》包含了内七篇中哲学上最为尖锐的段落，但又形容之为"晦涩"(obscure)与"片断"(fragmented)(Graham，页 48)。将一篇哲理名文，不见其整全与明白之意，反而读为"晦涩"与"片断"，这其实也是出自一种预设甚或偏见，Graham 更为此预设或偏见而设法修补之。在我看来，这不但是缺乏读者的善意，未能肯定伟大文本应有其融贯一致性，而且触犯了我所谓的"最小修改原则"。

四、文本作者或学派提供的诠释原则

除了上述一般诠释原则与中哲文本特性，我们所阅读的中哲文本作者或其学派，往往也提供了特定的诠释规则或至少对语言有其特定见解。例如，儒家的诠释学，除了前面提及孔子摘取关键句以显示要旨，即所谓"断章取义"的诠释法之外，还有孟子所谓"以意逆志"的原则，近似于狄尔泰(W. Dilthey)透过诠释达成理解的方法。就本文所关心的《庄子》文本而言，其中也提供了阅读与诠释的原则。就庄子《齐物论》的语言理论而言，对语言意义的理解与诠释必须注意"言者"与"所言者"的关系，尤其是所言者在主体构成的深浅上的先验依据。此外，也必须注意《庄子》本身对其文体的看法。基本上，按照《寓言》篇所言，《庄子》文本有寓言、重言、卮言三种文体。本人在《庄子的语言哲学初考》一文中有较详细的论述(沈清松，1985)，在此仅举其要。《寓言》篇说："寓言十九，重言十七，卮言日出。"(郭庆藩，页 947)显示在《庄子》文本中有十分之九是寓言，其意在与以此说彼，以 X 说 Y。使用寓言的目的是"以寓言为广"，将人的思维从感性经验与逻辑推理的限制中超脱，借以扩大人的经验与存在的范围。在寓言中有十分之七是重言，所谓重言，是指对先圣先贤言行与传统典籍加以引述，然则此种引述既已被寓言化，便不只是照抄，而是寓言化甚至创造性的诠释。其目的则是在于"以重言为真"，借重时间中较为久远而有见于经纬本末的言行加以引述，以开显真理，表现真理的历史性。较为特别的是，《庄子》文本中，对先圣先贤之言的引述多属对话性质，以显示交谈中意义的辩证性与视域交融。至于卮言，则是在情境中的评论与对他人(例如惠施)的随机指点；凡《庄子》文本中的评论性文字和庄子与他人的对话，尤其庄子与惠施的对话，皆属之。这类评论皆须就情境来立言，无任何的预设立场，诉诸天道的均准，在情境中揭示真理，并且随说随扫，以保无穷的思想活力，揭示道本身及其所开显的内涵之无穷。以是，其目的是"以卮言为曼衍"。例如，在各篇中庄子与惠施的交谈都是属于卮言，庄子对自己的语言加以解构，也是属于卮言。"卮言日出"

① 就英译本而言，Angus Graham 比较能了解到在此是针对有对偶的自我，为此他译为"he had lost the counterpart of himself"。至于 Burton Watson 则没有细致地掌握到此间的脉络，将此段文字翻译成"he'd lost his companion"，并注解说："The word 'companion' is interpreted variously to mean his associates, his wife, or his own body"，显然不太敢肯定"companion"指的是什么，也没有了解到问题的关键是在于超越有对偶、相对待的自我。

表示卮言是庄子时时提出，随时点拨，随时评论，随说随扫的文字。

总之，在按照上述一般诠释原则、尊重中国哲学特性与文本作者或学派提供的诠释规则来解读文本之后，也可将哲学文本放在更为宽广的历史脉络，也就是哲学史、思想史，甚至一般政治社会经济史的历史脉络中来解读；进一步，还可以运用不同理论来加以解读，甚至展现阅读者分析性与批判性的理性思考能力，提出自己原创性的见解。由于篇幅所限，兹不再赘。

五、关于《齐物论》篇名及其英译

根据以上方法论的考量，以下我们且以《齐物论》为例，来看中国哲学文本的诠释与英译问题。首先，关于《齐物论》的篇名，一般认为并非出自庄子之手，而是郭象编辑时所定；对其语义，有释为"平齐物论"或"物论之齐"者，认为是针对名家、墨家、儒家等相互是非的知识体系或论说立论，这些皆属于不同的"物论"，对知识与世界有不同诠释，于是形成不同的意识形态并相互冲突。就此而言，《齐物论》较属于在知识论方面探讨知与言的源起，并进行意识形态批判之作。但是，除此此外，也有将之释为"齐物之论"，认为该篇旨在倡言万物皆属平等，发扬"天地与我并生，万物与我为一"之旨。这是存有学或本体论上的平等。

其实，这两种说法在庄子现行文本中皆可找到支持，而且两层意义密切相关。就文本的语用运动看来，《齐物论》一开始提出"至人无己"，之后马上用大块噫气的寓言，表明吹在不同形状与大小的洞穴，会产生不同的声音，喻若不同深浅与形式构成的主体性，会发出不同的声音与言知。紧接着，提出不同的"言"与"知"是来自不同的主体性层面，并由于各执成心，因而有儒、墨之是非，亦即产生不同学派与知识体系的相互冲突。可见，基本上，《齐物论》应是由"物论之齐"开始，就哲学上言较倾向于知识论与语言哲学的问题，讨论不同的言与知如何形成。庄子追溯不同知识体系与论述在主体构成上的依据，来看它构成的深浅，一直要追溯到真君、真宰，亦即以道为真正的主体。既然到了道的层面，也就是进入了终极实在或本体论的层面，并进入"道通为一"之境，在此"道"贯穿了一切，于是体验到"天地与我并生，万物与我为一"，万物彼此之间，万物与人我之间，皆平等。于是这就进入了"齐物之论"，阐发"天地与我并生，万物与我为一"之旨，其意较属于本体论、形上学层次。

换言之，《齐物论》始于"物论之齐"，追溯物论的差异是来自主体的构成，直到溯及真正的主体，也就是道本身，并由此进入形上学的"齐物之论"。这两层意义其实并不对立，反而皆属于同一文本的意义进展。

不过，无论是 Watson 将此篇名译为"Discussion on Making All Things Equal"，或 Graham 译之为"The Sorting which Evens Things Out"，都是取"齐物"之意，而忽视其中的"物论"之意。Graham 的译名，是将"论"的意思读为"纶"或"伦"(sorting out)，认为"Outside Taoism it suggests grading in superior and inferior categories, but Chuang Tzu detaches it from valuation, turns it into 'the sorting which evens things out'"(Graham, 页 48)。可见 Graham 所理解的"齐物"，只不过是透过"sorting out"的动作把万物给平齐了。但一旦做了如此的诠释，便会触犯了前面所说的融贯一致原则，因为《齐物论》文本随后提到"夫道未始有封，言未始有常，为是而有畛也。请言其畛：有左，有右，有伦，有义……"可见，《庄子》文本认为"伦"是后来才产生的，事物本身并未有如此区分。Graham 将此段翻译为"The Way has never had borders, saying has never had norm. It is by a 'That's it' which deems that a boundary is

marked. Let me say something about the marking of boundaries. You can locate as there and enclose by a line, sort out and assess"。他也是将"伦"译为"sort"，而将"有伦、有义"详作"sort out and assess"。由此可见，他对本篇篇名的翻译是以"齐物"为"纶物而齐之"来理解，然而"伦"与"义"既是后来才产生的，便无法透过 Graham 所谓的"纶"来齐物了，如此一来就相反了融贯一致的原则。虽然说 Graham 的翻译"志在齐物"，但其所谓"纶出"的动作本身在《庄子》看来是次要的，道本身并不如此。

六、言与知的形成对应着主体的构成

除了字、句与段落之外，对于大段落的掌握，往往会影响其下的次级意义层面的诠释。我将《齐物论》的文本语用运动简单地区分为几个较大段落，宛如戏剧中的场或幕，以方便呈现义理的进展。《齐物论》的第一大段是从"南郭子綦隐机而坐，仰天而嘘，苔焉似丧其偶"提出"至人无已"的议题开始，到"大块噫气，其名为风"的寓言讲完，也就是到"咸其自取，怒者其谁邪！"透过风吹在不同形状大小的洞穴而发出不同声音，以此为隐喻，来引入下文所论，言与知随着主体构成的深浅而有别，形成不同的知识体系与论述。① 于是引出下一大段对言、知之分析，其大意前已略述，兹不再赘。值得注意的是，本大段是始自南郭子綦与其弟子颜成子游的对话，属重言；继之以大块噫气之喻，属寓言。

第二大段落从"大知闲闲，小知闲闲；大言炎炎，小言詹詹"开始，是庄子对言与知及其在人主体构成上的根源之论述，属卮言，旨在点出不同的"知"与"言"的形态，是根源于自我构成的深浅不同，不但分析自我与主体构成的问题，而且畅论封闭于经验性自我者的命运，至"人之生也，固若是芒乎？其我独芒，而人亦有不芒者乎？"为止，把"知"与"言"与主体的构成、开展与自闭讨论到一个程度，这是第二大段落。

庄子在指出"言"与"知"的几种不同形态之后，马上接着讲"其寐也魂交，其觉也形开。与接为构，日以心逗"（郭庆藩，页 51）。显然是在讲身体层面的自我，当人睡着之时，魂交托于身体，而在醒的时候，身体舒展开来，向世界展放，开始与外物互动，"与接为构"，也由于与外物互动，产生种种心理的状态，如"缦者，窖者，密者。小恐惴惴，大恐缦缦"（同上），如此便进入到心理层面的自我。更进一步，在经验我的内核有个"机心的我"："其发若机栝，其司是非之谓也；其留如诅盟，其守胜之谓也。"（同上）所说的是一个在进行是非判断（judgment），或是算计以赢取我胜（无论利益之争或是非之辩）的自我（calculative self）。

如此，庄子简洁地交代了"经验的我"（empirical ego）的三个层次："身体的我"（bodily ego）、"心理的我"（psychic ego）以及"机心的我"（calculative ego）。若就此来看，Burton Watson 的译文并没有清楚地显示这一文义的运动，他将"其寐也魂交，其觉也形开"翻译为"In sleep, men's spirits go visiting; in waking hours, their body hustle"，这是将"魂交"解为"人的神魂（做梦）游走去了"，而将"形开"解为"身体的莽撞"，由于"魂交"并无"作梦游走"之意，"形

① 就此而言，Angus Graham 在英译注解中显示了对此段大意的了解。他说："Chuang- tsu's parable of the wind compares the conflicting utterances of philosophers to the different notes blown by the same breath in the long and short tubes of the pan—pipes, and the noises made by the wind in hollows of different shapes. It is natural for differently constituted person to think differently ... "（Graham，页 49）

开”亦无“身体莽撞”之意，也因此 Burton Watson 多少是诠释过度了。至于 Angus Graham 的翻译是“While is sleeps, the paths of soul cross; When it wakes, the body opens”。其中的上半句“the paths of soul cross”虽不知所云，但下半句“When it wakes, the body opens”则清楚掌握到身体层面及其醒时向外物开展的意思。在我看来，本句其实更好译为“In sleep, men's soul is handled over to his body; When awaken, his body starts to feel and open to the world”，这里所谈论的是身体的我，文字重点在于身体于睡时浑然不觉，醒时则向外开展，与外物互动，没有必要像成玄英疏所谓“故其梦寐也，神魂妄缘而交接”，后者更进一步涉及身体的无意识层面、做梦与佛教所谓“妄缘”的关系等，也是增益了原文之意。

有关心理的我，《齐物论》第二大段落随后提到“喜怒哀乐，虑叹变慹，姚佚启态”，我同意王夫之的注解，认为是“喜怒哀乐，虑叹变恕”八种心理状态，[①]忽而快、忽而慢的，不断地舒展开来。而 Burton Watson 与 Angus Graham 都是随着成玄英疏，将“姚佚启态“也一并加入，认为一共是十二种的心理状态。Watson 将此段翻译为“Joy, anger, grief, delight, worry, regret, fickleness, inflexibility, modesty, willfulness, candor, insolence”（Watson，页 32—33），至于 Angus Graham 则将之译为“Pleasure in things and anger against them, sadness and joy, forethought and regret, change and immobility, idle influences that initiate our gestures”（Graham，页 50）。在我看来，“姚佚启态”应译为“now slowly, now suddenly, unfolding themselves”，视为是前八种心理状态的时而疾、时而缓，展开其情态，如此一来，在语气和语义上也较能顺当地接续下文“乐出虚、蒸成菌。日夜相代乎前，而莫知其所萌。已乎！已乎！旦暮得此，其所由以生乎”。后者用“乐出虚、蒸成菌”的隐喻，进一步说出心理的我，并不是真正的主体，无根无由（如乐出虚、蒸成菌一般），也不知其生发的根源（其所萌）与原因（其所由以生），虽然说其根源与原因实不必远求，而可旦暮遇之。

本大段在提出真君、真宰的前后，各用了一些篇幅来说明，经验的我若封闭在己，不向上超越、发展，其命运如何。如“其司是非之谓也；其留如诅盟，其守胜之谓也；其杀若秋冬，以言其日消也；其溺之所为之，不可使复之也；其厌也如缄，以言其老洫也”（郭庆藩，页 51）。这段文字都是在描述或隐喻经验我在自我封闭时的生命状态，就像名家陷溺于言、知的辩论，尤其是庄子的对话者惠施，在庄子看来便是处于某种封闭于机心的状态。在这里，“其厌也如缄”，“厌”应该是沉溺之意，“缄”则是封闭之意，说的是辩者的生命情态沉溺在自我封闭之中。Watson 是将它译为“They grow dark, as though sealed with seals”（Watson，页 32），而 Graham 则译之为“It logs as though it were been sealed up”（Graham，页 50）。两段译文的文义皆十分晦涩。其实，应该译为“They indulge themselves in their own self-enclosure, as if sealed with seals”或许较为妥当。

庄子进一步提出对经验我的一个总结，谓日“非彼无我，非我无所取，是亦近矣”，是说明经验的我一方面是相对性的：“非彼无我”，这是有对偶的我之特性；另一方面，经验性的自我也是一选取的观点，无论是、非、利、害，都由这一选取观点而来。郭象注和成玄英疏皆日“彼，自然也”、“自然生我，我自然生”（郭象）、“若非自然，谁能生我？”（成玄英），可谓一下子从对言、知及其主体构成的讨论，跳跃到形上学层面能生的自然的讨论了。或许是因为参考了这类注解，导致 Watson 没有理解到这一文本所论及的仍是经验我，也因此他将“非彼无我，非我无所取”翻

① 王夫之：《庄子解》，收入《船山全书》编辑委员会编校：《船山全书》（长沙：岳麓书社，1996），第 13 册，页 97。

成"Without them we would not exist; Without us they would have nothing to take hold of"(Watson,页 33)。关于这一点,Graham 的翻译比较具有哲学性意涵,意思掌握得很好,并未受到郭象注的干扰,他将此句译成"Without an Other there is no Self, without Self no choosing one thing rather than another"(Graham,页 51)。

这一部分文本的语用运动,表示在这经验的我层次,虽有种种心理状态不断出现,但并没有真正的主体,也不知其根源:"莫知其所萌";也找不到真正的原因:"已乎,已乎!旦暮得此,其所由以生乎";亦不知其推动的动力何在:"不知其所为使"。经验的我(empirical self)不是主体,不是根源,不是原因,也不是动力;真正的根源、原因、动力,亦即真正的主体,是"真君"、"真宰",或可称之为"本真的我"(authentic self)。虽然本真的自我才是真正的根源、原因、动力、主体,并且可以表现在心理与身体层面,"可行已信",有其真实的表现,但仍然"若有真宰,而特不得其联"、"可行已信,而不见其形,有情而无形"。不过,万物皆有其真君、真宰,就此而言,无论"如求得其情与不得",皆"无益损乎其真"。庄子在此安立了随后所言"齐物"的根据。万物皆有其真君、真宰,是因为道在生万物之后,叉居于万物之中,成为其真正的主体。由于修辞的变化,《庄子》并没有要将术语固定化的意思,有时用"真君",有时用"真宰",都是表示真正的主体或本真的主体,是以"道"作为其本真的主体。到这地步,"如求得其情与不得,无益损乎其真",不管有没有自觉到本真的自我如何,都不影响本真主体的存在,是为齐物之基。

在提出真君、真宰之后,庄子又用了相当的篇幅,来讨论身体层面并没有任何真正的主体,如"百骸、九窍、六藏、赅而存焉,吾谁与为亲?汝皆说之乎?其有私焉?如是皆有为臣妾乎?汝皆说之乎?其有私焉?如是皆有为臣妾乎"?皆旨在陈述身体层次没有真正的主体,如此补足了前面已讨论过的在心理及机心层次没有真正主体之意。整体说来,真正的主体是真君、真宰。在本大段之末,庄子又进一步讨论一般人停留于经验的我,忘怀本真的我或缺乏对本真我的自觉,以致"终身役役而不见其成功,苶然疲役而不知其所归,可不哀邪"?"人之生也,固若是芒乎?其我独芒,而人亦有不芒者乎?"(郭庆藩,页 56)对此一自我封闭的命运表示哀叹,以终结本段。

七、从是、非的形成到相互照明

按照我的阅读,《齐物论》以下一大段,是从"夫随其成心而师之,谁独且无师乎"开始[①],到"是亦一无穷,非亦一无穷也。故曰莫若以明"止。其中分析不同物论或意识形态的冲突,首先是出自成心,也就是已构成但不彻底的心,并以此为指导;进而分析语言意义的构成,是由"言者"与"所言者"的关系构成,不同的物论各有其语言哲学假定,基本上它们的差异在于其主体构成或成心的深浅不同;最后,这段文本指出不同物论或意识形态的冲突,也是来自存在与视野的限定,"物无非彼,物无非是"、"自彼则不见,自是则知之",即使圣人能照之于天,其所提出来的论说,亦会被视为仅只是众言说之一而已。解决之道,最好是不要将彼与此对立,以己为是,以彼为非,反而要进入道枢之中,得其环中,以应无穷的是与非,让是与非彼此反复相明,也

① 郭庆藩之《庄子集释》将由"夫随其成心而师之,谁独且无师乎"到"吾独且奈何哉"放入对自我封闭的命运的哀叹。这种阅读法影响 Angus Graharm 的英译,使其未能觉察到这段文本的运动。在对自我封闭的命运哀叹之后,新的文本段落已转向对物论的形成在于成心,及其与是非的关系的分析。在此,Watson 的译文分段较佳。

就是在辩证历程中，彼此相互照明。这一大段落的哲学评论成分甚浓，亦属于卮言。

首先，本大段文本指出，是因为人先有先已构成的主体之心，并以之为指导，以至形成种种物论或意识形态，甚至坚持己见，是己而非人，因此才形成种种是是非非之争。就此而言，我不赞成《庄子集释》、Graham 英译等的分段法，将前大段中哀叹自我封限于经验性主体的命运的"人之生也，固若是芒乎？其我独芒，而人亦有不芒者乎"等句，与针对意识形态批判的"夫随其成心而师之"混为一段。至于 Watson 则是将两段区分开来，基本上是对的。不过 Graham 与 Watson 两人对于"成心"的翻译多少值得商榷。Watson 译"夫随其成心而师之"为"If a man follows the mind given him"(Watson，页 34)，这一译文虽注意到成心是先在构成的，但其文义好像是在说一个人的成心是先前被给予的，而忽视了"成心"是每一个人在时间中自行构成的主体，并以之为指导，而未能追溯至本真的自我。Graham 译之为"If you go by the completed heart and take it as your authority, who is without such an authority?"(Graham，页 51)则较可以与其在前面注文中所谓"differently constituted persons"相应，不过，在此他将"成心"译为"completed heart"仍有不妥。拙意以为，"成心"仍以译为"constituted mind"为佳，在此"constituted"是指现象学上所谓"已构成"之意，而"心"一词在《庄子》中，正如在《老子》一般，多少有些贬义。

其次，本大段提出：是非的形成与所用语言意义的不同有关。"夫言非吹也，言者有言，其所言者特未定也"，说的是语言有其意义，不是声音的吹动，不是如同幼鸟叫声。之所以"言者有言，其所言者特未定也"，是因为语言的意义是由"言者"与"所言者"的关系构成。[①]问题在于"所言者"视主体的构成与认知的深浅而有差别，其所谓"特未定"之处，在于所言者所指涉的意义，是随着主体构成的彻底性的深浅而有所不同。

再次，转到存在物的层面去讨论，是非的形成是由于在存在上，所有的物都是有限定的彼物或此物，也就是存在物的有限性与相对性，并且人皆是自彼或此的观点来觉知世界，也因此，"自彼则不见，自是则知之"[②]。像儒、墨之是非，这类言知体系的冲突，不只是由于主体的构成有别，其所使用语言有别，而且更是因为在存在层面所有的事物都是有限定的此或彼，从此看此物是在此，彼物则是在彼，自彼处看此物，会有所不见；自此处看彼物，也会有所不见；于是自此自彼，相互有所不见。这里既然是在讲物的彼与此，其所涉及的是形器(ontic)层面的有限性与相对性，而不是本体(ontological)层面的问题。

庄子认为，唯有进入本体层面，进入超越了彼与此、是与非对立的道枢，始能得其环中，以应无穷的彼与此，以及其所引致的无穷是与非："彼亦一是非，此亦一是非"，"是亦一无穷，非亦一无穷也。故曰莫若以明"。站在道枢的核心，可以使是与非相互照明，故日"莫若以明。"在此"以明"的意思是使彼与此、是与非相互照明，辩证上跻。

就此而言，Graham 和 Watson 的英译都没有了解到《庄子》"莫若以明"是"不如以彼、此相明，以是、非相明"的意思，也因此失去了《庄子》思想中原有的辩证性。既然你在此只有见于

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① 这点颇类似索绪尔(F. de Sausure)所谓：符号的意义是由"能指"(signifiant/signifier)与"所指"(signifié/signified)的关系构成的。不过，索绪尔在此讲的仅止于符号，而且他并未认为"所指"是由主体构成深浅所决定，而是认为这是由社会的约定或系统决定的。

② 此传统接受的文本是"自知则知之"，Graham 与 Watson 皆按此来翻译："If you treat yourself too as 'other' they do not appear, if you know of yourself you know of them."(Graham，页 52)"From the point of you of 'that' you cannot see it, but through understanding you can know it."(Watson，页 34)

此，在彼只有见于彼，于是有是有非，如此一来，最好是以你之所见与我之所见有所互补而产生辩证上“跻”的作用。郭象注与成玄英疏皆解为“反复相明”，其意近之。[①] Graham 与 Watson，于此意皆未能明白。Graham 译为“illumination”(Graham，页 53)，该词在西洋哲学(如奥古斯定的光照说)中有很重要的意义，但用于此则易滋生误会。在《齐物论》此处文本，有彼有此，有是有非，但可以透过彼与此、是与非相互辩证、相互厘清来相互补、相照明，此意亦将可导向随后所谓“两行”之意。而 Watson 所用的字眼是“clarity”，译“莫若以明”为“the best thing to use is clarity”(Watson，页 39)。不知道其所谓“clarity”何深层意思？依我看来，译“以明”为“mutual clarification”较为清楚，表示你看到的角度可以补充并照明我所看到的角度，我看到的角度也可以补充并照明你所看到的角度，于是促成了反复相明的效果。

八、由“物论之齐”到“齐物之论”

第四大段落，是从“以指喻指之非指，不若以非指喻指之非指也；以马喻马之非马，不若以非马喻马之非马也。天地一指也，万物一马也”开始，讨论进一层的语言哲学的问题，并追溯其与本体论的关系，再转进到本体论的问题，一直到“是故滑疑之耀，圣人之所鄙也。为是不用而寓诸庸，此之谓以明。”这一大段落是由“物论之齐”转进到“齐物之论”的关键。既然是庄子的义理论述，也因此仍属卮言。

首先，“以指喻指之非指，不若以非指喻指之非指也”的部分，无论 Graham 或 Watson 的翻译都不容易了解，如 Watson 翻译成“To use an attribute to show that attributes are not attributes is not as good as using a nonattribute to show that attributes are not attributes”(Watson，页 40)。此一英译将“指”译解为属性，其实，虽然有些“指”是属性，但并非全部的“指”都只是“属性”(attributes)而已。换言之，“属性”并不等于全部的符号或语言。Graham 译为“The meaning is not the meaning”(Graham，页 53)更是不知所云。其实，在这一语句或命题中，“指”一字既有“能指”，也有“所指”的意思。在此，索绪尔(F. de Saussure)的语言学有帮助我们诠释这段文字，他区分“能指”(signifiant/signifier)与“所指”(signifié/signified)，并指出符号的意义是由“能指”指向“所指”；换言之，由“能指”与“所指”两者的关系所构成。就像我说出或写出“马”，这一声音或符号是一“能指”，其所指的是实际存在的“马”。[②]

如此一来，本段语句可读为“以‘能指’喻‘能指’之非‘所指’，不若以‘非能指’喻‘能指’之非‘所指’也”，意思是说：无论声音符号或字型符号，都是由人构成的符号，并不是事物本身；“马”的符号是一构成的实在(constructed reality)，而实际存在的马则是一实在本身(reality itself)；为此，“能指”并非“所指”。为了要说明这点，以“能指”喻“能指”之“非所指”，不若以“非能指”来喻“能指”之非“所指”，也就是说不如去指点所指的事物本身彼此的区别，更能明显指出“能指”并不是“所指”。

对于以下的“以马喻马之非马，不若以非马喻马之非马也”，Watson 译为“To use a horse to show that a horse is not a horse is not as good as using a non-horse to show that a horse is

① 郭庆藩：《庄子集释》，页 65。

② 按照索绪尔，“所指”(signifié/signified)包括实在物或者我们脑子里某实在物的观念，例如一匹马和我们脑袋里对于马的观念。虽然在其他脉络，“所指”仍可指某实在物的观念；在此，我们只用以指称实在物。

not a horse"(Watson,页 40)。英译中"a horse"指的是具体的一匹马,而"non-horse"则较为抽象,至于能指的一面,也就是马的符号,则在其翻译中不见了。Graham 译为"Rather than use a horse to show that'A horse is not a horse'use what is not a horse"(Graham,页 53),意虽略近,但仍未厘清"能指"与"所指"的关系。其实,这段语句只是"能指"与"所指"关系的一个例子,其意思是:用"马"这个符号来说明"马"这个符号不是马本身,不如以指点一实际存在的非马(例如:一头牛),来显示其不是马,能更清楚地明白显示其差异,单只留在符号层面较难以辨别符号与实在之间的差异。

更推而广之,我们所说的"天地"也只不过是一个"能指"(significant/signifier)罢了,是一人为构成的符号,"万物"也一样是一人为构成的符号。换言之,符号与言说,都是构成的实在,但"构成的实在,,并不等于"实在本身"。"天地"是一"能指",就是一符号,"万物"也是一能指,就如"马"这一能指一般,皆不是实在本身。有关这一段文本有各种诠释,牟宗三先生将这段文字赋予最高的精神成就义,可谓赋予了这段文本以最大阅读。不过,最大阅读必须假定先前文.义内在、融贯一致与最小修改等原则。从整体文本的运动看来,若扣紧符号与实在的关系,此段文字便可顺当解通,不必加入精神高度的成就等的过度诠释。如果硬要解为精神高度的成就,则与下文脉络的衔接,便会出现落差,也就是会相反融贯一致原则,与文本的语用运动。

前面提到融贯一致原则与最小修改原则,在此,从"天地一指也,万物一马也"以下的一段文本,是一个考量的佳例:"可乎可,不可乎可。道行之而成,物谓之而然。恶乎然?然于然。恶乎不然?不然于不然。物固有所然,物固有所可。"显然,若就文本的融贯一致性,应该要把"恶乎可,可乎可,恶乎不可,不可乎可"放到"恶乎不然,不然于不然"之后,如此将文本读为:"道行之而成,物谓之而然。恶乎然?然于然。恶乎不然?不然于不然。恶乎可,可乎可;恶乎不可,不可乎不可。物固有所然,物固有所可,无物不然,无物不可。"如此一来,文义才一致而顺畅。这一修改也可从《寓言》篇得到支持。《寓言》篇里的相关文本是这样的:"有自也而可,有自也而不可;有自也而然,有自也而不然。恶乎然?然于然。恶乎不然,不然于不然。恶乎可?可于可。恶乎不可?不可于不可。物固有所然,物固有所可。无物不然,无物不可。"(郭庆藩,页 950)据此,可以说,前面的修改不但合乎融贯一致与最小修改的原则,也合乎文义内在原则(intratextuality)。有趣的是,此处文本将"然"与"可"的各种排列组合都写出来了,展示了排列组合与推理论证的高度能力,或许是因为庄子的对话对象很可能是惠施,庄子有时也会露一手分析论证的能力的关系。就此段而言,Burton Watson 的英译仍然忠实于原来的文本。Burton Watson 按照原文翻译,这是完全无可厚非的。不过,这一来便减损了文本的融贯一致性,也因此会有译文难懂或不知所云的缺陷。

在本大段中最重要的文字,诚然是主张种种形状、大小、美丑、千奇百怪之物,皆由"道通为一",且"凡物无成与毁,复通为一。唯达者知通为一",显示了到达齐物的观点之后,能以一切皆平等的精神,看待一切万物与言说,并以天道的标准,来任两行、和是非:"是以圣人和之以是非而休乎天钧,是之谓两行。"对此,Graham 译为"This is why the sage smoothes things out with his'That's it,that's not,'and stays at the point of rest on the potter's wheel of Heaven"(Graham,页 54)。这似乎是认为圣人是以自己的是非,去和润万物,殊不知圣人是以天道的均准去和世间种种是非。不过,Graham 将"两行"译为"Letting both alternatives proceed"在意义上比较清楚,是任是与非各自自行前进,然其缺陷在于他忽视了圣人是以天道的均准来和是非,而不是以自己的是非来和万物。

至于 Watson 将这段文字译为“So the sage harmonizes with both right and wrong and rests in Heaven the Equalizer. This is called walking two roads”(Watson,页 41),可谓简洁有力,表明了圣人和是与非。不过,他将“两行”译为“walking two roads”值得商榷,其意似乎是要让一个人既走在是之途,也走在非之途。整体说来,庄子的意思是:既然存在物和人对物的觉知皆属有限,在言与知中,无穷的是与非本就会不断自行发展;对此,人既要透过“以明”使其相互照明,而且要进一步居于“道枢”,得环中以应无穷之是非;更要再进一步,让是非提升到在天道的均准上达至相和之境,这才是真正的“两行”之意。

庄子在此将言与知提升到形上学层面,分析有限定的言与知以及坚持于某一言知体系,造成是是非非的根源所在。前面说到“道通为一”,表示所有存在物和言论与知识中都有道,因此都被道所贯通。但是,由道到物,这中间的形上理论还需打通。《齐物论》接下来的文本大体进入了这一问题:“古之人,其知有所至。恶乎至?有以为未始有物者,至矣,尽矣,不可以加矣。”所谓“古之人”是指心灵达至时间源头的典范型人物,处在时间源头,当然知道万物的起源,所以“其知有所至”;至于其所知的,是“有以为未始有物者,至矣,尽矣,不可以加矣”。“未始有物”就是无物。可见其所知万物的根源是“无”。若按照老子的宇宙生发论,由“道”到“物”的过程是这样的:“道”是一生生不息的存在活动本身,在其自我开显的过程当中,首先开显为“无”;“无”是种种奥妙的可能性,其中有一部分可能性实现为“有”,并经由分殊化、复杂化的过程,产生万物。大体上,庄子接受了这一宇宙生发论。只不过他在随后的文本中,将此一“道原”问题与“道言”问题合而言之,以指出宇宙生发论是由于语言的产出而成为可能,及其作为一种言知体系的限制。

在庄子看来,回溯至时间源头的典范人物,他所知道的是“无”,是无穷奥妙的可能性,是一切的开端,“至矣,尽矣,不可以加矣”,这是因为“道”最初就是开显为“无”。“其次以为有物矣,而未始有封也”,说的是由“无”到“有”,是有一部分的可能性实现为“存”,宛如“道生一”。“一”是“有”之始,但尚未开始分化,为此是“未始有封”。“封”是“封限”,就是分殊、区分、限定之意。“其次以为有封焉,而未始以为有是非也。”说的是由“一”开始分化、复杂化为万物,成为此物与彼物,于是有彼有此,有了种种限定的存在物;可是此时还没有由于受限定的知觉而执持种种相是相非的言知体系。一如前述,是在成心介入之后,才开始有是非。由于“自彼则不见,自此则知之”,于是开始有是、非了。“是非之彰也,道之所以亏也。”既然开始浮现是非,原初的道至此就有亏了。“道之所以亏,爱之所以成”,更加上爱恶的偏好,爱此而恶彼,或爱彼而恶此,以此或彼为是或为非,相是相非,相非相是,争辩无已,冲突乃生。

整体说来,这段文本首就形上学角度,讲出由“道”到“无”,由“无”到“有”,由“有”到各种“有封限之有”,成为一一分殊之物,也就是成为万物。其次,就认知的角度,由于成心的介入,产生种种是非。人所认知的是“构成的实在”,而不是“实在本身”,也因此就认知来讲,“是非之彰也,道之所以亏也”。再次,又加上爱欲的层面,“道之所以亏,爱之所以成”,于是乃有所偏执与好恶。这是一个逐层愈来愈分化、封限,乃至构成不同知与言的学派,相互论难,相互争辩的结果。在《齐物论》之初,只从主体的构成来讲“物论之齐”。现在的义理已推进到不只是主体的构成有别,而且物本身也有分别。于是乎由道的整全,一直到分化为种种之物,再加上主体的成心,因而形成是非,再加上爱欲的偏好,于是而有种种论辩与冲突。但是庄子要问:“果且有成与亏乎哉?果且无成与亏乎哉?”从道的角度来看,既是“道通为一”,当然没有成与亏。因为道贯穿一切,所有的万物彼此的差异与言知的争辩,只不过显示道本身的丰富与热闹,没有

什么成与亏。然而,“果且无成与亏乎哉”?从人的言知体系的建构性与有限性来讲,难道就没有成没有亏吗?意思是说:从物与人的角度来看,是有成有亏的。

接下来,庄子以昭文、师旷、惠子三位学有专长的人为例,来说明成与亏:“……昭文之鼓琴也,师旷之枝策也,惠子之据梧也,三子之知几乎!皆其盛者也,故载之末年。”这段文字,Graham译为“Chao Wen strumming on the zither. Music master K'uang propped on his stick, Hui Shih leaning on the sterculia. has the three men's knowledge much farther to go? They were all men in whom it reached a culmination, and therefore was carried on too late a time”(Graham,页54),可谓文通意顺,且与上下文脉络文义融贯一致。至于Watson则将此段译成“Chao Wen played the lute: Music Master K'uang waved his baton; Hui Tzu leaned on his desk. The knowledge of these three was close to perfection. All were masters, and therefore their name have been handed down to later ages”(Watson,页37),意虽可通,但他又将“三子之知几乎!皆其盛者也,故载之末年”解读为“三者皆是大师,所以后世仍有记载”。其实,在此“载”有“事”或“从事”的意思,意思是说,三者的专长皆达至高峰,是其盛才所至,为此他们会一直从事到晚年。也因此,下面才说“唯其好之也,以异于彼,其好之也,欲以明之。彼非所明而明之,故以坚白之昧终,而其子又以文之纶终,终身无成”。意思是说:因为他们爱好这些东西,表现得优异于别人,也由于自己喜欢,才会一直要教别人自己这一套。但由于所教的人非其才,也因此传不下去了。不但惠施的坚白论无传,且昭文的儿子虽继承父业,仍然终身无成。在此,Watson的译文语义不顺,行文紊乱:“Only in their likes they were different from him [the true sage]. What they liked, they tried to make clear. What he is not clear about, they tried to make clear, and so they ended in the foolishness of 'hard' and 'white'. Their sons, too, devoted all their lives to their fathers' theories, but till their death never reached any completion.”(Watson,页37)须知,自己喜好这一套,使自己能优异于别人,并不是异于真正的圣人;而是因为我会这一套,所以胜出别人之上。但由于所传非人,“故以坚白之昧终”,说的是惠施的坚自之论因此最后传不下去了,并不是说这三个人或所有的人都终究昧于坚白论。随后文字说的,则是昭文的儿子虽继承父业,仍终身无成,而不是说所有三个人的儿子都终身奉献于他们父亲的“理论”。Watson的翻译之所以乱,缺乏融贯一致性,是因为文中对于到底是谁教谁,谁传谁,谁昧于什么,都没有弄清楚。

九、从宇宙生发论到人文传统

《齐物论》第五大段是从“今且有言于此,不知其与是类乎?其与是不类乎?类与不类,相与为类,则与彼无以异矣。虽然,请尝言之。有始也者,有未始有始也者,有未始有夫未始有始也者”,一直到“孰知不言之辩,不道之道?若有能知,此之谓天府。注焉而不满,酌焉而不竭,而不知其所由来,此之谓葆光”,基本上是以卮言的形态,讨论宇宙生发论;并由从宇宙生发论逐层下降到人文传统,评述由圆融的整全到产生分化的性质的过程;并主张发挥人的精神或理性的整全作用,发挥“葆光”精神,在有限定之中常指向无穷之道,以为泉源。

大体说来,庄子虽不赞成“滑疑之耀”,像名家之流那样爱展现辩论的耀眼才华;相反的,庄子主张寄托于用,而不执著于用,也就是主张不要论辩,却要把种种物论都给齐了,遣是非、任两行。然而,他即使主张不辩论,也总得说半天才能表达于此。为此说:“有言于此,不知其与

是类乎？其与是不类乎？类与不类，相与为类，则与彼无以异矣。”这样一段卮言，可谓对自己的言论也做了一番自省和解构，质疑自己主张不要论辩，与惠施主张论辩以决胜负，就其皆是论辩而言，皆属言论一类。在这一自省精神下，庄子尝试论及宇宙有始无始与有无的问题，及对这些问题的种种意见，也就并没有给予答案，反而幽了自己一默：“今我则已有谓矣，而未知吾所谓之其果有谓乎，其果无谓乎？”这话也可算是卮言，对自己的言论，随说随扫，予以解构，更进而齐物之大小、平时间之久暂，甚至达到“天地与我并生，而万物与我为一”的高峰体验。这真是齐物的最高体验，也是万物与人在终极实在中达致密契之一的至境。

在此密契之一(unum mysticum)的视野中，庄子重新看待道原或与宇宙生发论的问题，说：“既已为一矣，且得有言乎？既已谓之一矣，且得无言乎？一与言为二，二与一为三。自此以往，巧历不能得，而况其凡乎！故自无适有以至于三，而况自有适有乎！无适焉，因是已。”这一段文字将老子所谓“道生一，一生二，二生三，三生万物”转移为“一与言为二，二与一为三。自此以往，巧历不能得……”的论述；换言之，是将“道原”问题与“道言”问题合而论之，把宇宙生发的问题与语言生发的问题结合起来谈。这显然是对宇宙论问题加以语言哲学的反省，并指出其限制，这点与《则阳》篇里对宇宙是否有第一因的理论，亦即“或之始”(有第一因)、“莫之为”(没有第一因)的批评，可谓前后呼应。①

《齐物论》接下来的文字总结道无封限、言无常是：“夫道未始有封，言未始有常，为是而有畛也。”道本身是没有封限与区分的，言说也没有常设的标准。自从道分化为彼物与此物，言论依照自设的标准去判定是与非，于是而有各种各类的“畛域”出现，包括空间上的区分，有左，有右；事物上的区分，有伦，有义——事物都各有其理与适当性质；言论上的区分，有分，有辩；心理上的区分，有竞，有争。此之谓“八德”，指的不是“道德”的“德”，而是八种性质的区分。“八德”既然出自“请言其畛”，其叙述方式是列举式的分类，不必力求完整的分类。就这部分而言，Watson 的译文如下：

The Way has never known boundaries: speech has no constancy. But because of [the recognition of a] “this,” there came to be boundaries. Let me tell you what the boundaries are. There is left, there is right, there are theories, there are debates, there are divisions, there are discriminations, there are emulations and there are contentions. These are called the eight virtues. (Watson, 页 39)

至于 Graham 的译文则是：

The Way has never had borders, saying has never had norms. It is by a “That's it” which deems that a boundary is marked. You can locate as there and enclose by a line, sort out and assess, divide up and discriminate between alternatives, compete over and fight over: these I call our Eight Powers.

以上这两篇译文都把“为是而有畛也”中的“是”理解为“此物之是”，也就是以某一物为“是”。其实，在此的“是”应是接着“封”与“常”而言。道自身未始有封，道在分化以后才开始有封限，至于一物之“是”则是分化与封限以后的结果。就本体论的角度看，如果道不分化，则无

① 郭庆藩：《庄子集释》，页 916—917。我认为《则阳》篇对宇宙有第一因或没有第一因的论述，类似康德的宇宙论第三个二律背反(antinomy)，只不过康德是以区分本体与现象来指引解决之途，而庄子则诉诸宇宙时空的无穷和语言的限制，认为语言只能论物，终日言只能尽物，至于道则是言默所不能载。

万物可言;道分化出万物,才有彼,才有是。Watson 和 Graham 都将此处的"是"理解为"此物之是",在哲学上会有困难,也达不到最大阅读的效果。其实是因为有了封,有了常以后,才开始有畛域出现。至于 Watson 和 Graham 对这八个畛域的翻译,也是可商榷的。Graham 的译文是"You can locate as there and enclose by a line, sort out and assess, divide up and discriminate between alternatives, compete over and fight over",其中左、右皆不见矣。而 Watson 虽译有左、右,然而他将"有伦,有义"翻译成"there are theories, there are debates",是将伦与义诠释为理论与辩论了。但是,正如我在前面的阅读,是在空间上的左、右之分以后,而有事物上伦与义的区分;随之以言论上分与辩的区分,再终之以心理上竞与争的区分。可见,在此还谈不上什么理论和辩论,且 Watson 的译法与后面的"有分,有辩"会产生重复。接下来,他将"八德"译成"Eight Virtue",虽在注解中说明是意在戏弄儒、墨,不过,我个人觉得,若要融贯一致,并允许最大的阅读,"八德"在此应读作"八项属性"(attributes),而不是八种"德性"(Eight Virtues)。Graham 将"八德"译成"Eight Powers",则更会误导,因为左、右、伦、义、分、辩、竞、争等都不是"power"。他的译文"You can locate as there and enclose by a line, sort out and assess, divide up and discriminate between alternatives, compete over and fight over",其中八德皆译为八种动作,而且也都看不出其中有"power"之意。

在接下来的文本中,庄子说:"六合之外,圣人存而不论,六合之内,圣人论而不议。春秋经世先王之志,圣人议而不辩。故分也者,有不分也;辩也者,有不辩也。曰:何也?圣人怀之,众人辩之以相示也。故曰辩也者有不见也。"所谓"六合"代表天地上下四方,基本上指的是全体事物存在的空间整体。[①] 如果说道先呈现为无,而无是奥妙的可能性,其中有一部分实现为有,于是才有出现在空间中的万物;那么,"六合之外"指的就是"道"及其所开显的无穷奥妙的可能性。对此,圣人不予否认,只是体察于"道"而明知语言不足以谈论道,所以说"六合之外,圣人存而不论"。[②]在此,庄子将语言与终极实在之间的关系再度联系起来。语言所能谈的不是终极实在,而是"六合之内"及其中的万物。所谓"六合之内,圣人论而不议",其中"六合之内"指的是空间或天地之内的万物,对此圣人虽可以论之,但并没有自以为是而斥他人为非的特定主张;原因在于万物都可彰显道,言说皆有所见乎彼或此,也因此"可乎可,不可乎不可;然乎然,不然乎不然",不必有特定的主张,否则就会将彼、此相对,加上成心的作用,就会彼此相是、相非。

以上针对"六合之外"、"六合之内",所谈论的既是道与物,分别属于本体论(ontological)和形器论(ontic)的层面。至于"春秋经世先王之志,则已经涉及先王的记载、历史的典籍与经世的典章制度等这些"人文的传统",由"道"而"物"而"人"。圣人对于人文传统,是采取"议而不辩"的态度,也就是说圣人对于人文传统有他自己的诠释观点,尤其是透过重言所表现的观点,这是以创造性的方式去诠释传统,但是圣人"不辩"。"辩"有两层意思,其一是"言辩",其二是"分辨"。可见,针对人文传统,圣人虽进行创造性的诠释,有诠释性的主张,但不在其中相互分辨与辩难——通常是在进行分辨以后才会相互辩难。

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① 庄子认为人没有办法直接谈论宇宙的诞生,更没办法对它提出理论。语言所能够指涉的只是事物,"终日言而尽物",不能尽"道"。为此没有一种直指或描述式的宇宙生发论。《大宗师》里则是透过一套神话,来讲宇宙的诞生,透过神明诞生的程序来解释空间与其中万物的诞生。

② 对照《则阳》篇所谓"终日言而尽物",至于"道"则是"物之极也",所以是"言默所不能载"。此亦与此所谓"六合之外,圣人存而不论"之意,颇为融贯一致。

至于说“故分也者，有不分也”，是因为你若进行分辨、分析，“道”作为整全，或是“六合”中的物作为整全，或是整个“人文传统”作为整全，若强为分析，一定有分析不到的地方，若强加言辩，一定有言辩所不及之处。圣人的气度恢弘，胸怀广阔，把自己对于道的整全、万物全体与人文传统的理解，皆纳之于怀。然而一般人则会彼此相分辨、辩难，以表现自己的认知、博学或才华。

庄子进一步表示：大道无法用名相表达，伟大的言论不会表现为争辩，自发的慈爱不会以儒家的仁爱方式表现，至大的廉洁不会自视清高，伟大的勇敢不会表现为逆害别人；这些都与庄子对各家各派价值观的评论有关。墨家、名家重视言辩，然而庄子认为“大道不称”、“大辩不言”。儒家重视仁爱，然而庄子则以为“大仁不仁”。墨家崇尚节俭，农家自耕自种，不向外取，对此庄子却要说“大廉不赚”。侠者以武犯禁，历来的武者与将军都是以勇为名，庄子却说“大勇不忮”。其理由在于“道昭而不道”、“言辩而不及”、“仁常而不成”、“廉清而不信”、“勇忮而不成”。以上“道”、“言”、“仁”、“廉”、“勇”五者本来是自发而圆融的，然而在强加展现之后就会变成有棱有角，失去原初的整全。若要能掌握原初的整全与其特定表现之间的张力，便需要一恢弘的理性作用，既能达到工具理性之知所达不到的领域，也就是达到“道”的整全、“物”的整全、“人文传统”的整全等等；而且要能明白道与可道、言与无言之间的张力，也就是掌握到一切表现的源头，可呈现为某种表现，可又不被定限于某种表现，反而能掌握到“道”与“不道”、“言”与“无言”之间的张力。如果能到达这个地步，也就是达至“天府”亦即天道在人身上的堂皇居所。

在我看来，“天府”是表示整全的理性作用，是人之理性光明的来源。我们可将“天府”视为真君、真宰之发用。以真君、真宰为体，以天府为用，将可在层层超越身体我、心理我、机心我之后，重新返回，重构身体、心理与判断。这不是工具理性，也不只是价值理性，而是兼顾整体的整全理性。经由天府的发用，使本真的我得以返回身体、心理、判断层面，其详细描述表现在《大宗师》篇。由于此一恢弘的理性能不断从“道”的整全、“物”的整全、“人文传统”的整全中汲取资源，注焉而不满，酌焉而不竭，大不同于名家辩论时所表现的耀眼的光芒，庄子称此整全理性的光明为“葆光”，意即“韬蔽或潜藏的光明”。

对于“天府”的英译，Watson 译为“Reservoir of Heaven”，较着重与后文“注焉而不满，酌焉而不竭”的相互呼应，但在文气上似乎在指称那位能知不言之辩、不道之道的（圣）人：“Who can understand discriminations that are not spoken, the Way that is not a way? If he can understand this, he may be called the Reservoir of Heaven.”试想，一个人怎能称为“天府”？不过，Watson 将“葆光”译为“Shaded Light”倒是能得其大意。相比之下，Graham 将“天府”译为“Treasure of Heaven”，将“葆光”译为“Benetnash Star”，都未遵循最小修改原则，而任随己意改动文本，将“天府”改为“天宝”，将“葆光”改为“摇光”，尤其将喻指人整全理性发用方式的“葆光”，改为北斗七星中的“摇光星”，这样违反了最小修改原则，也造成了在翻译上过度诠释的问题。

十、结　语

总之，在研究中国哲学之时，进行文本的阅读、理解、诠释与翻译，必须更加周延与谨慎。中国哲学的研究离不开对原典文本的理解与诠释，今后我们在解析中国哲学文本时，需要用比较严谨的诠释方法来处理，尽量不要割离文本，而能让文本本身说话。虽然文本总会邀请我们

去在其上进行哲学思索，而我们也总可以对文本作“最大阅读”(maximum reading)，不过，这必须先尊重“文义内在”、“融贯一致”与“最小修改”等原则，而且要注意中国哲学的特性，例如喜用“隐喻”与“叙事”，表达“形象-观念”，并与默观、艺术、道德与历史经验不可分割。最后，则需注意所研读文本的作者及其学派，是否也提供了诠释其文本的原则。这一切都必须放置在文本语用的动态发展过程中予以了解。本文对《齐物论》的诠释与英译的解析不求完整，只希望能以之为释例，表明这几层方法学考量的意涵与运用，显示本人对中国哲学向往之意，则于愿足矣。

选文三　On Translating Chinese Philosophic Terms

Derk Bodde

导　言

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什么位置、译文的读者类型是什么。在考虑了这些问题之后，卜德形成了一些翻译原则：风格的可读性、简洁性和自然性；统一性；准确性。尽管形成了这一套翻译的原则，译者并不能胶柱鼓瑟般机械地遵循这些原则，而是需要运用自己灵活的判断力和平衡各种价值观的能力，切忌奴婢式地一味顺从固定的规则。

The perennially fascinating problem of translating Chinese into Western languages (or vice versa) has evoked considerable discussion in recent years.[1] My excuse for adding to it here is that Professor Boodberg, in his review (see foregoing note) of my translation of Fung Yu-lan's *History of Chinese Philosophy*, has raised questions which, while addressed specifically to my rendering of certain Chinese philosophic terms, at the same time bear importantly on the larger problems of Chinese translation as a whole. In the following pages, therefore, I shall begin by commenting—I trust in a spirit of friendly discussion—on what Professor Boodberg has said about these terms (indicating in parentheses for each of them the English equivalents used by me in my translation, the two volumes of which will hereafter be cited as Fung 1 and 2). Then, using some of these as illustrations, I shall comment on the theories of translation presented by Professor Boodberg in his own article on "semasiology," as well as that by Professor Schafer on "two sinological maladies" (both cited in note 1 above). And having done this, I shall finally try to formulate a few general conclusions of my own.

1. *Yu* 有 (Being) and *Wu* 无 (Non-being)

Against these renderings for *yu* and *wu* (especially when used in non-Buddhist textual environment), as against several of the other renderings to be discussed later, Boodberg's general criticism is that they are "idiosyncratic and peculiarly supercharged terms of the Occidental philosophical vocabulary." With regard to *yu* and *wu* he continues more specifically that these words "preserved as verbs a transitiveness of meaning which kept them within the category of '* having' (or a French 'il y a') and scarcely permitted them to masquerade effectively as equivalents of our 'to be or not to be.'"

This is no doubt true. The difficulty, however, is that *yu* and *wu*, used philosophically, no longer operate as transitive verbs, but as nouns, and that this happens in Chinese texts long before the coming of Buddhism to China. In such cases, terms like "being and non-being" or "existence and nonexistence," despite their admittedly supercharged occidental associations, seem the closest—indeed almost the only—feasible equivalents. What then are the translators to do if they are to be denied their use? Their reply has been well nigh unanimous, as shown, for example, by the way in which they have handled the passage in *Lao-tzu*, chap. 2: *Yu wu hsiang sbeng* 有无相生, "*Yu* and *wu* generate one

another." Thus in French we find for this:

"L'etre et le non-e'tre" (Julien, Wieger, Duyvendaka[2]).

In German:

"Sein und Nichtsein" (Strauss, Richard Wilhelm, Forke[3]).

In English:

"Existence and non-existence" (Legge, Lionel Giles, John C. H. Wu,[4] Erkes, Hughes[5]);

"Being and Not-being" (Waley);

"Being and non-being" (Lin Yutang[6]).

This list, though far from exhaustive, contains some rather impressive names.[7] Rather than believe that none of these men was aware of the difficulties involved, I personally find it far easier to suppose that they translated the way they did because they could find no real alternative. Boodberg himself, unfortunately, has failed to suggest any such alternative.

2. *Hsing erh shang* 形而上 (What is above Shapes) and *Hsing erh hsia* 形而下 (What is within Shapes)

These phrases occur once in the *Yi Ching* and, more frequently, in Neo-Confucianism. In the *Yi Ching* they are rendered by Legge as "that which is antecedent to the material form" and "that which is subsequent to the material form,"[8] while by Wilhelm they are rendered (in close agreement with my own version) as "what is above form" and "what is within form,"[9] As found in Neo-Confucianism (Chu Hsi), Le Gall translates them either as "imperceptible" and "corporel" or as "supérieur *à* la forme" and "matériel,"[10] while Bruce translates "the corporeal" and "the incorporeal."[11]

Boodberg, however, comments that "parallel passages immediately following our phrases in the *Yi ching* require considering *erh* as an interverbal conjunction and *hsing* and *shang* (*hsia*) as verbs. Is then the first phrase to be understood as what is shaped (or: shapes) and transcends (become supernal?)/ and if so, what did that exactly mean?"

I am afraid I cannot satisfactorily answer this question. This does not greatly disturb me, however, because I believe there is excellent grammatical ground for rejecting the interpretation entirely as far as the *Yi Ching* (let along Neo-Confucianism) is concerned. This becomes apparent as soon as we reproduce the *Yi Ching* text in which our two key phrases appear, followed by die allegedly "parallel passages":

形而上者谓之道
形而下者谓之器
化而裁之谓之变

(Then follow two other lines essentially parallel to line 3.)

It is apparent that the seeming parallelism between these several lines is destroyed by one vital difference: the presence in lines 1 and 2 of the particle *che* 者, clearly making noun

phrases out of the preceding *hsing erh shang* (*hsia*), in contrast to the accusative pronoun *chih* 之 of line 3 (and the following two unquoted lines), which equally clearly gives verbal force to the corresponding three preceding words. Legge senses this distinction when he translates these latter words as "transformation and shaping" (in contradistinction to his "that which is antecedent ... and that which is subsequent" for lines 1 and 2). And though this distinction appears less clearly in Wilhelm's translation ("that which transforms things and brings them together"), he goes even further than Legge by suggesting that line 3 and the two lines following have been wrongly transposed to their present position in the text, and really belong to a passage two paragraphs lower down where the wording is very similar. Thus for him, as for Legge, it is plain that they do not constitute true parallels to the *hsing erh shang* (*hsia*) lines that precede.

3. *T'i* 体 (Substance or Essence) and *Yung* 用 (Functioning)

Here again there is considerable unanimity on the part of the translators: "substance and function" (Levenson[12] and Hellmut Wilhelm[13]); "substance, or body, and function; die fundamental and phenomenal" (Soothill and Hodous[14]); "substance and operation" (Bruce[15]); "substance and application" (Liebenthal[16]); "essence and function" (Nivison[17]). Boodberg, however, objects that "Chinese t'i never developed the subtlety of our 'essence' and 'substance' having remained close to the level of 'embodiment' or 'form'".

The important consideration here is that "embodiment" and "form," while usually entirely satisfactory for *t'i* when occurring alone, are entirely too concrete and physical in their connotations to express the addedrather metaphysical overtones it acquires as soon as it appears in the famous phrase, *t'i* and *yung*. In this formula, *t'i* signifies the inherent, enduring and fundamental (hence "internal") qualities of a thing or situation, in contrast to *yung*, which has reference to its functional, fluctuating and secondary (hence "external") manifestations.

This distinction of "inner" and "outer" is, as pointed out by Liebenthal (loc. cit.), clearly expressed in the Tz'u-hai dictionary's definition of *t'i-yung* (sub *t'i*, definition 10): "What is visible externally is *yung*; what is self-complete (*chü* 具) internally is *t'i*." Something of the same extended connotation for *t'i* also occurs in the term *pen-t'i lun* 本体论 (discussion on fundamental or original *t'i*), the modern Chinese coined equivalent for the "ontology" of Western philosophy. "Substance" certainly seems here more apposite for it than either "embodiment" or "form."

That *t'i* should thus acquire metaphysical overtones in certain contexts should not surprise us when we remember that the term *t'i-yung* itself, while popular in Neo-Confucian and later writings, is probably of Chinese Buddhist origin.[18] There it often occurs in conjunction with a third term, *hsiang* >W (laksana), as, for example, in the opening paragraphs of the Awakening of Faith, where the three words are respectively rendered by

Suzuki as "quintessence," "activity" and "attributes."[19] Elsewhere in Buddhism, however, *t'i and yung* are paired together without *hsiang*, as, for example, in the definition given for them by Chih-k'ai (538—597): "*T'i* refers to the (non-phenomenal) Reality (*shih-hsiang* 实相), which lacks all differentiation; *yung* refers to the totality of (phenomenal) dharmas (*fa* 法), which are non-identical in their graded distinctions."[20] Nor is it surprising to find the term *pen-t'i* (fundamental or original *t'i*) likewise recorded in the Buddhist dictionaries as a Buddhist expression.

In such Buddhist contexts, therefore (and, by extension, in later non-Buddhist contexts as well), it seems evident that words like "embodiment" or "form" cannot adequately express the full significance of *t'i*.

4. *Jen* 仁 (Love)

In his study of the historical evolution of the Confucian virtue *jen*, Dubs has shown that its essential significance is "love for others;" sometimes, however, the word has been narrowly interpreted to signify primarily the graded kind of love deemed appropriate for a Confucian hierarchical society, whereas at other times it has been broadened into a much more impartial and universalistic concept.[21] My own rendering of *jen* simply as "love," therefore, was an attempt to find a convenient mean between these interpretations, most readily covering its shifting meanings throughout its long history. This rendition is not unique, for it has also been used or suggested by such scholars as Bruce[22] and Tjan Tjoe Som[23].

Boodberg, however, prefers the more specific terms "humanity" or "co-humanity."[24] "With Bodde's 'love' made so much of by every Confucian writer," he remarks, "the non-sinological reader will keep wondering as to their motivation in persistently rejecting the Mohist doctrine of 'comprehensive love' (*chien-ai*, here 'love' is an entirely legitimate rendering), when he is not trying to brush off the familiar connotations of Agape, Eros, or Amor Dei that come to hover over *jen* .... "

My justifications for "love" are four in number:

(1) By explicitly stating in the Preface to my translation (Fung 2, pp. xvi-xvii) that *jen* does not, like *ai mi*, include the idea of sexual love, and that, in its narrowest sense, it denotes a graded love, I had hoped to save the reader from the ambiguities feared by Boodberg.

(2) Boodberg's argument for "humanity" or "co-humanity" rests primarily on the semantic equation between *jen* and its homophone *jen* ("man"), occurring three times in the Confucian classics in the formula: "*Jen* (humanity) means *jen* (man or mankind)."[25] Readers familiar with this formula, however, may be surprised to realize that in an even greater number of cases *jen* is defined, or at least referred to in the classics, in terms of that very word ai, for which Boodberg himself concedes "love" to be a legitimate rendering. Thus

we read: "It (*jen*) means to love (*ai*) others" (Analects, XII, 22); "The man of *jen* loves (*ai*) others "(Mencius, IVb, 28); "For the man of *jen*, there is nobody (or nothing) that he does not love (*ai*)" (ibid., VIIa, 46); "He is content with his circumstances and genuine in his *jen*, therefore he can practice love (*ai*)" (*Yi Ching*, Appen. III; Wilhelm, I, 317);"*Jen* serves to love (*ai*) them (the people)" (Book of Rites, chap. 17; Legge, XXVIII, 98).

Similar statements, moreover, are common in the non-classical literature of Chou and later times, e. g., the *Later Mohists*[26], *the Kuo-yü*[26], the *Huai-nan-tzu*[27], *Tung Chung-shu* (at least four times!)[28], the K'ung-tzu Chia-yü[29], Han Yü[30], Ch'eng Yi[31], Chu Hsi[32], and, in the nineteenth century, the eclectic T'an Ssu-t'ung[33]. Thus many Chinese thinkers have explicitly described *jen* in terms of *ai*, "love."

(3) As already indicated, there is a definite advantage, when translating a term with extended meanings like *jen*, to use a similarly broad English term like "love," rather than narrower words like "humanity" or "co-humanity" which, admirable though they be in certain contexts, hardly fit at all in others. What are we to do, for example, when told by Tung Chung-shu (Fung 2, p. 52) that "the beautiful expression of *jen* lies in Heaven, for Heaven is *fen*"? Or when Wang Shou-jen (Fung 2, p. 599) says of the great man that "when he sees plants and trees being torn and broken, he will certainly experience a feeling of sympathy and compassion ... because in his *jen* he is one with the plants and trees"? In these contexts "love" certainly seems to hit the mark better than do Boodberg's narrower alternatives.

(4) Finally, there is the stylistic convenience that "love" can much more readily be converted into a verb or adjective than can "humanity" or "co-humanity."[34] This is no small advantage when translating a text the size of Fung Yu-lan's, in which *jen*, functioning as verb or adjective, occurs many times.

5. *Yi* 意 (Idea) and *Yi* 义 (Righteousness, or, Very Occasionally, Concept)

Here again Boodberg's objection is that these words belong to the "supercharged" vocabulary of Western philosophy. "*Yi* [the first *yi*]," he says, "never acquired the pregnant richness of the 'idea' of Western tradition, and the other *yi*, mistranslated 'righteousness' and 'concept' hardly ever transcended the meaning of 'congruity.'"

The difficulty here is that, not only in "idea" but also in its Chinese counterpart *yi* (the first *yi*), we have to do with words that can operate both on philosophical and non-philosophical levels of meaning. On the non-philosophical level, there seems to be no objection to equating the two, as, for example, in the statement about Yang Hsiung (Fung 2, p. 137): "Nor would he do anything that did not accord with his own ideas (*yi*)."

What are we to do, however, in those admittedly rare cases where *yi* seems to be used as a technical philosophic term—for example, when Wang Pi (Fung 2, p. 184) talks about the relationship of *yi* to hsiang, "symbols," and *yen*, "words"? How are we to handle *yi*

here, unless we translate it by that same word "idea" which we elsewhere give for it in ordinary non-philosophical contexts? Unfortunately Boodberg offers no suggestions at this point, and I myself have none.

As for the other *yi*, "mistranslated 'righteousness,'" let us grant that it may originally have meant something like "congruity." Creel says of it, for example: "Its sense is not simply that of what is 'right' or 'righteous' in the ordinary meaning of these words. It means rather that which is fitting and suitable."[35]

As used in Confucianism, however, *yi* means a good deal more than merely the passive conformity of the individual to a social norm, such as might be inferred from a word like "congruity." Rather, *yi* characterizes the conduct of those individuals who are consciously aware of the existence of certain moral standards and obligations, and who strive in their every act to live up to them to the best of their ability. In the words of Creel (op. cit., 135): "It is a regulator of conduct similar to *li* and the Way; and one that constantly places his own responsibility squarely before the individual. For whereas the Way is general, and one may look to others for some guidance concerning it, the question of what is suitable in each given situation is one that the individual must decide for himself."

In the case of *yi*, as of *jen*, probably no single English term (such as "righteousness," "rightness," "justice," "moral duty") can fully convey the moral ramifications of the original. Any one of these, however, at least warns the reader that he is dealing with a positive moral concept, which is certainly not true in the case of such a colorless and amoral term as "congruity."[36]

6. *Li* 理 (Principle)

Though approving of this rendering, Boodberg then goes on to say: "One would wish we could devise an English rendering more faithfully registering the semantic range of *li*. Perhaps 'Ingrain' or '(Archetypal) Venation' would not be too awkward." My only comment is that I wish I could share this optimism. As far as "Ingrain" is concerned, I am even uncertain whether it is a noun, though I do know that a noun is certainly called for if we are to translate *li* at all.

7. *Liang Yi* 两仪 (Two Forms)

Here at last I am glad to be able to agree that—at least in Neo-Confucian context—"Two Forms" is not too happy for *Hang yi*, for which Boodberg's "paired congruities" may well be better. In its original *Yi Ching* context, however, I am less sure, since there the *Hang yi* are generally understood to be the two primary lines (one divided, the other undivided) from which have been evolved the eight trigrams. Legge accordingly translates "Two Forms," and it was probably overdependence on him which caused me to adopt the

same rendering even in Neo-Confucian contexts.[37]

As used in Neo-Confucianism, however (especially in Chou Tun-yi's Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate Explained), the *Hang yi* are usually interpreted as the *yin* and the *yang* which, since they do not have any definite physical shape, cannot very appropriately be described as the "Two Forms." Better is the term "Two Modes," extensively used by other translators of Chou's Diagram Explained.[38]

How tricky such terms can be, however, is exemplified by none other than Chu Hsi himself, who, though obviously well aware that Chou Tun-yi's *Hang yi* are the *yin* and *yang*, in one passage of his Conversations elects to define them along quite different and more concrete lines such as would there justify the rendering "Two Forms." Thus he tells us, using some of the very phraseology of Chou's Diagram Explained (Fung 2, p. 546): "There is a division into the *yin* and the *yang*, and the Two Forms (*liang yi*) are thus established. These Two Forms are Heaven and Earth, and are different in meaning from the Two Forms associated with the pictured trigrams."

8. Conclusion

I have already several times referred to Boodberg's article, "The Semasiology of Some Primary Confucian Concepts" (cited in note 1 above). This article now calls for closer examination, since its assumptions underlie many of the criticisms we have been discussing. What, precisely, does Boodberg mean when he speaks of "semasiology"? In his own words (op. cit., 320), it is a

> methodology ... which combines the meticulousness of scientific observation and computation in establishing the range, frequency of occurrence, and environmental reflexes of a given logoid with a naive but unshakable belief that within the diffuse and viscuous cytoplasmic mass of its connotations there lurks an ascertainable and definable etymonic karyosome. To that belief is to be added the conviction that, once the nucleus of a Sinitic word is delineated with reasonable precision, a patient search through the rich catalogue of the contour forms of the etyma of our Mediterranean heritage would finally yield a silhouette of sufficiently congruous perimeter ...

If this means, as I think it does, that we should try to establish phonetically, graphically and historically, the precise significance of a Chinese term, and then with equal care search our Indo-European linguistic treasury for that term most nearly coinciding with its contours, there seems to be nothing unreasonable here or even startlingly revolutionary. Indeed, as applied by Boodberg himself, the method results in some translations which, stylistically at least, are perfectly comprehensible and usable: "lordling" for *chün-tzu* (ordinarily "superior man," "gentleman"), "regimen" for cheng ("government"), "Form"

for *li* ("rites," "propriety"), "co-humanity" for *jen*.

As against these, however, it also yields "translations" which I regretfully find it hard to describe other than as neologistic monstrosities: "enrectivity, arrectivity" for *te* (ordinarily "virtue," "power"), "compagination" for *hsing* ("punishments"), "selfshipful compropriety, proper selfshipfulness" for *yi*. To me, at least, there is something wrong with a methodology when it results in translations which must themselves be translated before they can be properly understood.

A basic difficulty, it seems to me, is Boodberg's apparent conviction that a translation can be adequate only if it maintains etymological (and not merely conceptual) congruency with the original term. Unfortunately, in languages as far removed from each other as Chinese and English, the attempt to find such etymological congruencies can only sometimes be successful; in many other cases it inevitably imposes such a strain on the recipient language as to compel the translator to resort to bizarre neologisms of the sort noted. A basic canon of translation, in my opinion, is that it should pay careful heed to the peculiar genius of both the languages between which it operates, and not over-arbitrarily try to force the one into the Procrustean bed of the other. On this point it is instructive to see the way in which Chinese has translated many modern Western terms: because of its concreteness, it often tends to translate nominally terms which, in their original languages, have verbal derivation, for example, "(railroad) train," which in Chinese becomes *huo ch'e*, lit. "fire vehicle."

I do not mean to imply, of course, that the attempt to discover Chinese etymologies should be abandoned. Unless readily translatable and understandable, however, I believe that such etymologies should be restricted to footnotes or explanatory comment, and not compressed into topheavy neologisms then erroneously called "translations." At this point, moreover, we need the further warning that the search for meanings should not neglect the possible semantic evolution undergone by a term in the millennia following its earliest occurrence. "Lordling," for example, may be an adequate rendering for *chün-tzu* in its pre-Confucian setting, but it certainly fails completely to convey the rich connotations accumulated by that term from Confucius onward (when "superior man" or "gentleman" become conceptually far more appropriate).[39] To translate *chün-tzu* as "lordling" in such cases would be like translating "science" as "knowledge" in a modern textbook, simply because "knowledge" is what we know the word originally meant.

Something of Boodberg's approach to translation appears also in Edward H. Schafer's article, "Non-translation and Functional Translation—Two Sinolog ical Maladies" (see note 1 above), where we read (p. 251): "The chief if not the sole responsibility of the scholarly translator ... is to convey, as precisely as he may in a different tongue, the sense of the language of the original." By this Schafer means that it is the literal wording of a phrase that holds primary importance and should be inserted in the translated text itself, whereas any paraphrastic significance it may have in its particular context—what I would call its "dictionary meaning"—should be subordinated to a footnote.[40]

Schafer's principle operates constructively as long as he applies it to terms whose literal meaning is readily translatable and understandable. In other cases, however, it leads to such weird results as "Penetralian," "Auripor-phyrian," and "Protonotary Stimulant," suggested by him (p. 260) as renderings for certain official titles. The difficulty here, it seems to me, lies in Schafer's insistence on the universality of his principle, without making allowance for several pertinent considerations:

(1) What type of term is it that is being translated? Geographical names, official titles, and the like (which are the main concern of Schafer's article) are as a rule easier to translate literally than are philosophical and psychological terms (for which, in many cases, no really "literal" translation is possible).

(2) How important is the term being translated to the translation as a whole? A political scientist, for example, reading a Chinese historical text, may conceivably welcome "Officiant Penetralian" as the more-or-less literal rendering of *shih-chung* 侍中. I strongly suspect, however, that a student of Chinese thought, reading a philosophical text in which the identical title happens to occur, will be more than happy to settle for such looser but more immediately understandable "dictionary" renditions as "President" or "Secretary," permitting him the sooner to get back to his philosophical reading.

(3) Does a term's literal meaning still exist as a living reality in the minds of the persons who use it (and who hear or read it)? Or has its vividness faded into a mere cliché or convention, used unthinkingly whenever one wishes to evoke the "real," i. e., the "dictionary" meaning of the term? A case in point is the colloquial *yao-fan-ti*, whose literal meaning, "demander of food," has become entirely swallowed up in its dictionary meaning of "beggar." I doubt whether one in a thousand of the Chinese who use this term ever stops to think of its literal meaning. Why, therefore, unless one wants to be pedantic (or is writing a philological treatise), translate it other than as "beggar"? In such a familiar case, indeed, even a footnote reference to "demander of food" seems superfluous.

(4) What kind of text is it that is being translated? A work in which literary style is of the essence—for example a T'ang poem—would seem to call for a different approach, and a different kind of literalness, than would a text—say the chapter of a dynastic history—in which it is the content, not style, that is important.

(5) For whom is the translation primarily intended? Philological details that may seem desirable to the sinologist may well repel the less specialized reader, especially when he finds them interfering with his ready comprehension of the text as a whole.

Perhaps, having said all this, we can now try to formulate a few general conclusions of our own. A good translation, it seems to me, should ideally try to meet at least three criteria:

(1) Stylistic intelligibility, simplicity and naturalness. This means avoidance of clumsy locutions, awkward or hard-to-understand neologisms, eroticisms, and the other faults that often arise from over-labored and over-literal adherence to the original text. Such over-

literalness, however, need not always spring from scholarly over-caution, for there is another variety as well, deliberately cultivated by certain translators in the hope thereby of enhancing the quaintness and color of their work. For such translators *yao-fan-ti* will always be "demander of food," never "beggar," and this despite the fact that the image evoked by the original term is far paler than that evoked by it for Westerners in its literal English dress.

The rule here might be: translate colorfully only what is authentically intended to be colorful in the original; for the rest, be content with more sober (but for that reason often more idiomatic and more comprehensible) language. And if, having done this, the translator still feels the literal wording to be important, footnotes are always available for that purpose.

(2) Consistency. This means that a technical vocabulary consistently used in the original should as much as possible be reproduced by a similarly consistent vocabulary in the translation. This is why, as I have pointed out, I prefer an unprecise English word like "love" for a similarly unprecise Chinese word like *jen* rather than other narrower and therefore less widely usable words. And if, as often happens, consistency becomes unfeasible despite all efforts, it is then the translator's duty to warn the reader of this fact. Here I gladly accept Boodberg's reproof for not having always followed this principle myself, e. g., when, on p. 521 of my translation, I without notice rendered *li*—elsewhere "Principle"—as "truth."

(3) Accuracy. By this I do not merely mean accuracy of meaning—vital though such accuracy of course is—but also fidelity to the spirit and form in which the original is written. From this point of view, as I have tried to show, a merely literal translating of the language of the original does not always achieve its purpose. Nor does a translation which considers only a word's earliest etymology, without examining the semantic evolution it may have undergone in later times. We have seen, for example, die troubles that "embodiment" or "form" give us when we come to translate *t'i* in the phrase *t'i-yung*.

At the heart of our problem, as far as philosophical translation is concerned, is that we are not there dealing with sticks or stones, official titles or place names, but with ideas, ideals and convictions bearing highly charged emotional and intellectual overtones, the verbal expressions of which therefore equally consist of "idiosyncratic and peculiarly supercharged terms." This, of course, is just as true of Chinese as of Occidental philosophy.

The translator consequently finds himself in the unenviable position of having to grapple, on both sides of his translation, with vocabularies that are not merely supercharged, but differently supercharged, owing to the divergent linguistic and cultural backgrounds from which they spring. No matter how much he would like to escape from this predicament, he finds himself compelled in a large percentage of cases, owing to the very nature of his subject—the fact that he is dealing with ideas and not with things—to use precisely those supercharged terms of the one civilization in order to translate the equally (but differently) supercharged terms of the other. Obviously the risk involved is great, yet

equally obviously it is one he must assume, since all too often the only alternative to thus translating supercharged Chinese term A by the almost (but not quite) congruent supercharged Western term A1 is either not to translate at all or to invent bewildering neologisms of his own. The same problem, of course, arises in reverse in translating Western or other non-Chinese ideas into Chinese.[41]

Among techniques for circumventing, or seeming to circumvent, some of these difficulties, the easiest but least satisfactory is not to translate at all, but merely transliterate, troublesome terms. Save for a few terms scarcely translatable (such as *yin* and *yang*), or those with obscure or debatable meanings, I fully agree with Schafer's condemnation of this practice as one of our commonest "sinological maladies." Far better is it in cases of doubt to provide the reader with both the literal and "dictionary" meanings of the term, plus whatever further information is deemed desirable.

Had I myself done this more extensively in my translation of Fung Yu-lan's History, I suspect that I might have obviated some of Boodberg's criticisms. Here, however, I was confronted by special inhibiting considerations: the fact that the text was already formidably long, that it was the work of a contemporary Chinese scholar whose narrative I did not wish to interrupt more than minimally necessary, and that my translation was intended for the educated layman as well as the specialist. Certainly it seems true that detailed semantic investigations are technically far more feasible in specialized monographs than in broad surveys of the Fung Yu-lan type.

Obviously, no sustained translation from a language and civilization as alien as those of China can ever meet with equal satisfaction all the criteria we have been discussing. Translation necessarily represents a compromise between several competing desiderata, in the reaching of which, since it is not a science but an art, the translator must rely more on flexibility of judgment and a sense of balanced values than on any slavish adherence to fixed rules.[42] Under the best of circumstances, frustration remains one of his major occupational hazards, and often he must think bitterly of the truth of Kumāra-jīva's dictum, that translating is like the pre-chewing of food that is to be fed to others: in either case the product is bound to be poorer in taste and quality than the original.

Yet despite all the frustrations and facile criticisms to which the translator is exposed, certain positive compensations remain for him. One is the insight his work gives him into a civilization other than his own, and the sharpened insight into his own civilization that this experience affords. Another is the intellectual satisfaction coming from successfully pulling a little closer together ideas belonging to divergent cultural traditions, and from his consciousness that in so doing he is doing what only few people can do well. And a third is the moral satisfaction of knowing that he is thereby contributing—if only in small measure—to the world's store of knowledge.

Notes

1. Cf. the articles in Arthur F. Wright, ed., *Studies in Chinese Thought* (Chicago, 1953): Arnold Isenberg, "Some Problems of Interpretation;" I. A. Richards, "Toward a Theory of Translating;" Achilles Fang, "Some Reflections on the Difficulty of Translation;" Arthur F. Wright, "The Chinese Language and Foreign Ideas." Cf. also Edward H. Schafer, "Chinese Reign-names—Words or Nonsense Syllables?", *Wennti* no. 3 (July 1952), 33 - 40, and Schafer, "Non-translation and Functional Translation—Two Sinological Maladies," *Far Eastern Quarterly* 13 (1954), 251 - 260. Likewise Peter A. Boodberg, "The Semasiology of Some Primary Confucian Concepts," *Philosophy East and West* 2. 4 (January 1954), 317 - 332, and Boodberg, *Review of my translation of Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy*, Vol. II (Princeton, 1953), in *Far Eastern Quarterly* 13 (1954), 334-337.
2. *Tao To King* (Paris, 1953), 7.
3. *Geschichte der alten chinesischen Philosophie* (Hamburg, 1927), 263.
4. In *T'ien Hsia Monthly* 9 (1939), 404.
5. *Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times* (London & New York, 1942), 145.
6. *The Wisdom of China and India* (New York, 1942), 584.
7. The only exceptional reading I have found is that of Carus, whose "to be and not to be" would surely be objected to by Boodberg. Yet even Cams elsewhere (e. g., *Lao-tzu*, chap. 40) translates "existence and non-existence."
8. *Sacred Books of the East*, XVI, 377.
9. Richard Wilhem, *I Ching* (English translation by Cary Baynes, New York, 1950), I, 347.
10. *Stanislas Le Gall*, *Le philosoph Tchou Hi* (Shanghai, 2nd ed., 1923), 81 and 90.
11. J. P. Bruce, *The Philosophy of Human Nature* (London, 1922), 274.
12. In Wright, op. cit. (note 1 above), 155.
13. In *Journal of the History of Ideas* 12 (1951), 55.
14. Cf. their *Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms* (London, 1937), 488b.
15. *Philosopby of Human Nature*, 4.
16. Walter Liebenthal, *The Book of Chao* (Peiping, 1948), 19.
17. In Wright, op. cit, 118.
18. Cf. the citations in Fung 2, pp. 366 and 375. Though T'ang Yung-t'ung, in his study of the Neo-Taoist Wang Pi, himself uses the term *t'i-yung* to describe Wang's thinking, this term does not seem to be actually present in Wang's own writings (nor have I found it in other early non-Buddhist writings). See T'ang's article (transl. by Walter Liebenthal) in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 10 (1947), 143.
19. D. T. Suzuki, *Avaghosha's Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mabāyāna* (Chicago, 1900), 53. This is a translation of the version of the *Ch'i-hsin Lun* by Siksananda, 652 - 710 (Taisho ed. no. 1667; vol. 32, p. 584b), but the same terms also appear in the version attributed to Paramartha, 497 - 569 (ibid. no. 1666; vol. 32, p. 575c).
20. *Statements on the Lotus Sutra* 法华文句, chüan 3b (Taishō no. 1718; vol. 34, p. 38a).
21. H. H. Dubs, "The Development of Altruism in Confucianism," *Philosophy East and West* 1. 1 (April 1951), 48 - 55.
22. In his *Philosophy of Human Nature and Chu Hsi and His Masters* (London, 1923).
23. In his translation of the *Po Hu T'ung* (2 vols.; Leyden, 1949, 1952), esp. I, 292 - 293, where he offers justification for this rendering.
24. Both terms are suggested by him in his review. However, in his earlier "Semasiology of Some Primary

Confucian Concepts," 330 (cited in note 1 above), he definitely gives preference to "co-humanity" on the ground that this avoids the European and non-Chinese connotations evoked by "humanity."

25. Mencius, VIIb, 16; *Doctrine of the Mean*, chap. 28; *Book of Rites*, chap. 7 (Legge, Sacred Books of the East, XXVIII, 333).
26. Cf. their definition (cited in Fung 1, p. 275): "*Jen* is to love (*ai*)."
27. Chap. 20: "What is called *jen* is the love (*ai*) of others." Cited in Tjan Tjoe Som, op. cit., I, 293.
28. Cf. *Ch'un-ch'iu Fan-lu*, chap. 29: "The standard for *jen* lies in showing love (*ai*) to others, not the self" (cited in Fung 2, p. 38, and Tjan, loc. cit.); chap. 30: "Jen without wisdom means love (ai) without discrimination" (cited in Fung 2, p. 39); chap. 58: "If we examine the purpose of Heaven, (we see that) it is boundless and infinitely *jen* ... The purpose of Heaven is ever to love (*ai*) and confer benefit" (cited in Fung 2, pp. 52-53); chap. 59: "*Jen* means to love (*ai*) others" (cited in Tjan, loc. cit.). These definitions scarcely support Boodberg in his decision to render *jen* as "co-humanization" when speaking of "Tung Chung-shu's great formula for the 'co-humani-zation' of the universe."
29. Cf. R. P. Kramers, *K'ung Tzu Chia Yü* (Leyden, 1950), sect. 9, p. 242, where three disciples of Confucius, on being asked by him to define *jen*, reply respectively that it is "to make others love (*ai*) yourself," "to love (*ai*) others," "to love (*ai*) yourself."
30. "A love (*ai*) for everyone is called *jen*." Cited in Fung 2, p. 409.
31. Cf. citation in Fung 2, p. 517, where Ch'eng Yi states that from a man's "feeling of distress, which is linked to love (*ai*), ... one may deduce that he (innately also) possesses the quality of *jen*."
32. Cf. Chu's commentary on *Analects*, I, 3: "*Jen* is the Principle (*li*) of love (*ai*), it is the virtue of the heart." Cited in Soothill, Analects of Confucius (1910), 104.
33. Cf. citation in Fung 2, p. 693: "There is something supremely great and supremely subtle .... It has no name, but we call it the 'ether.' As made manifest in action, Confucius ... referred to it as *jen* ... Mo Tzu referred to it as universal love (*chien ai*). The Buddha referred to it ... as compassion and mercy. Jesus referred to it ... as loving (*ai*) others as oneself .... The scientists refer to it as the power of love (*ai*) and attraction."
34. On p. 330 of his "Semasiology," Boodberg suggests "co-human" and "co-humanize [oneself]" as variant forms for "co-humanity," yet on p. 328 he correctly points out that *fen* as a verb functions transitively. But to "co-humanize [oneself]" is scarcely transitive!
35. H. G. Creel, *Confucius, the Man and the Myth* (New York, 1949), 134.
36. Perhaps I am not being fair here, and perhaps Boodberg, despite his reference to "congruity," does not mean that he would actually use it as a translation for *yi*. In his "Semasiology," for example, after analyzing *yi* at length, he concludes (pp. 330-331): "Most Chinese contexts would become perfectly clear if *yi* were translated 'self-shipful compropriety' or 'proper selfshipfulness.'" To this I must reply with regret that as far as I am concerned, even "congruity" seems preferable to neologisms such as these, concerning which I shall have more to say presently.
37. Cf. Legge, *Sacred Books of the East*, XVI, 373. Wilhelm, *I Ching* (English ed., I, 342), translates a little differently: "two primary forces."
38. E. g., Bruce, *Chu Hsi and His Masters*, 130, and C. P. Hsu, *Ethical Realism in Neo-Confucian Thought* (Peiping, 1933), 26; also Forke, *Geschichte der neueten chinesischen Philosophie* (Hamburg, 1938), 48: "die beiden Modi"; Le Gall, op. cit, 36, and Chow Yih-ching, *La philosophie morale dans le Néo-Confucianisme* (Paris, 1954), 42: "les deux modes." Gabenlentz's *Thai-Kih-Thu* (Dresden, 1876) was not available to me.

39. I question, however, whether even in pre-Confucian times chün-tzu had the possibly "perjorative value" suggested for it by Boodberg on p. 322 of his article. On the contrary, I believe that many passages could be cited from pre-Confucian literature to show that chün-tzu was then a respected designation. As only one example, cf. *Book of Odes* no. 251 (Waley transl., p. 182): "All happiness to our Chün-tzu, Father and mother of his people."
40. I have doubts about the way in which Schafer uses "connotation" and "denotation" to describe these two kinds of meaning, but I shall not discuss them here. Instead, for the sake of simplicity, I shall use the terms "literal meaning" and "dictionary meaning" (i. e., the meaning which a dictionary or other authoritative source or evidence would indicate a term as really having in a specific context, irrespective of its usual "literal meaning"). For example, "of Scotland or its inhabitants" is the literal meaning of the word "Scotch," but "whiskey" and "parsimonious" are both recognized "dictionary meanings" for it when it occurs in certain contexts.
41. Cf. Arthur F. Wright, "The Chinese Language and Foreign Ideas," cited in note 1 above.
42. If I myself have seemed onesided in stressing the dangers of over-literalness, it is because scholarly translators often appear less conscious of these than of the opposite dangers of under-literalness. Most of us are quick enough to condemn translators whose laziness or ignorance allows them to be content with loose paraphrase, or those other translators who (sometimes for love of fame or money) are ready to glamorize and "jazz up" their work by filling it with modern idioms and ideas hopelessly alien to the original.

选文四　论《易经》的英译与世界传播

吴　钧

导　言

选文原刊载于《周易研究》2011年第1期。

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选文认为翻译是人类交流与传播史上最古老最复杂的文化现象，从17世纪以来，世界上各种语言和不同风格的《易经》译本就层出不穷。《易经》英译对世界影响重大，但长期以来存在多方面的问题有待解决。本文通过探讨《易经》英译的相关问题旨在寻找新世纪全球化语境下《易经》翻译的改进与《易经》世界传播的新思路。

《易经》为我中华民族的群经之首，它凝聚着中华民族悠久的文化传统，承载着中国人的大智大勇，是中国文化最具民族性的经典代表。自17世纪以来，世界各国的学者就开始不断开

拓挖掘这座人类文明与智慧的宝藏，各种语言和风格的《易经》译本和研究论著层出不穷，而《易经》的英语翻译作为《易经》翻译的一个重要方面值得认真地研究。

一、《易经》英译的历史概述

有记载的最早西方人士的《易经》翻译是 1626 年在中国杭州由法国传教士金尼阁(Nicolas Trigault，1577—1628)翻译出版的拉丁文《易经》。金尼阁追随其老师利玛窦，力图在东方传统思想与基督教义之间寻找结合点，这是他研究并翻译《易经》的初衷。此后在 1710 年，法国传教士白晋(Joachim Bouvet ，1656—1730)历经艰辛完成《易学宗旨》的撰写，并把它带回欧洲，引起包括德国科学家和思想家莱布尼茨在内的西方学界的兴趣与关注，而正是由于莱布尼茨对《易经》的发现和研究，《易经》引起了西方社会的重视和进一步翻译与研究的热潮。[1]

《易经》英文翻译的代表作是 1882 年由英国传教士理雅各(James Legge)翻译的版本。理雅各为把握中国人心灵的钥匙而立志翻译《易经》。自 1843 年起他就在中国香港传教，在长达 30 年的岁月中他对《易经》产生了浓厚的兴趣。为便利研究与翻译，他还聘请了中国学者王韬来港合译古典“四书”、“五经”。他历时 15 年，28 卷的英语译作“The Chinese Classics”才得以完工，由牛津克拉来登公司出版发行。他的这部《易经》英译收入该书第二卷，标题翻译为 *The Book of Changes*。理雅各的翻译主要依据宋代理学家的《易》注，并把“经”与“传”分开来译，他认为把两者分开来译更有利于正确理解和翻译《易经》，但他的《易经》翻译和对《易经》的评述却并没有分开独立进行。尽管他的翻译有很多误译和值得商榷的地方，但无论如何，理雅各为翻译《易经》做了大量艰苦的研究和前期准备，他的《易经》翻译是世界上第一部权威的英文《易经》翻译本。在终于完成了翻译之后他曾说：“对译中国古籍的人来说，没有一部比《易经》更难的了。”由此可知他翻译《易经》的艰难程度。

理雅各这部筚路蓝缕、历经艰辛完成的《易经》英译本一经问世，立刻引起了西方世界不小的轰动。他的译作得到两方易学研究者高度评价，被认作为当时最好的译本，此后多次再版并产生极大影响。此后其他《易经》英译本也都以此本作为标准和参照。理雅各的《易经》英译的功绩不仅在于此译本引起西方世界对《易经》文化的进一步关注，还在于他的翻译为《易经》在西方的传播和学术研究奠定了基础。

人类社会进入 19 世纪末、20 世纪初以来，中国《易经》的各种翻译版本更是五花八门，层出不穷。在几百年的世界近现代历史时期，西方世界对中国神秘的《易经》有了越来越多的兴趣与翻译的热情，《易经》逐渐成为世界范围的热门话题，不断有新的译本与研究论著问世。但总的来说，尽管早期西方传教士对《易经》的译介是出自要了解并控制中国人的目的而来，但他们的辛勤翻译对中国传统文化在世界的传播和影响却做出了不可抹杀的贡献。《易经》在西方国家的传播、西方汉学的兴起以及对世界学术思想的影响都与这些早期传教士的艰辛翻译紧密相连。但总体来讲，他们对《易经》的翻译都存在不同程度的误解和错译，各种译本中都存在不少歧义与相互矛盾的解释和译文，如对一些卦辞与爻辞有完全不同或差异极大的理解和解释等，但《易经》毕竟由此开始被揭开神秘的面纱而走向世界。

从 20 世纪 20 年代始，《易经》在世界有了更为广泛深入的传播与影响。在美国，《易经》成为崇拜东方神秘主义的一代青年的精神食粮；在欧洲，各种译本成为风靡一时的畅销书。但各

种粗制滥造的译介使得《易经》庸俗化，并由此影响了《易经》的健康发展与传播。这一阶段，在西方纷繁杂乱的众多《易经》的翻译版本中，德国汉学家卫礼贤（Richard Wilhelm）的译本脱颖而出。卫礼贤为德国来华的基督教传教士，他于1923年来华，拜儒学大师劳乃宣为师学习《易经》等中国典籍。在劳乃宣的指导帮助下，他历经艰辛，费时十载终于完成了《易经》的德语翻译。他的译本比理雅各的译本更能保持原著精神，在德国出版发行后广受称赞并多次再版，被誉为西方世界《易经》翻译之蓝本。[2]

20世纪40年代，美国波林根（Bollingen）基金会组织人力，聘请德译英专家贝恩斯（Cary F. Baynes）将卫礼贤的这部德文译本转译为英文，书名译为 *The I Change or Book of Changes*，于1950年分为两卷本在美国出版发行。从1960年起，此译本多次修订再版，销路极好，影响极大。除此之外，还有Da Liu的英译本 *I CHING COIN Prediction*，中文书名《易经金钱卦》等译本也有一定影响和销路。

2008年，在美国和英国出版发行了科姆·法耐尔（Kim Farnell）的《简版易经》（*Simple I Ching*）[3]。

在国内，1993年初上海外语教育出版社出版发行了汪榕培、任秀桦合译的《英译易经》，后又于2007年、2009年再版发行。这是新中国成立后首部由中国人自己翻译的英语《易经》译本。[4]此外还有青岛出版社于1995年出版的罗志野的《易经新译》英译本等。[5]总的说来，从古至今无论是早期西方传教士的《易经》英译本还是中国人自己的《易经》英译本都存在着各种不同的不尽如人意的地方，这对中国传统文化的世界传播十分不利。时代发展到今天的21世纪的跨文化交流的时代，《易经》英译的这种状况亟待改善，相关问题亟待解决。

二、《易经》英译存在的问题与原因分析

自中国近代以来，《易经》文化日益引起西方学者的重视。长期以来，中外学者在翻译传播《易经》经典、在中西文化交流中做出了不可磨灭的功绩。但就至今的《易经》翻译来说，由于各种不同的原因，尽管经过古今中外历代先贤与学者辛勤耕耘，《易经》翻译已经有了悠久的历史并留下了一定的研究成果，但至今仍然存在许多不尽如人意的地方。尽管《易经》译本种类繁多，但到目前为止，世界上仍没有一个公认的、权威的《易经》英译本，而英语是世界最普及的国际语，所以这种现象对《易经》文化的世界传播造成了很大障碍。概括而言，《易经》英译存在的翻译问题可以归纳为以下几个方面：

（一）文本理解差异

《易经》是中国最古老的一本占筮之书，也是一本凝聚着中国远古先民智慧的哲学著作。《易经》的古文字言简意赅，寓意深远，包含着极其丰富的思想内容。《易经》的每一卦都有其核心思想，并依爻位由下到上的顺序呈递进关系。每一卦的思想都隐含在简洁而古奥的卦爻辞中，如不熟悉古义的遣词造句规律，读来一定如堕五里烟云，若照字面意思直译，而不对经义中隐含的潜在信息和思想加以解释说明，这对于读《易经》译文的西方人来说，自然是如读天书了。如汪榕培和任秀桦合译的英译本就是只有经文翻译而没有注释，这样的《易经》译文，对于英文译文读者来说，就恐怕很难领悟到《易经》字里行间隐藏着的深刻含义和绝妙的中国式的智慧和哲理了。这在今后的《易经》新版本翻译中应当加以注意和纠正。

再如《易经》语言中的通假现象，常常被不熟悉《易经》古汉语的读者误读误解。例如：《遯》卦有“肥遯，无不利”之句。此句中的“肥”通“飞”，“遯”即“退避”之意，是“高飞远退”或“远走高飞”之意，但有人解释为“肥豚”，译为“fat pigs”。[6] 再如《屯》卦的音义，是译为“zhun”还是“tun”？含义为“屯聚”还是“困难”？就连《易经》专家们也争论不休，没有一个定论，更谈不到正确地翻译成英语了。[7]

随着时代的变迁、文字的改革、民俗的演变，《易经》的远古汉语必将越来越令今人感到艰涩难懂。不光是对于外国人或外国语的翻译者，就是对于中国人，包括历代学者和研究者来说，它都是一本古奥难懂、神秘玄妙的书。很多人想读懂它却望而生畏。历代学者穷毕生之力，皓首穷经，写出汗牛充栋的研易巨作，也还是没有研究透彻，甚至有的研易文章让人越读越糊涂。而对《易经》理解的差异，必将导致翻译的不同。这就是为什么古今中外，《易经》的翻译版本层出不穷，但各种版本互相矛盾，不知究竟哪个更为准确的原因所在。所以说，《易经》翻译最重要的就是要在理解上下功夫。翻译者对原文理解得越透彻，译文在帮助读者理解上做的注释越详尽到位，《易经》的世界传播效果就越好。

（二）句法表达差异

中文和英语是世界上使用最广泛的两种语言，它们各自以其独有的风格与特点传承着源远流长的本民族文化。英汉两种语言属于不同的语系，在词汇、语法等各个方面都有极大的差异，这些差异无疑对翻译有很大的影响。特别是《易经》的语言为中国远古时代的语言，它与中国现代语言相比又有很大的不同与变化。所以说，要翻译好《易经》一定要了解这两种语言的特点和相互之间的差异。翻译《易经》除了首先要正确理解古汉语原意外，在句子结构方面还要注意英语表达的句型特点，即原文中的一句简短的汉语。要用英语惯用的带从句的树形结构的复合长句来表达。这是因为英语是高度重视“形态”的语言。英语行文注重句子结构完整及句子之间的逻辑关系，具有层次分明的句子特点。例如：《蒙》卦卦辞“匪我求童蒙，童蒙求我”，要译成合乎英语习惯的英语句子，就需用带从句的树形结构的复合长句：“It is not I who seek the help from the pupil, but the pupil who seeks the help from me.”再如：《乾》卦九二爻辞“见龙在田，利见大人”，在现有的翻译版本中就有几种不同的译法：

(We see its subject as) the dragon appearing in the field. It will be advantageous to meet with the great man. —James Legge[8]

Dragon appearing in the field. It furthers one to see the great man. —Cary F. Baynes[9]

The dragon appears in the fields. It is time for the great man to emerge from obscurity. —汪榕培[10]

The dragon appears in the fields, as if a thing begins to sprout or a plant comes out of the earth. It will be advantageous for one to find a great man. —罗志野[11]

从上述 4 种不同的英文翻译，我们可看出好的英语翻译的不易。这其中遣词造句的优劣真伪的区别，不仅在于理解的不同，还在于英译选词与句型的表达不同。这就需要我们根据译入语的语言规则来细致地比较鉴别，以确定何种翻译更为合乎英美人士的语言表达习惯，并在将来的重译中加以借鉴。

（三）民俗文化差异

语言是文化的外在表现，文化是语言的内涵。在翻译中如果不重视文化的差异，生搬硬套

地照字面意思翻译，就不可能达到应有的文化传播效果。例如：在翻译《易经》时，首先遇到的一个对西方人的文化困惑就是“阴阳”的概念。对中国人来说，“阴阳”是大千世界一切对立物象的总和，甚至中国的哲学也被称之为“阴阳哲学”，而西方人却没有这个广泛的象征概念。所以在早期西方人士的《易经》翻译中，对“阴阳”有着五花八门的不同翻译与解释，例如有人将其狭隘地译作“male”和“female”。再如众所周知的中国“龙”的象征意义：它有着吉祥和喜庆、神奇刚健、尊贵权力等多种象征意义，在《易经》中“龙”是《乾》卦六爻的象征物，例如：“潜龙”、“见龙”、“飞龙”、“亢龙”等。《易经》里，“龙”是生命力的象征，《乾》卦交爻从潜龙到亢龙，生动地再现了阳气从萌生到鼎盛再到衰退的六个自然发展变化的阶段。但“龙”(dragon)在西方文化中却是邪恶的象征。例如英国文学史中最古老的史诗《贝奥武夫》(*Beowulf*)，它完成于公元8世纪，被誉为现存古英文文学中最伟大的作品，讲的就是古代英雄战恶龙的神话传说。[12]而在所有《易经》英译本中，“龙”都被译为“dragon”，考虑到中西方人的文化差异和对“龙”的不同文化概念，“龙”的现有英译及其解释就值得再商榷。由此可见，翻译《易经》不仅要做两种语言之间的语码转换工作，更重要的是注重两种文化之间的交流与沟通。

(四) 思维方式差异

中西文化在漫长的历史中，长期独立发展，形成了很不相同的文化传统。在这个有着重大差异的文化传统背后，最核心的差异是思维方式的差异。中国人传统的基本思维方式是形象思维，而西方人的基本思维方式是逻辑思维；中国人重形象与悟性思维，而西方人则重分析与理性思维；中国人崇尚天人合一，而西方人则讲主客二分。《易经》是中国文化之源，这些差异在《易经》文本中必然有比较充分的体现。如果不明了这种差异，先入为主地以西方人的思维方式来理解《易经》文化，就会产生理解上的错误与困惑，就不可能真正读懂《易经》文本。因此，西方人学习《易经》，首先有必要了解中国文化的思维特点，而我们在翻译中国古典《易经》时，也要考虑西方人的思维习惯、语言表达与接受的习惯，译文要尽可能清晰、逻辑，以利西方读者正确理解。

(五) 审美情趣差异

中西方的语言文化和思维方式的不同，必然进一步导致中西方审美情趣的差异。例如中国人崇尚“天人合一”，自古以来就有的农耕生产与生活模式形成中国人对称和谐的美感，反映到文本格式上，中国人的山水诗画，叠音词、押韵、对偶等修辞手法都在《易经》中得到充分的展示。《易经》的语言凝练、优美，运用叠音词和押韵的地方比比皆是：“君子终日乾乾”、“履道坦坦”、“翩翩不富”、“谦谦君子”、“虎视眈眈”等，这种种的修辞手法使得《易经》用中文读起来朗朗上口，不仅好读更好记，由于它的中文音韵美，更增强了它的中国文化的生命力。但对应的英语翻译若也用叠音词，就会使英文翻译显得莫名其妙。例如：《谦》卦中“谦谦君子”这一叠音词被理雅各译为“the superior man who adds humility to humility”[13]就显得不伦不类。对英美人士来说，并不能从这种叠音词的运用中获得与中国人感受原文时同样的美感体验。可见中西语言习惯不同，美感体验也有差异。这就要在翻译时注意不能生搬硬套地来死译，以至于使原文美感在译文中荡然无存。

《易经》翻译存在的问题是多方面的。除了上述五个方面的问题以外，还有诸如以下问题：《易经》术语的解释与翻译没有统一的标准。就连“易经”这个书名就有数种不同的译法，如：“I

Ching”,“The Book of Changes”,“Yijing”等。再如对“乾”的翻译:有译作“Creative”(造物主)的,有根据发音译作“Qian”或者“Chien”的,还有译作“The Qian Hexagram”或“Heaven”(天)的。此外,各种英语译本中还存在着《易经》翻译的内容与原文不符的现象,各种版本有多种不同的解释与翻译等问题,这种混乱状况使得阅读原本就艰深难懂的《易经》显得更加不易,也致使《易经》读者之间难以顺利地进行交流与沟通。这些问题都有待在新世纪的《易经》研究与翻译中得以解决。

总之,要使《易经》英语翻译既忠实于原文,同时又做到通顺流畅、优美感人,并合乎译入语的语言习惯与特征,符合译入语读者的阅读与思维、审美习惯,使得译文易于被译入语读者接受,是值得翻译者下大功夫来做的一件事情。

三、《易经》英译与世界传播

翻译是人类交流与传播史上最古老最复杂的文化现象。我国唐朝时期的贾公彦在《周礼注疏》中对翻译是这样定义的:“译即易,谓换易语言使相解也。”[14]由此,我们看到翻译学与《易经》的相通之处,翻译就是搭建桥梁、“换易语言”,达到传播之目的。

而据西方《圣经》记载,人类为了建造通向“大同”的巴别塔而触怒了上帝,是上帝的惩罚使得人类的语言由此而各异不通。然而人类没有屈服,他们凭借着翻译向上帝挑战,使上帝弄乱的语言不仅能相互沟通而且各具民族特色。可见,翻译在西方人心目中是人类追求心灵相通、建造“大同”的通路。由此可见,中西方文化的交流是世界不同民族和人民的共同愿望,人类文明得以传播与延续,“翻译之为用大矣哉”[15]。

历史证明:人类的进步离开了翻译是不可想象的,正是因古今中外众多的翻译家们脚踏实地“一木一石”地建造,不计名利地位、没有喝彩赞扬地默默耕耘,人类文明和社会进步才能在相互沟通与碰撞中向前发展。

近年来越来越多的中外学者从传播学的角度论述了“传播模式同样也是翻译模式”的新理念。例如美国翻译理论家 E. A 奈达就说过:“翻译就是交际。”[16]将翻译纳入传播学的研究新视野中进行研究,可以使翻译学的研究进入一个开放的动态系统,从不同于以往的新角度观察翻译。因为翻译可以与传播学一样,有它的信息传递过程、传播方式、传播渠道、传播目的、传播对象等诸多因素。从传播学的角度分析《易经》翻译及其传播则更具有深远的时代意义。

自古以来,作为世界四大文明之一的中华文明,就以其旺盛的生命力繁衍传承至今,对世界产生过巨大的影响。《易经》不仅属于中国,也属于全人类。翻译,作为中西文化交流与沟通的桥梁,应该是一个双向式的交流传播渠道。然而长期以来,在中西文化的交流与传播过程中,主要是“拿来”的翻译传播,中国文化走出国门、“送出”的翻译传播处于缺失的尴尬状况,这与中国厚重的文明古国的身份是不相符合的。在今天跨文化传播日益频繁的新时代,中国文化在世界文化之林中是否能重新获得崇高地位和荣耀,发挥本应具有的世界作用,翻译无疑是一个重要的因素。而《易经》的对外翻译传播不仅有力地说明了传播的双向性和中国文化走向世界的可能性,还为新世纪的跨文化交际提供了有益的成功经验。

目前在 21 世纪全球信息化跨文化传播的新形势下,我国继佛经翻译、科技翻译和西学翻译三次大的翻译高潮之后,正处在第四次翻译高潮之中。在新世纪的跨文化交流中,中国文化如何发挥它应有的世界传播作用,在世界新文化之林中占有自己应有的位置,是摆在当代中国

人面前的光荣任务。而《易经》翻译的世界传播，必将为新世纪中国文化走向世界提供新的成功的典范。随着汉语热的升温，《易经》也越来越成为一门跨越国境的“显学”。

中西方的“对话”是人类的一种特殊语言交流方式。正是在“对话”中，双方扩大了眼界，达到视野的融合，使精神文化提升到新的高度。对话意识追求的是人类精神的“解放”，是人类文明的创新与发展。中国文化自古就有易学和道家的“阴阳互生”，几千年前就有了地球生物永恒生存的“对话模式”和“交叉生成”模式。在当下，“对话”更应当成为我们在新世纪的一种全球意识。[17]在新世纪，我们可以《易经》翻译与研究为契机，深入探讨中国传统典籍的世界传播问题，以适应在全球化语境下中国文化走向世界的“对话”需要。中国人正在建造一座“汉语桥”与世界连接，而古老《易经》必将发挥重要的交流传播作用。在今天全球化的信息时代，中国传统文化所描述的大同世界的美好理想正在新一代中国人手中成为现实。

在新世纪里，《易经》的翻译和传播仍然是中国对外翻译传播的重点和热点。《易经》的各种语言文字的翻译版本仍将不断涌现，并通过网络等多种传媒渠道向世界更为快捷地广泛传播，这就对《易经》研究者提出了鉴别与选择翻译标准的任务和责任。随着互联网的日益普及，电子版本的《易经》刊物和网站也遍布网络，但仔细观察，互联网上不少《易经》译本粗制滥造，还有的只限于与风水、占卜算命等有关的内容，这就使得《易经》的传播流于低档次。可见进一步提高翻译的水平以加强中外易学研究的交流仍是易学走向世界的重大课题与当务之急。

在当今的信息时代，国际交往日益频繁，翻译者更是不同语言之间交流的使者和桥梁。因此《易经》翻译关注的就不应当仅仅是译者语言表述的如何，还应该关注读者对译文的反应，并且将译文读者对译文的反应与原文读者对原文的反应进行比较，看其是否达到了预期的翻译传播效果。根据英国著名翻译理论家 Peter Newmark 提出的“交际翻译”(communicative translation)理论来看，翻译不仅仅是语言文字的转换，它更是一种文化信息的传递。但考察中外《易经》翻译史就会发现，《易经》翻译与研究的注意力长期以来都是集中在文本上的，评价译文的标准也是把译文与原文进行对比，看译文是否忠实于原文，是否通顺、流畅、雅观。译文的“信、达、雅”是译者孜孜以求的目标，这无可非议，但传统的评价往往忽视了译文读者的感受，这样的翻译方法与研究有很大的偏颇和局限性。现在我们从翻译传播学理论的新视角出发，借助于传播对象论来进行《易经》翻译受体论的研究，把《易经》翻译研究的范围扩展到翻译文本的读者这一受众群体上来，由此进一步拓展到涉及翻译受体的环境、心理等各个方面的翻译受体论研究，这将是一个非常有价值的更高层次的新的翻译理论和实践的研究模式，而《易经》翻译的实践将为新的翻译传播学理论提供宝贵的个案经验。也就是说，从新的翻译传播学的观点出发，《易经》翻译不仅要关注文本翻译，还要注重翻译信息产生的效果，强调读者对译文的感受。翻译对读者的效果，译语读者对译文的感受才是衡量译文质量的标准。可见，在《易经》翻译中，我们不仅要把好文字翻译关，还要注意以读者为中心，使翻译信息对译语读者产生与原语读者尽可能相同的效果。

美国当今传媒业巨头鲁伯特·默多克有一句名言：“谁掌握了传播的入口，谁就掌握了整个世界。”[18]由此我们可以进一步体会翻译传播在新世纪的重要作用。尽管直到目前，翻译比起创作仍处在次等的地位，但随着国际交往的进一步发展，人们会越来越明白：“懂不懂‘翻译’之道，将会决定一个个机构、社区、民族、以至全人类的命运。”[19]《易经》翻译与世界传播的成功定将更加证明这一点。《易经》翻译在新世纪必将进入一个更高层次的研究领域。随着《易经》翻译与研究的进一步深入我们有理由相信，中国古老的《易经》文化一定会在新世纪重新焕发

活力，从前翻译中的误解和曲解也会随着时代的前进和认识的加深而得到不断修正和澄清，中国《易经》文化在世界的翻译传播一定会具有新的更加持久的魅力。可以预言：在新世纪汉语走向世界的今天，《易经》文化及其精神必将在世界发扬光大，与时空共存。

选文五　Contextualized Translation of the *Yijing*

Kidder Smith

导　言

本文选自美国期刊 *Philosophy East & West* 第 49 卷(1999 年第 3 期)。

作者 Kidder Smith 是 Bowdoin College 的历史和亚洲研究教授。他在这篇文章中基于一种语境化原则，考察了《易经》几个英译本的特征。实际上，他是受到 19 世纪以来的一种学术传统的影响，即致力于对《易经》文本形成的语境还原，在各个次生文本出现的不同时期中寻求文本的意义，同时放弃对非历史性的所谓文本本质的探求。文章主要对两个《易经》英译本进行了比较：一个是 Edward Shaughnessy(夏含夷)翻译的 *I Ching: The Classic of Change*；一个是 Richard John Lynn(林理彰)翻译的 *The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi*。Shaughnessy 使用的《易经》版本是根据长沙马王堆汉墓发掘出土的文本。该文本与《易经》标准本存在着差异，这些差异是《易经》在汉朝这个时期经过语境化之后形成的。其中增加了标准本所没有的“二三子问”、“易之义”、“要”等部分。Shaughnessy 意识到了这些在汉朝这个文本成文时期的语境化内容，所以指出《易经》这个文本在汉朝语境中“功能和地位上都发生了剧烈变化”。其中这个文本再语境化体现在哲学流派的融合上，上述增加的部分就体现了汉朝在接受《易经》时对这一卜筮性文本的世俗化阐释，藉此将其从一个单纯的卜筮工具转化为修身齐家治国平天下的工具。马王堆《易经》版本与前世《易经》版本之间还存在很多文字上的差异，例如前者就有很多异体字，如“乾”和“键”、“有”和“又”、“经”和“径”、“礼”和“履”等。这些异体字的出现并非是单纯的在文本的传抄过程中出现的错讹，也有可能是语境化的结果。

随后，文章又简要地考察了林理彰英译的王弼注的《周易略例》。王弼的注释采用的实际上也是一种语境化的方式。他的注释具有他所处时代的复杂性，而文章认为林理彰的翻译恰当地体现了这种语境的复杂性。最后，文章对《易经》五个版本的英译进行了简明的比对，用的例子是“履卦”的开头一句话：“履：履履虎尾，不咬人，亨。”这五个版本对这句话的英译充分表明了五个版本各自所处的语境的不同，译文反映了五个版本与各自特定的历史语境以及与各个注释者所关心的对象之间的联系。

It's a simple enough idea, really, a strategy that's been available since the nineteenth century: historicize the *Yijing*, seek its meaning in the various relationships it has formed with specific actors at specific times, and abandon the search for an ahistoric essence. The two books highlighted here provide essential tools for that project. Both translate the *Yijing* as it was understood at key historical moments—and, of course, the *Yi* turns out to be a profoundly different work for each. The first, *I Ching: The Classic of Change*, by Edward Shaughnessy, catches an underground current from the crucial hundred-year period that spans the foundation of empire in 221 B. C. The second, *The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi*, by Richard John Lynn, reveals the supremely important Wang Bi 王弼 vision of the third century A. D., which displaced most previous interpretations, dominated *Yijing* exegesis of the subsequent seven centuries, and established hermeneutical principles for the text that have been taken for granted until the twentieth century. For several reasons, then, these books are worth our serious consideration. They open two new gateways into the *Yijing* tradition; they raise questions that specialists cannot ignore; and, in conjunction with other members of the English-language *Yijing* corpus, they identify key moments of that text's transformations over three millennia.

Edward Shaughnessy has translated the *Yijing* materials excavated at Mawangdui, 马王堆 (near Changsha, Hunan) from a tomb sealed in 168 B. C. Although the find was made in 1973, only portions of the texts had been published until very recently.[1] Three features particularly distinguish this *Yijing*: it includes otherwise unknown commentaries; the sixty-four hexagrams appear in a sequence different from that found in the received text; and the hexagram and line texts contain a large number of variant graphs.

Of the half-dozen commentaries, only one, the *Xicizhuan* 系辞传 (Appended statements), has been previously known, and that in a slightly different form. The others are:

The Several Disciples Asked (*Ersanzi wen* 二三子问)

The Properties of the Changes (*Yi zhi yi* 易之義)

The Essentials (*Yao* 要)

Mu He (谬和) *and Zhao Li* (昭力)

Most typically these texts detail conversations between Confucius and his followers or the explication of particular hexagrams. For example, in *The Essentials*, Confucius' disciple Zi Gong asks, "Does the Master also believe in milfoil [*Yijing*] divination?" Confucius replies: "I am right in (only) seventy out of one hundred prognostications" (p. 241). Or in the text named after him, Zhao Li asks, "Does the *Changes* have meaning for the lord of a state?"—to which the Master offers three pertinent hexagrams(p. 275).

Who wrote these works? For what purpose? Whose questions are they designed to answer? What is their historical importance? No definitive answers have been established, and, as Shaughnessy reports, most Chinese scholarship has not yet moved past arguments

about "school" affiliation. It might be fruitful to view these texts as stages in the naturalization of a divination manual, the transformation of a specialist's mantic tool into an instrument of governance and morality. Earlier witnesses to this process are the two dozen references to the *Yi* occurring in the *Zuozhuan* 左传 (*The Traditions of Zuo*), compiled in the fourth century B. C. Thus, when the "Confucius" of The Essentials expresses ambivalence about divination—neither eschewing it nor endorsing its unqualified effectiveness—he provides continuing evidence for, in Shaughnessy's words, the "dramatic change in the function and status" (p. 25) that the *Yijing* was undergoing at this time.

The Mawangdui manuscript is also notable for the order of its hexagrams. As Shaughnessy writes:

> Whereas there is no discernible logic to their sequence interactive text, except that hexagrams are grouped by pairs ... , the sequence of hexagrams given in the manuscript is based on a systematic combination of the hexagrams' constituent trigrams: the top trigram of a hexagram is the basis of its position in the manuscripts' sequence; it is then combined in turn in a prescribed sequence with each of the other trigrams serving as its bottom trigram (p. 17).

That is, the first eight hexagrams are those whose upper trigram consists of three unbroken lines, followed by eight hexagrams with two broken and a solid, and so on. There is every reason to suppose this a later reordering of the "irrational" sequence of the received text. Yet, apart from that observation, we know almost nothing of its context or significance. Who espoused it? Is it just a backwater experiment conducted in the land of Chu? Why did its tradition fail to survive above ground? Its particular rationality must be a Han phenomenon, but to what streams within that broad intellectual tradition does it have the clearest affiliation? The eleventh-century thinker Shao Yong reordered the hexagrams as well, also on the principles of binary mathematics—but is there anything more than a surface resemblance between these two projects?

Finally, is this sequence in any way related to the third area I Would like to examine here: the numerous graphic variants in the hexagram and line texts? For these variora are striking. Although the received text sometimes has the stronger reading, in other instances the Mawangdui manuscript clearly suggests a better alternative. Shaughnessy notes that the third line of *Guimei* 归妹, Returning of Marrying Maiden, reads in the received text *gui mei yi xu* (归妹以须). This, he remarks, "is so unclear that it has given rise to such opposite interpretations as 'The marrying maiden as a slave,' and 'The Marrying Maiden should take a waiting approach to marriage'" (p. 33). These difficulties are dissolved by the manuscript's reading of *ru* 嬬 for xu, so that the line then becomes "The returning maiden with consorts," in parallel with the hexagram's first line, "The returning maiden with younger sisters."

These variora are not confined to hexagram and line statements. Indeed, half of the

hexagram names in the manuscript differ from those found in any other text. For example, the first two hexagrams of the received text are *Qian* 乾 and *Kun* 坤, or Primal Yang and Primal Yin. In the Mawangdui manuscript these are called *Jian* 键 and *Chuan* 川, or Key and River (or The Flow). One basis for these substitutions is their near or perfect homophony-thus, even in modern northern Chinese, *Qian* and *Jian* are quite close in sound. Loans of this sort are widely documented in early manuscripts. For example, you X, "also," frequently and transparently substitutes for you; "have," "there is." Here there is no way to mistake one word for the other. But what of loans like *jing* 径, "footpath," for *jing*, 经 "the warp in weaving"—cases where the substituted word also has graphic and semantic similarities with the graph it is substituting for—that is, when the shape, sound, and meaning of both graphs seem to derive from a common ancestor, a single older word that gradually became differentiated into later words with distinct meanings? More puzzling: what if one cannot readily determine whether it is the case of a simple phonetic loan, two cognate graphs, or some other, more complex relationship?

Here is an example of that conundrum. The tenth hexagram in the received text is *Lü* 履, Treading, and its text reads:

Lü hu wei bu die ren heng 履虎尾不咥人亨

Tread on a tiger's tail. It does not eat the person. Receipt.

—where "receipt" indicates the acceptance of a ritual offering. The equivalent of this hexagram in the Mawangdui manuscript is hexagram number 4, *Li* 礼, Ritual Action. The hexagram text reads:

Lü hu wei bu die ren heng 履虎尾不咥人亨

—which one might translate as

Ritual action with a tiger's tail. Not considering the person true. Receipt.

On the surface, "*lü*" is a better reading, especially in the context of the line statements. Is "*li*" then just a mistaken graph, based on the near homophony of the two words in early Chinese and some slight graphic similarity? This has been the usual explanation, for, as Shaughnessy notes, "These differences have not yet attracted much notice in China, where it seems to be too often assumed that the received text represents the definitive text, and that variora in the manuscript are due merely to scribal error" (p. 17).

But this case is not so easily resolved, for the relationship of the two graphs is far more complex. The *Erya* 尔雅 thesaurus of the third century B. C. glosses *lü* as *li*: 履礼也 (Ⅱ.68). The *Shuowen* 说文 dictionary of circa A. D. 100 inverts that definition: "Ritual acts are a treading (履礼也), the means whereby one services the spirits and maximizes fortune." And a received commentary on the *Yi* from the fourth/third century B. C. links the two in its assertion that "The gentleman does not do (*lü*) what is not ritually correct (*li*)" (*Xiangzhuan* 象传, to hexagram number 34, *Dazhuang* 大壮). We have only the most rudimentary understanding of such paronomasia and its protocols, and huge amounts of work must still be done to determine the elasticity of the graphic medium. The task will require

both a Boodbergian sensitivity and the erudition of a Qiu Xigui 裘锡圭.

The specialist will appreciate Shaughnessy's succinct indications of graphic choices. S/he will be equally pleased to know that, as with other works in Ballantine's Classics of Ancient China series, the complete Chinese text is printed facing the translation—including nearly two hundred other wise unattested graphs. The new materials made available here, as well as Shaughnessy's brief and lucid introductions, will also benefit the general reader. If the commentary translations are sometimes awkward, we should note that these texts do not fit easily into English. As Shaughnessy says, "This is very much a first effort to make available to a wider reading audience, both general and scholarly, the earliest, yet newest, text of one of the greatest books of world literature" (p. 34). He has surely succeeded in this regard.

The *Yijing* that Wang Bi inherited from the Han, and which he was to transform, contained certain elements discernible in the Mawangdui text. Yet Han hermeneutics was based primarily on the intense manipulation of trigram associations. For example, the *Qian* 乾 trigram, composed of three solid lines, was linked with heaven, the horse, father, metal, ice, and the head. Interpretation consisted of identifying and decoding the several component trigrams within the hexagram.

Wang's innovation, spelled out most clearly in his *Lueli* 略例 (General remarks on the *Changes of Zhou*) (pp. 25 - 46 of Lynn's translation), was to see the hexagram not as a congeries of animals and objects but as an abstract image, a single concept unifying all its parts. The literal tiger of *Lü* became the image of a danger that was safely traversed; the horse of *Qian*, its upper trigram, gave way to the quality "strength." In Wang Bi's version the *Lü* hexagram text reads as follows:

> Even if one treads on the tiger's tail, as it will not bite, so he will prevail.
>
> He comments:
>
> A judgment [i. e., a hexagram text] as such addresses itself to what it considers so be the controlling principle of the hexagram in question. That which governs this entire hexagram is to be found in the Third Yin [line]. To "tread ... on the tiger's tail" refers to the danger involved here. Third Yin is the master of the *Lü* hexagram ... . As the [upper] *Qian* trigram embodies the virtues of strength and rectitude, one here uses cheerfulness not as a device to commit the evil of sycophancy but as the right means to respond to *Qian*. Thus it is appropriate that one who treads on the tiger's tail in such a way here will not be bitten but prevail. (p. 200)

Wang's treatment brings the complex relationships of hexagram structure to convergence at a single point, the hexagram's dominant concept, a concept invariably grounded in the moral dimension of a swirling world of process. Wang thus well approximates the social and political choices facing elite men of the third century A. D. His

achievement is all the more stunning in that he died at the age of twenty-three. Lynn's translation preserves that complexity and rendersit into a clear and accessible English, gliding skillfully between literal and loose. This, I would suggest, is the single best introduction to the *Yijing* currently available.

Columbia University Press has made a CD-ROM from that material, The Columbia *I Ching* on CD-ROM, including everything from the book except Lynn's front and back matter.[2] It has been set up for divination, with a hexagram-generating mechanism, a simple changing-line device, and a journal for recording one's results. A mouse click switches one easily from moving line to commentary to related text, and so on.

Formally, the *Yijing* seems perfectly suited to this approach. Like a computer, it constructs a huge network out of the simplest bipolar alternation. From within that closed field of possibilities it generates the potential of vast meaning. Since its relationships are ever shifting, its user requires some means to make instantaneous connections to precisely defined objectives located far across the network, a task well suited to the computer's capabilities. And yet I haven't found this approach especially useful, or even that much fun. Perhaps it is best enjoyed by someone relatively new to the text.

Thus far I have applauded Shaughnessy and Lynn for providing English-speaking readers with gateways into two of the many *Yijing* worlds. Yet, to appreciate their contribution fully, we must place these new entrances beside three others already established. Then a historical development in the *Yi*, hard to discern without access to Chinese-language materials, begins to reveal itself.

First of these three is Richard Kunst's 1985 dissertation, *The Original "Yijing"*[3]. It contains a complete translation of the hexagram and line texts as Kunst imagines them to have been composed in the early first millennium B. C. In some instances the text will be familiar to readers of the later versions. For example, the Lü hexagram text states:

Step on the tiger's tail. It won't bite the person. Treat.

Here Kunst has rendered *lü* as a verb, "to step." But in the line texts it resumes its primary nominal form as "sandals, shoes." Thus the fifth-line text:

Split-open shoes. The determination is threatening. (p. 259)

This *Yijing* is blunt and concrete, close to the object-world of the early diviners and without the abstracted elaboration of later interpreters.[4]

The second reference point is already familiar to Western readers, though we do not usually recognize its historicity. I am referring to the *Ten Wings*, those commentaries that were combined with the divination manual to form the received text of *the Classic of Change*. While some contain very early material, most seem to date from the fourth to the second century B. C. Like the Mawangdui commentaries we have examined, these are prominent players in the *Yijing*'s transition into Warring States and Han life. Thus, for example, the *Tuan* 彖 commentary(Wings one and two) to the Lü hexagram reads:

He steps into the thearch's position (*lü di wei* 履帝位) and is not anxious. His aura is

bright (*guang ming* 光明).

Or the *Xiang* 象 (Wings three and four):

The noble man settles the will of the common people by discriminating above from below.

The 1882 translation of James Legge—our third text—relies on the mid-Qing compendium *Zhouyi zhezhong* (周易折中 The Yijing—Striking the mean), which in turn derives largely from the Song commentaries of Cheng Yi 程颐 (1033—1107) and Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130—1200).[5] Seen in light of our inquiry, this translation represents the final Confucianization of the *Yi*, its necessary transformation into a guide for the literati of late imperial China.

So readers of English now have five gateways into the long history of the *Yi*: the original text, the *Ten Wings* of some five centuries later, the Mawangdui manuscript, the Wang Bi commentary, and the Neo-Confucian work of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi. Let's sample the first line text of Lü in these five versions. The original(early first millennium):

Plain white shoes. There will be no misfortune in going. (Kunstp,p. 259)

The *Xiangzhuan* (fourth/third century):

"A going" of "simple treading." Alone he enacts his wishes.

The Mawangdui manuscript (third/second century):

Initial line:

Counter treading;

in going there is no trouble. (Shaughnesspy,p. 45)

Wang Bi (ca. A. D. 245):

If one treads with simplicity, to set forth will bring no blame, (Lynn, p. 201) Cheng-Zhu (Northern and Southern Song):

The first NINE, undivided shows its subject treading his accustomed path. If he go forward, there will be no error. (Legge, p. 79)

These are five distinct worlds, five forms in which the *Yi* has taken incarnation. Individually each links us to a particular historical context, to specific concerns that its author(s) sought to address. Taken together they also suggest something of the range that this most mutable of texts has inhabited over the last three thousand years.

More recently—that is, in the last hundred years—that range has greatly expanded. We have already examined a CD-ROM version of the *Yi*. And we might now re-imagine the classic Wilhelm/Baynes translation as a late member of a distinguished Chinese-American lineage. Here's how Richard Wilhelm, with the encouragement of Carl Gustav Jung, viewed the Lü hexagram:

> The meaning of the hexagram is not standstill but progress. A man finds himself in an altogether inferior position at the start. However, he has the inner strength that guarantees progress.

Is there any better way than "progress" for the *Yi* to manifest in modern America?

Notes

1. For a detailed discussion and bibliography, see Shaughnessy, pp. 283 n. 2 and 345 - 348.
2. Princeton has as well. It's *The Multimedia I Ching*, based on the Wilhelm/Baynes translation and including Hellmut Wilhelm's Eight Lectures (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
3. Richard Alan Kunst, *The Original "Yijing": A Text, Phonetic Transcription, Translation, and Indexes, with Sample Glosses* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1985) (p. 664).
4. Greg Whincup's *Rediscovering the* I Ching (Garden City: Doubleday, 1986) undertakes the same project, but with less success.
5. The *I Ching: Book of Changes* (various reprints of the original Oxford edition).
6. The I Ching or Book of Changes, the Richard Wilhelm translation rendered into English by Cary F. Baynes, foreword by C. G. Jung (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), vol. 1, p. 47.

第三节　史学典籍的翻译

选文一　On Translating Chen Shou's *San guo zhi*: Bring Him Back Alive

Robert Joe Cutter　William G. Crowell

导　言

本文选自 Eugene Eoyang 同 Lin Yao-fu 主编的 *Translating Chinese Literature*，印第安纳大学出版社，1995。

高德耀(Robert Joe Cutter)，美国汉学家，1969 年获亚利桑那大学学士学位，1971 年获亚利桑那大学硕士学位，1983 年获西雅图华盛顿大学博士学位，原为威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校东亚语言文学系教授，现任亚利桑那大学语言与文学系教授及系主任、国际语言及文化学院院长。其主要研究领域为中国中古文学及历史，博士论文为《曹植及其诗歌》(*Cao Zhi and His Poems*, 1983)，著有《斗鸡与中国文化》(*The brush and the spur: Chinese culture and the cockfight*, 1989)，与 William G. Crowell 合译了陈寿《三国志》中"皇后与嫔妃"部分(*Empresses and Consorts: Selections from Chen Shou's Records of the Three States with Pei Songzhi's commentary*, 1999)。合译者威廉·戈登·克洛维尔(William Gorden Crowell)原为外交官，现为独立学者，获华盛顿大学中国历史学博士学位，主要研究领域为中国中古历史。

迄今为止，在英语世界还没有《三国志》的全译本，高德耀与克洛维尔计划将整部《三国

志》译出，已出版的“皇后与嫔妃”部分为整部译作的第一部，是其试验性成果。正如他们在这篇文章中所说的，“这部分是整部译作的试验田，可以检验我们解决问题的方法是否得当”。

译者在文中梳理、总结了翻译《三国志》的策略，并对翻译所涉及的汉学问题进行了分析，尤其是注疏问题。由于中国典籍有注疏传统，因而翻译绕不开该问题。译者选择的是裴松之的注疏，该注疏并非一般的训诂类注疏，而是对陈寿《三国志》的补充和延伸，这与《三国志》本身过于简略有很大关系。之前也有西方学者翻译过《三国志》片断，但都未用裴注，高德耀和克洛维尔这种特别的选择与其翻译理念有关。他们指出，裴注是对《三国志》的补充，而非单纯的解释，使得史书更为完整，正如《左传》是对《春秋》的必要补充。译者在文中指出，“任何严肃的读者都不可能跳过裴注来阅读《三国志》”。然而，译者也注意到裴注与《三国志》有矛盾之处，为此他们在翻译时将注疏与原文对应分列两页，以恢复和保持《三国志》的原貌。为达到保留典籍本原特色的目的，在翻译中他们注重精确性，采用了“汉学式翻译”方法。“汉学式翻译”方法建立在中国“小学”基础之上，指的是运用训诂、考据等传统方法来阅读、研究中国典籍，在此基础上再进行翻译。译者表示，之所以选择这种翻译方法，很大程度上是出于对“读者”的考虑。译者认为，中国古代典籍译本的主要读者应是该领域的专家学者，并非普通大众，因此翻译不应当为了可读性而牺牲典籍的本原特色。他们努力的方向是经得起考证的准确翻译，是一种“学术性翻译”。

This essay is in a sense the coming out of a pair of closet translators.[1] A few years ago, we began discussing the possibility of translating the *San guo zhi* 三国志 (*Records of the Three States*) of Chen Shou 陈寿 (233—297), along with Pei Songzhi's 裴松之 (372—451) equally famous commentary. Since then, we have done drafts of a number of sections, as well as a complete and fully annotated translation of the text and commentary to the chapters on the empresses and consorts of each of the three states. We are now writing an introduction to these three chapters. This annotated translation and its prolegomena will, we hope, find a place as a monograph. At the same time, it will serve as a proving ground for the envisioned translation of the entire history, allowing us to test our approaches to various problems presented by the text.

The *San guo zhi* and Its Commentary

Following the abdication of the last Han emperor in A. D. 220, China split into the states of Wei 魏 (220—265), Wu 吴 (222—280), and Shu 蜀 (221—263). The *San guo zhi*, one of the twenty-five officially sanctioned standard histories (*zheng shi* 正史), deals with these three contending realms. Chen Shou, author of the work, was from the state of Shu.[2] In his youth, he studied with the historian Qiao Zhou, learning the *Shang Shu* 尚书 (*Hallowed Documents*) and the three commentaries to the *Chun qiu* 春秋 (*Spring and Autumn Annals*), and concentrating particularly on the *Shi ji* 史记 (*Records of the Grand*

Historian) and the *Han shu* 汉书 (*Han History*)[3]. Later, he served as an official in the Shu government.[4] Shu was conquered by Wei in 263, by which time affairs in Wei were controlled by the Sima 司马 family. In 265 Sima Yan 司马炎 (236—290) abolished Wei and ascended the throne as first emperor of the Jin 晋 dynasty (265—317). Chen Shou was recommended by the influential official and literatus Zhang Hua 张华 (232—300) and so came to serve the Jin. He was charged with editing the *Zhuge Liang ji* 诸葛亮集 (*Collected Works of Zhuge Liang*) and completed the task in 274.[5] Done a mere forty years after Zhuge's death, this earlier collection of that famous statesman-strategist's works was in all likelihood quite comprehensive and reliable; however, it was lost before the Song dynasty (960—1972).[6]

With Jin's conquest of Wu in 280, Chen began work on his history of the three different states.[7] He used a variety of sources to compile a history quite different from many of the standard histories;[8] the *San guo zhi* does not adhere to the format established by the *Shi ji* and the *Han shu*, since it lacks *zhi* 志 (or *shu* 书, treatises) and *biao* 表 (tables), consisting instead only of *ji* 纪 (annals) and *zhuan* 传(biographies).[9] From the outset, by referring to the Wei rulers as emperors and calling his accounts of them "annals", Chen makes Wei the legitimate successor of Han, placing Shu and Wu, whose rulers are merely accorded "biographies," in a lesser light. This viewpoint is also reflected in the amount of space allotted to each of the states, for all of the sixty-five *juan* that make the work, thirty are devoted to Wei, fifteen to Shu, and twenty to Wu. Wei's legitimacy is conveyed by other means as well. For example, Chen is silent in the way "Wei shu" section about Liu Bei 刘备 (161—223) of Shu and Sun Quan 孙权 (182—252) of Wu being proclaimed emperors, and in the "Shu shu" section he gives coronation dates according to Wei reign years.[10] Chen has been criticized by, but it is hard to see how he could have done differently. He was, after all, a Jin official, and Jin claimed succession from Wei. As the *Siku quanshu zongmu* 四库全书总目(*General Catalogue of the Imperial Library*) entry on the *San guo zhi* observes, to make Wei a usurper would have been tantamount to calling Jin a usurper.[11]

It is not known when Chen Shou completed his manuscript[12], but drafts of the *San guo zhi* received the kind of reception writers dream of *Zhang Hua*, for instance, likened him to Sima Qian 司马迁(145—ca. 86 B. C.) and Ban Gu 班固(32—92), the authors of *Shi ji* and the *Han shu*, respectively. Comparison to these quintessential historians of the past was high praise, indeed. It must have seemed that Chen had written the last word on the Three States period, for Xiahou Zhan 夏侯湛(243—291), who was then writing his own Wei shu, gave up and destroyed his work.[13] Two thousand years later, the great literary critic and theorist Liu Xie 刘勰 (ca. 465—ca. 522) added his voice to the chorus acclaiming Chen and his history.[14] Let us note, however, that the *San guo zhi* was not originally officially sponsored. Official copies were not made until after Chen's death.

In short, given his political and intellectual environment and the materials he had to work with, Chen produced a kind of masterpiece. That is not to say it was perfect.

Criticisms had been leveled at the work over time.[15] The first important criticism was that it was too brief and omitted too much. The complaint of brevity has some merits and is still heard.[16] As Carl Leban explains,

> despite Chen Shou's position and the availability of contemporary source material, great gaps still existed in certain parts of the record, most particularly with regard to Shu, but also evident in the sometimes overly terse reports on the activities of individual personalities and the vagueness with which events are dated both in the annalistic chapters and the biographies. The very excitement generated by the original *SKC* accounts further engenders a thirst for greater detail, frustrations which must have been felt even by earlier readers.[17]

In about 426, enthusiasm for the text joined with frustrations with its succinctness and led Emperor Wen 文帝 of the Liu Song 刘宋 dynasty (420—479) to order Pei Songzhi to write a commentary to it. Pei submitted the completed commentary to the throne in 429, and the emperor, with considerable foresight, deemed it an imperishable contribution.[18] This work with which the emperor was so taken differs substantially from commentaries associated with other histories, notably those to the *Shi ji* and the *Han shu*. The commentaries to those historians are primarily of the *xungu* 训诂, or glossatorial, type. But from the commentary itself and from Pei's memorial submitting to the throne, it is obvious that his goal was different.[19] The task Pei set for himself was that of making the work better by supplementing Chen's accounts with whatever records were still extant. Despite the criticism leveled at the commentary by Ye Shi (1150—1223)[20], Pei does not seem to have simply gathered up material that had already been seen and rejected by Chen, for much of what is found in the commentary is contemporary to Chen or later and would not have been available to him.[21] The commentary is over three times the length of *San guo zhi*[22] itself and cites more than 150 works, not including classical texts and Pei's own comments. It preserves a large amount of material from texts since lost.[23]

The basic text used for our translation is the Zhonghua shuju edition, first published in Beijing in 1959. This is a modern punctuated edition containing useful collation notes.[24] The text of the *San guo zhi* have been remarkably well preserved.[25] The oldest printed edition of the text dates from the Xianping 咸平 period (998—1003) of the Northern Song (960—1126). A photograph of a page of this text was included at the front of the 1959 Zhonghua shuju edition published in Beijing but is not found in the 1973 revised reprint. The Xianping edition was not the only Song edition. In the Southern Song (1126—1279) there were several paintings, and the commonly used Bona edition 百衲本 is a photolithographic composite of Shaoxing 绍兴 (1131—1162) and Shaoxi 绍熙 (1190—1194) editions.[26] At least three important editions of the text appeared in Ming 明 times (1368—1644) and three during the Qing.[27]

Much works was done on the San guo zhi by pre-twentieth century scholars, but aside

from the Zhongzhu shuju recension, the most valuable single edition of the *San guo zhi* is the *San guo zhi ji jie* 三国志集解(*Collected Explanations to San guo zhi*), completed by Lubi 卢弼 in 1936.[28]

On the Translation of Chinese Texts

If permitted a translator's note, an introduction, or a preface, a translator will almost always give some indication of the value of the original text and, therefore, of the translation. Burton Watson calls the *Shi ji* a "monumental" work "widely and affectionately read" by "educated Chinese" and "men of learning in Korea and Japan"—a work of "incalculable influence" on the literatures of the three lands.[29] Homer H. Dubs, on the other hand, is strangely reticent on this point regarding the *Han shu*, perhaps because his translation, as the inclusion of a Chinese text and detailed notes shows, was intended for a more academic audience, one which could be presumed to know the significance of the work without being told. Even so, Dubs's omission is surprising. Even as scholarly a translator as David Knechtges quotes the Song saying *Wen xuan lan, xiu cai ban* 文选烂秀才半("The Wen xuan thoroughly done, / Half a licentiate won"), pointing out that Xiao Tong's 萧统 (501—531) anthology "was one of the primary sources of literary knowledge for educated Chinese in the premodern period, and it still is the vade mecum for specialists in pre-Tang literature."[30]

There can be no question of the importance of *San guo zhi*. The Chinese consider it one of the most important of the dynastic histories, for in its pages are chronicled the ideas, events and documents of one of the most exciting periods in Chinese history. This was a time of tremendous social, economic, and political changes as well as outstanding literary achievements, and the *San guo zhi* is crucial for an understanding of all of them. It is also an essential repository of information on personalities and topics such as Daoism and Daoist movements, medicine, and the customs of foreign peoples. As a moment's reflection will show, the book has exerted a powerful effect in the popular milieu on Chinese of all ages and been a "pervasive influence in fiction, drama, and popular religion,"[31] not to mention history and historiography. In Taiwan alone there must be scores of temples decorated with scenes from the *San guo zhi* as sifted through popular lore and fiction. The canonization of Guan Yu 关羽 and the widespread devotions to him today are a good example of this influence.[32] That the *San guo zhi* has been long referred to, along with Sima Qian's *Shi ji*, Ban Gu's *Han shu*, and Fan Ye's 范晔(398—445) *Hou han shu* 后汉书(*Later Han History*), which was actually written later than the *San guo zhi*, as one of the *Four Histories* (*Si shi* 四史) is indicative of the high regard in which it has been held.

There is no western-language translation of the *San guo zhi*. Books, articles, and dissertations sometimes contain translation of passages or sections, but they almost never include the relevant parts of Pei's commentary, and the total amount in translation is

minuscule. Perhaps the translator who has sampled most broadly from the text is the redoubtable Achilles Fang.[33] Fang, of course, was translating the *Zi zhi tong jian* 资治通鉴 (*Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Governing*), not the *San guo zhi*; it is only when the two texts overlap and in certain notes that he can be said to be dealing with the *San guo zhi* proper.[34]

If the *San guo zhi* is, as just suggested, an important Chinese text deserving an English translation, the question then becomes, what kind of translation? The question has to do with the mature of translation itself. As a practical matter, there are three crucial and interrelated factors in the translation equation: translator, original text, and audience. With regard to the first of these, at least as far as translation from Chinese is concerned, we are much our mentor's children. This phenomenon is what makes it possible for people to speak of the Boodbergian influence, for example. It is not as hard to change one's approach to translation as it is for a leopard to change its spots, but it is no easy thing, either, for mostly we have no desire to do so. The nature of a given translation in Chinese is, therefore, frequently determined more by who does it than by cogitation on the art and craft of translation.

This is not to say that translators from China are inflexible. Everyone tries to improve and adapt. We may even bone up on certain styles and genres of literature in English in order to adjust to the needs of particular Chinese texts. A translator of early medieval Chinese literature for scholarly publications certainly will not use exactly the same approach when called upon to provide an unannotated translation of a Tang tale for a general anthology of Chinese literature or render a modern Taiwanese short story into English. But insofar as Chinese is concerned, it is probably true that many translators prefer to stick to the way of doing things that they have developed under the influence of their teachers and others in the field whom they admire.

When a translator does alter his or her approach, it is rarely an act of apostasy. Rather, it has to do with one or both of the other elements of the equation: the text or the audience. One of the advantages of being an academic translator is that one has certain freedom to select one's material. This means that such translators can choose to work almost exclusively on texts more or less congenial to their style, background and interests. This, in turn, means that they have a good idea of their audience and its expectations. But most translators, perhaps, occasionally find themselves wandering beyond their periodic or generic confines. And when they do, they may decide that different kinds of texts call for different kinds of translations. Thus a person who normally deals with early texts in classical Chinese and uses a fairy literal style when translating them may see that style as inappropriate for modern fiction. The decision to switch approaches may be inspired by the translator's beliefs about the different natures of the texts and their relationship to modern man. But it may also be determined by the intended audience of the translation.

Audience is a notoriously difficult problem when speaking about studies and translations

of Chinese.[35] In some case, the audience is not much in doubt. Although Burton Watson was thinking of specialists as well, he makes it clear that his *Records of the Grand Historian* was done with a general audience in mind.[36] At one point he writes:

> I am aware that some of the practices may render the translation unsatisfactory to specialists who are interested in the *Shih chi* as a source for historical data, rather than as a unified work of literature. Yet any attempt to please all readers, specialists and non-specialists alike, would almost certainly end by pleasing none. Michael Grant, in the introduction to his translation of Tacitus' Annals, states his opinion that "except as a mere crib, an unreadable translation is useless." Though the wording is a bit drastic, I fully agree with his dictum in principle, and ask the reader to keep it in mind in judging what follows.[37]

It is hard to disagree with the notion that an unreadable translation is useless. But if it is truly unreadable, it is not even useful as a crib, so what Grant and Watson have in mind is something else, not something totally unreadable. Grant is rejecting outdated English and translatorese.[38] No one is in favor of these, of course. Who today would translate like Legge, admirable though his work is for his time? But the question of readability is not so simply seltted. As Grant writes, "it remains a real issue, though one could and should refine it by asking, readable to whom, an investigation which, in regard to translation, has still hardly begun."[39] Thus we are thrown back to the question of audience.

Eugene Eoyang tackled this problem as regards Chinese translation in an illuminating paper entitled "Waley or Pound? The Dynamics of Genre in Translation."[40] He posits three types of translations: co-eval, surrogate, and contigent.[41] Coeval and surrogate translations are both self-sufficient, for the former subsumes the original as a reference for an audience familiar with it and effectively captures its spirit and meaning, while the latter assumes a readership totally unfamiliar with the original and must stand by itself.[42] A contingent translation, on the other hand, is not self-sufficient, for it presumes the presence of the original text and is meant to be read with it. Such a translation is what might otherwise be referred to as a literal translation (whatever that means), and Eoyang argues that it is not for bilingual readers, who have no need for such a literal rendering, or for general readers, for whom it would have no appeal. Contingent translations are essentially student trots for those neither wholly ignorant of nor wholly familiar with the language.[43] Of such works he writes:

> Texts and editions for this readership have proliferated in recent generations. These versions, with their accompanying linguistic apparatus and the density of their annotation and exegesis, will often bewilder the general reader. They are sometimes presented in a "metalanguage" comprehensible neither to the speaker of the original language nor to the native speaker of the target language untrained in the specialized discourse. In the case of Chinese, these may be familiar as

"sinological" translations.[44]

Once again, one has to agree that translations "in a 'metalanguage' comprehensible neither to the speaker of the original language (presumably meaning one also well-educated in the target language) nor to the native speaker of the target language (presumably meaning an educated reader willing to expend some effort to enter a world which may be partly alien)" are to be avoided at all costs. And Eoyang himself points out that his tripartite generic categories are far from rigid.[45] Still, one regrets slightly the tone of the statement and the seemingly pejorative use of the hoary word "sinological."

Now, one dictionary says that sinology means "the study of things Chinese," and a sinologist or sinologue is "one versed in the Chinese language, or in the customs and history of China."[46] While these definitions are not incorrect, they are unlikely to satisfy most scholars. Some might go so far as to deny the validity of any field called sinology, while others, especially those who think of themselves as sinologists, might feel that the above definitions do not really explain what they do. For them, sinology is in large measure akin to philosophy. That is, it involves bringing knowledge of many kinds to bear on the study of Chinese written materials, especially (but not exclusively) literary texts, in order to answer various kinds of questions about them. As such, sinology has to do with methods and approaches, and while these may influence the final translation of a text, they do not perforce damn that translation to unreadability and ultimate failure.

While it is true that some translations by sinologists are tough going and inelegant, some can serve all of the hypothetical audiences mentioned above, provided we qualify the notion of general readership.[47] The likelihood of any translation of classical Chinese literature attracting a truly general readership, however, has gone remote. Thus, while there should be a continuing need for anthologies for the classroom, the main audience for scholarship and translation of traditional Chinese texts is "our fellow specialists and the serious young students ... attracted to the field."[48] Translators of classical Chinese cannot reject a larger audience by making ridiculous translations, but they cannot count on that audience, either. Our goal, then, is to produce an accurate, philosophically sound translation that avoids both excessive "'naturalization' of the foreign, which erases the unique character of the original," and "exploitation of the exotic, which exaggerates differences."[49]

On Translating the *San guo zhi*

The problems translations of the *San guo zhi* face are not much different from those faced by translators of other early dynastic histories and of old Chinese texts in general. The language of the text and commentary is usually fairly straightforward, but many terms and proper nouns require research and explanation. And the language does grow considerably more complex and difficult in quoted material, including memorials, letters, edicts, some sections of Pei's commentary, and others, still earlier texts such as the *Yi jing* 易经 and

Han apocrypha.

Honorifics and official titles present a special problem. In the text they are frequently applied anachronistically. For example, in the Wei section, Cao Cao is regularly referred to by his posthumous title of *taizu* 太祖 (Grand Progenitor), and empresses are called *hou* 后 (empress), even in accounts of events before their assumption of the title and after their assumption of some other title, such as *tai hou* 太后 (empress dowager). These special usages occur not only in the descriptive and narrative parts of the material but also in ostensible reports of direct speech as well. In our translation, such honorifics are sometimes replaced by pronouns or the person's name, but they are often retained. To ensure clarity, they are sometimes followed by the person's full name set in apposition. This is especially useful for reminding the reader who's who at the beginning of a new *juan* 卷. For example, when Liu Bei's honorific Xian zhu (Former Ruler) first appears in the biography of Zhuge Liang, for 时先生屯新野 we may write "At the time, the Former Ruler, Liu Bei, was garrisoned at Xinye."[50]

Any translator of traditional Chinese historical or literary texts knows that there are a thousand such nuts-and-bolts questions involved in translating any substantial work. The *San guo zhi* does, however, present one unique problem—the relationship between the text and the commentary. The envisioned translation is of both Chen Shou's text and Pei Songzhi's commentary because it is unthinkable to do the text alone. The relationship between text and commentary is closer in the case of this history than any other, the closest analogue being perhaps the *Chunqiu* 春秋(*Spring and Autumn Annals*) and the *Zuo zhuan* 左传(*Zuo's Commentary*). Furthermore, as already observed, the nature of the commentary is rather special. Certainly, no one would want to read *Han shu* without the commentaries of Yan shigu 颜师古(583—645) and others. But while those commentaries are read primarily as explanations or elucidations of the text, Pei's commentary is read as a supplement to the text, even as a rival work.

Pei's preservation of texts otherwise lost to us and his presentation of additional and alternative information does not come without a cost. In perhaps no other history is the prose of the original so broken up by long passages of commentary.[51] It is possible to skip over the commentary, but no serious reader is likely to do so, and the existence of any other kind of reader is unlikely. In most cases the interruption, though apparent, is not significant. An example is the following[52]:

> Empress Zhen, consort of Emperor Wen and canonized Brilliant, was a woman of Wuji in Zhongshan, the mother of Emperor Ming and a descendant of Grand Guardian Zhen Han of Han times.[53] The family had been officials for generations at two thousand piculs.[54] Her father Yi was prefect of Shangcai.[55] She lost her father when she was three.

At this point, Pei Songzhi quotes *Wei shu* (*History of the Wei*) to supplement the

information in the *San guo zhi*:

> *Wei shu* says: Yi married a woman named Zhang from Changshan, and she gave birth to three boys and five girls. The eldest son Yu died young. Next was Yan, who was recommended as filially pious and incorrupt, was a dividion head under the regent, and was magistrate of Quliang.[56] Next was Yao, recommended as filially pious and incorrupt. The eldest daughter was Jiang, followed in order by Tuo, Dao, Rong, and the empress. The empress was born during the Han on a *dingyou* day in the twelfth month of *Guanghe* 5 [January 26, 183]. Every time she went to sleep, her family seemed to see something like a person bringing a jade garment to cover her, and they often marveled over it together. When Yi died, whatever it was joined in the wailing for the deceased, and those within and without the family found it even stranger. Later, when the physignomist Liu Liang examined the empress and the other children, he pointed to her and said, "This girl will be inexpressibly noble."

From the time she was small until she was grown, the empress never cared for frivolity. When she was eight, someone performed outside by riding standing up on a horse. The people in the household and all of her older sisters went up to the gallery to watch. Only the empress did not go. All of her older sisters thought this was odd and asked her why. She replied, "A woman should not watch things." When she was nine, she enjoyed writing, and anytime she saw a character, she always knew it. She often used her elder brothers' brushes and inkstones, and they said to her, "You should stick to women's work. You don't think all of this writing and study will make a woman erudite of you, do you?" The empress replied, "I have heard that of all the worthy women of antiquity, there was never one who did not study the success and failures of former times in order to admonish herself. If one does not understand writing, how can one examine these?"

Here Chen Shou's account resumes:

> Later, when the armies of the empire rebelled and there was also famine, the people all sold their precious objects of gold, silver, pearls, and jade.[58] At that time, the empress's family had a great deal of stored grain, and they used a large amount to buy these objects. The empress was ten or so and said to her mother, "Now, while the world is in turmoil, we are buying a lot of precious objects. 'Though a man may have done nothing illegal, his cherishing his jade is a crime.'[59] Furthermore, all about everyone is starving and in want. It would be better to give our grain as relief to kinsmen and neighboring villages and to practice benevolence and charity on a broad scale." The whole family agreed it was a good idea and followed her advice.

The commentary once again interjects:

> Wei lüe (Wei Epitome) says: When the empress was fourteen, she lost her middle elder brother Yan, and her sorrow continued beyond the stipulated mourning period. She served her widowed sister-in-law in set ways. The empress often remonstrated with her mother, saying, "My elder brother unfortunately died young. Sister-in-law is young to be a celibate widow and has been left with but a single child. Speaking in terms of moral obligation, you ought to treat her like a daughter-in-law, and you should love her like a daughter." Her mother was moved by the empress's words and shed tears. She then ordered the empress and her sister-in-law to live together. Whether sleeping or resting, sitting or rising, they were always together, and their mutual affection grew deeper and deeper.

Chen's account then resumes with "In the Jian'an period, Yuan Shao obtained her for his middle son Xi ..." It is obvious that the commentarial insertions at once retard Chen's narrative and provide additional information regarding Empress Zhen's special qualities.

The supplemental information provided by Pei is not always so innocuous. A few years ago one of us studied a particular event in the life of Cao Zhi 曹植(192—232) in which the commentary had a mischievous effect on later scholars.[60] The passage in question reads:

> Cao Zhi once rode his carriage down the speedway, opened the major's gate, and went out. Cao Cao was incensed, and the perfect of [the majors in charge of] official carriages was sentenced to death. Thenceforth, he added to the restrictions on the marquises, and his favoritism towards Cao Zhi declined daily.[61]

To flesh out the account in Chen's narrative, Pei Songzhi chose a passage from Guo Ban's 郭颁 *Wei Jin shi yu* 魏晋世语(*Conversations of the Wei and Jin Eras*):

> Cao Cao dispatched the heir apparent Cao Pi and Cao Zhi each to go out one of the gates of Ye, but secretly ordered the gate that they were not to go out in order to see what his son would do. When the heir apparent Cao Pi arrived at the gate, he was not allowed out and returned. Yang Xiu had previously cautioned Cao Zhi, "Since you have received a royal command, if the gate should not let you out, you may kill the gatekeeper." Cao Zhi followed his advice.[62]

This *Shi yu* version, as stated in Cutter's earlier article, is extremely suspect. Even Pei Songzhi himself was careful to point out that *Shi yu* is quite unreliable,[63] but later scholars have not always been as discerning. Guo Moruo, for instance, accepted the story in building an indictment of Cao Zhi.[64]

Unreliable, anecdotal material can always influence the interpretation of historical events, whether found in a contiguous commentary or not. Still, the basic fact is that here and elsewhere Pei's commentary interrupts Chen's original text and often offers conflicting information in a seductively convenient format. Interruptions are most frequent in an edition like Lu Bi's *San guo zhi ji jie*, but even the Zhonghua shuju edition, which uses note

numbers, intersperses chunks of Pei's commentary between blocks of Chen's text. One way of minimizing this effect in the translation might be to place the translation of the text and of the commentary on facing pages, thus using page format to attempt to reintegrate Chen's narrative.

Chen Shou has been unfortunate in two ways. First, his work has had to compete with his own commentary, and second, *San guo zhi* has been overshadowed in the popular mind, at least, by *San guo yan yi* 三国演义. This important novel has greatly affected the popular perception of persons and events in the *San guo zhi*, in many instances placing historical figures in quite a different light. So pervasive is its influence that for many people around the world the title *San guo zhi* calls to mind the fictional work rather than Chen Shou's history. The primacy of *San guo yan yi* in popular lore is an understandable and inmutable act of life. The relationship between *San guo zhi* and Pei's commentary, on the other hand, is amenable to a slight, but more than cosmetic, modification. Thus one of our goals, in addition to that of producing an accurate and philologically sound rendering understandable to the educated Western nonsinologist, is to "restore" *San guo zhi* as an integrated narrative; one supplemented, not broken up, by Pei's commentary.

Notes:

We would like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to Professor Miao Yue 缪钺, a great scholar of the *San guo zhi* and a kind and considerate man.

1. The subtitle is borrowed from the title of Oliver Taplin's review of Homer, The Iliad, trans. Robert Fagles, intro. and notes by Bernard Knox (New York: Viking, 1990), which appeared in the *New York Times*, 7 October 1990. The significance of the subtitle has to do with "restoring" Chen Shou's narrative, a goal discussed at the end of the paper.
2. He was from Anhan 安汉 in Ba 巴 Commandery. A biography of Chen appears in Chang Qu's 常璩 fl. Ca. 347) *Huayang guo zhi* 华阳国志 (*Records of the Kingdom South of Mount Hua*). See liu Lin 刘琳, ed., *Huayang guo zhi jiao zhu* 华阳国志校注 (*Records of the Kingdom South of Mount Hua Collated and Annotated*) (Chengdu: Ba Shu shushe, 1984), 11. 849—852.
3. Liu, *Huayang guo zhi jiao zhu*, 11. 849; Miao Yue, "Chen Shou yu *San guo zhi*"陈寿与三国志(Chen Shou and *Records of the Three Kingdoms*), in *Zhongguo shixue-shi lun ji* 中国史学史论集(*Essays in the History of Chinese Historiography*), ed. Wu Ze 吴泽 and Yuan Yingguan 远英光(Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1980), 315.
4. See Liu, *Huayang guo zhi jiao zhu*, 849; *Jin shu* 晋书(*Jin History*), comp. Fang Xuanling 房玄龄 (578—648) et al. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), 82. 2137; Miao, "Chen Shou yu *San guo zhi*," 313, 314n.
5. Miao, "Chen Shou yu *San guo zhi*," 313; Wen Xuchu 闻旭初, "Bian jiao shuoming"编校说明(Editorial Explanation), 1, in Duan Xizhong 段熙仲 and Wen Xuchu, eds., *Zhuge Liang ji* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1972).
6. Wen, "Bian jiao shuoming," 1.
7. Note that *San guo zhi* was not Chen's only work of a historical nature. He also authored *Yibu qijiu zhuan* 益部耆旧传(*Accounts of the Elders of Yi Region*) and *Gu guo zhi* 古国志(*Records of Ancient States*),

both new lost.

8. The sources potentially available to him are discussed in Carl Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Rise of Wei: The Early Years" (Ph. D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1971), 3 - 19.
9. Miao, "Chen Shou yu *San guo zhi*," 321, suggests that the absence of the treatises found in other standard histories was due to insufficient data. While this may well be true, Leban suggests that a further reason for Chen's format is that at the time Chen wrote *San guo zhi*, the great historians of Sima Qian and Ban Gu notwithstanding, "the forms of historical writing were still in a state of experimental flux"; Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Rise of Wei," 19. Many Qing dynasty (1644—1911) works attempt to supply *zhi* and *biao* for *San guo zhi*. Such works include those found in volumes 2 and 3 of *Ershiwu shi bu bian* 二十五史补编, 6 vols. (1936; Taipei: Kaiming shudian, 1959).
10. Miao, "Chen Shou yu *San guo zhi*," 317. See also Luo Hongzeng 罗宏曾, *Wei Jin Nanbeichao wenhua shi* 魏晋南北朝文化史(*A Cultural History of Wei, Jin, and the Northern and Southern Dynasties*) (Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin chubanshe, 1988), 433. Cf. Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Rise of Wei," 21 - 22.
11. Ji Yun 纪昀 (1724—1805) et al., comps., *Siku quanshu zongmu tiyao* 四库全书总目提要, in *heyin Siku quanshu zongmu tiyao ji Siku weishou shumu jin hui shumu* 合印四库全书总目提要及四库未收书目禁毁书毁书目(*Combined Printing of Siku quanshu zongmu tiyao, Siku weishou shumu, and Jin hui shumu*) (Taibei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1971), 10. 17. See also Miao, "Chen Shou yu *San guo zhi*," 317 - 318; Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Rise of Wei," 21. This criticism that Chen treated Wei rather than Shu Han as the legitimate successor of the Han perhaps says more about those making the accusation than it does about Chen's scholarship or integrity. Those who take this stance have usually been supporters of regimes such as the Eastern Jin 东晋 (317—420) and the Southern Song (1127—1270), whose situations were similar to those of Shu. See Miao, *San guo zhi dao du*, 7 - 8. There is some evidence that Chen may simply have seen Wei as primus inter pares. A related criticism is that Chen glossed over many incidents that place the Wei or the Sima family in an unfavorable light. See for example, Zhao Yi's 赵翼(1727—1814) *Nianer shi zhaji* 廿二史劄记(Beijing: Zhongguo shudian, 1987), 74 - 76. Chen did have to show the Sima family in a good light, so any translation of the *San guo zhi* must include explanatory notes informing the reader of any discrepancy between the facts of an event and Chen's treatment of it.
12. Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Rise of Wei," 1.
13. Jin shu, 82. 2137; Miao, "Chen Shou yu *San guo zhi*," 315 - 316.
14. See Fan Wenlan 范文澜, ed., *Wenxin diaolong zhu* 文心雕龙注(*Commentary to* Embellishments on the Heart of Literature) (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1978), 4. 285; Vincent Yu-chung Shih, trans., *The literary Mind and the Carving of Dragon*, bilingual ed. (Tai pei: Chung Hwa, 1970), 122. For other accolades, see Luo, *Wei Jin nanbeichao wenhua shi*, 433.
15. One charge is that Chen omitted biographies of certain individuals for personal reasons. His biography in the *Jin shu* says that according to some people, he had offered to include biographies of Ding Yi 丁仪(d. 220) and Ding yi 丁廙(d. 220) if their sons would pay him one thousand *hu* of grain. The account goes on to say that the grain was not paid and the biographies were not included. A number of scholars have questioned this story. Arguments on both sides are summarized by Miao Yue in the preface to his *San guo zhi xuan zhu* 三国志选注(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 4 - 6.
16. One yearns to know, for example, what really transpired when Cao Pi 曹丕 (187—226; reigned as Emperor Wen of Wei 魏文帝, 220—226) had Emperess Zhen 甄后 put to death (*San guo zhi*, 5. 160). Chen says only that he was irate because she became fractious and discouraged over the favor he was

showing to others, but this was probably not the whole story. Another omission of great concern, particularly since the *San guo zhi* has no treatises, is its lack of detail in describing the creation of the *tun tian* 屯田 system by Cao Cao 曹操(155—220) and of the new method of levying land tax based on the amount of the land held rather than according to the yield. Both were extremely important administrative changes and were the antecedents of major fiscal institutions in later dynasties, most notably the Tang. Chen mentions the first only in passing (*San guo zhi*, 1. 14, 16:489) and the second not at all. Were it not for Pei's commentary and the *Hou Han shu*, we might completely misunderstand the origins of these two important institutions. On the other hand, the terseness of the *San guo zhi* may have contributed to its suitability for adaptation as fiction.

17. Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Rise of Wei," 30.
18. *Song shu* 宋书(*Song History*), comp. Shen Yue 沈约(441—513) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), 64. 1701. See also Miao, "Chen Shou yu *San guo zhi*," 321.
19. See Pei's "Shang *San guo zhi zhu* biao"上三国志注表(*Memorial Presenting the Commentary to* San guo zhi), in *San guo zhi*, comp. Chen Shou (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), 1471—1472. It is translated in Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Rise of Wei," 30 - 32.
20. See Ma Duanlin 马端临(ca. 1250—1325), *Wenxian tongkao* 文献通考(*Comprehensive Examination of Documents*), 191. 1623, in *Shi tong* 十通(*The Ten Comprehensive Works*) (Taibei: Xinxing shuju, 1965).
21. Miao, "Chen Shou yu *San guo zhi*," 322.
22. There are approximately 200,000 graphs in the text itself and around 540,000 in the commentary, according to Miao Yue, *San guo zhi daodu* 三国志道读(*Directed Readings in the* San guo zhi) (Chengdu: Ba Shu shushe, 1987), 30.
23. See also Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Rise of Wei," 33 - 34. It is sometimes suggested that the presence of this material in Pei's commentary may have contributed to the disappearance of the originals, but this is far from certain.
24. This is not to say that the punctuation of the edition is entirely consistent, reliable and free from error. See, for example, Fang Beichen 方北辰, "San guo zhi biaodian shangque"三国志标点商榷(*On the Punctuation of* San guo zhi), *Sichuan daxue xuebao* 四川大学学报 1987, no. 1: 90 - 97.
25. Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Rise of Wei," 41 - 44, contains a survey of the publication history of *San guo zhi*.
26. See also Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Rise of Wei," 42. The Bona edition of the twenty-four histories were published 1927—1937 by Shangwu yinshuguan (Comercial Press) in Shanghai. On standard histories and editions, see Yamane Yukio 山根幸夫, "Zong lun (san)"总论(三)(General Discussion, Part Three), trans. Gao Mingshi 高明士, in Gao Mingshi, ed., *Zhongguo shi yanjiu zhinan* 中国史研究指南(*Research Guide to Chinese History*), 4 vols. (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1990), 1:64 - 66.
27. See Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Rise of Wei," 42 - 43. In the tally just given, Mao Jin's 毛晋(1599—1659) Jigu ge 汲古阁 edition of *shiqi shi* 十七史(*The Seventeen Histories*) is counted twice. Printing was begun in 1628, then the works were reprinted in 1660 using reconditioned woodblocks. See Arthur Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (1943; Taibei: Ch'eng Wen Publishing Co., 1972), 565.
28. Lu was a disciple of Yang Shoujing 杨守敬(1839—1915), on whom see Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 484. Other valuable contributions to our understanding of the language of the *San guo zhi* have been made by Qing scholars such as Gu Yanwu 顾炎武(1613—1682), Yu Zhengxie 俞正燮(1775—

1840), and Zhao Yi, and the modern scholars Zhou Yiliang 周一良. See also Miao, *San guo zhi dao du*, 44.

29. Burton Watson, trans., *Records of the Grand Historian of China: Translated from the Shi ji of Ssu-ma Ch'ien*, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 1:3, 6.
30. David R. Knechtges, trans., *Wen xuan, or Selections of Refined Literature*, vol. 1, *Rhapsodies on Metropolises and Capitals* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 1.
31. Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Rise of Wei," 30. Virtually every Chinese knows the main protagonists of the *San guo zhi*. Popularly held notions of what these historical personages were like may not conform to the contents of the text itself, but they are pervasive: Cao Cao was crafty, clever, and often brutal; Liu Bei was highly principled, gracious, but not sufficiently ruthless; Zhuge Liang (181—234) was a master strategies and politician far cleverer than any of his opponents; and Sun Quan was vain and ambition. Nothing reveals the hold exercised by these characterizations on the Chinese so much as the debate that led to the "rehabilitation" of Cao Cao in 1959. It began with a pair of articles published in January by Guo Moruo 郭沫若 and Jian Bozan 翦伯赞 reevaluating Cao Cao and his role in history. By the end of China's preeminent historians participated in the debate, and the articles appeared in major national and provincial papers. Thirty-seven of the articles were collected in the anthology *Cao Cao lun ji* 曹操论集 (*Collected Discussions on Cao Cao*) (Beijing: Joint Publishing, 1960). The blurb on the jacket of the 1979 reprint of the book gives some sense of the issue: "In people's minds Cao Cao has always been considered the archetype of a treacherous minister and a traitor—a villainous bastard."
32. On Guan Yu, see Cai Xianghui 蔡相烨, *Taiwan de siji yu zongjiao* 台湾的祠祀与宗教 (*Taiwanese Sacrifices and Religious*) (Taibei: Taiyuan chubanshe, 1989), 107 - 112, and Prasenjit Duara, "Superscribing Symbols: The Myth of Guandi, Chinese God of War," *Journal of Asian Studies* 47, no. 4 (November 1988): 788 - 795.
33. Achilles Fang, trans., *The Chronicle of Three Kingdoms* (220—265): *Chapters* 69—78 *from the* Tzu chih t'ung chien 资治通鉴 of *Ssu-ma Kuang* 司马光 (1019—1086), ed. Glen W. Baxter, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
34. On translations from *San guo zhi*, see Hans H. Frankel, *Catalogue of Translations from the Chinese Dynastic Histories for the Period 220 - 960*, Chinese Dynastic Histories Translations Supplement No. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957), 11 - 55. Although over thirty pages of listings may seem like a lot, note that Frankel catalogues passages as short as twenty-five graphs, less than one full line on one page of the 1,510-page Zhonghua shuju edition. A fair amount has been done since Frankel compiled his catalogue. Several dissertations include blocks of the text, but even these constitute small fragments of the whole. Examples include Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Rise of Wei"; Paul W. Kroll, "Portraits of Ts'ao Ts'ao: literary Studies on the Man and the Myth" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1976); Ronald C. Miao, "A Critical Study of the Life and Poetry of Wang Chuang-hsuan" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1969); and Robert Joe Cutter, "Cao Zhi (192—232) and His Poetry" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1983). Miao's dissertation was later revised and published as Early Medieval Chinese Poetry: The Life and Verse of Wang Ts'an (A. D. 177—217) (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1982). There is a complete Japanese translation of the text and commentary: Imataka Makoto 今鹰真 et al., trans., *Sangokushi* 三国志, *Seikai koten bungaku zenshu* 世界古典文学全集 no. 24a—c, 3 vols. (Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1984—1989. Wang Jingzhi 王静芝 et al., trans., *Baihua San guo zhi* 白话三国志 (*Record of the Three Kingdoms* in Vernacular Chinese) (Taibei: He Luo tushu chubanshe, 1970) dose not include Pei's commentary.

35. See James J. Y. Liu, *The Interlingual Critic: Interpreting Chinese Poetry* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), ix - x, 17 - 20. Liu is not writing specifically about translation, but there is a connection. Some of his remarks will not doubt strike many readers as slightly imperious and sinocentary.
36. Watson, *Records of the Grand Historian*, 1:6 - 9.
37. Watson, *Records of the Grand Historian*, 1:8. Watson is quoting Grant's *Tacitus on Imperial Rome*. But Grant makes the same point "unreadable" translations elsewhere. See Michael Grant, "Translating Latin Prose," in *The Translator's Art: Essays in Honour of Betty Radice*, ed. William Radice and Barbara Reynolds (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987), 82 - 83.
38. Grant, "Translating Latin Prose," 83.
39. Grant, "Translating Latin Prose," 84.
40. Eugene Eoyang, "Waley or Pound? The Dynamics of Genre in Translation," *Tamkang Review* 19, nos. 1 - 4 (Autumn 1988—Summer 1989): 441 - 465.
41. Eoang originally suggested these terms in his essay "Translation as Excommunication: Notes toward an Interwordly Poetics," presented at the first Sino-American Symposium on Comparative Literature. It now constitutes chapters 6—9 of his *Transparent Eye: Reflections on Translation, Chinese Literature, and Comparative Poetics* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), 111 - 168.
42. Eoyang, "Waley or Pound?" 442 - 443. When dealing with old Chinese texts, the question of whether there is such a thing as a native reader ariser; see Liu, *The Interlingual Critic*, 17 - 18.
43. Eoyang, "Waley or Pound?" 442 - 443.
44. Eoyang, "Waley or Pound?" 443.
45. Eoyang, "Waley or Pound?" 445. He has also spoken approvingly of sound philology, which I discuss below. See Eugene Eoyang, "The Maladjusted Messenger: *Rezeptionsasthetik* in Translation," CLEAR 10, NO. 1 - 2 (July 1988): 66.
46. *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, s. v. "Sino-." The modern media tend to use the word sinologist in a very broad fashion. It seems to be the equivalent of "China hand" and "China watcher."
47. David Knechtges's translations are a good example. They are highly accurated and literate renderings which reflect the spirit of the originals. C. T. Hsia has written:

    When the Wen xuan is completed, Professor Knechtges will have accomplished a work of unprecedented importance in the study of pre-T'ang literature. It is virtually the only anthology of "refined literature" that all scholars of the T'ang and after should know by heart to be truly educated in literature. The rhapsodies of the first two volumes are notoriously difficult to read and understand in the original; now even leading scholars in China, Japan, and Korea, if they read English, will find much to profit them in reading Knechtges' renditions of these compositions, along with the copious notes.

    See C. T. Hsia, "Classical Chinese Literature: Its Reception Today as a Product of Traditional Culture," *CLEAR* 10, no. 1-2 (July 1988): 139. Other skillful translators having a strong sinological bent include Stephen West and Paul Kroll.

8. See Hsia, "Classical Chinese Literature", 133 - 140. He also writes (140), "The study of classical Chinese Literature, insofar as it is a product of a traditional culture becoming increasingly remote from us, must be in part historical and philogical to maintain its challenge and excitement."
9. Eoyang, "The Maladjusted Messenger," 75.
0. *San guo zhi*, 35. 912.

51. Only in more recent compilations, such as Wang Xianqian's 王先谦 (1842—1918) collected commentaries on the Han histories and Takigawa Kametarō's 泷川龟太郎 *Shiki kaichu kosho* 史记会注考证, do we get such lengthy interruptions of the text. But even these do not appear to contain blocks of commentary as extensive as Lu Bi's *Collected Explanations to Records of the Three Kingdoms*. See Wang Xianqian, ed., *Han shu buzhu* 汉书补注 (*Supplemental Notes to Han History*) (1900; Taibei: Yiwen yinshuguan, 1956), and *Hou han shu ji jie* 后汉书集解 (*Collected Explanations to Later Han History*) (1915; Taibei: Yiwen yinshu guan, n. d.); Takigawa Kametaro, *Shiki kaichu kosho* (*Study of Records of the Grand Historian and Assembled Commentaries*) (1932—1934; Taibei: Hongye shuju, 1987).
52. *San guo zhi*, 5. 159 - 160.
53. Wuji 无极, in the Han kingdom of Zhongshan 中山, was in the vicinity of modern Zhengding 正定, Hebei. Zhen Han 甄邯 was the son-in-law of Grand Minister of the Masses Kong Guang 孔光, a supporter of Wang Mang 王莽 (45 B. C. —A. D. 23). Both Zhen and Kong played a role in Wang's consolidation of his power, and Zhen became a member of his circle of advisers and one of his most important officials. See Homer H. Dubs, trans. *The History of the Former Han Dynasty*, 3 vols. (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1938, 1944, 1955), 3:137 - 138, 140, 142 - 145, 167, 181, 200, 225, 234, 236 - 237, 263, 319.
54. In Han times, officials were ranked in terms of *shi* 石, or piculs of grain, although this method of ranking had lost any direct connection with salary in kind. The highest officials had ranks of ten thousand bushels marked the next level of the bureaucracy, with other ranks ranging down to one hundred bushed and less. See Hans Bielenstein, *The Bureaucracy of Han Times* (Cambridge University Press, 1980), 4 - 5; Charles O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 16.
55. Shangcai 上蔡, in the Han commandery of Ru'nan 汝南, was located near modern Shangcai in Henan Province.
56. Changshan 常山 was a Han commandery with its seat located in modern Yuanshi 元氏 County, Hebei. Its name was changed from Hengshan 恒山 to avoid the personal name of Emperor Wen of Han (r. 180—157 B. C.), Liu Heng 刘恒.
57. Filially pious and incorrupt (*xiao lian* 孝廉) was a category of men recommended for service in the central government by the commanderies and kingdoms. See Bielenstein, *The Bureaucracy of Han Times*, 134 - 136, and Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China*, no. 2418. *Da jiangjun* 大将军 (general-in-chief) is here translated as "regent" to convey the function and significance of the office. See Bielenstein, *The Bureaucracy of Han Times*, 124. Quliang 曲梁 was a Han prefecture in the area of modern Yongnian 永年, Hebei.
58. This is apparently a reference to the turmoil of the 190s, when the Han was dissolving into pieces controlled by military leaders, rebels, and powerful regional administrators. See B. J. Mansvelt Beck, "The Fall of Han," in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 1, *The Ch'in and Han Empires*, 221 *B. C—A. D. 220*, ed. Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 349.
59. This is a Zhou proverb found in *Zuo zhuan*. Cf. *Zuo zhuan*, Huan 10.
60. Robert Joe Cutter, "The Incident at the Gate: Cao Zhi, the Succession, and Literary Fame," *T'oung Pao* 71 (1985): 228 - 262, esp. 233 - 240.
61. *San guo zhi*, 19. 558. Cf. Cutter, "The Incident at the Gate," 229.
62. *San guo zhi*, 19. 561. See also Cutter, "The Incident at the Gate," 233 - 234; Hugh A. Dunn, *Ts'ao Chih: The Life of a Princely Chinese Poet*, new ed. (Beijing: New World Press, 1983), 59.

63. See also Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Rise of Wei," 37. Although Leban does not give a locus for Pei's criticisms, they can be found in *San guo zhi*, 4: 133.

64. Guo Moruo, "Lun Cao Zhi" 论曹植 (On Cao Zhi), in *Lishi renwu* 历史人物 (*Historical Personages*) (Shanghai: Haiyan, 1947), 17.

选文二　The New Translation of the *Shi Chi*

C. S. Goodrich

导　言

这篇文章讨论了 Burton Watson 的《史记》英译本。Watson 翻译这部中国史书的宗旨是"牺牲忠实性去换得可读性"。这部两卷本的译著是对《史记》选择性的翻译。对于删除未译的部分有的译者给出了合理的解释，有的解释文章作者不予认同。先秦前的部分 Watson 以年代久远不可考为由放弃不译，可是其中的重要人物如孔子是不可以漏译的。如果考虑到这本译作的普通受众的读者定位，涉及专门知识的内容可以不译。这种读者定位还体现在学术性的欠缺上，其中一个主要的表现就是缺少注释，这恐怕是因为译者担心注释会分散读者阅读时的注意力和兴趣。但是 Goodrich 却以严谨的学术态度将《史记》及其英译本定位在一个具有学术性的文本上面。这种定位同 Watson 的翻译定位是有较大出入的。

Goodrich 认为该译本的欠缺主要表现在一些字词的理解和表达上。比如，Watson 把"燕雀安知鸿鹄之志哉"中的"鸿鹄"翻译成 swan 是不准确的。这里的"鸿鹄"指的是一种传说中的大鸟，近似于《庄子》"逍遥游"里面的"大鹏"。还有些地方 Watson 处理的方式应该更为严谨一些，如他把"(范增)举所佩玉玦以示之者三，项王默然不应"翻译成：[Fan] three times lifted up the jade pendant in the form of a broken ring which he wore and showed it to Yü, hinting that he should "break" once and for all with the governor。显然，后面的 hinting that he should "break" once and for all with the governor 为 Watson 所加，用以说明"玦"含的谐音义"绝"，"断交"的意思。

文章除了具体地分析了《史记》英译本中有失妥当的一些处理方式，还对这个译本的总体风格进行了评论。Watson 用 Michael Grant 翻译史诗《伊里亚特》的方法为自己翻译《史记》提供支持。Grant 认为"富有色彩的华丽语言无法让当代作家理解塔西陀的独特的个性"。不过，这种崇尚简约的翻译风格也受到了一些质疑。一味地崇尚简约会与原文的风格相背离。如荷马史诗的语言风格是华丽的、铿锵的以及富有诗意的，简单明了的语言翻译出来会使原文的风格丧失殆尽。此外，《史记》毕竟是汉代时期产生，必然有当时那个历史时期的语言特征，所以，如果用现代语言译出的话尽管明白易懂，却会使得译文转移了表述对象，所指涉的不是一个历史世界而是一个当下的世界。

Students of Chinese antiquity have for some time been awaiting the publication of Dr. Burton Watson's translations from the *Shih chi*, whose appearance was foretold in the same scholar's modest but useful volume on Ssu-ma Ch'ien.[1] The results of Dr. Watson's labors are now available, and are sure to be of interest to all sinologists. It is not only to sinologists, however, that the work is addressed, but also to "the educated reader in general," according to one of the editors of the series of which these volumes form a part.[2] A certain freedom has therefore been taken. Some situations in which the translator has, by his own account, "sacrificed strict fidelity to readability" are mentioned in the Introduction (1, 6 - 7). Professional scholars are likely to have reservations about certain of these liberties, and about others which will be mentioned below. In any case, they must admire the perseverance and industry of the translator in bringing to completion a task of this magnitude and his courage in tackling the innumerable problems presented at every turn. The chronological scope of the material translated is indicated by the subtitles of the two volumes rather than by the general title of the work (see n. 1 above). Thus the very large part of the *Shih chi* which has to do with the Ch'in and pre-Ch'in periods is omitted. It will be supposed that some account of this omitted material would be presented, together with indications as to where the reader might turn for translations from it. In these respects the uninitiated will remain entirely in the dark. The parts of the *Shih chi* dealing with pre-Han matters are dismissed in all too general terms (1, 4 - 5) as derivative and unreliable. Broadly speaking, true enough. But this by no means limits the interest and value of these texts for the modern reader, who may not know that it is to these very chapters that we must turn for accounts of the careers of such important figures as Confucius and Ch'in Shih-huang-ti. Moreover, the historically doubtful portions include much that is of high interest from the standpoint of, for example, folklore, legend, and religion, matters which are as worthy of the reader's attention as, e. g. , the fabulous elements in Herodotus. The fact that the greater part of this pre-Han material was translated by Chavannes is not mentioned![3] Nor are there any references to the work of other scholars whose translations make these portions of the *Shih chi* accessible.[4]

In addition to omissions based on chronological limitations, there are others based on the condition of the text in question and on degree of specialization (thus, *chüan* 105, on medicine). The translator states briefly his reasons for omitting these texts, reasons which, in view of the "general reader" audience and the special problems involved, are quite legitimate.[5] The five treatises which are not presented nevertheless contain a wealth of valuable material, and it is again regrettable that the reader is not informed that this is all available in the French of Chavannes. In a sense the same might be said of the tables; while their contents are intrinsically of little interest, the general reader might have profited from the knowledge that they had been translated by Chavannes. The value of such a reference would be heightened for the present work because of the meager historical and chronological assistance given the reader. In any case, Ssu-ma Ch'ien's introductions to those tables which

fall within Dr. Watson's chosen period are, with negligible exceptions, presented in translation.[6] It was a wise decision to include these passages, in which the historian speaks more in his own voice, and in a more synthetic vein, than is his wont.

The subtitles to the two volumes (n. 1 above) will suggest Dr. Watson's rearrangement of Ssu-ma Ch'ien's material along chronological lines. Volume I is itself divided into two sections. In the first section (Parts I—VI) are placed translations of those texts, whether annals, "hereditary houses," "biographies," or (as in one case) the introduction to one of the tables, which have to do mainly with the period of the founding of the Han. The second section (Parts VII—XI) continues in like manner from the death of Kao-tsu to the accession of Wu-ti. Another instance of transposing material concerns the summations of each *chüan* which Ssu-ma Ch'ien placed at the end of his biography.[7] These are translated and placed separately as introductions at the heads of the chapters to which they refer. The three treatises translated by Dr. Watson, the notices of foreign peoples, and the biographies of certain classes of persons (scholars, knight-errants, etc.) are all placed in Volume 2. In general this seems a good arrangement, making for greater coherence than do the original divisions of the *Shih Chi*. The reader will infer this rearrangement from the tables of contents and the finding lists in the two volumes, as well as from statements of the translator (1, 4 and 19, n. 1). A still greater degree of order might have been gained if the three diachronic types of materials referred to above (treatises, ethnological notices, etc.) had been more clearly dissociated from the chapters whose subjects are distinctly limited in time. (See Vol. 2, Part II, where the translator follows, with a few exceptions, the order of the *Shih chi*, *chüan* 107—*chüan* 120, thus including together much unrelated material.) Since considerable changes were being made, why not go consistently the whole way, putting treatises and ethnological notices with the collective biographies at the end? But this is a small point, and the issue was evidently decided with greater weight being given in this case to the order of the original text.

The translation itself is, of course, the main thing. Dr. Watson's rendition raises some fundamental questions of method and purpose which will be dealt with below, following detailed examination of a few passages. At the outset, however, it will be worthwhile to call attention to one limitation accepted by Dr. Watson which seems to me to have serious consequences. This is the almost total absence of annotation. Footnotes are, of course, neither good nor bad in themselves; they are illuminating or needlessly diverting depending upon the nature of the text and the relevance and value of the information supplied in the notes. In the case of any ancient text there is a great deal to be explained to the reader unfamiliar with the matter in hand; and the specialist occasionally would like to know the basis for the interpretation of a difficult passage. Some of the questionable points noted below would doubtless seem convincing if the translator had justified his rendering in a note, and others might have been corrected had the translator felt obliged to provide such justification.

The portions of Dr. Watson's translation which have been checked in detail are mainly from the first two chapters, in his arrangement, the "hereditary house" of Ch'en She (*Shih chi* 48) and the annals of Hisiang Yii (*Shih chi* 7). The following points are noted where changes are suggested: (*Records*, 1, 19): "rich and famous" translates *fu kuei*[a]. "Rich and honored/of honorable position" would be preferable.

(ibid.): "how could you little sparrows (*yen ch'üeh*[b]) be expected to understand the ambitions of a swan (*hung hu*[c])?" One stricter interpretation might read, "how can swallows and sparrows know the ambitions of geese and swans!" (This would be close to the version of Haenisch, including exclamation point to indicate a purely rhetorical question. 8) However, there is a strong possibility that hung-hu, whether taken as a binom or not, refers not to the natural aquatic bird but to a supernatural creature. According to *Ssu-ma Chen*[d] *hung-hu*[e], "giant swan," denoted a fabulous bird which he likens to the phoenix (*feng-huang*). Again, in the view of Yen Shih-kue *hu* here stands for *huang hu*[f], a supernatural bird able to traverse a thousand 1*i* with one wing-beat, and the aerial mount of immortal fairies. However, *hung* is taken separately by him, apparently in its normal sense: hence, "geese and (supernatural) giant swans."[9] Obviously, there is room for choice here. But the commentators clearly appear to favor *hung-hu*[e] (or *hu*) in the sense of a super—natural "giant swan." The similarity to the parables of the small birds and the giant *p'eng*[g] in the Chuang-tzu, Hsiao-yao yu, also argues for the fabulous bird. Hence mere "swan" seems lame.

(ibid.): (men) "from the poor side of the town" (*lü tso*[h]). Literally "left of the village gates," this expression has been variously interpreted. According to *Ssu-ma Chen*[d], in Ch'in times those whose corvée duties had been remitted were settled at the left of the village gates. He also set forth an alternative view, that those who lived at the right of the village gates were the rich and powerful, while the poor and weak dwelt on the left.[10] This is apparently the explanation adopted by the translator. However, there is evidence that the expression had a different meaning, one which later scholars have upheld against the interpretations already mentioned. During the reign of Han Wen-ti (179—157 B. C.) *Ch'ao*[i] submitted a memorial touching on military conscription in which he described the (to him) oppressive system of the Ch'in. Various classes of people were first taken, and "after this they entered the village gates (*lü*) and took those on the left (*tso*)."[11] The expression *lü tso*[h] itself occurs in connection with conscription in the economic treatise of the Han shu. In this case the comment of Ying Shao[j] (fl. A. D. 190) closely follows the account of Ch'ao Ts'o, with the addition that "they had not yet reached the point of taking [those on] the right when the Ch'in fell."[12] Yen Shih-kue made a point of praising Ying Shao's explanation while condemning all others as wrong.[13] He might have gone further and emphasized (as did Takigawa) that Ying Shao was merely following Ch'ao Ts'o[i], whose account is likely to be dependable since he lived not long after the fall of Ch'in. Presumably for this reason Takigawa joins Yen Shih-kue in dismissing the other interpretations as expressed by Ssu-ma Chen[d].[14] The phrase *lü tsoh* is used only in connection with conscription and probably has no

inherent economic or social significance. It suggests a final "clean sweep" of the remaining man-power after specific categories had been exhausted. On present evidence the left-right division appears to have been purely arbitrary.[15] This is going rather far afield for one expression. But if the sources take some tracking down, the basic evidence was presented by Prof. Takigawa, whose opinion has been noted above, in the edition used by the translator. It therefore appears that this probably erroneous rendering could easily have been avoided.[16]

(1, 19 - 20): "When the group had got as far as Ta-tse County" (*t'un Ta-tse hsiang*[k]). These words mean "were camped in Ta-tse County" (or "in Ta-tse Township"). Incidentally, this clause has been transposed so as to accord with the order of events, and with certain points of diction, occurring in the parallel passage of the *Han shu*. This is also true of the opening lines of this chapter, in which the names and home towns of the protagonists are set forth.[17] In neither case is there any explicit mention of the *Han shu* text.

(ibid., 1, 20): "It was apparent that the men would be unable to reach the appointed place on time, an offense punishable by death" (*tu i shih ch'i, shih ch'i fa chieh chan*[l]). More strictly, "They calculated that they had already missed their rendezvous [at a mustering place]. According to the law, the missing of one's rendezvous was in all cases punished by decapitation" (or, "having missed their rendezvous, they would be decapitated"). The juristic *fa* suggests that *chan* is specific here, not mere "death," for which other words would do. (N. b. the "Enthauptung" of Haenisch, p. 73.) This is, in effect, acknowledged by Dr. Watson who, when the predicament is restated in nearly identical language, translates (1, 21): "anyone who misses a rendezvous has his head cut off."[18] (It is from this passage that I have gratefully borrowed "rendezvous" in the correction suggested above.)

(ibid.): "He took good care of his troops" (*ai shih tsu*[m]). This probably means rather, "He was devoted to his officers and soldiers."[19] (ibid.): "we could lead the world in our own tune, and there are sure to be many who will join in the chorus!" (*wei t'ien-hsia ch'ang, i to ying che*[n]). Perhaps more strictly, "we might act as music-masters to the world, and there ought to be many who would respond." It is by no means certain, however, that the musical figure was meant to be felt here at all; *ch'ang* was early explained as "master, chief, first, head," etc., as Chinese commentators remind us. The music-master idea was proposed by modern Japanese scholars and is certainly debatable.[20] I prefer "we might act as the leaders of all under heaven" for the first of these clauses. In the earlier (unquoted) part of this sentence the title *kung-tzu*[o] is not translated.

(ibid.): *tsu-hsia*[p] as "you, your." If one can not find a close counterpart, it is at least possible to indicate the appropriate tone of respect by such an expression as "you, sirs" or "you, my lords." (Cf. Haenisch, p. 73: "Meine Herren.") In any case, *tsu-hsia*[p] is not a mere pronoun.

(1, 20 - 21): "It must mean that we should first do something to overawe the men in

our group" (*tz'u chiao wo hsien wei chung erh*[q]). Better: "This simply teaches us first to overawe the throng." Context, including a slightly earlier "our throng" (*wu chung*[r]), makes it clear that "our group" is the thing referred to, but the flavor of *chung* is altogether lost in the colorless word "group."

(1, 21): "Ch'en She secretly sent Wu Kuang to a grove of trees surrounding a shrine." Better: "... into a temple in a grove of trees" (*ts'ung-tz'u chung*[s]). On this same page the rendition of the three words which immediately follow (*yeh kou huo*[t]) is open to question. Dr. Watson translates, "When night fell, Wu Kuang lit a torch, and, partly concealing it under a basket ... ". In effect, he is here paraphrasing an interpretation offered by Shen Ch'in-han[u]. The Ch'ing scholar accepted earlier views, namely, that kou denoted a container such as a basket or censer and that a flame was placed within it; and he added that it was so used as to "conceal and reduce the light, producing the appearance of an *ignis fatuus*."[21] (It would have made the translator's own paraphrase more pointed had the last bit been included, since it immediately precedes "cried out like a fox," both in the *Shih chi* text and in Shen Ch'in-han's account of it.) The three words quoted may well have been intended to imply approximately what Shen and Dr. Watson suggest; but we cannot know this, and the translator owes it to the reader to inform him when he is enlarging or interpreting the text to this extent. Incidentally, there are various other interpretations of these words, which can also be defended.[22] This terse passage illustrates the danger involved in dispensing with notes.

(ibid.): "As Wu Kuang had expected, the commander began to beat him." The Chinese text(wei kuo ch'ih. Kuang[v]) is simpler: "... the commander really did beat Kuang." The difference in meaning is small, but the greater degree of fidelity is desirable. The translator's tendency to amplify the original typically takes the form of inserting verbs indicative of mood or aspect. Thus, again on this page, "they proceeded to kill," where the text merely says "they killed." The result is undoubtedly at times smoother English. But these additions, where frequent and indiscriminate, besides being less faithful to the original text, have the further effect of weakening such expressions when they are present in the Chinese.

Other instances of paraphrase occur on this page. Thus: "Kings and nobles, generals and ministers—such men are made, not born!" The words following the dash represent *ning yu chung hu*[w] in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's text, which might be translated, "How can there be a special breed of them!" The implication could have been added in a note or in brackets if it was thought necessary, as in the *Han shu* version, where Yen Shih-ku's note to this effect occurs in the commentary.[23] What follows is really misleading. According to Ssu-ma Ch'ien, the conscripts at this point all replied, "We respectfully accept what you ordain" (ching shou ming x).[24] This becomes (1, 21) "We are with you!" Exclamation point indeed! It is difficult not to envisage some sort of English or American democratic gathering here (political or athletic, perhaps), with its air of enthusiastic rallying—round. If all forms of assent are alike, then "yea verily" equals "okay!" In these last two in stances it is clear that

the translator has been guided by a desire to present a rough equivalent of the Chinese in modern English idiom, English idiom prevailing to the point where a roughly equivalent English maxim is used in the first case. In neither passage do we have quite what Ssuma Ch'ien intended; in the second case the effect of English idiom is remote from the Chinese and seriously misleading.

The account of the first military operations of the rebels contain some errors of detail. Thus (1, 22), "After capturing Ta-tse County, they proceeded to attack and capture Chi. They dispatched Ko Ying ... ". The text actually says, "They attacked Ta-tse County and, having reassembled their troops, attacked Chi. After Chi submitted, they ordered Ko Ying ... ". "Their troops" (ping Y) represents a minimal emendation based on the Han shu text and on an edition of the Shih chi mentioned by Takigawa.[25] Haenisch emends differently (und nahm es translating pa chihz), also ultimately from the Han shu text, which completes the account of the action against Ta-tse.[26] Probably the Shih chi has indeed lost the three characters indicated by Takigawa (*ping*[y] and *pa chih*[z]); it therefore seems appropriate to restore all three, thus: "They attacked Ta-tse County and captured it and, having reassembled their troops," etc. as suggested above. Lacking as it does virtually any critical apparatus, it is impossible to say of Dr. Watson's translation whether he accepted the emendation pa chih[z] "captured it," or merely translated *shou*[aa], "to assemble, gather" but also "to take, capture" in the latter sense, without the emendation *ping*[y]. One infers the latter alternative. The matter is made no simpler by the sequence, in the received text, *kung Ta-tse hsiang*, *shou erh kung Chi*, *Chi hsia*[ab]. The attempt to match the translation to the last six Chinese words cited will show the difficulties that can arise from relatively free translation combined with lack of critical comment.

Incidentally, what Ko Ying was ordered to do to the land east of Chi was *hsün*[ac], i. e., probably to make a tour surveying the boundaries of this area.[27] The text does not say that he was "to seize control of the area" (I, 22), a thought which has been introduced by the translator.

Some points in the translation of the biography of Hsiang Yü may be mentioned. In the first lines the death of Hsiang Yü's great uncle is reported as follows (1, 37): "Hsiang Yen ... was driven to suicide by the Ch'in general Wang Chien." In fact, the text translated by Dr. Watson merely states that Hsiang Yen was "put to death" (*lu*[ad]) by Wang Chien. There is a conflict of sources here, the annals of Ch'in Shihhuangti asserting that Hsiang Yen killed himself after being defeated by Wang Chien. This latter account may be the true one; but even if this were the case (which appears not to be certain), the translator would here be improving his text, not translating it.[28] If Dr. Watson had first translated the text here, the alternate view could easily have been presented in a brief note.

On p. 38 there occur some instances of freedom in translation which are characteristic, and will appear excessive to some readers. Thus the simple verb *yüeh*[ae], "to say," is rendered "remarked" in one case, "cautioned" in a second, and "replied" in a third. Finally it is

translated "said"![29] This usage is open to the same criticism as is the frequent insertion of modal and aspectual verbs: it says more than the author says (though the saying may introduce a pleasing variety). And the effect of a more descriptive verb in Chinese (a verb of exclaiming, replying, chiding, etc.) is lost whenever it may occur. More on this below.

If variety is introduced in verbs of saying, it is eliminated in terms of address. Thus (1, 50) *wei ta wang*[af] is rendered simply "for you." The addition of "great king" would be simple, idiomatic, and faithful to the original.[30] (Cf. what is said above on *tsu-hsia*[p].)

It is at this point (1, 50) that Hsiang Yü begins to be called King of Hsiang (*Hsiang wang*[ag]). There are perhaps some exceptions, but throughout the remainder of his own annals: "King of Hsiang" is the rule. This usage contrasts with the preceding part of these annals (*chüan*[7]) and with the references to Hsiang Yü throughout the annals of Kao-tsu.[31] Early in *chüan*[7] he is also called *Hsiang Chi*[ah]. Dr. Watson always refers to Kaotsu's antagonist as Hsiang Yü. It is, of course true that these differences are not important to the narrative as such; and they may not be important in other respects, as the translator supposes. But this is a modern assumption; and while it accords with modern rationalism and common sense, it departs entirely (as the translator himself observes) from the prevailing Chinese tradition. In any case, when he suppresses such distinctions the translator is being less true to his text; he is in danger of becoming rather a censor than a translator. In the present case it is reasonable to infer, from the consistency in the use of *Hsiang wang*[ag], that something meaningful to the author has been eliminated.

Other errors and doubtful points in this chapter: (1, 51): "swearing an oath of friendship" (*yüeh wei hun yin*[ai]).[33] More specifically, "swearing to make a marriage compact." (1, 52): "how would I ever have doubted you?" (*ho i chih tz'u*[aj]).[34] Less specifically, "how would it have come to this?" (1, 62): "raising clouds of sand" (*yang sha shih*[ak]).[35] Better: "raising sand and stones." (Ibid.): "No matter how sorely we are pressed in chase it will not do to abandon the children!" (*sui chi, pu k'o-i ch'ü, nai-ho ch'i chih*[al]). The position of the negative adverb seems to rule out this interpretation. Chavannes' rendering is preferable: "Quoique nous soyons serres de prses, ous ne pouvons hater notre marche; aquoi sert de les abandonner?"[36] On p. 63, changes of a familiar sort: "defeated army" (or "armies") (*pai chün*[am]) becomes "defeated divisions;" and the impersonal "*Ch'u*"[an] and "army of Han" (*Han chün*[ao]) become "Hsiang Yü" and "The king."[37] In this context such alterations as the last two are not really defensible as necessary for intelligibility since the associations of the protagonists with their states is clear. Again, T'ien Heng "managed to gain control of Ch'i" (*te shou Ch'I*[ap]).[38] The extra verb may suggest that he barely did so, that there was fumbling or difficulty. The real difficulty lies in the insertion of a modern English expression for which there is no equivalent in the original. The Chinese only states that T'ien "gained possession of Ch'i" or "succeeded in taking Ch'i." Again, yilehae on this page is rendered "advised him against it," while three pages later it becomes (1, 66) "intervened."[39]

On p. 72 the translator's simplifications have some unfortunate effects. When Hsiang Yü turns to his few surviving soldiers to hear them confirm the success of their final sortie as he had foretold, the text reads *ch'i chieh fu yüeh*, *ju tawang yen*[aq], meaning, "The horsemen all bowed down and said, 'It is in accordance with the great king's words.'[40] To say "His men all bowed and replied, 'You have done all you said'" is another case of falsifying human relationships by refusing to take terms of address seriously. The same thing at the bottom of this page. When one of Kao-tsu's generals discovers Hsiang Yü he is made to say "'This is Hsiang Yü!'" But the text says rather, "'This is King Hsiang!'" The difference is, of course, particularly important where it occurs within quotes.[41]

A few suggestions concern the chapter on the Hsiung-nu. For ch'i-shear "mounted archery" is more appropriate than "riding and shooting" (2, 159). The phrase is elsewhere correctly rendered "shooting from horseback" (2, 161).[42] Dr. Watson commendably follows the Chinese glosses in his rendering of the first syllable of the name of the celebrated *shanyü* who usually appears as Maotun in sinological writings; here he is Motun. However, it is possible that this is only half the story; modern Chinese lexicographers give Mo-tu as the modern reading for this name.[43] On pp. 163 – 164 of the second volume Hsiung-nu words and epithets are variously dealt with. This constitutes a difficulty, especially if footnotes are eschewed. In any case, I do not see why *luli* and *kutu* are capitalized unless they are identified as names. Two other Hsiungnu expressions are italicized here. The Tias barbarians are omitted from the translation in one case (2, 163).[44] "White Peak" (2, 165) does not seem justified for *poteng* (or *Poteng*[at]). Perhaps this is a case where Dr. Watson's choice of a translation would have been convincing had a footnote been provided, lacking which one finds *teng* as "peak" hard to swallow.[45] This passage also furnishes an instance of a story told elsewhere with additional detail and available in translation, reference to which might have been of value to the reader.[46]

Unfamiliar or unknown names and titles come off rather badly where no assistance is furnished the reader. Often tribes and important places can be located by means of maps, of which there are three in Volume One and one in Volume Two. But these maps show only a fraction of the ethnic and place names referred to in the text. Thus one looks in vain for the Hui-mo, who appear several times in the text, and for the Su-shen and the Ting-ling, each of which appears once. (Appearances are calculated by index entries.) Very few place names are, in fact, shown, so that anyone wishing to follow, for example, the military actions of the period is soon lost. Perhaps a single large folding map drawn to a much larger scale would have served the purpose better. A couple of cartographic points: Eastern Ou is shown (2, 62) but not Western Ou. The latter appears twice in the text. Its position, not only west but far south of Eastern Ou, cannot be inferred with reasonable hope of accuracy from the existing entry. And on one map (1, 57) T'ai-yüan is shown considerably north of its true position, virtually at the latitude of the northern section of the Yellow River.

Two final examples of inserting supplementary material in the translation itself may be

mentioned. When Fan Tseng signaled to Hsiang Yü using a jade pendant of the type *chiieh*[au], Dr. Watson translates (1, 52),

> [Fan] three times lifted up the jade pendant in the form of a broken ring which he wore and showed it to Yü, hinting that he should "break" once and for all with the governor.

The phrase beginning with "hinting" is not in the text; Ssu-ma Ch'ien merely records the signal, he does not interpret it.[47] Of course, the translator should have put this interpretive material in square brackets or in a footnote. The ingenuity of "broken ring" and "break with" as a parallel to the probable Chinese pun on *chüeh/chüeh* is noteworthy nonetheless.[48]

Another sort of elucidative addition occurs in the account of the Hsiung-nu. The translation reads (2, 164), "The days *wu* and *chi* of the ten-day week are regarded as most auspicious." "Of the ten-day week" is the translator's addition here.[49] It is an innocent and useful addition, with which it may seem pendantic to quarrel. However, the attribution of the entire system of decimal counting of days may not have been implied, and it is obviously dangerous to introduce this into a Chinese account of a foreign tribe. The logical solution is again brackets or a footnote. As a matter of fact, there is a footnote (1, 106) on the use of the stems and branches and their application to chronology. Probably it would have been more convenient if a statement on this subject had been placed in the introduction, thus obviating the need for elucidating material either with or, as here, in the text. Cross-references would then not be needed. (They are missed in the present arrangement because the cyclical terms appear infrequently in the two volumes, and the one explanatory note is easily missed or forgotten. The index is no help in this regard.) An explanation of the cyclical system certainly ought to be more detailed than this one footnote to convey very much to the general reader. To a degree the same might be said about year titles, on which there is a brief note (2, 44) which might easily be missed; the information would be more accessible in the introduction.

The question of the Hsiung-nu brings up the matter of footnotes. There are occasional notes to the translation, and these will often be found useful by the general reader. On the other hand, many of them contain virtually no information, while others follow the pattern "some say this, others say that." In such cases the scholars concerned are never identified, nor are their works; I have not found a single reference to any scholarly work in the footnotes. A case in point is the one general note on the Hsiung-nu, found not in the chapter devoted to them, but at their first mention (1, 32): "The nomadic people who occupied the area north of China. They are often identified with the Huns." The rest is silence. This spares the reader much pain, but it does not do much for his curiosity, except perhaps to whet it. The undergraduate who supposes that an important matter in world history is involved is herewith encouraged to forget it.

On the "golden man" of the king of Hsiu-t'u Dr. Watson has this to say (2, 180): "Scholars have long speculated whether the 'golden man' might not have been a Buddhist image. If so, this passage would mark the earliest record of Chinese contact with the Buddhist religion." It is true that some scholars have so speculated for a long time—in fact, since Chang Yen in the third century. However, they have now entirely ceased to do so; everyone who has investigated the matter recently agrees that the golden man has nothing to do with Buddhism.[50] In this case the characteristic vagueness of Dr. Watson's note is the more mischievous because the untutored reader is given no hint where he can inform himself. Again, an important problem in world civilization is dismissed with a curiously transparent, *simpliste* "explanation," one which has here the further property of being seriously misleading.

The answer to this problem is neither arcane nor involved; indeed, it seems to me that Chavannes furnishes a worthy model, with due allowance being made for that portion of his notes and critical comment which is addressed only to the specialist. His translation is provided with adequate footnotes, in which sources are cited by chapter and verse when this is deemed useful. Chinese works predominate among the sources, both primary and secondary, which he cited. But this was the consequence of Chavannes' pioneering role and the presumption of a mainly sinological audience. Today it would be possible to refer to the considerable western sinological literature of the past sixty years, including the work on the *Shih chi* of Chavannes himself and that of other scholars as well, which appears to have been largely ignored by Dr. Watson.[51] References to this literature would have been of great value to the really interested reader, especially to students, in cases such as those cited above where important questions cry out for adequate explanation. Footnotes as such do not render a work impenetrable to the general reader; on the other hand, one may well ask what is the function of these very bland generalizations that seem to convey so little (and that little at times misleading), with no evidences of authority or suggestions for further inquiry. In my view it will be a dull undergraduate who, on reading some of these few notes, will not wish for something more substantial.[52]

It remains to say something about the translation in more general terms. I should say that the translation is, in general, pretty reliable, in the limited sense that the reader will seldom be misled as to the course of events in the narrative history of the period covered. (Indeed, "corrections" and other additions to Ssu-ma Ch'ien's text are occasionally incorporated in the translation without being identified as such, as we have seen above in the case of Hsiang Yü's ancestor!) But the translation tends to be misleading wherever, as occasionally happens, the language of the original is accommodated to everyday twentieth-century English. Examples are the series of titles and terms of respect which become mere pronouns, or the colorless "group" for *chung*, "horde, throng." In the case of "We are with you" the translation reaches, in my view, the nadir of modern journalistic paraphrase. Both the editor and the translator speak, in accents that seem tinged with apology, of the need for

a literary, a "readable" translation (1, Editor's Foreword and 6 - 8). Very good. Most scholars would like to see this too, a translation that is both faithful and in good English, not a mere parroting of Chinese constructions. But not to render, so far as possible, what the Chinese text says is something else again. For what begins as a matter of style, strict contemporaneity of expression, can end by producing a parody of the original, e. g., "We are with you." What is severe, hierarchical, sometimes courtly, becomes familiar, tame, egalitarian, and informal—even chummy. Perhaps the result is superficially more "human" and therefore more understandable. But it must be recognized that such understanding is not a species of absolute enlightenment, in limbo; rather, it must be an understanding of a thing, a definite object with a definite character. A sympathetic "understanding" based on frequent blurring of the profile of the original will not lead to greater understanding of Chinese civilization of 100 B. C. among the general readership. Yet this is what occurs every time a really false modern expression is substituted for a possibly more difficult or unfamiliar expression that would be truer to the original.

In this regard I think it is worthwhile to consider some of the opinions adduced or alluded to by Dr. Watson in support of his method of translation. Thus, Michael Grant, on translating from Tacitus:

> [The attempt] to render Tacitus' peculiar Latin into peculiar English would mean abysmal failure in another most peremptory requirement. For, in our mid-twentieth century, it would not be readable and, except as a mere crib, an unreadable translation is useless. (Grant's italics)

These sentences are quoted in abridged form but with approval by Dr. Watson, who, however, dissociates himself from what he regards as the "drastic" mode of expression (1, 8). Again, Grant in praise of Robert Graves:

> his reminder that twentieth-century English has to be plain is still relevant. No amount of colourful or fanciful language will make the strange personality of Tacitus understandable to contemporary writers, who find rhetoric and the grand style unnatural and unreadable. Today the only faint hope of rendering his complexity lies in as trenchant and astringent a simplicity as the translator can achieve.

Mr. Grant then resolves certain problems by his own answer to the question, What would Tacitus do if he were writing today.[53] (The non-existence of his subject, imperial Rome, at the present time, with the changes that this entails, is not mentioned.)

Not only does Dr. Watson adduce Mr. Grant, and Mr. Grant Mr. Graves, but Dr. Watson him self leads us to the Professor of Poetry direct. Graves is adduced as authority for "bringing up" extra material into the translation (1, 7), a practice that has already been noted. Graves has put his views on translation far more bluntly than does Michael Grant in his introduction to Tacitus. No translations from Homer less plain than his own are really

bearable. For him Richard Lattimore's version of the Iliad is a "competent crib ... I approve of cribs, but dislike all the translations I have yet read. ... their authors seldom consider what will be immediately intelligible, and therefore readable, and what will not."[54] (Graves' italics.) We may be thankful that Dr. Watson, while acknowledging his indebtedness to the Gravesian school of translation, has not chosen to take such a short way with the dissenters.

This view, that the classics must above all be put into the plainest of plain English, has not gone unchallenged. Hugh Lloyd-Jones, in reviewing Graves' Iliad, put it extremely well. He allows the value of communicating something of the epic strain and the archaic Homeric world in "plain English" for those to whom it would at first seem forbiddingly remote. But (he continues):

> the success of these versions has been won at a heavy price .... Homer's language is nothing if not ornate, rich in resounding and poetic compounds and gorgeous imagery; the belief of certain translators of the modern school that it must have stood close to the spoken language of its day can be shown to be absurd. The most obvious characteristics of the style and vocabulary of the poet are ones that translations of this sort utterly fail to bring out.
>
> Why have their authors chosen to present Homer in an idiom so radically different from his own? This happened because the whole character of modern life and literature had reached a point as far as possible from the atmosphere of the ancient epics. The modern reader had become wholly unsympathetic to the Homeric outlook; if he was to have Homer at all, he would have him only if reduced to his own measure. The exuberance of his language had to be pruned; and in place of the effects by which he had charmed his readers for millennia, his translators brought out qualities dear to the modern reader, but not hitherto observed in ancient writing.[55]

Ssu-ma Ch'ien's history is not an epic poem, but the passage has its relevance, *mutatis mutandis*. These thrusts and parries are directly relevant to our subject because of Dr. Watson's declared views on translation from ancient languages and because of the authorities he adduces. A wholly unrelated illustration of the method is worth noting here as an example of the absurdities to which the readable, modern translation, fit for the mid-twentieth century, can attain. In the English version of Professor Bonnard's interpretation of Hellenic civilization Odysseus, the "man of many devices," becomes "a great man for machines!"[56] Messrs. Grant and Graves are not alone in their theory of the special requirements of "modern" translation, but it is evident that they employ the method with greater discretion than do some; and so, happily, does Dr. Watson. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is a definite school of modern translation which emphasizes certain characteristics of modern prose expression and excludes what is not thought to be characteristic. There are, of course, some clear merits to this approach, among them the presumed gain in communication, simplicity, clarity, etc. all very reasonable and attractive. These merits appear to greatest

advantage when contrasted with obscure, pompous, and over-grandiloquent translations of the past, as in Graves' argument (see n. 54 above), and in the preliminary concessions of Lloyd-Jones. However, we should be beyond beating dead horses now, and in a position to judge methods solely according to their intrinsic merits and characteristic results. A most important criterion can be expressed in the question, What happens to the matter to be translated? Is it reproduced clearly, faithfully, and recognizably in its new linguistic raiment (due allowance being made for the in-evitable losses and minor distortions)? If this cannot be brought off, then an explanatory note is in order. Otherwise, if we choose to present in our translations only those things that "will be immediately intelligible, and therefore readable," we confine ourselves to our own linguistically defined environment; we literally reduce Homer to our own measure, and Ssu-ma Ch'ien too. When it is a question of translating from ancient or exotic works, preoccupation with readability in the modern vernacular, with what Tacitus or Ssu-ma Ch'ien might say (!) if writing today, really constitutes an indulgence in fantasy. In so doing we lose sight of the task plainly at hand, to translate what ancient historians in fact said about their own world. If we are willing to let the plainest modern vernacular determine the limits of our understanding of the ancients, then we are bound to mutilate where we should translate, and we shall ourselves be the poorer for it.

Mention has been made of Dr. Watson's allergy to the verb "to say." Good English "demands" variety, he writes (1, 7), whence the use of innumerable more descriptive substitutes. We probably all feel this in varying degrees and, if composing freely, would normally use forms of "to say" less frequently than *yüeh*[ae] is employed in classical Chinese. But it strikes me that it is not necessary to make such a point of this; nor is it a particularly sound practice to introduce elements into a text on the basis of stylistic grounds alone. It is instructive in this regard to compare identical passages in the King James New Testament with the recently issued *New English Bible*. In Matthew II, III, and IV I note nine cases where forms of εἶπον and λέγω rendered by "to say" in the King James Version have now been translated by "to ask," "to reply," etc.; or else some other device has been substituted, e. g., a colon.[57] In most of these cases the "say" seems appropriate enough, and there are no indications that the text chosen differs from the traditional one. It is probable, therefore, that the translators merely felt the same stylistic force as did Dr. Watson. It seems to me that, precisely because the translators closely followed the Greek text at such points at these, we have a solemn Biblical association with frequently recurring forms of "to say;" hence the effect gained by using it for *yüeh*[ae] need not suggest a "clumsy schoolboy," as Dr. Watson suggests (1, 7), but rather may contribute to a quite acceptable elevated style. But I should not like to push matters of style too far. The real point is that it is absurd, in translating into modern prose, to let one's thoughts be dominated by what is stylistically fashionable, normal, or expected of one in the modern language. It is a better balance of the factors involved to consider primarily how best to convey *the meaning of the original* in good English. And when conflicts arise, as they must, between the two

languages involved, there must be giving on both sides; the difficult problems should not be resolved only by determining what goes most smoothly into modern English vernacular.

These are some reflections based on a partial reading of Dr. Watson's book, including his introductory statements on translation. Perhaps a close reading of other chapters would produce a different impression. Thus a casual reading of the biography of Ssu-ma Hsiang-ju, with occasional reference to the text, reveals Dr. Watson's sensitivity to the frank exoticism of the *fu* of this author and his ability to convey much of the richness of the original. The kings of Ch'i and Ch'u and the Son of Heaven are allowed the splendor of their hunting parks, as represented in the Tzu-hsuiand *Shang-lin fu*, whereas it will be re called that the real life kings are unaccountably denied their royal titles and dignities. In regard to titles, one wonders why Hsiao-wen, Hsiao-ching, and Hsiao-wu are rendered respectively "Wen the Filial," "Ching the Filial," and (simply) "Wu" (1, 341, 367, and 375). There is not only the anomalous omission in the case of Hsiao-wu, but also the curious decision to translate the non-distinctive element in the other two titles, the hsiao shared by all three, while leaving the three individual epithets (Wen, Ching, Wu), which are at least as meaningful, in romanization.

Professional sinologists, to whom these volumes are not primarily addressed, will probably feel disappointed in these translations in several ways. They do not make serious use of sinological scholarship, nor do they contribute to it. The translation will often seem alien in style and diction to the original and the infrequent notes, while occasionally helpful, will as often convey little of real value.[58] In all these respects the work will seem a backward, not a forward, step, sixty years after *Les menmoires historiques*. The wish will likely be expressed that Dr. Watson had gone about his task intensively rather than extensively, devoting himself to a scholarly translation of (say) a third or a fourth of the material presented here. Nevertheless, the volumes will have considerable value, especially for the western student of Han history, for whom the persons and events of the period 200—100 B. C. will now be accessible in English as they have not been hitherto. For this we shall all have occasion to be grateful for the labors of Dr. Watson.

Notes:

1. *Records of the Grand Historian of China translated from the Shih chi of Ssu-ma Ch'ien*, 2 *vols. Vol.* 1: *Early Years of the Han Dynasty*, 209 *to* 141 *B. C.*; *Vol.* 2: *The Age of Emperor Wu*, 140 *to circa* 100 *B. C.* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1961). See Watson's earlier work, *Ssu-ma Ch'ien*, *Grand Historian of China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958).
2. W. T. deBary, v. 1, Foreword. The series in question is *Records of Civilization*, *Sources and Studies*, sponsored by the Department of History at Columbia University.
3. This is not to say that Chavannes' work was not duly acknowledged. But the reader will not gain the smallest appreciation of the extent (not to speak of the quality) of the French master's work from the brief acknowledgment in this volume (1, 10). Those who consult Dr. Watson's *Ssu-ma Ch'ien* (p. x et passim) will be made aware of Chavannes' great contribution.

4. Thus Bodde, *China's First Unifier* (*Leiden*, 1938), *and Statesman*, *Patriot*, *and General in Ancient China* (New Haven, 1940).
5. Vol. 2, p. 10. A convenient "Finding List of Chapters of the Shih chi," indicating the omitted chilan, is printed at the end of each volume.
6. The introductory remarks to *chüan* 21 and 22 are so brief as to be almost without value.
7. Shih chi, ch. 130. In the edition of Takigawa, Kametar, Shiki kaichii kochoa (10 vols., Tokyo, 1934) (hereafter SC), ch. 130, pp. 30 - 58. The main text of this chapter, with Pan Ku's additions (*Han shu*, ch. 62) was translated by Dr. Watson in *Ssu-ma Ch'ien*, pp. 42 - 69, and is therefore omitted in the present work.
8. E. Haenisch, "Der Aufstand von Ch'en She im Jahre 209 v. Chr. (*Shiki* 48)," AM, new ser., 2 (1951—1952), 72 - 84. This translation was apparently ignored by Dr. Watson.
9. SC, ch. 48, pp. 2 - 3; *Tz'u hai*, *s. v. hung-hu and huang-hu*; and Wang Hsien-ch'ien's *Han-shu pu-chu* b(*Kuo-hsileh chi-pen ts'ung-shu* ed.; hereafter *HS*), ch. 31, p. 3231. Cf. Haenisch, p. 73.
10. SC, ch. 48, p. 3. The first interpretation was earlier recorded by Meng K'angc (fl. A. D. 127); *HS*, ch. 49, p. 3759.
11. *HS*, ibid. Note that the passage does not appear in the biography of Ch'ao Ts'o in SC, translated by Watson (Records, 1, 527 - 531).
12. *HS*, ch. 24A, p. 2011. See Nancy L. Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China* (Princeton, 1950), p. 147.
13. *HS*, ch. 49, p. 3759 and ch. 24A, p. 2011.
14. SC, ch. 48, p. 3.
15. Note that Meng K'angc acknowledged the existence of the Ch'ao Ts'o-Ying Shao interpretation: "Some say that it is merely that in the earlier levy they took [those on] the left of it" (i. e., of the gate). *HS*, ch. 49, p. 3759.
16. It is not true to say, as does Haenisch (p. 81), that the Chinese dictionaries and commentators on the Han shu provide no explanation of *lü-tso*. However, modern dictionaries do tend to present in full only the interpretations of the Shih chi passage, omitting the conflicting views expressed in the commentary on the *Han shu*, presumably because the Shih chi is the earlier text (but irrespective of the dates of the commentaries on the two texts). See *Tz'u hai* and *Dai kanwa piten*, s. v. Hu Han-hsing d quotes the passage from *Ch'ao Ts'o* as well as the So-yin commentary on the Shih chi; see *Tz'u-chih t'ung-chien e* (punctuated ed., 2nd printing, 4 vols., Peking, 1957), p. 254.
17. *HS*, *ch.* 31, pp. 3231 - 3232 and *SC*, *ch.* 48, pp. 2 and 3.
18. *SC*, *ch.* 48, pp. 6 - 7.
19. Haenisch's "bei Offizieren und Soldaten beliebt ist" (p. 73) fits the general context nicely, but appears un—tenable on grammatical grounds.
20. SC, ch. 48, p. 4 and *HS*, ch. 31, p. 3232. Haenisch (p. 73) is wide of the mark here.
21. *HS*, ch. 31, p. 3233, quoted by Wang Hsien-ch'ien. The Tz'u hai editors appear to have followed Shen without assigning credit; see s. v. kou huo hu ming f.
22. See comment of Yao Fang quoted by Takigawa, SO, ch. 48, p. 6; the Japanese version in Shiki kokujikaih, 4, 262 (*in Kanseki kokujikai zensho* i, Waseda University, this vol. d. Tokyo, 1919); and Haenisch, p. 74. Notte also that the parallel text gives kou J (Yao Fan g, loc. cit., and HS, ch. 31, p. 3233).
23. HS, ch. 31, p. 3234. Cf. Haenisch, p. 74: "Konige und Fürsten, Minister und Feldherren, wie? [sic] haben sie etwa eine Rasse fürsich?"
24. "What you ordain" is chosen deliberately to avoid the ambiguity of "your ordinance." The parallel text

(HES, ch. 31, p. 3234) gives ling k instead of *ming*, but this difference cannot be assumed to be meaningful.

25. *HS*, *ch.* 31, p. 3234 and SC, ch. 48, p. 7.
26. Haenisch, p. 74. His emendation is faulty in one detail, owing to his use of a Manchu edition in which the *Shih chi's shou* is emended to pa chih (p. 81, n. 17). But *pa* should not substitute for *shou*; both are present in the *Han shu* text and (with ping restored following the *Han shu* and Takigawa) both are necessary for the completion of the sense.
27. N. b. the gloss lüeh of Li Ch'i m, quoted both by Ssu-ma Chen and Yen Shih-ku (*SC*, *ch.* 48, pp. 7-8; *HS*, *ch.* 31, p. 3235. Presumably hsün is used here in the sense of its homophone hsün n.
28. See SC, ch. 7, pp. 2-3, with commentaries of P'ei Yin o and Ssu-ma Chen; also Chavannes, *Les memoires historiques de Se-ma Ts'ien*, 2, 122 and 247.
29. See cases of *yüeh* in SC, ch. 7, pp. 4, 5, and 6.
30. *SC*, *ch.* 7, p. 28.
31. See SC, ch. 7, p. 28; ch. 7 and *ch.* 8, passim.
32. See the General Introduction (1, 6-7).
33. *SC*, *ch.* 7, p. 29.
34. SC, ch. 7, p. 30.
35. *SC*, *ch.* 7, p. 52.
36. Mem. hist, 2, 300; text in *SC*, ch. 7, p. 52.
37. *SC*, *ch.* 7, pp. 53-54.
38. Ibid., p. 54
39. Ibid., pp. 54 and 60.
40. Ibid., p. 71.
41. Ibid., p. 73.
42. *SC*, *ch.* 110, pp. 12 and 16.
43. See *Kuo-yü tz'u-tien*, s. v. [ ] p and [ ]q and *Chung-hua ta-tzu-tien*, s. v. [ ] q. The latter work gives a fairly full explanation based on the Ku-chin yiln-huir and a gloss on the *Han shu* text.
44. *SC*, *ch.* 110, p. 21.
45. Ibid., p. 26. Note that Chinese scholars typically speak of "Po-teng Mountain" (Chang Shou-chieh 8, ibid; also *Ku-chin ti-ming ta-tz'u-tien*, s. v. *Po-teng shan*). Po-teng was also the name of a river flowing from this region (ibid.). These facts make "peak" an unlikely interpretation of *teng*.
46. See Dubs' note on the siege of Kao-tsu by the Hsiung-nu, where more is said of the stratagem which lifted the siege (*The History of the Former Han Dynasty*, 1, 116-117).
47. SC, ch. 7, p. 30.
48. Compare chüeh t, chüeh u, and ch'üeh v and see explanations of chileh t quoted in *Tz'u hai*. Note also comment of Hu San-hsing d quoted by Takigawa, *SC*, loc. cit.
49. See *SC*, ch. 110, p. 24.
50. See, inter alia, Chavannes, *Me'moires historiques*, 1, lxvii; Ware, *TP*, 30 (1933), 108-110 and 34 (1938), 174-178; Dubs, TP, 33 (1937), 1-14. To these may be added the more recent opinions of Kao Chu-hslln, CAJ, 5 (1959—1960), 222 and E. Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China (2 vols., Leiden, 1959), pp. 21 and 324-325. Shiratori strongly opposed the identification of the Hsiung-nu "golden man" as a Buddhist image; see his article "On the Territory of the Hsiung-nu Prince Hsiu-t'u Wang and His Metal Statues for Heaven Worship," *Memoirs of the Research Dept. of the Toyo Bunko*, 5

(1930), 1 - 77 (esp. pp. 25 - 36). Note, however, that his statement that Pelliot "once adopted the theory" (i. e., of the golden man as a Buddhist image) seriously misrepresents the French master's position. The position originally adopted by Pelliot was that of Chavannes and others who opposed this identification; he subsequently wrote "je serais aujourd'hui moins affirmatif"—a far cry from accepting the identification! See *BEFEO*, 3 (1903), 98 and 6 (1906), 392 - 393. (Shiratori only says that Pelliot "admitted" or "allowed" the Buddhist image interpretation in the Japanese version of his article. See *Miyake hakushi koki shukuga kinen rombunshu* w [Tokyo, 1929], p. 270.) I do not find other statements of Pelliot's views on this point. For what it is worth, there is the argument *ex silenrtio*: Pelliot often expressed his own opinions concerning articles in *T'oung Pao* with which he disagreed, and there appears to be no comment on this subject in connection with the articles of Ware and Dubs. For other scholars who have opposed the interpretation of the golden man as a Buddhist image, see Pelliot, *BEFEO*, 6 (1906), 393; Zürcher, p. 325; and Shiratori's English text, p. 34.

51. For example, the translation of Haenisch (n. 8 above). See other translations, in addition to those of Chavannes, which appear in the *Preliminary List of Translations from the Shih chi* circulated recently by Dr. T. Pokora (Prague, 1961). To these can now be added E. Gaspardone's "Sseu-ma Siang-jou chez les Barbares," Sinologica, 6 (1961), 145 - 170. This translation, in which portions of *Shih chi* 117 are compared with parallel recensions in the *Han shu* and the Wen hsiian, might have been of great value to Dr. Watson in his rendering of Ssu-ma Hsiang-ju's biography (2, 297 - 342).
52. It is instructive to consider those works of synthesis for the general reader in which the forms of scholar—ship are inconspicuously maintained as needed, e. g., the *Bibliotheque de Diffusion* of the Musee Guimet (including the *Melanges posthumes of Maspero*) or M. Gernet's recent La vie quotidienne en Chine (Paris, 1959).
53. Tacitus: *The Annals of Imperial Rome*, trans. by Michael Grant, Penguin Books, 1961. Both quotations and paraphrase from p. 24.
54. Robert Graves, The Anger of Achilles, London, 1960, p. xxxii.
55. Hugh Lloyd-Jones, The Listener, 1960, p. 584.
56. Andre Bonnard, *Greek Civilization*. Vol. 3: From Euripides to Alexcandria, trans. by R. C. Knight (Lon-don, 1961), p. 201. Perhaps responsibility for the grotesque up-dating of this epithet, certainly its idio—matic English, must be laid at the door of Knight rather than Bonnard.
57. *The New English Bible*. Oxford and Cambridge University Presses, 1961. Matt., II, 2, 5, 17; III, 2, 14, 15; IV, 3, 7, 17.
58. In addition to the inadequate explanations in the notes already mentioned, scores of others might be cited. Among the conspicuous omissions are brief descriptions of books, e. g., the classics. Thus there are eight index entries for the *Book of Changes* and sixteen for *the Spring and Autumn Annals*; in neither case is the work in question ever described, nor are references to the descriptions of others provided. So also with men, e. g., Chang Ch'ien and Tung Chung-shu; the works of Hirth, O. Franke, and K. Woo are ignored. The general reader is left entirely in the dark by this treatment.

a 富贵　b 燕雀　c 鸿鹄　d 司马贞　e 颜师古　f 黄鹄　g 鹏　h 闾左

【延伸阅读】

[1] Wai-lim Yip. *Diffusion of Distances: Dialogues between Chinese and Western Poetics*. Berkeley, California: The University of California Press, 1993.

[2] Pauline Yu. *The Reading of Imagery in the Chinese Poetic Tradition*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

[3] *Shih-shuo Hsin-yu: A New Account of Tales of the World*. Richard B. Mather (trans.). Ann Arbor The University of Michigan Press, 2002.

[4] Ma, Y. W., & Lau, Joseph S. M. *Traditional Chinese Stories: Themes and Variations*. (ed.). New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

[5] Edward L. Shaughnessy (trans.). *I Ching: The Classic of Change*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1996.

[6] Richard John Lynn (trans.). *The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

[7] Cutter, R. J., & Crowell, W. G. *Empresses and Consorts: Selections from Chen Shou's Records of the Three States with Pei Songzhi's Commentary*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999.

[8] Eugene Eoyang. Waley or Pound? The Dynamics of Genre in Translation. *Tamkang Review* 19, nos. 1-4(Autume 1998—Summer 1989), 441-465.

[9] Burton Watson (tran.). *Records of the Grand Historian: Han Dynasty I, II*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.

【问题与思考】

1. 中国古典诗歌和西方诗歌之间的差异表现在哪些方面？这些差异对翻译有哪些影响？

2. 叶威廉认为在中国古典诗歌的英译中应如何保持前者的“原生态”？

3. 马瑞志把《世说新语》中的口语体表达分为几种？各自的翻译方法是什么？

4. 语境在口语体表达的翻译中所起的作用有哪些？

5. 英汉哲学概念的差异对概念翻译有何影响？这些影响表现在哪些方面？

6. 安乐哲对“天命之谓性，率性之谓道，修道之谓教”的两个英译文是如何展开比较的？有无信服力？

7.《易经》英译的语境化处理方式是如何体现的？

8.《易经》有哪些特殊的文本形态？在翻译中如何充分还原它的这种文本性？

9. 译者翻译《三国志》选择了裴松之注疏，是否有违翻译的忠实原则？典籍翻译中选择注疏应当有一定的原则吗？

10. 对于“汉学式翻译”方法，文中提到西方学者有不同的看法，你如何看待典籍翻译中的这种方法？

第三章　汉籍英译名家研究

导　论

中国古代典籍的英译史可以追溯到明清时期，尤其是自清朝开始各个时期都有汉籍英译的名家出现。从理雅各到韦利，从韦利到霍克斯，再到刘殿爵、安乐哲等。这些翻译名家致力于中国哲学、文学等经典的英译工作，把中国古代经典中的核心内容进行英译，介绍到西方去，同时也不断重译经典，将对经典文本的不同理解以及不同侧面展现给西方读者，也为西方的汉学、中国学的建立和发展提供了文献准备。

汉语典籍的英译者有着各自的文化身份。像理雅各就是以传教士身份对中国典籍进行英译的，他的翻译活动有着宗教色彩。但是后来他的传教士的文化身份色彩慢慢淡化，逐渐转变为学者型翻译者，最后成为了牛津大学教授，可以说是汉学研究的先驱人物。而后来从事汉籍英译的翻译家大多执教于大学，文化身份以学者、教授为多，并且他们的翻译工作多伴随对中国哲学、文学、历史的研究。译者的文化身份还有侧重性的一面，即有的是以译入语作为母语的译者，在翻译中肩负的任务是将译出语文化译介到自己的文化之中；还有就是以译出语为母语的译者，具有这种文化身份的译者所肩负的任务是把自己的母语文化译入到异质性文化当中。这两种文化身份的翻译者各有优势也各有弱项。前者的优势体现在翻译的表达过程，而后者的优势则体现在翻译的理解过程。

汉语典籍的英译者还有一个身份，那就是过程身份。译者的主体性体现在翻译的各个阶段。在对原文的诠释阶段，翻译者的主体性体现在诠释者的身份上面，而当翻译者付诸译入语的表达时其身份则是一个表达者或修辞者的身份。这两种身份的修养以及在整个翻译过程中的完美对接是翻译质量的必要保证。当然，当翻译者完成了翻译过程而面对自己的译文时，译者又转变成了鉴赏者或批评者的身份，需要间离自己的译作而对其有一个公正、客观的评价。

汉语典籍的英译者的主体性身份是多重的，至少是双重的。从文化身份上来讲，一个译者既可以是翻译者，同时也可以是哲学、文学或史学的专门研究者。文化身份的多重性是典籍翻译者的必要条件。多方面的相关素养或学养是翻译质量的保证。这种主体身份的多重性还体现在整个翻译过程中：翻译者在实施翻译的各个阶段，既是阐释者也是表达者，既是读者也是批评者。翻译者只有协调好这些主体性身份才可以臻达理想的翻译境界。

选　文

选文一　Nineteen Century Ruist Metaphysical Terminology and the Sino-Scottish Connection in James Legge's Chinese Classics

Lauren Pfister

导　言

本文选自 Michael Lackner 同 Natascha Vittinghoff 主编的 *Mapping Meanings: The Field of New Learning in Late Qing China* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 615-638。

费乐仁(Lauren Pfister)现任香港浸会大学宗教及哲学系教授,兼任该校林思齐东西方研究中心、香港中文大学中国哲学与文化研究中心研究员等,研究领域集中在西方传教士的汉学研究,尤以对理雅各的研究最为著名,著有 *Striving for "The Whole Duty of Man": James Legge* (1815—1897) *and the Scottish Protestant Encounter with China* 等专著,目前担任《理雅各著作选编》(8 至 10 卷)的主编工作。

这里所选取的费乐仁的文章主要探讨了理雅各对中国古代哲学典籍的翻译活动。理雅各在 19 世纪中期以传教士的身份来到中国。这位濡染了虔诚的公里教会家庭氛围的苏格兰人,同时也受到了苏格兰哲学的熏陶。当时的知识分子很多都是牧师,对休姆激进经验主义和怀疑主义中的"人类信仰的基本法则"和"人类理性的基本元素"予以了重新认识。感知不是由"内在观念"调整的。相反,这些感知是体现性的自发事件,导致了关于事物是其基本特性的内在判断。对随意关系的敏感、有一个外在的世界这一事实、基本的人类价值和关系义务贯穿于人们在社会与自然环境的复杂和前理性的参与之中。在共持的信仰中有一个基本的取向,这个取向被广泛地接受,尽管不为真。理雅各试图在中国文本中寻找阐释的原则,他认为只要有了理解的基本原则,对文本的阐释就是合理的。理雅各在对中国经典文本的英译中就使用中国哲学的阐释原则,这为他的翻译找到了理论支撑。理雅各带到中国的是一套哲学和神学观念,这些观念具有灵活性和应用性,藉此建立了文化之间共同的理解基础。

选文主要从三个方面展开对理雅各翻译活动的研究:他是如何处理儒家精神世界的元素和各个方面的;他在面对内在于儒家思想的宇宙论时遭遇到了哪些困难;他是如何通过对"道"的不同译法将道家思想置入新亚里士多德哲学的概念框架中的。理雅各利用他所出版的文本的不同部分,这些文本包括译本、序言、译注以及译本之后的具有词典形态的词汇表,以便探讨不同的译文,表明了他在相关问题上的苏格兰实在论观念,指出中文文本中的歧义之处。同时,还揭示了他对形而上观念的评价和情感。理雅各的翻译不是被动的,他会借助对原文中的观点的质疑来宣导自己的哲学或神学观点。例如,孟子认为经过修养人可以达

到"圣人"的境界,但在理雅各看来这是万难做到的。文章还专门谈到了理雅各对"道"这一中国核心哲学范畴的处理方式。理雅各根据"道"在文本中出现的不同语境予以了不同的翻译。在文章作者看来,理雅各为了实现翻译的准确性而牺牲掉了"道"这个范畴所本来具有的原初的转喻色彩。他还喜欢用诸如 principles 和 duties 这样的范畴来作为"道"的对译词,这些词语具有浓重的苏格兰实在主义色彩。这样一来,就把"道"所具备的"在世"的存在论色彩给抹去了。

1. Legge's Hermeneutic Environment: Scottish Realism

What James Legge (1815—1897) brought with him to the southeast China coastline in 1843, when he moved the Anglo-Chinese College (*Yinghua shuyuan* 英华书院, 1818—1856, 1920—) from Malacca into the newly created colony of Hong kong, was more than an educational institution. His mind was infused with an evangelical Christian conviction self-consciously taken up as his own way to live dutifully in the world, one fully adopted only after he had graduated at the age of 20 with a Master's degree from King's college in Aberdeen. In fact, Legge had grown up in a pious Congregational home in northeastern Scotland and had absorbed many influences from his eldest brother's theological reflections as well as the prevailing Scottish philosophy of his day.[1] In the latter case, philosophical reflections among Scottish intellectuals, many being ministers in the state-supported Presbyterian church of Scotland, had provided an articulate response to the radical empiricism and skepticism of David Hume (1711—1776), by means of a reconsideration of the "fundamental laws of human belief" and the "primary elements of human reason." Though highly rational and imbued with methodological thoroughness inherited from Aristotelian ways of thinking, the basic tenets of this Scottish school set out to reconceive the way in which human beings come to know the world.

In ways that were very much the epistemological accounts later extrapolated in the early twentieth century by Gabriel Marcel (1889—1973), Thomas Reid (1710—1796) and his nineteenth century followers claimed that sensations were not mediated by "innate ideas" as assumed and presented in the English philosophies of John Locke (1632—1704) and George Berkeley (1683—1753) and the Scottish empiricism of Hume; rather, they were spontaneous events of embodiment which led to inherent judgments about the basic nature of the way things are. Sensitivities to casual relationships, the fact that there is an external world, and the generality of certain basic human values and relational duties all come through this complex and pre-rational engagement of people in their social and natural environments. Not assuming an analytical stance as the most fundamental position of a person in the world, even though logical analysis of mental phenomena may help philosophers to bring out new understandings to the nature of mental powers, these Scottish realists argued that there was

a basic orientation in commonly held beliefs that was generally acceptable if not actually true, recognizably related to certain basic experiences of persons within their lifeworlds. The judgments relying on this orientation to one's lifeworld are graded into various degrees of truth values, some being "certain, others such as are probable, in various degrees, from the highest probability to the lowest." Beliefs derived from spontaneous sensate experience then could carry weight as "contingent truth" or be identified in a few very significant cases as related to "necessary truths."[2] Here, then, was an account of human ways in the world that appealed to "common sense" as a justifiable orienting factor in human experiences, and one that could also account for differences in beliefs and beliefs systems in various places among different people. This was done without appeal to a faculty psychology which Immanuel Kant (1724—1804) had already worked out in continental Europe in the late eighteenth century, but which Scottish philosophers did not know well until the 1850s, when Kant's system and transcendental method began to overshadow their own alternative approach to the nature of the mind, sensations and beliefs.[3]

So, for example, the pain of gout in a big toe not only "informs" me in a passive manner that there is pain, but also simultaneously presents to consciousness the concomitant and positive "belief" that "my toe" exists in the world as part of "my body." This is a general state of my being-in-the-world, and though sensations of this sort may occasionally be untrue due to unusual circumstances (a post-amputation relapse into feeling what is a no-longer-existent limb, for example), these false impressions can be analyzed, corrected, and made understandable to "common sense."

This was of particular significance to the young Legge's own orientation to a complex nineteenth century world with its diverse beliefs, giving him a means to unravel a number of major problems which restrained him from embracing Christian faith until the year following his graduation from King's Colleges in 1835. As he also learned from these Scottish realists, there were "first principles" of necessary truths which provided a basic orientation to the nature of grammar, logic, mathematics, aesthetic taste, morality and metaphysics. So, Legge's will to search for hermeneutic principles within the Chinese texts he investigated was certainly motivated by this pre-understanding that these were basic principles of understanding which would lead to reasonable and justifiable interpretations of any text. Consequently, his highlighting of a hermeneutic principle located in the *Mencius* by placing it on the flyleaf of each volume of the *Chinese Classics* was itself a self-conscious affirmation that evidence of the recognition of these first principles in logic and interpretation did exist in the Ruist scholarly world.[4] In the moral realm, relational "duties" involved a very strong assertion of the inherent rightness of filial affection between brothers and parental care for children, reflecting sentiments justified by Scottish realist arguments that were remarkably parallel to very similar values in Ruist-informed world-views in the late Qing dynasty.[5] In the metaphysical realm, there were explicit arguments related to the existence of deity in the highest sense (among a number of other issues), providing extensive arguments relating to

the distinction between natural and special revelation. These were worked out in great detail by Dugald Stewart (1753—1828), making possible under the rubric of "natural theology" a very articulate account of various conceptualizations of spiritual and divine categories reached or dictated by unaided human reason.[6] It was this account that had been particularly helpful to Legge in extending theological discussions into the realms of comparative religious investigations, and apparently had a role in leading him to convictions about the reality of divine "special revelation" which he embraced as a Christian.

As a consequence, Legge brought with him to the Chinese continent a set of philosophical and theological orientations that provided a particularly flexible and utilizable method for seeking out common understandings and for sensing areas where there were conflicts in general beliefs supported by Christian and Ruist worldviews. It is this orientation which guided Legge in his studies of the Ruist canon, investigations initiated in earnest in the early 1840s; he employed it as he studied the texts and their commentaries, all used to prepare his lectures to students at the Anglo-Chinese College in Hong Kong from 1844 to 1856. Only after this account of thorough immersion in the Ruist scriptures and their commentarial traditions did Legge initiate the translations which would lead to the publication of the first of eight tomes of the *Chinese Classics* in 1861.

2. Fusion and Confusion? Legge's Rederings of Ruist Metaphysical Terms

Having understood the hermeneutic pre-understandings influencing Legge's approach to the massive and life-long project of translating the whole of the Ruist canonical literature, we can now move directly into discussing a few major instances of his renderings of Ruist metaphysical terminology. The focus of our subsequent discussions will be placed on:

(a) Legge's handling of elements and dimensions of the Ruist spiritual world;

(b) The apparent troubles he faced in seeking to make sense of the organismic cosmology inherent in and undergirding Ruist accounts of human beings; and

(c) His multiform rendering of the term, *dao* 道, which manifests numerous points where Scottish realist principles informed translations and so reshaped a "daological" universe into a Neo-Aristoteilian conceptual framework.

In pursuing these particular areas of metaphysical terminology, we are consciously attempting to reveal how Legge's Scottish realism and Non-conformist theology informed and influenced his search for conceptual equivalents between Ruist and Christian worldviews. In addition, we will show how these ways of thinking guided him in locating, explaining, and evaluating the nature of general beliefs held among scholarly Chinese commentator which were drawn from their interpretations of the Ruist scriptures. Furthermore, we will seek to show how Legge employed the potentials of different dimensions of his published texts—the translations themselves, his prolegomena, the commentarial notes beneath the translations,

and his inchoate classical dictionaries at the back of each volume—to explore alternative renderings, indicate his Scottish realist judgments on certain issues, point out ambiguities in various Chinese passages, and express his own evaluations and emotions in facing some of the more difficult metaphysical conceptions which taxed his Scottish Christian view of reality in general and his understanding of Chinese beliefs in particular. We will argue that while Legge was a remarkably sensitive translator and interpreter in numerous areas, he failed to provide an adequate account of the organismic cosmology inherent in both Ruist and Daoist worldviews. So, while opening a door for Christian apologetics in the realm of natural theological discoveries within the Ruist canonical literature, in other areas his translations actually limited the access to readers of one of the major ways Ruist scholarship interpreted their ancient scriptures.

2.1 God, Ruist Pneumatology, and Legge's Account of Levels of Ruist Spirituality

It is clear that by 1852 Legge had already become convinced by his own study of Ruist scriptures and their commentators (including some Roman Catholic secondary sources) that *shangdi* 上帝 was the best way to translate the words *theos* and "*elohim* in the biblical texts. The debate and its long term importance has been worked out elsewhere, and so will not be repeated here."[7]

Subordinate to the "Lord on High" (*shangdi*) were a number of spiritual beings, all generally categorized as *shen* 神 or *guishen* 鬼神. Their presence in the texts of the Ruist scriptures in general were undeniable, even in spite of the serious problem that in one important passage in the *Analects* Master Kong[8] (551 B. C. —479 B. C.) was described as not having discussed matters related to these *shen*.[9] In his notes to this passage, Legge indicates how Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130—1200) and Wang Su 王肃 (195—256) both identify *shen* with activities of a mysterious sort which were comprehensively and collectively associated with "ghosts and spirits" (*guishen*).[10] So, whether or not Master Kong actually lectured on them or not, the question would be to understand what was portrayed in any "activities of a mysterious sort" that were regularly associated with spiritual beings in other places within Ruist scriptures.

In the *Zhongyong* 中庸 there is a place where the Chinese sage is recorded as having taught the following lessons about spiritual beings:

> How abundantly do spiritual beings (*guishen*) display the powers that belong to them? We look for them, but do not see them; we listen to them (locate them), but do not hear them; yet they enter into all things, and there is nothing without them. They cause all the people in the kingdom to fast and purify themselves, and array themselves in their richest dresses, in order to attend at their sacrifices. Then, like overflowing water, they seem to be over the heads (*ru zai qi shang* 如在其上), and on the right and left (*ru zai qi zuoyou* 如在其左右) of their

worshipers.[11]

Such a straightforward explanation provides a firm foundation for Ruist pneumatology. Here we not only have this particular account of how spirits act and influence human behavior, it also includes specific details that go far beyond a shamanist invitation of spirits into a medium for the sake of divination. Rather, it suggests that these spirits promote human rituals appropriate to the recognition of their existence, their powers of blessing, and the roles which specific humans must assume in various kinds of ritual contexts. Spirits were part of the harmonious universe in which humans could take a specific ritual position of respectful propriety, interacting with them by means of physical symbols just as the spirits engaged them on spiritual planes.

Far more significant in this context is the interpretive malaise Legge experienced in deciding how to translate the phrase *guishen*. In his notes to the first passage mentioned in the *Zhongyong* above, Legge discusses at length the meaning of the phrase and decides at the very end that "in the text (here) they blend together, and are not to be separately translated. They are together equivalent to 神 (*sh*en)."[12] Yet when he reveals the metaphysical discussions related to this phrase in the Song Ruist traditions, citing passages from Zhu Xi, the Cheng 程 brothers,[13] and Zhang Zai 张载 (1020—1077), Legge finds himself unable to accept their attempts at unifying images of the yin-yang forces and a universe united by means of "the two breaths of nature" with the *guishen*. He concludes with an air of frustration: "It is difficult—not to say impossible—to conceive in one's self exactly what is meant by such descriptions." In explanations prepared by the Qing scholar Mao Qiling 毛奇龄 (1623—1716), Legge found more understandable beliefs where the *guishen* were equated with the *dao*: they "are the 道 (*dao*), embodied in Heaven (*ti tian* 体天) for the nourishment of things."[14] While adding critical remark to this statement, Legge is apparently not fully conceived by Mao Qiling's interpretation of these metaphysical issues. What Mao is essentially presenting is an organismic universe, one in which different dimensions of the spiritual world interact with material realms for the sake of their "nourishment." If this is the case, then from the Ruist point of view human beings would have a heightened potential to engage and interact with these spiritual beings, perhaps even to the point of taking on qualities normally associated with them.

2.2 Ruist Anthropology: Tracing the Transformative Possibilities of Humans

This function of spirits—the nourishment of human beings by means of spiritual embodiment—is in fact a part of the scriptural teachings of the Ruist canon Legge did know, but it was here that his own Christian world view began to feel very uncomfortable. Where it is stated in the *Zhongyong* that the "most entirely sincere" person (*zhi cheng* 至诚) may come to the point of "assisting the transforming and nourishing powers of Heaven and Earth" so that he may "form a ternion with these two powers," Legge demurs. It is an

"extravagance" not truly descriptive of a more limited human nature.[15] When the same kind of person is described in a subsequent passage as one "like a spirit" (*ru shen* 如神), Legge let loose a blast of Scottish "common sense," revealing his own comparative religious hierarchy of spiritual experiences, and so resisting any attempt to place the image into a more reasonable light:

> The whole chapter is eminently absurd, and gives a character of ridiculousness to all the magniloquent teaching about "entire sincerity." The foreknowledge attributed to the Sage—the mate of Heaven—is only a guessing by means of augury, sorcery, and other follies.[16]

Though this could be read as a point where Legge temporarily lost his patience with Chinese Ru scholarship, this response would be too superficial. For Legge, the metaphysical stakes at this point were high: If humans can in some sense become divine or "like spirits," then there would be no need for a Christian salvation: yet his own convictions about the nature of human beings is that they were far from this kind of perfection, easily deterred into immoral and unjust behavior, and rarely if ever so gifted as to be "like a spirit." In other places Master Meng[17] has also made an even stronger claim, one which once more touched this sensitivity in Legge's beliefs, consequently prompting a rather awkward coining in English in order to avoid the awkward connection. In the *Mencius* 7B:25, there is an explicit hierarchy of cultivated human beings, starting with the "good man" and developing through stages of being "faithful, ""beautiful," and "great" to the point where they are recognized as "sages" or "sagely" (*sheng* 圣). But this is not the last stage: one further transformation is possible. Legge offers the following rendering: "When the stage is beyond our knowledge, he is what is called a spirit-man."[18] The final term, however, is *shen*, "a spirit" or "spiritual." In an organismic cosmology such as the one promoted here. This kind of transformative development would be feasible because the basic nature of all things is the same.[19] Legge, however, could not conceive of this cosmology as being true, and so addressed the problem directly and thoroughly in his attached comments:

> 圣而不可知之之谓神, ("what is sagely and we cannot know it, this is called divine")—with this we may compare what is said in the Doctrine of the Mean (*Zhongyong*), 至诚如神, "the individual possessed of the most complete sincerity is like a spirit." In the critical remarks in the 四书合讲 (*Sishu hejiang*, *Combined Commentaries and Paraphrases to the Four Books*), it is said, indeed, that the expression in the text is stronger than that there, but the two are substantially to the same effect. Some would translate 神 (*shen*) by "divine," a rendering which it never can admit of, and yet, in applying to man the term appropriate to the actings and influence of Him whose way is in the sea, and His judgments a great deep, Chinese writers derogate from the prerogatives of God.[20]

While recognizing the error of interpreting *shen* in too high a manner, Legge here

nevertheless is unable to accept any possibility that a human being may take on the characteristics these Ruist scriptures claim for them. By means of the oblique gloss from the Psalms and Proverbs, where the sea remained a symbol of the unfathomable, something clearly beyond rational comprehension, Legge argues that human beings are necessarily limited in their abilities to achieve these kind of things. In fact, Legges's sensitivities also could have cited other passages within the Ruist scriptures to indicate a point of tension within various texts of their own canonical literature. He had previously translated in the *Zhongyong* another passage which clearly stated:

> Common men and women, however ignorant, may intermeddle with the knowledge of (the way of the superior man); yet in its utmost reaches, there is that which even the sage does not know. Common men and women, however much below the ordinary standard of character, can carry it into practice; yet in its utmost reaches, there is that which even the sage is not able to carry into practice. [21]

Legge's note to this passage, once more struggling to find an overall coherence for the Ruist placement of human beings in the midst of Heaven and Earth, illustrates again his battle with the implications of an organismic cosmology in which humans can reach heights equivalent to spirits.

> ... I confess to be all at sea in the study of this paragraph, Chu (Zhu Xi), quotes from the scholar Hau (侯氏), that what the superior man fails to know was exemplified in Confucius's having to ask about ceremonies and offices, and what he fails to practice was exemplified in Confucius not being on the throne, and in Yao and Shun's being dissatisfied that they could not make every individual enjoy the benefits of their rule. He adds his own opinion, that what men complained of in Heaven and Earth, was the partiality of their operations in overshadowing and supporting, producing and completing, the heat of summer, the cold of winter, etc. If such things were intended by the writer, we can only regret the vagueness of his language, and the want of coherence in his arguments. [22]

In this response, Legge is critizing Zhu Xi's interpretation of the passage, suggesting that Zhu Xi had missed the real point which is in Legge's mind more obvious and practical. Certainly, as in the case of the other person's comments Zhu cited, there would be historical and institutional matters that any person would not necessarily know, and so they would have to be learned by inquiry; in addition, one could be disappointed in not being able to fulfill what one felt destined to accomplish. But these specific examples miss what for Legge would seem to be more generalizable: humans, even at their greatest heights of understanding and strength, still cannot do all that is ideally placed before them. Interpretations which avoid this implication, a matter bound up with the ontic and daological nature of humans in and of themselves, would appear in Legge's mind to have missed the

point.

But if this is in fact the case, Legge continues to inquire, why would such "extravagant" sayings be made about Master Kong as the "universal sage" at the end of the *Zhongyong*? In Legge's sight these involved contradictions of the first principles of understanding about the human mind and human actions, and so he could only point out the inconsistencies which he felt obliged to indicate, and persist in arguing that even in some of the texts of the ancient Ruist traditions themselves it could be suggested that humans were less powerful and potentially transformable than the highest Ruist ideas would permit.

2.3 Revealing Dimensions of the *Dao* by means of Scottish Realist Principles

One of the most challenging terms to render into English is the *dao*, partly because of its diverse meanings, but mostly because of the metaphysical fecundity of its employment in all the major Chinese traditions. In his dictionary entry for the term *dao* at the end of the first volume of the *Chinese Classics*, Legge summarized the renderings of the term under two major categories: (1) a road, a path; (2) doctrines, principles, teachings.[23] In fact, however, within this first volume of the *Chinese Classics* there are many more tropes for *dao*, some of which are full of significance for us after having investigated Legge's handling of some other major metaphysical terms in the Ruist canonical vocabulary.

Illustrating the thoroughness of a fine scholar and considerate translator, we can follow Legge in all the places where the term *dao* portrayed some rather mundane meanings: *dao* can be a physical "road"[24] and a general "course"[25] of life; it can simply to "speak"[26] or can refer to the act of "leading" or "ruling" over others.[27] Only in a few cases was it used with other meanings not always clearly explained.[28] In the *Zhongyong* it appears many times as the "path", but this is a metaphysical figure of speech with another meaning which we will clarify further on.[29]

Though there is at least one occasion when Legge renders the terms as "practical courses,"[30] and so reflects other times when he recognizes that it determines what is "characteristic" of a certain way of acting and living[31], the more significant tropes to reveal the imprint of Scottish realism on Legge's translation vocabulary occur in passages dealing with Ruist politics, moral and ethical situations, and places where an ultimate concern are expressed by this term.

With regard to the political realm, when the general phrases *you dao* 有道 and *wudao* 无道 appear, Legge often renders these as "when good government prevails" or "when the kingdom is well-governed" in parallel with "when bad government prevails" or "when the kingdom is ill-governed."[32] But in other contexts he shifts his rendering to reflect the Neo-Aristotelian terminology: "when right principles prevail," "when right principles are prostrated" as well as simply "principled" versus "unprincipled" conditions.[33] Because these passages often occur in tandem within the same saying, it is clear at this point that Legge used reference to "principles" as a briefer way to specify actions that displayed proper

political judgment. Here the metonymic power of the symbol, *dao*, is lost; Legge chooses to replace it with a more direct and more narrowed reference to the rules and regulations by which these actions can be assessed.

Although there are other metaphysical ways in which the *dao* is used to describe the patterns of life of a father, of the ancient kings, and of archery[34], among the most prominent phrases in this category is the "way of the superior man"[35]. There are a few times in these texts where there are more general references to the "Way of Heaven" (*tian dao* 天道 or *tian zhi dao* 天之道), the "way of men" (*ren zhi dao* 人之道), and the "way of Heaven and Earth" (*tiandi dao* 天地道).[36] Here the translation carries over the metonymy and applies it as in the Chinese original to the person, being, or activity which it describes; this "way" has a normative force, suggesting that it not only typifies a particular role but becomes prescriptive for those who would follow it. In this sense, we can begin to see why Legge might be willing to use normative terms to augment the meaning of the single Chinese character *dao* in other contexts.

One of the ways which norms are transferred is by means of teachings, and so in the context of the Ruist emphasis on teacher and student relationships, augmented by the concern for equipping people to learn well, it is appropriate at times to see Legge render *dao* as the "doctrines," "principles" or even "institutions" of great people such as Master Kong and the ancient sage-kings.[37] With this in mind Legge stretches our sensitivities for appropriate translation when he takes the beginning phrase of the Great Learning and offers it as "What the Great Learning teaches is ... " when it would read more literally "The way of the Great Learning is ... ".[38]

While these turns of language are generally accepted or acceptable, it is in the contexts where Legge feels obliged to reveal the normal, ethical, and axiological dimensions of the *dao* that his philosophical heritage becomes intimately bound up in a more complex hermeneutic act of translation. Sometimes Legge portrayed the dao as the "proper way" or the "upright way," other times as "their duties" when the possessive pronoun was present (*qi dao* 其道).[39] A stronger feeling is produced when the *dao* is called the "right way," simply "what is right," or pluralized as "true principles."[40] The height of this moralized or ethicized *dao* is expressed in Legge's phrase, the "path of duty" or "the rule," but also much more emphatically in the *Zhongyong* as "THE PATH," the "universal path" (*tianxia zhi da dao* 天下之达道) or, for the same phrase, "the duties of universal obligation."[41] Though context has a large impact on Legge's choices for these translation tropes, it is obvious that in these renderings he is relying on his own moral understandings and offering translation equivalents that do not attempt to portray in a simple or single metonymy the family of meaning inherent in the concept of *dao*.

At a few moments in these texts Legge is driven to use other axiological terms in order to portray what he senses in the ultimate concern of the Ruist scriptures. So when Master Kong describes his basic orientation toward life as being "set on *dao*" or his "object" being

dao, Legge transforms it to being "set on truth" and simply seeking "truth."[42] In at least one place it appears as "excellence," revealing a superlative plane of interests and concerns.[43]

What is ponderous about these moralizing and axiological tropes in Legge's portrayal of the metaphysical *dao* is that the richness of the original metonymy is lost in the precision of translation. The Scottish realist concern for "principles" and "duties" becomes his major mental scaffolding for portraying what may also include a more dynamic cosmological background. While his renderings tend to privilege the rational qualities of a person's self-conscious awareness of their obligations and rules for working out those duties in a particular role, it does not come close to offering a sense of the "course," "path," "road" or "way" which characterizes their being-in-the-world as well as their mode of existence.

Apparently this factor in his way of translating the *dao* did continue to test and tax Legge's mind, so that years later, when he was preparing a translation of the *Daodejing*, Legge returned to the problem of translating *dao*. Having been caught up in a controversy with the vituperative Herbert Giles (1845—1935), Legge carefully rethought his own approach to the *dao* within the Daoist universe of symbols, and finally suggested, in a context quite unexpected for Daoist translations, that the "*Tao*" is really not a "positive being" at all, but a "mode of being," a "phenomenon."[44] While most Daoist philosophers and religious adherents would probably find this questionable, since they are much more willing to emphasize the transcendent and "depth" dimensions of the *dao* in their own tradition, Legge obviously was struggling with a serious metaphysical matter. The *dao* of the *Daodejing* expresses itself through the invisible presence of subtle activity, while the *dao* of the Ruist scriptures is embodied in the person who "expands the *dao*," since the *dao* in and of itself does not expand the man. But it was here already in 1861 that Legge had faced a major quandary, missing the potential cosmological significance of this saying. He rendered the passage as follows: "A man can enlarge the principles which he follows; those principles do not enlarge the man." In his notes Legge was spurred to elaborate this passage. Unexpressed and yet influencing his comments was the sense that this *dao* identified with "principles" seemed so passive, a *dao* which, for him as a Christian (where the incarnate logos had also been perceptively rendered as the *dao* in John 1:1), should have an active life of its own. So he elaborated:

> PRINCIPLES OF DUTY AN INSTRUMENT OIN THE HAND OF MAN.
> This sentence is quite mystical in its sententiousness. The 翼 says:[45]—道 (*dao*) here is the path of duty, which all men, in their various relations, have to pursue, and man has the three virtues of knowledge, benevolence and fortitude, wherewith to pursue that path, and so he enlarges it. That virtue remote, occupying an empty place, cannot enlarge man, needs not to be said. That writer's account of 道 here is probably correct. and "duty unapprehended," "in an empty place," can have no effort on any man; but this is a mere truism. Duty apprehended is constantly enlarging, elevating, and energizing multitudes, who had previously been

uncognizant of it. The first clause of the chapter may be granted, but the second is not in accordance with truth. Generally, however, man may be considered as the measure of the truth in morals and metaphysics which he holds; but after all, systems of men are for the most part beneath the highest capacities of the model men, the Chun-tsze (*junzi* 君子).[46]

It is somewhat ironic that Legge at this juncture, having moralized the concept of *dao* by making it into "principles" and the "principles of duty," would feel that the "superior man" would ultimately go beyond this. What is it that completes the superior man's life? According to Master Kong, through the translation of Legge, we learn, "If a man in the morning hears the *dao*, he may die in the evening without regret."[47] Legge had the man hear "the right way," and so came very close to capturing the sense of that unseen power which could, in fact, become the defining way of shaping a Ruist's life.[48]

3. The Significance of the Sino-scottish Connection in James Legge's Translation of the Chinese Classics

As an informed Scottish and committed Christian translator of the ancient Ruist scriptures, James Legge understandably carried many aspects of his intellectual upbringing with him into his office when he worked out his translations. This is both hermeneutically expected and should be carefully assessed. A number of historians, translatologists, and cultural critics—some of the most articulate being Raymond Dawson, Eugene Chen Eoyang, and Edward Said—have claimed from their various professional viewpoints that nineteenth Christian missionaries were too intimately bound up with their own backgrounds. By this they meant that the broader interests of the missionary and cultural projects which these Christian missionary adhered to made their publications and translations nothing more than a distorted picture of the texts and cultures they studied. Eoyang directs his poignant criticism, spiced with a generally tasteful and sometimes bitter sarcasm, directly at Legge. His focus is primarily on passages related to the concept of "Heaven/heavens" (*tian* 天), where in some of Legge's translation there are errors, and in others a number of intellectual and spiritual tensions. Unlike the approach we have taken above in relating how Legge struggled with understanding and portraying an alternative form of cosmology, Eoyang criticizes the underlying Christian commitments which arise in Legge's renderings and commentaries in various portions of the *Analects* or *Lunyu* and the *State of Harmony and Equilibrium* or *Zhongyong*:[49]

(T)here is a profound ambivalence in Legge's attitude toward the Confucian tradition: to the texts themselves, so commonsensical and rational, Legge is passionately impatient; to the commentaries, so often intuitive and mystical, Legge

> is positive and skeptical ... Legge shows his largesse and views Confucius with the same indulgence and pity that Dante felt for the denizens of limbo ... Legge's compassion for Confucius reflects the magnanimity of nineteenth-century Christianity to the less fortunate, to the unbaptized ... Yet, as benighted as Legge saw Confucius to be, he was no more receptive to Neo-Confucian commentaries which did "medle-... with metaphysics." He quotes Zhu Xi's exegesis of Confucius, and rather than being inspired by it, or finding that it satisfied his penchant for "revelation," or being impressed by its efforts to answer questions relating to "the human condition and destiny," Legge is derisive ... If the commentator were Mathew and not Zhu Xi, and if instead of such phrases as "equilibrium and harmony" Legge had read "the peace that passeth all understanding," one wonders whether he would have been quite so unsympathetic.

Having made insightful criticisms of mistranslations and misdirections in some of Legge's specific renderings, Eoyang summarizes his criticisms at a higher level of ideological critique:[50]

> It is not Legge's own bias, but the bias inherent in a fundamentally Christian outlook which he could not escape, nor see objectively, that infuses his intemperate and inconsistent critiques of the Confucian canon. He saw Confucius as a false prophet, a Messiah manqué, whose practical wisdom was useful in developing moral character but whose thought would be forever mired in unbaptized and unredeemed benightedness.

While Eoyang's piercing rhetoric suggests that Legge's translation is inherently skewed, interpretatively blinded by a biased "Christian outlook" which can understand neither its own "bias" nor the "commonsensical and rational" vision of Ruist "secularism," Eoyang's own bold expression of ideological resentment carries its own ironies. Does Eoyang's monolithic characterization of "the Confucian tradition" as a "commonsensical" and "secular" present a fair and balanced account of the Ruist metaphysics involving "heaven," "ghosts and spirits," a transcendent "Way" and a spiritually informed "sageliness"? Can it adequately explain the ritual and spiritual significance of the imperial sacrifices offered in Beijing by the emperor at every equinox and solstice, dictated by the ritual scriptures of the Ruist cannon, and constantly practiced during Legge's lifetime?[51] Were there no alternative Ruist interpretations of these canonical texts and of Zhu Xi's dualistic metaphysics which struggled over the meaning of the original scriptures and decried Zhu Xi's dualism, even though it was the "orthodox standard" for canonical interpretations, as incoherent? Are the "passionately impatient" criticisms of anti-Zhu Xi scholars during the Qing dynasty such as Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619—1692), Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 (1610—1695), Yan Yuan 颜元 (1635—1704), and Dai Zhen 戴震 (1723—1777) "inherently biased" because their own Ruist monistic cosmology finds Zhu Xi's dualism philosophically incoherent?[52] Rather than projecting a

singular and inflexible "Confucian tradition" as the counterpoint to Legge's putatively vitiated method of translation, we should take the multiformity of the Ruist traditions which Legge himself addressed much more seriously. For example, would Eoyang reconsider his ideological critique of Legge's "interpretive blindness" if he knew, as Legge did in his own day, of a systematic monotheistic interpretation of the Ruist cannon by a nineteenth century Cantonese scholar-official? Legge had actually met this person, Luo Zhongfan 罗仲藩 (d. 1850), and possessed copies of his works in his own personal library.[53] Would it increase the feasibility of Legge's monotheistic preferences in translating certain passages in the Ruist scriptures if Eoyang knew that there were also major eighteenth century Korean Ruists whose monotheistic interpretations were a source for a reformist vision within that national expression of the "Confucian tradition"?[54]

These are examples of why we have tried here to understand in a more hermeneutically comprehensive manner the Scottish realism which informed Legge's translation judgments. Certainly Legge did have self-conscious commitments, ones he brought to bear on both texts and commentators. One would not expect, if Eoyang's account of Legge's "intemperate and inconsistent critiques" of Ruism is correct, that Legge, having so unselfconsciously distorted the meanings of the Ruist scriptures, would have anything insightful or positive to say at all about these texts and their traditions. Only Eoyang's interpretation of Legge can we understand, then, how Legge could refer to Mencius as a "Chinese philosopher" of equal status to one of his own country's eighteenth century Christian statesmen and philosopher, Joseph Butler?[55] Would it be possible to understand why Legge rejected as many times as he accepted the monotheistic Ruist interpretation of the *Great Learning* by Luo Zhongfan?[56] Could this position explain why Legge preferred Zhu Xi's interpretations of other texts more often than not?[57] Our approach through the Sino-Scottish connection crafted by Legge on the basis of his Scottish realist commitments makes these positive and nuanced assessments by Legge more understandable. In addition, it provides a broader hermeneutic basis for grasping why, at times, he would also reject certain concepts and commentaries within particular Ruist traditions.

We have shown in our study that metaphysical terms and concepts were in fact present within the Ruist canonical literature, and that Legge struggled with some of them because he did, feel within himself an intellectual and spiritual tension. At times, as Eoyang rightly points out, Legge found those terms and concepts unacceptable, but did this disqualify him completely as a translator? From a hermeneutically informed position, it would be more balanced to consider Legge's own context in Qing dynasty China, the interpretive options available to him, and a fuller range of translations he actually employed within these texts. In addition, we have sought to explain why, on the basis of Scottish realist philosophical principles, Legge would make judgments which strike Eoyang as "intemperate." While one can understand how Eoyang, taking up a secularist account of early Ruist philosophical traditions, would feel this way, we have strong reasons on the basis of our hermeneutic

approach to challenge his claim that Legge was "inconsistent" and blindly or unselfconsciously "biased." He was committed, but it was a self-conscious and rationally justified commitment which he gleaned from his studies in Scottish realism. His nuanced account of Ruist traditions, which Eoyang counts as a "profound ambivalence," reveals the seriousness and self-conscious effort Legge took to deal with as much of these texts and their commentaries as he could. Under these conditions, the fact that Legge changed his very negative overall assessment of "Confucius" in 1861 to a more positive critical appreciation of him in 1893 illustrates how Scottish realism also provides some of the principles he employed to reassess his justifications and guided him toward new convictions.[58]

What we have shown here is that the Sino-Scottish connection reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of Legges's renderings. It would be fairer to both the multiform Ruist traditions and Legge's numerous translations of their canonical literature to have both the weaknesses and strengths of his renderings and evaluations kept before us in a balanced perspective. He did experience these interpretive limitations, general interpretive limitations we should recognize from a hermeneutical standpoint as affecting anyone who does translating. In doing so, we may learn more about how and why Legge's translations did occasionally run into difficulties and conundrums. In addition, we might learn how he managed to avoid a number of refractory pitfalls in translation which some of his predecessors in the French Academy (especially Guilliame Pauthier) and earlier missionary translations (especially that of David Collie) did not successfully overcome.[59]

Notes:

1. Details regarding the philosophical, theological and intellectual influences on Legge and his eldest brother, George, were first discussed in my articles, see Lauren Pfister, 1990b. "Some New Dimensions in the Study of the Works of James Legge (1815—1897): Part Ⅰ," *Sino-Western Cultural Relations Journal* 12, pp. 29 - 50; id. 1991. "Some New Dimensions in the Study of the Works of James Legge (1815—1897): Part Ⅱ," *Sino-Western Cultural Relations Journal* 13, pp. 33 - 46. An intellectual biography of Legge's missionary career is being considered for publication through the Scottish Studies center of the University of Mainz. If it is feasible to publish, the work will be entitled *Pursuing the Whole Duty of Man. James Legge* (1815—1897) and *the Scottish Encounter with China*.
2. Quotations here come from William Hamilton (ed.) and Harry M. Bracken (comm.). 1967. *Thomas Reid—Philosophical works*. Vol. 1. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchlandlung, pp. 209 - 211.
3. There was an attempt in the mid-nineteenth century by the Scottish philosopher and commentator of the "Commonsense School," William Hamilton, to bridge the differences between Kant's faculty psychology and the Scottish realists' arguments for actively informing sensations against "innate ideas," but in the end this only hastened the domination of Kant's transcendentalism in the later part of the nineteenth century. Only in the later decades of the twentieth century in North American discussions of "reformed epistemology" (Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff being some of the more prominent figures in this growing discussion) does one see a new international appeal to arguments originally raised by these Scottish philosophers, particularly as they are presented in Reid's works.
4. The text came from the Mencius 5A: 4, in James Legge (tr. and comm.). 1893 (1861). *The Chinese*

Classics with a translation, critical and exegetical notes, prolegomena, and copious indexes (hereafter *CC*). Oxford: Clarendon Press, vol. 2, p. 353, and stated "(Interpreters) may not insist on one term so as to do violence to a sentence, nor on a sentence so as to do violence to the general scope. They must try with their thoughts to meet that scope and then shall apprehend it." A fuller discussion of the significance and problematic of the citing of this passage as a hermeneutic principles has been offered in my articles, "Mediating Word, Sentence and Scope without Violence: James Legge's (1815—1897) Understanding of 'Classical Confucian' Hermeneutics" in: Ching-I Tu (ed.). 2000. *Classical Interpretations. The Hermeneutic Traditions in Chinese Culture*. New Brunswick, New Jersy: Translation Press, pp. 370 - 382.

5. This was so much the case that McCosh, in his account of Thomas Brown's (1778—1820) meteoric career as a member of the Scottish Commonsense School, was upheld as a paragon of filial virtue due to his close relationship with his parents and siblings. Cf. James McCosh. 1875. *The Scottish Philosophy: Biographical, Expository, Critical, From Hutcheson to Hamilton*. London: MacMillan and Company.
6. There is a very extensive passage in Stewart's work dealing with these matters, explicitly developed because of the anti-theistic tendencies he recognized in the ideologies of the French Revolution. See these discussions and arguments in William Hamiltion (ed.). 1854. *The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart*. 11 vols. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable and Compny, vol. 7, pp. 12 - 227.
7. Legge made this explicit in his extensive writings related to the Term Controversy (the debate over how to translate "God," "spirit" and other biblical terms into Chinese written language) between 1850 and 1852, the culmination of his efforts being inscribed in his lengthy essay. *The Notions of the Chinese concerning God and Spirits: with an Examination of the Defense of an Essay, on the proper rendering of the words Elohim and Theos, into the Chinese Language*, 1852. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Register Office. His position was restated in 1877 by means of a much briefer argument and less extensive reference to original Chinese texts in a controversial work of 12 pages, *Confucianism in Relation to Christianity*, where he set forth in cogent form the basic positions which would become associated with "Leggist" accommodation strategies in Christian missiology for the last decades of the nineteenth century (James Legge. 1877. *Confucianism in Relation to Christianity*. London: Trubner and Sons). Extensions of this controversy are seen in the context of Chinese debates in 1877 in the article included here by Wong Man-kong, and in the sixth chapter of Irene Eber's recent book (Irener Eber. 1999. *The Jewish Bishop & the Chinese Bible: S. I. J. Schereschewsky* (1831—1906). Leiden: Brill, pp. 199 - 233).
8. Kongzi, "Confucius."
9. *Analects* 7:20 (*CC*1, p. 201).
10. For Legge the information gleaned from these interpretive glosses support was particularly significant, because since the late 1840s he had opposed another group of missionaries who insisted on using the term *shen* to translate the idea of the biblical "God." These glosses obviously suggested Legge's claims were correct: the meaning of the term shen was too broad to be useful in designating a unique and ultimate being.
11. *Zhongyong* 16 (*CC*1, pp. 397 - 398). Parenthetical comments and Chinese characters are added here by this author, but the italicized phrase is as in the original text.
12. See *CC*1, p. 398.
13. Cheng hao 程颢 (1030—1085) and Cheng Yi 程颐 (1033—1107).
14. See *CC*1, p. 398.
15. Zhongyong 22 (*CC*1, p. 416).

16. See comments to *Zhongyong* 24 (*CC*1, p. 418, notes, left column).
17. Mengzi, "Mencius" (ca. 372 B. C. —ca. 289 B. C.).
18. *CC*2, p. 490.
19. I have developed more thoroughly this comparative cosmological suggestion in a paper presented to the workshop on Mencius at the National University of Singapore in January 1999. See my "Why the Demophilic cannot be Democratic and what might make it so: Reconstructing 'Moral Humans' in Mater Meng's Philosophy," in Alan Chan and Jiuan Heng (eds.). 2002. *Mencius: Context and Interpretation*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
20. *CC*2, p. 490 - 491.
21. *Zhongyong* 12 (*CC*1, p. 392).
22. *CC*1, p. 393, notes.
23. *CC*1, p. 497, right column. He admittedly adds a subcategory to the first definition, pointing out that it "very often" appears with a "moral application. " In addition, he adds without further comment, it may be "the course or curses, the ways proper to," and even sometimes "the right way, what is right and true. " In these latter renderings we begin to feel the impact of his Scottish commonsense account of the term. Under the second category he also mentions a pair of tropes which appear fairly often: *you dao* 有道 and *wu dao* 无道, which he points out can be applied to persons as being "principled" or "unprincipled" or to political kingdoms which are "well-governed" or "ill-governed. " Once more, in the former rendering the presence of Scottish realist terminology is undeniable.
24. *Analects* 6:10; 9:11; 17:14 (*CC*1, pp. 189, 221, 324).
25. *Analects* 8:7; 15:39 (*CC*1, pp. 210, 305); *Great Learning* (*Daxue*) 10 as the "great course" of the "sovereign" (*CC*1, pp. 378 - 379; *Zhongyong* 30:3) as the "courses of the seasons and of the sun and moon" (*CC*1, p. 427).
26. *Analects* 11:30 and 16:5 (*CC*1, pp. 286, 311 - 312); *Great Learning* 3 (*CC*1, p. 363).
27. *Analects* 1:5; 2:3; 12:23; 19:25 (*CC*1, pp. 189, 221, 324).
28. e. g. see *Great Learning* 10 (*CC*1, pp. 375 - 376).
29. *Zhongyong* 1,2,4,5,13,27:1 (*CC*1, pp. 383 - 385, 387 - 388, 393 - 394, 422).
30. *Analects* 1:2 (*CC*1, p. 138 - 139).
31. Legge actually uses the phrase "it is characteristic of ... " in a number of contexts describing the "superior man" (*junzi* 君子) and the "good man" (*shan ren* 善人) in *Analects* 5:12, 11:19 (*CC*1, pp. 178, 243 - 244).
32. *Analects* 5:2; 8:13; 14:1; 15:6; 16:2 (*CC*1, pp. 172 - 173, 212, 275,296, 310); *Zhongyong* 27:7 (*CC*1, p. 423).
33. *Analects* 8:13; 12:9; 16:2; (*CC*1. pp. 212,258, 310): *Zhongyong* 10 (*CC*1, pp. 189 - 190).
34. *Analects* 1:11, 1:12, 3:16 (*CC*1, pp. 142, 143, 160).
35. *Analects* 14:30, 19:12 (*CC*1, pp. 286, 343): *Zhongyong* 12,13,15,33:1 (*CC*1, pp. 391,394, 396,431).
36. *Analects* 5:12 (*CC*1, pp. 177 - 178): *Zhongyong* 20:18, 26:7/8 (*CC*1, pp. 413, 420).
37. *Analects* 4:15 rendered as "my teachings" (*CC*1, p. 169); *Analects* 5:6 personalized without pronoun in text (*CC*1, p. 174); *Analects* 6:10; 14:38; 19:22 and *Zhongyong* 29:3 as "institutions" (*CC*1, pp. 188, 346,425).
38. *Great Learning* "Text of Confucius" and ch. 3 (*CC*1, pp. 356 - 357, 363), where Legge continues to render the term as "what is taught" and *daoxue* 道学 as "the work of learning. "
39. *Analects* 4:5; 18:2; 19:19; *Zhongyong* 27:1 as found in *CC*1, pp. 166, 331 - 332, 345, 422 respectively.

40. *Analects* 4:8, 6:22, 11:23 (*CC*1, pp. 189, 221, 324); *Zhongyong* 20:18 (*CC*1, p. 413).
41. *Analects* 7:6, 15:28, rendered in the notes as "Principles of duty" (*CC*1, pp. 196, 302); *Analects* 15:41 as "the rule for ..." (*CC*1, p. 306); *Zhongyong* 1 as "path of duty" (*CC*1, p. 383?); *Zhongyong* 3. 13 as "THE PATH" (*CC*1, pp. 383 - 385, 393); *Zhongyong* 20:8, 13 as "the duties", "the duties of universal obligation" (*CC*1, pp. 407, 409).
42. *Analects* 4:9, 15:31 (*CC*1, pp. 168, 303).
43. *Analects* 9:26 (*CC*1, p. 225).
44. Consult James Legge, 1885. "Book of rites," in F. Max Muller (ed.). *Sacred Books of the East*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, wol. 39, p. 15.
45. This text is the *Sishu yizhu lunwen* 四书翼注论文, a collection of essays by a Hanlin scholar named Zhang Zhentao 张甄陶, who produced this work during the Qianlong 乾隆 period (1736—1796). Legge translates its title as *A Supplementary Commentary, and Literary Discussions, on the Four Books*. Like a few of the works cited by Legge, this is not a well known piece of work, and the person's name does not appear in any of the standard biographical and bibliographical works in English or Chinese. Nevertheless, Legge's gloss on the text (*CC*1, p. 129) is helpful: The author was a Zhu Xi follower, and wrote essays for "advanced" students. Legge studied it "with interest and advantage."
46. *Analects* 15:28 (*CC*1, p. 302 in the notes).
47. *Analects* 4:8 (*CC*1, p. 168).
48. Nearly 80 years after Legge published his first edition of the *Chinese Classics*, the influential modern Chinese philosopher, Feng Youlan 冯友兰 (1895—1990) published in his own philosophical work a synopsis of the meanings of the term *dao*. In general, Feng claimed, *dao* carried six meanings. These include (1) road, which is extended in meaning to include "the way one should act," and so entails the basic meaning of "the truth" (*zhenli* 真理). (2) In Ruist traditions it can mean "the highest truth" or "truth in totality" (*zhenli quanti* 真理全体). This denotation Feng explicitly associates with the passage mentioned above, where Legge renders it as "the right way." (3) In Daoist traditions, it can mean the "true and original vital energy" (*zhen yuan zhi qi* 真原之气). (4) the "moving universe." (5) the linkage between the Supreme Ultimate (*taiji* 太极) and the Ultimateless (*wuji* 无极). (6) the Heavenly Way (*tiandao* 天道), which for Feng was akin to the second meaning, but carried a special attachment to what he took to be the highest level of conscious human attainment in thougt. The diversity of these meanings and their breadth of denotations, though not always overlapping with Legge's accounts due to their much broader range of sources employed in Feng's synopsis, provides a remarkably positive affirmation of Legge's diverse renderings for the term, including its metaphysical translations. See Feng Youlan 冯友兰, 1996. *Zhen yuan liu shu* 真元六书 (*Six books on the True and Original*). Shanghai: Huadong Normal University Press, pp. 72 - 73.
49. Eugene Chen Eoyang. 1993. The Transparent Eye: Reflections on Translation, Chinese Literature, and Comparative Poetics. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 175 - 176 in passim. The second Ruist scripture mentioned here is often called the Doctrine of the Mean, a title Legge himself had conceived as a possible but unsatisfying translation in 1861, but decided to change in 1893 to the English rendering above. Unfortunately, his editor in Oxford apparently preferred to the former, more Aristotelian-sounding title, and so Legge could only add his protest in a footnote to the introductory notes to that particular text.
50. Eoyang, 1993, p. 177.
51. For a comprehensive summary of these issues, offering a number of advances on Legge's own account of these matters as presented in his work, The Religions of China (1880), consult Jeffrey Meyer. 1991. *The*

Dragons of Tiananmen: Beijing as a Sacred City. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

52. A general account of the positions of most of these Qing dynasty scholars appears in the second volume of Feng Yulan's *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, but more mature and lengthy reflections on these matters appear in the fifth and sixth volumes of Feng's larger and Marxist-oriented work in this same realm, *Zhongguo zhexueshi xinbian* (Feng Yulan. 1953. *A History of Chinese Philosophy*. Translated by Derk Bodde. Princeton University Press; id. 1985—1987. *Zhongguo zhexueshi xinbian* 中国哲学史新编[*A new edition of A History of Chinese Philosophy*]. Beijing: Great people's Press).
53. See my interpretation of one of these texts by Luo, Lauren Pfister. 1999. "Discovering Monotheistic Metaphysics: The Exegetical Reflections of James Legge (1815—1897) and Lo Chung-fan (d. circa 1850)," in Ng On-cho et al. (eds.). *Imaging Boundaries: Changing Confucian Doctrines, Texts and Hermeneutics*. Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 213 - 254.
54. This historical influence in Korean Ruism is discussed briefly in Mark Setton. 1997. Chong Yagyong: *Korea's Challenge to Orthodox Neo-Confucianism*. Albany: State University of New York.
55. Legge describes Mencius in these terms in his prolegomena to *CC*2, pp. 54 ff.
56. Legge's comments on Luo's commentary and his reasons for rejecting it are given in the commentarial notes at the bottom of the page beneath his translation of the *Great Learning*. This is found in *CC*1, pp. 358, 367 - 369, 371, 376, and 378 - 379.
57. Because Legge referred to Zhu Xi's commentaries not only in relationship to the Four Books but also in his studies of the Book of Poetry, this is a very rich area of study. Some details of Legge's various responses to Zhu Xi's commentaries in relationship to three of the Four Books has already been documented in my articles (Pfister, 1991).
58. Eoyang actually mentions this translation in Legge's ideas in a footnote (Eoyang 1993, p. 177), but leaves the impression that this change in Legge's attitude was nevertheless somehow ingenuine or, at the very least, part of the "profound ambivalence" which he senses in the portions of Legge's work which he has investigated. I have offered another interpretation of that transition in Pfister 1991, and would prefer a hermeneutically guided assessment of Legge's transition as one that moved from a profound rejection of a "Confucius of Ruist traditions" in 1861 to a critical appreciation of a more accurately portrayed image of the historical person of Confucius in 1893. An article which will reveal these assessments in greater detail is being written for an issue of the *Bochumer Jahrbuch fuer Ostasienkunde* on Chinese hermeneutics to be edited by Heiner Roetz.
59. The translations of these earlier nineteenth century figures have been put into contrast with Legge's renderings in my articles, cf. Lauren Pfister. 1990a. "Serving or Suffocating the Sage? Reviewing the Efforts of Three Nineteenth Century Translators of The Four Books, with Special Emphasis on James Legge (AD 1815—1897)." *The Hong Kong Linguist* 7, pp. 25 - 56.

选文二 Poet as Philologist

David B. Honey

导 言

本文选自 David B. Honey 所著 *Incense at he Altar: Pioneering Sinologists and the Development of Classical Chinese Philosophy*,2001。

David B. Honey(韩大伟)博士毕业于美国加利福尼亚大学伯克利分校,现为杨百翰大学中文教授。他的这本专著对清朝以及民国时期的欧洲和美国汉学家进行了研究,其中就包括美国汉学家 Arthur Waley(阿瑟·韦利)。韩大伟往往从文献学角度入手认识汉学家的翻译方法。他将韦利定位为一名作为"语文学家的诗人",说明了韦利的翻译重心放在对中国诗歌特别是《诗经》的翻译上面,同时他的翻译又集中在汉语这种以文字为中心而非以语音为中心的特征上。由于汉字会出现假借、同音异形等现象,一方面造成了阐释的困难,而另一方面又提供了阐释的空间。韦利就利用这种空间对原文文本中的汉字做出了自己的解读。如把《孟子》中的"征"解读为"争",把"关"解读为"弯"等。当然,这种解读方式会给人过度诠释的感觉,也不乏有人对其诟病,认为他的这种解读方式过于随意(at will)。他在翻译中所持有的这种阐释态度,同他的诗人身份是分不开的。

在韦利的身上综合了各种身份特征,其中之一就是他的诗人身份。他对中国古诗情有独钟,专门选译了中国诗歌,集结成诗集 *The Book of Songs*,并且还有关于李白的论著 *The Poetry and Career of Li Po*,借此致力于中国诗歌在英语世界的传播。他对自己的翻译诗歌采取一种动态的态度,即他会对译诗重新润色、加工,使译诗以新的面貌出现,具有风格上的变化,这种从注重表面诗意到对原诗多面向的考虑,反映了他的翻译的动态观。所以,他修改译诗不仅仅是在风格上改变原来的译诗,而且还伴随着翻译方法上的改变,在直译和意译、再造和模仿以及文学性和学术性之间变换。不过,在他的翻译方法的变化过程中呈现出了一个大致的走向,即逐渐远离翻译的忠实原则,作为叛逆者的身份越来越明显。

Ivan Morris isolates five general qualities of Waley that undergird all of his writings. First is profound scholarship and an incredibly wide range of knowledge. Second is his remarkable linguistic skill. Third is his sensibility in English prose and poetry. Fourth is his devotion and commitment to literature. Lastly is his power of concentration.[1] To these abstractions I will attempt to add some concrete qualities.

Most importantly, at the base of both his scholarship and wide range of knowledge was his remarkable linguistic skills. He acquired languages as easily as one acquires college credit in night school. His famous off-hand remark about classical Japanese bears repeating: "Since

the classical language has an easy grammar and limited vocabulary, a few months should suffice for the mastering of it."[2] He had a reading knowledge of Greek, Latin, Sanskrit, Hebrew, Mongolian, Turkish, Ainu, Italian, Dutch, and Portuguese. He also read and spoke fluent French, German, and Spanish. He used this knowledge to plumb many documentary depths, especially anthropological literature. For instance, his translation of the *Tao te ching* is rife with apt comparisons, from tortoise-divination in Africa and magic ritual in Babylon to omen lore of Alpine peasants and Buddhist and Christian thought.[3]

He also knew what to do with language, especially classical Chinese, handling its intricacies with exceptional skill. A prominent example is his treatment of textual layers in the *Tao te ching*, now revealing embedded scholia (e. g., #XXXI), now ossified axioms (e. g., #'s VI, XII, and XXIV). He is especially sensitive to the interplay of puns and the nuances of onomatopoeia. On the later, he once remarked that

> Chinese abounds in reduplicative expressions ... used in an onomatopoeic or quasi-onomatopoeic way. These words, representing shades of feeling as well as nuances of sound, appearance, etc., could not of course be rendered pictorially, and are often expressed by phonological equivalents that, taken separately, have a quite different meaning. Thus under the heading 坎 we get the expression 坎坎, a reduplicate which is generally admitted to have a quite different meaning from 坎 by itself.[4]

One crucial aspect of his technical philosophical skill is his holistic approach to the nature of the logographic writing system that allowed for various graphic "spelling" of the same word, an understanding not reached universally among sinologist in England even today.[5] For instance, concerning the text of Mencius, Waley preferred to regard *cheng* 征 as standing for 争: "there is every reason to suppose that 征 is a phonetic substitute for mistake for 争;"[6] or "关 is a phonetic substitute for 弯. No satisfactory sense can be got out of this passage as it stands. Probably something has dropped out of the text."[7] It is true that Karlgren considered such elasticity of interpretation as making too free with graphic forms, substituting at will characters that fit with one's preconceived interpretations, without the immediate defense of textual notes:

> In regard to the philology proper, the interpretation of difficult words and phrases, (Waley) has assiduously studied many of the best Ts'ing time authorities. And yet the student is left somewhat helpless and bewildered, because Waley's book was published as a literary volume without any scholarly apparatus at all (an additional volume of 32 pages containing textual notes offers so little as to be of no practical assistance)...
>
> Particularly I object to Waley's frequent altering of the text (scores of important cases) where the transmitted text admits of a perfectly satisfactory interpretation ... Our principle must be a great caution: never to alter the

transmitted text unless it is necessary and the emendation is obviously plausible.[8]

Since Karlgren has the reputation in his various exegetical works of dredging up, with admirable effort, a wide variety of opinions without always choosing between them, this attitude is more a reflection of Karlgren's lack of creative insight than a disparagement of Waley's scholarship. Subjective judgement, guided by literary style and a feel for the language, is always necessary in any text-critical work. And of the latter qualities Waley possessed an abundance.

Waley also was extremely careful to define and choose his terminology precisely, even at the expense of lengthy digressions, as in the introduction to *The Way and Its Power*:

I have still a number of words to discuss. The reader will perhaps at this point begin to wonder whether I have lost sight of my original purpose in writing this introductory essay and have, owing to a predisposition towards philology, forgotten Chinese thought and slipped into writing a treatise on the Chinese language. I can only say that I see no other way of studying the history of thought except by first studying the history of words, and such a study would seem to me equally necessary if I were dealing with the Greeks, the Romans, the Egyptians, the Hebrews, or any other people.[9]

Thus, belying his reputation as merely a poet-translator, Waley often engaged in the same finely argued philological analysis that occupied his professional colleagues. His famous powers of concentration and commitment to uncovering the meaning of each word often led him to excessive lengths in order to solve solitary linguistic problems, as in some cross-continent jaunts to make use of the rare manuscript or odd edition. For instance, in "Black the Taoist," Waley considered whether Black had been influenced by any Taoist text. Consequently, he devoted a full page detailing the transmission history of the only Taoist text available in England at the time, an early Latin translation of the *Tao te ching* first brought to London in 1788.[10] And, if he was not willing to spend his time on tedious work in textual criticism to uncover strands of filiations, he was at least aware of the problem and admirably cautious where lacking such a study.[11]

Popularizing Poetry

Underlying all of Waley's work was his intention to popularize Oriental literature, whether Chinese poetry, Japanese novel, an Ainu epic, or *The Secret History of the Mongols*. He expressed this intent on more than one occasion. For instance, at the close of his book *Yuan Mei*, he concluded

> Despite their imperfections my translations have in the past done something towards inspiring a number people with the idea that, for lovers of poetry, Chinese is a language worth learning. I hope that this book may serve the same purpose and in particular do something to dispel the common idea that all good Chinese poetry

belongs to a remote antiquity.[12]

Hence his larger works were directed towards the general reader. His non-specialist audience seemed almost to justify his existence at the margins of academia. This also explains his avoidance of most of the technical apparatus of the sinology: extensive documentation and annotation, bibliographical digression, learned philological diversions, or the use of arcane technical jargon. Again, from *Yuan Mei*: "This book is meant chiefly for the general reader with no knowledge of pre-Soviet China ... I have concentrated ... on whatever in his story has a general human interest, and on translating such of his poems as can be made intelligible without an undue amount of explanation."[13] In his self-appointed role of popularizer of Chinese and Japanese poetry, he created the most enduring impression on the English literary outlook towards the Orient since the publication in 1879 of Edwin Arnold's epic poem about the life of the Buddha, "The Light of Asia."[14]

When Waley felt compelled to produce notations to document the sources of his studies, to offer explanatory background, or to explain the basis of a conclusion, he preferred to consign them to the appendices, as in *The Way and Its Power* and *The Poetry and Career of Li Po*, or even to publish them entirely separate, as in his "Notes on the Tun-huang Pien-wen Chi,"[15] meant to elucidate the translations included in his *Stories and Ballads from Tun-Huang: An Anthology* (1960), as well as textual notes to his *Shih-ching* edition and his version of the *Meng-tzu*.[16] The most he would generally concede to the niceties of scholarship was a reference list of sources used, or a finding list of poems, as he once wryly explained: "I write chiefly for the general reader. But specialists seem sometimes to read my books as a recreation, and for the benefit I have given references to the Chinese texts used, in the hope that they will check up on some of my translations and tell me of my mistakes."[17]

As this quick survey shows, Waley wrote widely on an impressively diverse array of subjects, some interconnected, some not. Yet despite his breadth, he never merely dabbled as many of his amateur country had in the previous century—the quaint habit of proffering strongly held if uninformed views on a subject, published in journalistic fashion, then moving on to a fresh target. On the contrary, his grounding in the original sources, a certain feel for cultural values, and his unerring sense of taste guided him to those areas he felt competent to evaluate. His explorations, then, not only helped open up new areas, but usually set their investigation upon solid ground.

His salutary restraint and intellectual modesty in the face of unexplored research territory is explained at length in his 1923 offering, *An Introduction to the Study of Chinese Painting*:

> This book is rather a series of essays than a general survey of early Chinese painting. To attempt such a survey at the present time would, I think, be dangerous owing to the lack of those detailed and special studies by which general

works are usually preceded ... The danger of demanding symmetry and completeness from a historian who has not the necessary material at his command is well illustrated by many Histories of the obscurer literatures. A writer, let us say, undertakes to compile a history of the literature of some remote country. He himself is perhaps interested in fiction, but only moderately in poetry, and not at all in philosophy; there exist no preliminary researches to guide him. He will write sensibly of fiction, perfunctorily of poetry, and ludicrously of thought.

Conscious of this danger, I have confined myself so far as possible to topics of which I have special knowledge. I have tried, moreover, to mention as few rather than as many artists as possible, lest my book should become a mere dictionary. [18]

Waley may have limited the scope of the subject was faithfully and artfully set within the full context of contemporary history, current cultural and literary trends, and artistic movement. In fact, at times so broad were his background settings that he felt compelled to justify them.

A considerable part of this book is occupied with the history of Chinese art-tradition, aesthetic, and taste; an attempt is also made to give in the broadest outlines a history of early Chinese civilization in general. If anyone says that the knowledge of these things is irrelevant to the study of art, I answer that in human beings, as we know them, sensitivity to art is usually accompanied by some degree of intellectual curiosity ... Now if, in regard to any age or country, these questions can be answered at all, it will be largely through the study of literature, and principally, of poetry. Hence in writing this book I have sometimes been helped by knowledge gained from the study of Chinese poetry. Moreover, in supplying a certain literary background, I am justified, I think, by the intimate connection between poetry and painting which from early times existed in China. [19]

Translator as Traducer

Nine translations from the *Shih-ching* are included in *An Introduction to the Study of Chinese Paintings* as illustrative examples, and are mostly extended extracts of lengthy originals. Excerpts from these 1923 samples in the column on the left below may be compared with the 1937 versions on the right to introduce Waley's general approach to the art of translation. [20]

Mao #167	We plucked the bracken, plucked the bracken
We pluck the bracken,	While the young shoots were springing up.
The new bracken,	Oh, to go back, go back!
The bracken springing from the Earth ...	The year is ending.

"Home, home," We cry,
For the old year's ending...
We have no home, no house,
Because of the Hsienyun...

Mao #30
All day the wind blew wild.
You looked at me and laughed;
But your jest was lewdness and
　　Your Laughter, mockery
Sick was my heart within.

All day the wind blew with a whirl
　　Of dust.
Kindly you seemed to come,
Came not, nor went away.
Long, long I think of you.

Wild and windy was the day;
You looked at me and laughed,
But the jest was cruel, and the
　　Laughter mocking.
My heart within is sore.

There was a great sandstorm that day;
Kindly you made as though to come,
You neither came nor went away.
Long, long my thoughts.

The dark wind will not suffer
Clean skies to close the day.

We have no house, no home
Because of the Hsienyun...
Cloud trails on cloud. Oh, cruel thoughts!
I lie awake and moan.

A great wind and darkness;
Day after day it is dark.
I lie awake, cannot sleep,
And gasp with longing.

The sky is black with clouds;
The far-off thunder rolls;
I have woken and cannot sleep,
　　For the thought of you
Fills all my heart with woe.

Dreary, dreary the gloom;
The thunder growls.
I lie awake, cannot sleep.
And I am destroyed with longing.

Mao #115
There grows an elm-tree on the hill;
And by the mere, an alder tree-
You have a coat but do not wear it,
You have a gown, but do not trail it...

On the mountain is the thorn-elm;
On the low ground the white elm-tree.
You have long robes,
But do not sweep or trail them...

In the first version of Mao #167 Waley preserves the repetition of the noun "bracken," while in the second he opts to reflect the repetition of the verb "pluck," restarting the third instance of the noun as "young shoots." The second version "Oh, to go back, go back" again more faithfully reproduces the repetition of the verb in the original.

In Mao #30, the first version follows the surface meaning of the word *chung* 终 in lines 1 and 5. In the second, Waley has opted for a more scholarly approach: he adopts a gloss of

Wang Yin-chih, already proposed in Legge, taking *chung* as a marker of completed action, equivalent to *chi* 既. The alliteration of "Wild and windy" in the second version attempts to duplicate a phonological feature of the original, a rhyming pattern (*chung-feng* 终风). Yet the first version better reflects the repetition of *chung-feng* and its variants in stanzas one through three. All in all, the second version is more economical in expression. Again, the second translation of Mao #115 is more economical, and reflects the original syntax better.

As Waley matured, he not only refined his style, but his English versions increasingly embodied more dimensions than just surface meaning. According to Edward Schafer, the scholarly act of translation encompasses three distinct aspects of language:

> A translation which aims at illuminating the literary craftsmanship, the intellectual riches, and the imaginative resources of a writer in a foreign language, must, to the greatest possible degree compatible with the structure of the translator's language, take into account the semantic subtleties of that writer's lexicon (first of all), and the morphology (secondly) and the syntax (lastly) of his language.[21]

Hence, the mature Waley, as our comparison of *Shih-ching* poems shows, was often able to reflect all three aspects without sacrificing style or taste.

Yet, the two versions represent more than a maturing of style over time; they represent Waley's division of translation into two fundamental approaches, the free versus the literal, the recreative versus the imitative, or the literary versus the scholarly. Hence, the 1937 *Book of Songs* version, on the whole, more closely reflects both the line, the imagery, and the style of the original, with all its terseness and repetition. Yet, since Waley thought that "so much is inevitably lost in translating Oriental literature that one must give a great deal in return,"[22] he therefore concentrated on making each translation, whether from the *shih-ching*, *Ch'u-tz'u*, *ballads*, or *shih poetry*, as independent and artistic as possible. And because of the audience he had in mind, he eschewed the use of footnotes to explain the background or expand on the meaning.

Ivan Morris once explained that what Waley was able to give back to readers through his translation was a sense of the artistry of the original:

> What enabled him to do this was a rare mastery of style and a self-assurance that allowed him after he had thoroughly understood a Chinese or Japanese text, to recast it entirely in supple, idiomatic, vibrant English, rather than stick to a phrase-by-phrase or sentence-by-sentence rendering, which might convey the surface meaning but would inevitably mar the artistry of the original.[23]

Waley himself on several occasions expressed the literary aims of his translations, never more comprehensively than in 1958, reproduced in Madly Singing in the Mountains: "If one is translating literature, one has to convey feeling as well as grammatical sense."[24] To do this, Waley insists, a translator must command all of the resources of his native language.

And as a practicing poet, Waley certainly could claim a supple feel for English.

One special characteristic of his translations of Chinese poetry is the beauty of his English. His practice was to make one English stress equivalent to each Chinese syllable, resulting in what some would call "sprung rhythms."[25] On this verse form, J. M. Cohen remarks as follows:

> To him it is as natural a measure as blank verse, and one that has the advantage of being free from 19th-century associations ... Dr. Waley's "sprung rhythms" have the virtue of freshness, and of a conversational ease which aptly renders the very restrained and direct emotion of such a reflective writer as Po Chu-i.[26]

If Waley as a stylist is almost always beyond criticism, it is in his choice of translation strategy, specifically the practice of foreshortening extended passages by way of paraphrase or selected ellipses, that have involved him in recent polemics.

The most successful modern translator of *The Tale of Genji*, Edward Seidensticker, himself an admirer of Waley, nevertheless epitomizes Waley's most obvious failings as follows:

> ... The Waley translation is very free. He cuts and expurgates very boldly. He omits one whole chapter, the thirty-eighth, and close scrutiny reveals that the titles of at least two chapters ... are meaningless in his translation because he has omitted the passages from which they derive. It may be argued that he tidies things up by cutting, and therefore "improves." In some cases he probably does ... On the whole, however, his excisions seem merely arbitrary.
>
> More complex, and perhaps more interesting, is the matter of amplification. Waley embroiders marvelously, sometimes changing the tone of an episode or the psychological attributes of a character. Perhaps here too he sometimes "improves," but the process of amplifying and embroidering is continuous, and one is very reluctant indeed to conclude that Murasaki Shikibu has the worst of it all the way.[27]

Seidensticker's translation also preserves more of the hundreds of poems that appear throughout the work, many of which are expunged by Waley.[28] All in all, those who prefer Waley do so because of the effects of his "beguiling cadences."[29]

Waley adopted a similar approach in his rendering of *Journey to the West*, which he called *Monkey*.[30] In his preface, Dr. Hu Shih noted that Waley only translated thirty of the original one hundred chapters; yet, in spite of some omissions remembered from his boyhood with fondness, Hu agreed with most of what Waley cut, and endorsed his method of "omitting many episodes, but translating those that are retained almost in full."[31] Of course, it is the "almost in full," and the amplifications redolent in *Genji*, that have attracted critical

attention. Yet, in comparison with Ezra Pound, Waley the translator was found by a scholar of comparative literature, Eugene Eoyang, to be more faithful to the original structure, sense, and tone of the *Shih-ching* even if more prosaic and less inspiring in his English: "Waley produces contingent translations of unerring if often bland good taste. Pound produces surrogate translations of variable quality, ranging from misjudged exercises in failed rhetoric to superlative re-creations with a life of their own."[32] Of course, only someone more concerned with the emotions engendered by reader response than the authority of the author accessed by philological tools would even pose the question that opens Eoyang's essay: "Who is the better translator? Arthur Waley or Ezra Pound?"[33] According to traditional sinology, philology, not phenomenology, should decide the issue. The question of who is a better poet, however, is a matter for aesthetics.[34]

When translating individual poems, Waley would often sacrifice the literal sense for the safe of safe imagery or unruffled diction. Though not as blatant as expunging entire chapters or extended passages, such an effort is intended to accommodate the tastes or expectations of a reader rather than to convey the literary construct of the author.

A case in point is a poem from early in Waley's career, contained in his 1919 publication Translations from the Chinese. "Song of the Men of Chin-ling" is not a translation of the title but a description of the poem, originally entitled "Song of Entering the Court" (*Ju-ch'ao ch'ü* 入朝曲) bracketed by Waley as a subtitle, "Marching Back into the Capital."[35] The translation is a smooth and pleasant, without any jarring neologisms or awkward locutions:

Chiang-nan is a glorious and beautiful land,
And Chin-ling an exalted and kingly province!
The green canals of the city stretch on and on
And its high towers stretch up and up.
Flying gables lean over the bridle-road:
Drooping willows cover the Royal Aqueduct.
Shrill flutes sing by the coach's awning,
And reiterated drums bang near its painted wheels.
The names of the deserving shall be carved on the
    Cloud Terrace.
And for those who have done valiantly rich reward awaits.

First of all, Waley changes several images. In the original, the second couplet literally reads "Green waters stretch over undulating distances,/ Vermilion loft-buildings rise up across successive stages." For Waley, "waters" become "canals," and the lou type of building becomes a high tower bereft of its color. Hence, there is no contrasting of the reds of man-made artifice with the green colors of natural waterways. In the next couplet, "lean over" is a weak rendering of a powerful image of the gables on opposite sides of the road

"clasping" their rafter-like hands together, embracing the roadway. "Bridle-road" stands for "Express Way," the imperial highway reserved for His Highness or his messengers. "Royal Aqueduct" spruces up the original "Royal Ditch," denoting the imperial moat. In the penultimate couplet, the verbs do not do justice to the activity of a royal procession along the imperial expressway, Waley's "sing" rendering the original "surrounds in protection," and "bang" being an ineffective substitute for "escort."

As for allusions, Waley does note that "Cloud Terrace" was the record office, but neglects to mention that it was located in a Han-period palace and refers less to records than the painting of the portraits of the twenty-eight famous ministers of merit who helped establish the Han dynasty.

Finally, the initial couplet of the poem became a famous reference to the splendor of early Nanking, known as Chin-ling, and was repeatedly recycled in both shih and tz'u poetry over the ages. As such an evocative image, its importance should be mentioned (and preserved more exactly): Waley's "exalted and kingly province" is less exalted than the original: "province of emperors and kings!" or "imperial and kingly province!"

Overall, we see that Waley was more concerned in this poem, and in many others, with composing an effective, euphonious English counterpart to the Chinese original, even at the expense of an image, an action, or a color. Writing in a style that forswore the use of heavy annotation, Waley has been justifiably faulted at least for not making more of an effort to preserve the original sense and the imagery used to convey it, even at the expense of the bloom of his English prosody. But, in all fairness to his age and sensibility, such aspersions should function more as an orientation to his chosen approach than a just criticism. In Waley's view, the overall effect of the poem was its artistry; he strove, therefore, to preserve its artistry in English form. Where the choice of the translator hinged more on poetic style than semantic substance, Waley was rarely wrong.

Waley combined both the roles of philologist and poet in his many translations. But his philological skills always served to further literary purposes. Because of the exotic nature of Chinese and Japanese literature to English readers of his time, and due to Waley's exquistic command of English, the effects of his translation were strangely exhilarating and refreshingly liberating. In the words of Jonathan Spence, "Arthur Waley selected the jewels of Chinese and Japanese literature and pinned them quietly to his chest. No one did anything like it before, and no one will ever do it again."[36] Let Waley send us off, accompanied by a benedictory verse by Yuan Mei in his inimitable translation:

The first sign of farewell to life
Is the returning inside out of all one's tastes.
The great drinker stops caring for wine,
The traveler wants only to be left where he is.
My life-long passion was my love of company,
And the more my visitors talked, the better I liked them.

But ever since my illness came upon me
At the first word I at once stop up my ears.
And worse still, when my wife or children come
I cannot bring myself even to wave a hand.
I know that this is a very bad sign;
My old body has almost done its task.
But strangely enough I go through my old books
With as great delight as I did in former days,
And ill though I am still write poems,
Chanting them aloud till the night is far spent.
Shall it be "push the door" or "knock at the door"?
I weigh each word, each line from beginning to end.
I see to it that every phrase is alive;
I do not accept a single dead word.
Perhaps the fact that this habit had not left me
Shows that I still have a little longer to live.[37]

Notes:

1. "The Genius of Arthur Waley," 69 - 77.
2. Waley, *Japanese Poetry: The "Uta"* (1919; rpt. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976), 12.
3. Waley the comparative anthropologist is perhaps best seen in an important article on the *I-ching*, "The Book of Changes," BMFEA 5 (1933): 121 - 142.
4. "The Book of Changes," 139 - 140.
5. For example, Needham and his coterie of learned colleagues insist on referring to Chinese characters as "ideograghs" throughout the various volumes of *Science and Civilisation*.
6. "Notes on Menius," in Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, 2:viii, #126.
7. Ibid., 2:xii, #427.
8. Karlgren, *Glosses on the Book of Odes*, 76. The same sentiments are expressed in Wong Siu-kit and Li Kar-shu, "Three English Translations of the *Shijing*," 116 - 117.
9. *The way and Its Power* (New York: Grove Press, 1958), 29 - 30.
10. "Blake the Taoist," in *The Secret History of the Mongols and Other Pieces* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1963), 169 - 175.
11. See, for example, "Some References to Iranian Temples in the Tun-huang Region," *Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philosophy* 28 (1956): 123 - 128.
12. *Yuan Mei: Eighteenth Century Chinese Poet* (1956; rpt. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), 204.
13. *Yuan Mei*, preface.
14. See Philip C. Almond, *The British Discovery of Buddhism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1.
15. *Studia Serica Bernhard Karlgren Dedicata*, 172 - 177.
16. *The Book of Songs: Translated from the Chinese. Supplement Containing Textual Notes* (London:

George Allen and Unwin, 1937); "Notes on Menius," AM n. s. 1 (1949): 99 - 108; rpt. In Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, 2: vii - xiv.

17. *The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes* (1958; rpt. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 5.
18. *An Introduction to the Study of Chinese Painting*, 3.
19. Ibid., 3 - 4.
20. Ibid., 13 - 16; *The Book of Songs* (1937; rpt. New York: Grove Press, 1960), infra.
21. Schafer, "Preliminary Remarks on the Structure and Imagery of the 'Classical Chinese' Language of the Medieval Period," TP 50(1963): 263.
22. "The Genius of Arthur Waley," 71.
23. Ibid., 71.
24. Ibid., 152.
25. Ibid., 158.
26. Ibid., 33.
27. Edward Seidensticker, *Murasaki Shikibu: The Tale of Genji* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), xiv. This work, and the one by Edward Kamens cited below, were kindly drawn to my attention and supplied by my colleague Professor Scott Miller.
28. A similar tendency is found in Waley's version of *The Travels of an Alchemist* (London, 1931), where some, but not all, of the poems in classical Chinese are removed. Even Waley's version of the *Shih-ching* omits fifteen poems, partly to spare the reader the so-called "banality" of the originals, and partly due to textual problems (see *The Book of Songs*, preface to the first edition).
29. For more on Waley versus Seidensticker, see Edward Kamens, ed., *Approaches to Teaching Murasaki Shikibu's "The Tale of Genji"* (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1993), 6 - 11.
30. *Monkey: Folk Novel of China by Wu Ch'eng-en* (1943: rpt. New York: Grove Press, 1958).
31. Ibid., 4.
32. Eugene Chen Eoyang, *The Transparetn Eye: Reflections on Translation, Chinese Literature, and Comparative Poetics* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), 208; see 183 - 209 for the entire Waley-Pound comparison, and Eoyang's definitions of "contigent" translations (for readers who have some knowledge of the target language but not expertise) and "surrogate" translations (for readers who do not know the target language).
33. Any fair-minded reader would readily admit that Waley was unfairly outnumbered at the outset, for Pound conceded that a team effort was at his side in making his translations: "Cathay, Translations by Ezra Pound, for the most part from the Chinese of Rihaku, from the Notes of the Late Ernest Fenollosa, and the Decipherings of the Professors Mori and Ariga;" Yip, *Ezra Pound's Cathay*, 3.
34. Ibid., 190. A recent introduction to the traditional Chinese views on authorial intent and modern criticism in opposition is Zhang Longxi, *The Tao and the Logos: Literary Hermeneutics, East and West* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), 133 - 187.
35. *Translations from the Chinese* (1919; rpt. New York: Alfred A. KNOPF, 1941), 99.
36. Spence, *China Roundabout*, 329.
37. *Madly Singing in the Mountains*, 220 - 221.

选文三　Interpreting Culture Through Translation

Roger Ames

导　言

本文选自 *Interpreting Culture through Translation: A Festschrift for D.C. Lau*，香港中文大学出版社，1991 年。

刘殿爵毕业于香港大学中文系，后执教于伦敦大学东方和非洲研究院，教授中国哲学，20 世纪 70 年代回到香港，任香港中文大学中国语言文学系主任。他英译的经典著作包括《论语》、《孟子》、《道德经》等，尤其是《论语》，已经成为西方最经典的英译本。刘殿爵在翻译中国经典的时候会把同时代的文本进行比较和分析，作为重新建构文本的方法。他擅长将不同来源的相关段落搜寻并拼装起来，寻找出解开文本死结的方式。他有一种后现代主义理论所倡导的互文本性意识，并且凭着他惊人的记忆力，他在自己的头脑中形成了一个文本库，可以随时调动起来在翻译中为我所用。他可以准确地判断不同语境中汉字的内涵以及细微的语义特征，其精确程度任何现成的文本都无法提供。他还充分地意识到，可以用一种语言表达的思想用另一种语言未必也能表达出来。所以，探索用一种语言表达另一种语言的思想是他不懈努力的目标。

这篇文章根据家族相似理论，认为中国文化与英语文化属于不同的文化家族，它们之间的相似程度非常微弱，两种文化虽有交流互通但也隔绝已久。刘殿爵在汉语哲学经典的英译过程中充分意识到分别以二元思维和关联思维为特征的中西文化和哲学之间的对立，有意识地把中西哲学思想差异反映到译文中去。刘殿爵拥有扎实的哲学准备，这种哲学准备使他能够在翻译的过程中避免让西方哲学理念强加给中国哲学。

刘殿爵在中国哲学文本的英译中尽量避免使用技术性的词汇，倾向用日常词汇以便与西方哲学概念相区隔。例如，对“有”与“无”的翻译，他并没有惯常地使用 being 和 non-being 来译，而是译为 something 和 nothing。还有，刘殿爵倾向于使用盎格鲁—撒克逊英语，避免使用拉丁化的英语。这里的主要原因是，他认为中国先秦时代的哲学经典中的语言多为对话体，具有口语色彩，而这个特点可以用同样具有口语色彩的盎格鲁—撒克逊英语体现出来。如果用拉丁化的英语，尽管可以使译文带上学术性，但却与中国哲学经典的总体风格相去甚远。口语可以帮助普通人把潜意识里的内容即刻反映出来，不会经过学理性抽象思维的过滤。口语文化的当下性和瞬间性强调口语表达要与人类经验的具体性相结合，把思想的抽象性、间离性和当下性与日常熟识的经验结合在一起。这种观念在语言表述上表现为少用纯粹的概念语言，而是注重使用意象和隐喻。这种取类联譬的汉语语言思维方式与盎格鲁—撒克逊古英语的思维方式不谋而合。如古英语中经常使用的隐喻语(kenning)，把 sea 说成是 whale's bath 或 sea-wood 等，就是一种取譬联类的思维表述方式。这也是刘殿爵在中国哲学经典的英译中偏向于使用盎格鲁-撒克逊风格的英语的理据。

Among Lau's published works, the authoritative translations of the Lao Tzu, the Mencius and the Analects are unequalled in their popularity, and have done much over this past generation to foster Western literacy in Chinese philosophical literature. Above it was implied that a reading of Ryle might provide us with a starting point for speculating on what it is that makes these translations of Lau so distinctive. One obvious connection would seem to be the lucidity of Ryle's own style, itself a model of English usage. A second factor that may well have influenced the Lau translations in Ryle's analytic attitude and the consequent set of formal linguistic distinctions that can be appropriated profitably by the translator to reflect on and refine his text and his language.

Professor Lau over a lifetime has been fascinated by language, and has taken Ryle's investigatory attitude to language as his own. He begins from Chinese, where he is a scholar in the traditional sense. Having assimilated the classical corpus through many years of reading and reflection, Lau takes the comparison and analysis of contemporaneous texts as a methodology for textual reconstruction. He is a master at finding and bringing together related passages from disparate sources as a way of discerning particular clues and unraveling textual knots. Juxtaposing different redactions of an illustrative anecdote or historical allusion, he is able to draw out the intertextuality of texts belonging to a shared historical epoch. Dependent as much upon his memory as his library, Lau treats the entire corpus as his text.

After a career of searching through and puzzling over problematic texts, his mind, like his personal copies of the texts, is full of marginalia. Through the experience of knowing the written characters in so many different contexts, he has come to understand their range of meaning and their nuances with a precision that goes beyond any available lexical resources. And the facility with which he moves between the original texts and then back and forth between this corpus and the English language is legendary among his colleagues and his students. "Roger, are you sure you mean 'cautious'? Perhaps you're thinking of 'careful.'" And Lau would have no trouble explaining the difference.

But there is perhaps more to the Ryle connection than the subtlety with which Lau analyzes and moves between languages. We might speculate that Lau's attraction to Ryle is as much philosophical as it is linguistic. Lau has had a lifelong interest in learning languages. But for him, the point does not seem to have been so much the successful acquisition of the languages as, in the process of learning them, the gaining of some insight into the way languages work. This interest in how languages work is connected to two problems that have occupied Lau and the best minds of British philosophy in this century: (a) In what way does language furnish clues to the nature of the world? and (b) in so far as we cannot think without language, what limitations does a given language impose on thinking, and how can we discover and articulate them?

From the various contributions of Lau and from conversations with him over the years, we can deduce at least his partial answers to these important philosophical questions.

Languages constituent organic systems; so does the world they report on. The two do not always coincide, and as speculations about the nature of the world have developed from ordinary talk about the world, there is no guarantee that any given expression has always been carefully chosen for its ability to report accurately on the world. At any rate, the ordinary user of a language rarely has an understanding of how his own language works.

Take an example. Most people take it for granted that verbs stand for actions. As a rule of thumb, this might be true enough, but if one is using language as a clue to the nature of the world, this assumption is too rough and ready to be reliable. Lau uses Ryle's famous example about the verb "to know." People tend to assume that "knowing" is an action or activity. Ryle noticed that we do not normally say "I am knowing." What does this signify? It signifies that "to know" is not an action. Equally, we cannot say "For how long was he knowing something?" This points to the same conclusion. When we can say "I am X-ing," or "for how long was he X-ing?", X is an action. "To know" fails as an action on both accounts. By looking carefully at the language, Ryle is able to say something about what it means to know. He can conclude that knowing, as a "capacity verb," reveals a disposition, indicating that a person can bring something off or get something right. It belongs to the same family as skill worlds.

Going back to the original question: in what way does language furnish clues to the nature of the world? Lau's answer is that when the organic system which is the world is at odds with the organic system of a particular language, this misfit will show up in the fact that a normal linguistic form is not applicable. In this case, "A is X-ing," is not applicable to the verb, "to know."

The second insight that has made Lau a dedicated student of languages is the following. When someone knows only one language, there does not seem to be anything he cannot say, but as soon as he learns another language, he discovers that there are things he can say in one language which he cannot say in the other. Only then does he realize that all the time he was confined to thinking in one language, he was limited to thinking what was possible in that language—a limitation from which he was liberated only after he had acquired a second language. (In this connection, one must distinguish between what one can say when one uses a language, and the fact that one can explain what one cannot say in a language by using the same language as a metalanguage.) We can take Lau's conscious concern about "Being" as an example. One cannot state the Ontological Argument in Chinese because the construction involving the verb "to be" in asserting existence. Still one can use Chinese as a metalanguage in explaining how the Ontological Argument is something that can be stated in an Indo-European language.

So far, I have been paraphrasing conversations I have had with Lau. Throwing caution to the wind, we might press the Ryle connection further. After all, the main thrust of Ryle's most important work, *The Concept of Mind*, is a sustained challenge to the Cartesian mind-body dualism and its implications. Dualism of course is a feature of Western philosophy and

culture that does not begin with Descartes, but rather is traceable back to the metaphysical presuppositions of the classical Greeks and their distinctions between Being and Becoming, Reality and Appearance. For Ryle, what he calls "Descartes' Myth" lies in the fundamental and pernicious habit of assuming "that there are two different kinds of existence of status." It is arguable that it is precisely this two-world metaphysics implicit in much of Western systematic philosophy that marks this tradition's clearest difference from a Chinese world view, and which makes these two traditions exotic for each other. It might well be that Lau found in Ryle a critique of Western philosophical presuppositions that enables him in the process of translation to resist an imposition of Western assumptions on Chinese philosophical literature.

Before suggesting how it is that Lau is able to get behind these Western philosophical presuppositions in his translations, more has to be said about the distance between traditional Western and Chinese world views.

There are obvious reasons for being cautious about exotic cultures. It is surely the appreciation of culture difference that attracts the scholar's interest and inspires growth. With the Western and the Chinese traditions, the world views that separate them make each of them arguably the most remote and exotic high culture from the other's perspective. To move back and forth between the Western and the Chinese worlds, then, is perhaps to traverse humanity's greatest culture divide.

The civilizations that share the Indo-European group of languages are certainly many and diverse, but by virtue of trade, population movements, and the imperceptible dissemination of ideas, they have over past millennia developed a culture family resemblance. This relationship does not extend to the centripetal Chinese, for whom the Great Wall has been as much a cultural screen as a physical barrier.

The prominent French sinologist, Jacques Gernet, argues with persuasion that when the two great civilizations of China and Europe, having developed almost entirely independently of each other, first made contact in about 1600, the seeming inaptitude of the Chinese for understanding Christianity and the philosophic edifice that undergirded it was not simply an uneasy difference in the encounter between disparate intellectual traditions, but a far more profound difference in mental categories and modes of thought, and particularly, a fundamental difference in their conceptions of human agency. Much of what Christianity and Western philosophy generally had to say to the Chinese was, for the Chinese, quite literally nonsense.

The West fared little better in its opportunity to appreciate and to appropriate the Chinese contribution. In fact, it fared so badly that the very word "Chinese" in the English language came to denote "confusion," "imcomprehensibility," "impenetrability"—a sense of order inaccessible to the Western mind. The profound difference between prevailing Western senses of order and those dominant in the Chinese world view plagued Europe's encounter with this antique culture from the start. With Eurocentric savants seeking corroboration for

their own universal indices in the seventeenth century, they idealized China as a remarkable and "curious land" requiring the utmost scrutiny. Their esteem for Chinese culture, however, plummeted from these romantic "Cathay" idealizations to the depths of disaffection with the inertia of what, in the context of their own industrial revolution, was cast as a moribund, backward-looking and fundamentally stagnant culture.

There is a profound distinction between the European and Chinese world views that can be captured in the contrast between dualistic and correlative thinking. And there is a profound ambiguity that has emerged from the frequent eliding of these two radically different senses of order which has inhibited understanding in the fretful encounter between China and the West. It is this fundamental ambiguity of order that has, within the bounds of Western philosophical reflection, hobbled attempts to give Chinese philosophy and culture its integrity and its full measure of difference, and which has severely limited the impact of Western cultural influences on the Chinese experience.

To establish a working contrast, the gross lines of that sense of order dominant in the Western tradition might be sketched in the following terms. I say "gross lines" because the tradition is rich and varied, and counter-examples abound. Still, I would claim that one real contribution of comparative philosophy is that it does enable us to identify certain continuities and emphases in the dialectic of Western thought that are peculiar to it. And this brief characterization is made more persuasive by virtue of the fact that it is the dualistic sense of order, so prominent in Western philosophical thinking, which has been the target of its own internal critique—Vico, Nietzsche, the Pragmatists and Existentialists, and much of contemporary Continental reflection.

The Western culture experience, going back to ancient Greece, is grounded in a two-world reality-appearance distinction. This distinction challenges the ultimate reality of change, and has largely defined the work of philosophy as the pursuit of the permanent behind the transitory. In Plato, this proclivity separated an immortal soul from the temporality of physical, sensual existence; it separated the universal and objective form of beauty and justice and all things good from their shadowy reflections in particular phenomena; it separated rational principle as some Archimedean point in the changing world of experience; it separated and elevated "scientific" knowledge available for discovery and contemplation (theoria) over particular and productive knowledge. With the melding of Greek philosophy and the Christian tradition, the immortality of the soul was guaranteed, the universal principles of truth, beauty, and goodness came to reside in a transcendent Godhead, and a rational theology promised that an understanding of the world constructed by the light of reason was consistent with and a complement to that higher knowledge available through revelation and faith. In this tradition, just as God's punishment imposed on human beings for their initial sin is mortality and change, so His reward for obedience is permanence.

The signal and recurring feature of Western civilization which emerged to dominant the

development of its philosophical and religious orthodoxy was the presumption that there is something permanent, perfect, objective and universal that disciplines the world of change and guarantees natural and moral order—some originative and determinative arche, an eternal realm of Platonic eide or "ideas," the One True God of the Judeo-Christian universe, a transcendental strongbox of invariable principles or laws, a geometric method for discerning clear and distinct ideas. The model of a single-ordered world where the unchanging source of order stands independent of, sustains, and ultimately provides explanation for the sensible world is a dominant if not an often unconscious assumption in this tradition.

The dominant Western sense of order, then, dating back to a pre-Socratic pursuit of some underlying arche, tends to be cosmogonic, assuming an initial beginning and privileging the primal, unchanging principle that causes and explains that origin and everything that issues from it. Hence the weight given to analytic thinking, linear, causal explanations and the dualistic categories in which these explanations are couched. There is implicit in this world view a primacy given to some transcendent principle: the source of a top-down, disciplining order which can be discerned as unity and intelligibility, whether it exists external to us as Deity or purportedly internal to us as the hardwiring of our essential nature. It is a "given"—a source of order independent of our own actions and experience.

How do we escape these presuppositions of our own tradition, then, to discern and articulate the internal impetus that gives definition to both change and order in the Chinese world view? Jacques Gernet, in comparing the two traditions, observes that

> ... according to Aristotle, it is normal for all things to be at rest, whereas for the Chinese, in contrast universal dynamism is the primary assumption.

In describing the largely failed encounter between the Jesuit missionaries and the Chinese intellectuals, Gernet ascribes the mutual understanding to this contrast between externally imposed order assumed in our tradition, and the Chinese assumption that order is immanent in and inseparable from a spontaneously changing world. It is for this reason that the Chinese invested little importance in the conception of a willful God-head:

> Believing that the universe possesses with itself its own organizational principles and its own creative energy, the Chinese maintained something that was quite scandalous from the point of view of scholastic reason, namely that "matter" itself is intelligent—not, clearly enough, with a conscious and reflective intelligence as we usually conceive it, but with a spontaneous intelligence which makes it possible for the *yin* and the *yang* to come together and guides the infinite combinations of these two opposite sources of energy.

Yin 阴 and *yang* 阳 (or alternatively, Heaven and Earth, or *ch'ien* 乾 and *k'un* 坤) are correlative modalities, expressing the mutuality, interdependence, diversity, and creative efficacy of the dynamic relationships that are immanent in, pattern, and valorize the world.

The full range of difference in the world—intellectual and physical, change and continuity, quality and quantity, nobility and baseness, fact and value, substance and accident—is explicable through these correlative and complementary relationships. Although there is an omnipresent hierarchical distinction obtaining between complementary aspects—*yang* defines a dominant relationship and *yin* a subordinate one—these opposing modalities are resolutely continuous and inseparable. *Yin* and *yang* as correlative are not universal principles that define some essential feature of phenomena, but are explanatory categories that report on a creative tension in specific differences which makes the immediate concrete things of the world intelligible. Important here is the primacy of the particular. Things of the same kind are not defined in terms of essences or natural kinds, but by virtue of the kinship resemblances that associate—"family resemblances." Hence, describing any particular phenomena does not require the discovery of some underlying determinative and originative principle—a basis for making many one—but a tracing out and unraveling of the relationships and conditions of the phenomenon's context, and its multiple correlations. As Lau has many times pointed out, the language of a classic Chinese epistemology has more to do with "mapping" and "unraveling" than with the grasping of some underlying formal essence presupposed in classical Western epistemology. Where in the classical Western model, the formal essence reduces the many to one, in the Chinese model, one evokes many. Each phenomenon in suggesting other similar phenomena has the multivalence of poetic images. *Yin* and *yang*, far from being universal essences, are invariably a perception from some particular perspective that enables us to unravel patterns of relationships and interpret our circumstances. They provide us a vocabulary for sorting out the relationships that obtain among things as they come together and constitute themselves in unique compositions.

Now, disparate cultures, exotic for each other, are not available for wholesale import. They can only be appropriated respectively through the currency of their own language and experience. And it is the vagaries of translating one culture through the medium of another that the important differences which have justified the project of translation in the first place are put at risk. Given this fundamental difference between Chinese correlativity and Western dualism, how then has Lau as an interpreter moved between them and, in translating them for each other, been so effective in using the language to minimize the problem of equivocation?

My response to this question is no more respectable than one person's conjecture—at best, an interesting if not entirely plausible story. And anyone who knows and admires Lau would undoubtedly have his or her own account to offer. To what extent Lau would accept these claims about the fundamental differences between the Chinese world view and that of the West, and to what degree if any he would acknowledge these speculations about his own use of language, I am uncertain. I pursue the question here because it is an occasion to reflect on Lau's work, and a Festschrift for Lau is surely an open invitation for us all to do so.

One claim I do think Lau would assent to is that a distinctive characteristic of his

translations is his uncommon preference for the Anglo-Saxon vocabulary for the English language. Now, this feature of his translation goes beyond the general stylistic distinction we can make between the sensibleness of English academic prose and its more free-wheeling North American counterpart. While the former works for the clarity and simplicity possible with the English language (think of Russell, Bradley, Stevenson, and of course, Ryle), the latter is willing to sacrifice ordinary language for the demands of more grand theoretical schemes. It is certainly Lau's preference for the Anglo-Saxon language that gives his readers the impression of simplicity and clarity. Compare Lau's *Lao Tzu* 61 with the distinguished American translator, F. W. Mote:

> 大国者下流也天下之牝天下之交也牝常以静胜牡为其静也故宜为下故大国以下小国则取小国小国以下大国则取大国故或下以取或下而取大国不过欲兼畜人小国不过欲入事人夫两者各得其所欲大者宜为下

D. C. Lau:

> A large state is the lower reaches of a river—the female of the world. In the intercourse of the world, the female always gets the better of the male by stillness. It is because of her stillness that it is fitting for her to take the lower position.
>
> Hence the large state, by taking the lower position, annexes the small state;
> The small state, by taking the lower position, is annexed by the large state.
> Thus the one, by taking the lower position, annexes;
> The other, by taking the lower position, is annexed.
> Thus all that the large state wants is to take the other under its wing;
> All that the small state wants is to have its services accepted by the other.
> Now if they both get their desire,
> It is fitting that the large should take the lower position.

F. W. Mote:

> A great country can be compared to the lower drainage of a river. It is where the world converges; it is the female of the world. The female, by its quiescence, always overcomes the male. By quiescence it assumes the lower places. Thus it is that a great state by condescending to small states, gains them for itself; and that small states, by abasing themselves to a great state, wins it over to them. In the one case, the abasement leads to gaining adherents; in the other case, to procuring favor. Large states want merely to annex and accumulate people, while small states want merely to be brought in and given services to perform. Both, indeed, can gain their objectives, so the large state should assume the more lowly place.

The contrast between these two renderings can be described in terms of Lau's concern to separate prose from verse and in the concreteness of his images, but perhaps the most subtle difference is the clarity that comes with his almost exclusive use of Anglo-Saxon vocabulary.

One of the virtues of Anglo-Saxon words is that they have by and large remained ordinary expressions in use in everyday communication. "Ordinary" in this sense means that they have escaped being drafted into the technical vocabulary of philosophy, and are therefore unencumbered by philosophical content which is bound to introduce distortion.

There are many examples of Lau's conscious avoidance of the technical vocabulary of philosophy. Where the vast majority of interpreters of Chinese classics have used Being and Non-being as equivalents for *yu* 有 and *wu* 无, Lau has consistently over the years used Something and Nothing instead. Being and Non-being are fraught with the assumptions of an essentialist ontology alien to the traditional Chinese view of the world. Being is the abstract quality shared by all things that are. Non-being is the opposite abstract quality of all things that are not. *Yu* 有 on the other hand is not a shared abstract quality of things, but some things that exist (for example, *wan yu* 万有), or the totality of things that exist. Something might not be adequate to express this latter meaning, but the advantages of Something over Being outweigh the disadvantages.

What is it about Anglo-Saxon English, in many ways a language within a language, which recommends it in moving between Chinese and English? I would suggest that there are at least three fundamental and complementary explanations for Lau's appeal to the Anglo-Saxon vocabulary. Firstly, this return to a re-Latinized language is at the same time an appeal to a pre-Christianized world view. Secondly, the orality of the classical Chinese text and the conditions that distinguish an oral tradition from a literal one are most comfortably captured by the language of another oral tradition—in this case, Anglo-Saxon. And thirdly, there are identifiable characteristics in the nature and operation of the Anglo-Saxon language that recommend it for capturing linguistic concerns important to Chinese.

Nietzsche and Heidegger return to the conceptual clusters of pre-Socratic Greek as a strategy for getting behind the dualistic metaphysics bedrock in the received Platonic-Aristotelian-Christian tradition, and for exposing alternative philosophical possibilities. Both philosophers are persuaded that a particular world view is sedimented in the language of a culture and the systematic structure of its concepts, encouraging certain philosophical possibilities while discouraging others. As Nietzsche speculates,

> The strange family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and German philosophizing is explained easily enough. Where there is an affinity of languages, it cannot fail, owing to the common philosophy of grammar—I mean, owing to the unconscious domination and guidance by similar grammatical functions—that everything is prepared at the outset for a similar development and sequence of philosophical systems; just as the way seems barred against certain other possibilities of world-interpretation.

In fact, Nietzsche goes on to suggest even within the Indo-European family of languages, the closer a people's languages is to Latin, the stronger and more entrenched is its commitment

to the amalgamated Platonic-Christian world view:

> It seems that Catholicism is much more intimately related to the Latin races than all of Christianity is general is to us Northerners—and unbelielf therefore means something altogether different in Catholic and Protestant counters: among them, a kind of rebellion against the spirit of the race, while among us it is rather a return to the spirit (or anti-spirit) of the race. We northerners are undoubtedly descended from barbarian races, which also shows in our talent for religion: we have little talent for it.

Other Western thinkers who have been self-conscious about side-stepping the underlying dualistic tendencies of Western philosophy have produced alternative linguistic strategies. Whitehead and Pierce invented neologistic categories which could be defined in such a way as to skirt traditional presuppositions. The phenomenologists proposed an explicit methodology for precluding implicit metaphysical assumptions. The hermeneuticists, in challenging "method" itself, have sought to expose "the myth of the given."

In the case of Lau's translation, the conscious appeal to Anglo-Saxon vocabulary and the exclusion of the Greek and Latin has precisely the effect of returning to the "spirit" of a pre-Christianized Old English. The "Latinization" of Britain was undertaken systematically by a wave of distinguished monks, scholars and teachers who constructed their schools and church-sponsored institutions on a platform of classical learning in Latin and Greek. It is demonstrable that the most typical vocabulary introduced into Old English by these scholastic Christians was intimately related to the mythology of the new religious doctrines and to the details of institutional organization. The transformation that Augustine and his followers wrought on Britain was by means superficial—it was a calculated and profoundly successful attempt by Rome to change the philosophy of a nation. Within a century and a half of their arrival in 597, England had risen to a position of intellectual leadership in Europe—a leadership that was justified by the successful transplantation and flowering of the alien high culture in a previously Anglo-Saxon land. The classical Western world view was digested and assimilated to the extent that the native Anglo-Saxon resources were conscripted into its service, and Old English itself responded creatively to the cultural demands. God (not deus) becomes a hero rather than a transcendent deity; Christ is no longer some abstract force, but is cast an Anglo-Saxon warrior whose crucifixion was an act of courage and daring; the cross is no longer an abstract symbol of human redemption, but is a tree with a particular history relating its own intensely dramatic story of humiliation, humility and pride.

There is a second significant change which occurred with the Latinization of Old English that has a bearing on the appropriateness of the original Old English for translating classic Chinese culture. With the rapid spread of Latin high culture, Britain was progressively transformed from a fundamentally oral culture into a chirographically controlled literal

culture. The English language moved from the orality of a rhapsodic and "living" Old English toward the kind of literacy promoted by an analytic and "dead" Latin and classical Greek. Culture as the immediate revelation of the heroic unconscious of a living people gradually gave way to the abstractions of a learned academy.

But what are the specific features that distinguish an oral culture from a literate one? Water J. Ong argues persuasively that the differences are fundamental, and can be articulated in terms of significantly different thought processes, conceptions of personal agency and social structures. Much of what he has to say is familiar to us from the distinction between poetry which evokes (presents) one. Paraphrasing and augmenting Ong's insights and observations, the oral mind can be distinguished from the literate in the following terms.

An oral tradition tends to be formulaic, patterned and dependent upon mnemonic devices such as metrically tailored sequences, parallels, proverbs, aphorisms and riddles. Recurrent quasi-historical allusions to memorable figures and events are repositories through which experience is stored and continued. It proceeds additively rather than through the patterns of subordination we find in literate culture: "And ... And ... And ... " rather than "... who ... which ... that ... " Oral language tends to be aggregative, epithetic and even clichéd where literate language is analytic (not oaks and soldiers, but repeatedly "sturady oaks" and "brave soldiers"). The oral "texts" tends to be redundant or "copious," and does not have the sparsely linear pattern of literate prosody. The oral presentation is characterized by minor variations on old and familiar formulas and themes, and hence tends to be conservative and traditionalist when compared to the more innovative possibilities of the literate text. Oral expression generates a complex history of variations and redactions, resisting the verbatim repetition we associate with the written word.

The order of the oral and literate presentations is different. The oral culture follows no strict chronological or linear order, but tends to introduce boxes within boxes created by thematic recurrences and allusions. There is no tight climatic plot. It tends to be rhapsodic: a medley of miscellaneous images patched together and collected sometimes rather randomly in recitation. Pieces of "text" are sown together correlatively out of concrete situations and operations ("axe, chop, tree, sap") creating images rather than following conceptually and logically ("tools") in the more categorical and abstract mode of linear, sequential exposition.

Given the immediacy and temporality of the oral culture, orality favors contact with concrete human experience, and tends to express the abstract, distant and objective by assimilating it to the immediate and familiar: a preponderance of colorful images and metaphors rather than the more stark language of concepts.

The hearing-dominance that attends oral expression encourages empathy and participation—it incorporates, unifies and harmonizes, and fosters homeostasis in the communal organism.

The scop or "historian-minstrel" would shape his familiar story to accommodate the interests and responses of his audience. The story line would be interactive and negotiated in a co-creative process that would seek middle ground between the talents of the orator and the dispositions of his audience. On the other hand, the sight-dependence of literature tends to separate, isolate and dissect—it entails exteriority and alterity, separating the intention of the author irrevocably from the particular sentiments of the reader.

We can appropriate Ong's distinction between an oral and a literate culture for our distinction of Lau's translations on two levels. Firstly, anyone familiar with the general nature and structure of a classical Chinese text recognizes many similarities between it and the oral tradition as Ong is inclined to describe it. This familiarity is undoubtedly a function of the role that orality plays in the birthing process of a written Chinese text. Since a written text can be the record of an oral tradition and can preserve many of the organizational features of its oral origins, the distinction between an oral culture and a literate one is at best tentative. Lau recounts in some detail the process whereby a text is standardized in his description of the gradual emergence of the *Lao Tzu*. He rehearses the principles of compilation that can be adduced from the *Lao Tzu* and other contemporaneous works, and attempts to lift the infrastructure of the *Lau Tzu* text to the surface by dividing its 81 chapters into 196 distinguishable sections. He sets off its rhymed passages, notes what is seemingly interpolated commentary, and does whatever is necessary to mark off further layers of arrangement without dissolving the traditional order. According to Lau, perhaps the most familiar pattern of composition is the correlation of seemingly isolated passages on the basis of some topical similarity, where relevance of association can be as thin and elusive as the mere repetition of one or two catchwords, if it exists at all. In all of this effort to identify the seams between the shorter units, to reveal the looseness of the stitching, and to caution the reader against any linear and sequential reading of the text, Lau is as worried about an order or logic that we might unwittingly impose upon the text as one that we might overlook.

The oral use the text would be put to even after it had congealed into a literate form is another factor that would associate the Chinese text with the oral tradition. As Lau again suggests, the aphoristic passages of the literate text might well have served as rote centerpieces for oral commentary and discussion. The orality implicit in the development and use of the Chinese text would seem to recommend Anglo-Saxon over Latinized English as its medium for translation.

A second level on which Ong's characterization of oral culture can be related to the Chinese tradition can be seen in his claim that people resident in oral traditions thinks differently from members of literate cultures. This difference between the "correlative" mode of thinking associated with orality contrasts with the more "analytic" or "conceptual" mode

of thinking associated with literacy. This contrast between analytic and correlative thinking is precisely the language I have used to distinguish the thought processes that characterizes a Western world view dominated as it is by dualistic metaphysics, and the correlativity that features so prominently in the articulation of the traditional Chinese world view. One immediate signal of this contrast between the dominant Western world view and its Chinese counterpart is the vocabulary of philosophic reflection. The inventory of dualistic categories pervasive in Western philosophy such as reality/appearance, God/world, reason/experience, mind/body, form/matter, knowledge/opinion, object/subject and so on, tends to suggest an ontological disparity and independence as a condition of the opposition between them. God is more real than and stands independent of his created world. Chinese philosophy, on the other hand, appeals to the correlative language of heaven 天/earth 地, *yin* 阴/*yang* 阳, thing (*t'I* 体)/function (*yung* 用), pattern (*li* 理)/energy (*ch'I* 气), guest 客/host 主, husband 夫/wife 妇, ruler 君/subject 臣, father 父/son 子, where the opposites are complementary and mutually entailing. Once again, the correlativity implicit in the Anglo-Saxon oral tradition and its world view resonates comfortably with the correlativity that is pervasive in the basic vocabulary of Chinese philosophy.

Finally, there are ways in which the Anglo-Saxon language works that make it particularly adaptable for capturing linguistic concerns important to Chinese. Old English is more concrete than are Latin derivations: "to grasp" evokes an image more readily than to "to comprehend;" "cow" is more immediately present to the mind than "beef." This same evocative concreteness and concern to focus images is an often remarked on feature of the Chinese language. But the commonality does not stop here. An important feature of the Anglo-Saxon language that it owes to its teutonic roots is kenning: the construction of compounds or even phrases by juxtaposing words and images. For example, the ocean is the "whale's-bath," the "foaming-fields," or the "sea-wood," the "wave-courser," or the "broad-bosomed;" the king is the "leader-of-hosts," the "giver-of-rings," the "protector-of-earls" or the "heroes-treasure-keeper." These polynomial constructions do the work of abstraction by conjuring one image out of two or more. In this process of kenning, sound was not irrelevant. Often visual, imagistic clarity would be sacrificed in some degree in order to achieve an aural effect. This capacity for kenning—the creation of new meanings by juxtaposing and compounding concrete metaphors—enables the language to express the abstractions of science, theology and philosophy while maintaining the vividness and vitality of the immediate image. Where there was a need for Old English to import a new idea, rather than appropriating the new word from the foreign language, it would frequently exercise this option of adapting its own resources.

The capacity of Old English for kenning is reminiscent of the way in which the pre-Buddhist Chinese language functioned on demand to generate its abstractions, to maintain

the focus of its concrete images, and to appropriate ideas from foreign sources.

In addition to Lau's use of the Anglo-Saxon language, another distinctive feature of his contribution is his profile as sinologists. The contemporary North American predilection for discipline and methodology over area studies that has, within the American academy, increasingly rendered the sinologist a dinosaur, has not been duplicated in Europe broadly, and certainly not in Britain. And an argument can be made that the specificity of sinological skills, accumulated in response to particular projects, is more commensurate with the demands of the Chinese tradition than the abstract disciplinary skills of the North American philosopher, historian or literary critic. That is, the intellectual tradition of China and the corpus that reports on it does not resolve tidily into ahistorically defined disciplines and culturally independent methodologies, but tends to be biographical, situational and resolutely historical. It is interesting that, in spite of Lau's professional training as a philosopher, his career has been shaped by working on those canonical texts which constitute the interdisciplinary core of the Chinese intellectual tradition.

This present anthology then, ranging across many disciplines, authored by scholars from three generations of sinology, and representing both the Western and the Chinese sides of Lau's career, appeals for its logic and its coherence to the man who is being celebrated by it. It is hopefully an intellectual profile of D. C. Lau—philosopher, historian, anthropologist, philologist, man of letters. Each of the contributions represents a dimension of Lau's own contribution by academics and friends grateful to Lau for their own professional and personal reasons.

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【问题与思考】

1. 在理雅各着手翻译《道德经》时他是如何重新思考"道"这一范畴的？这次的认识与先前有什么不同？

2. 欧阳桢对理雅各进行了哪些批评？这些批评为什么会受到质疑？

3. 理雅各作为译者的主体身份特征是如何在他的翻译活动中体现出来的？

4. Waley 作为翻译者有哪些身份特征？这些身份特征是如何在翻译过程中具体体现出来的？

5. Waley 对中国诗歌的翻译观念的变化轨迹是什么？

6. 刘殿爵是如何通过翻译阐释中国文化的？

7. 刘殿爵为什么主张用日常语言翻译中国哲学概念？

第四章　汉籍英译的策略与技巧

导　论

在思考翻译技巧和策略时，翻译者往往会采取一种二元对立的思维方式，即通过二元对立思维对翻译技巧进行取舍，不是直译就是意译，或者要么异化要么就是归化。其实，在很多情况下，翻译者需要中和两种对立的翻译方法，采取一条翻译的“中庸之道”。

在汉籍英译的初期，特别是传教士为了传教的需要，往往使用“格义”的翻译方法。之所以这样是出于他们对自己翻译目的的考量。为了说明他们所传播的宗教教义同中国的思想特别是儒家思想有相通之处，以便更加有效地传播宗教，翻译者通过格义在英语中找到与儒家思想中的范畴或术语表面类似的对应词，不无强加式地将它们相互等同。比如将《论语》中的“天”翻译成 Heaven。这种格义的方法实际上是一种类比的方法，存在着诸多的消极面。其中一个消极影响就是用表面的类似掩盖了内在的、实质性的差异。这样反而会让西方读者误解中国的文化。“格义”的翻译方法从某种意义上讲就是一种“归化”的翻译策略的体现。但是如果摈弃“格义”这种归化式的翻译方法，而一味地去采取“异化”的方法，也就是直译的方法，那么可能就会让译入语读者难以理解目的语文化的内涵。那么，如果使用直译的翻译方法，在一些情况下需要启用补偿的翻译手段。翻译的补偿方法分为文内补偿和文外补偿两种。文内补偿一般是借助上下文，进行“失之东隅收之桑榆”式的意义弥补；而文外补偿则是通过注释的手段对因翻译损失掉的内容加以说明和解释。这两种补偿手段的目的都是为了尽量减少翻译带来的意义缺损。

总而言之，无论是直译还是意译，无论是异化还是归化，都可以将翻译的方法和策略归结为两大类：“镜”式翻译和“灯”式翻译。前者主要通过尽量减少翻译者的主体性干扰，客观地还原原文的文本性，相应的翻译态度是科学的、理性的；而后者则是在某种程度上允许翻译者的主体性干扰，甚至创造性地发挥译者的主观能动性，或多或少地让译文沾染上译者的主体性色彩。不过，过分强调哪一种翻译路向，都会给翻译带来得不偿失的结果。翻译者应该在翻译的过程中中和两类翻译路向，最大限度上避免翻译的极端化。

选 文

选文一 On Translation of Taoist Philosophical Texts: Preservation of Ambiguity and Contradiction

Jesse Fleming

导 言

本文选自美国杂志 *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*，1998 年第 25 期。

作者 Jesse Fleming 曾是美国夏威夷大学的博士，专攻中国古代哲学，特别是庄子哲学。他的博士论文 *Chuang Tsu and the Problem of Personal Identity: A Study of Identity and Interrelatedness* 探讨了庄子哲学的基本问题，尤其是对庄子关于个体身份的观点进行了追问。

他在当下这篇文章中提出了道家哲学文本的翻译观念。由于针对的是哲学文本的翻译，所以他把自己的翻译观建立在一些哲学家对语言的认识和理解之上。这些哲学家包括柏拉图、尼采、海德格尔、维特根斯坦、索绪尔、奥斯汀和塞尔等人。作者运用海德格尔关于翻译与阐释关系的阐述，认为翻译过程离不开翻译者的阐释行为，同时又强调不能过分依赖译者自身的阐释或是与原语文本同时代的阐释。无论是参考译者自己的阐释还是原语文本共时的阐释，翻译者要准确地把握对阐释的依赖程度。文章继而借助维特根斯坦“意义即用法”的语言哲学观念，抛弃对原语文本客观意义的还原，而是建议译者致力于在译文中还原原文文本的施为性。文章指出，以《老子》和《庄子》为代表的道家文本旨在产生的冲击力不仅仅针对读者的 Weltanschauung 即“概念程式”，而且更为重要的是针对读者的存在方式。所以，构成文本意义的是“做的什么”，而不是“说的什么”。道家哲学文本通过演示给读者如何去做来传达“意义”，而这种“意义”却是常规性逻辑规则、语言和道德律例所无法捕捉到的。基于这种语言观，道家哲学文本充斥着悖论和自相矛盾的话语。作者主张道家哲学文本的翻译也同样需要采用原文的语言策略，不能通过迫使概念性词语带上具体的、特定的以及排斥性的“意义”来违背原文所蕴含的哲学精神和意图。道家哲学文本的翻译应该力图保留原文的缝隙、空白、矛盾、未定性、歧义性等，这才是翻译道家哲学文本的理想模式。

“Language which can be believed is not beautiful; beautiful language is not believable.”

Lao Tzu, ch. LXXI.

There are a number of issues in the philosophy of translation which are crucial. First is the question whether the translator should be trying to uncover and convey the author(s)' "meaning"/intention or the text's "meaning," since of course texts often don't say what authors intend. Another important issue is whether the translator's task is to recover/retrieve the text's original meaning which it had for readers at the time of its composition or whether the translator should instead seek to make the text "relevant" and meaningful to his contemporaries; perhaps this explains why plays written by Shakespeare and others are sometimes performed in modern idiom, stage setting, and garb, and also why it seems necessary that each generation provide its own re-translation of classics such as *Homer*, *Lao Tzu*, etc. A related question is whether or not it is necessary or even helpful to engage in more or less speculative etymology, searching out the earliest root meanings of words (in the way Heidegger, Wohlfart, and Ames do, for example) in order to get the full connotation of words as they have been used more recently; in the case of Chinese words, it is particularly tempting to do this since most Chinese "characters"/graphs are pictographic and/or ideographic in nature and highly suggestive. Another classic issue, perhaps first raised by Plato, is whether the translator should ignore the figural (the metaphoric, idiomatic, puns, etc.) and concentrate on the literal, this is particularly a problem in philosophical texts such as those by Nietzsche and Chuang Tzu which are poetic and playful.[1] A related question is when, if ever, the emotional content of a text (as in lyrical poetry) should take priority over its conceptual content in the translator's work. A different question raised by Heidegger is whether certain languages (e. g. Greek) are especially difficult, or even impossible, to translate into other languages (e. g. Latin); it seems obvious that in general languages from different linguistic families (e. g. Chinese and English) will be more difficult to translate into each other, than languages sharing distant roots (e. g. German and English). Another of the many issues raised by Heidegger regarding the philosophy of translation of philosophical texts, is the supposed distinction between translation and interpretation; like Heidegger, I would argue that all translation involves some degree, as simple reading does, of "interpretation"—there is no simple reading off the surface of a text of its obvious objective meaning. Yet another puzzling problem in the theory of translation/interpretation is when and why ought readers and translators rely on a commentarial tradition when interpreting (ancient) texts. This is particularly a problem in the Chinese hermeneutic tradition; for example, readers and translators (into *pai hua*, modern colloquial, spoken Chinese) of classical Chinese texts such as the I *Ching* and the *Lao Tzu* rely, in my opinion, too much on the authoritative commentaries of Wang Pi and Chu Hsi.[2] On the other hand, according to "Taoist Logic" at work in such texts (as I will briefly explain it below), the "opposite" view—that later commentarial traditions and interpretations are not mere extraneous accretions but actually complete/complement the "Urtext"—must also have some degree of truth or validity, even though this may seem to contradict what I just argued above. A related issue is to what degree a translator ought to rely on contemporaneous/synchronic

texts written at the same time as the one undergoing translation; in my own view, in general it is useful if not indispensable to know what other authors meant at a certain historical period by certain technical terms in order to fully understand what a text of that period means, and the Chinese philosophical tradition constitutes a special case insofar as it is radically intertextual. In other words, I would argue that it is impossible to understand a single text in that tradition in isolation from its historical context in a way that is even more extreme than the Western philosophical tradition where certainly one needs to know Plato and Aristotle, for example, in order to understand Hegel or Heidegger, for example. Finally, and perhaps most fundamental is the question, "What makes a translation a good and accurate one, or a bad and inaccurate one?" Of course to answer this question we must first have some clear notion of what "translation" is.

Let us begin, then, this exposition on the *Tao* of translation, by assuming that "translation" (*Uebersetzung*) is a kind of transferring or carrying over of the original "meaning" of a given text from one language into another. Immediately we are faced with the philosophical question: What is the meaning of "meaning?" In the history of Western philosophy (and literary theory) there have been many proposed definitions of "meaning" (e. g. Frege's famous distinction between *Sinn*/sense and Bedeutung/reference). But, when considering the case of the Chinese philosophical tradition, the theories of the later Wittgenstein (in his *Philosphische Untersuchungen*) seem most applicable. Wittgenstein, of course, argued that "meaning is use and that there is a difference between saying and showing. His theory that the meaning of language lies not in its mimetic mapping of the world's ontological structure, but rather in its use in a life-game by life-forms, was picked up by later Anglo-Saxon philosophers such as Austin and Searle and developed into "speech act" philosophy which sees all language as basically performative, as having not only some abstract conceptual (locutionary) content, but more importantly a perlocutionary or illocutionary "force" or meaning. Recent scholars of Chinese philosophy such as Chad Hansen (*A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought*)[3] and Wu Kuang-rning (*Chuang Tzu: World Philosopher at Play*, and *The Butterfly as Companion*)[4] have argued that the language of classical Chinese philosophical texts is fundamentally performative or evocative. According to this view, the "meaning" of texts such as the *Lao Tzu* (the *Tao-re Ching*) and the *Chuang Tzu* lies precisely in the intended impact not merely on the reader's *Weltanschauung* or conceptual scheme, but more importantly on the reader's way of living. Thus, the "meaning" of these texts is precisely what they show or do rather than merely what they say. The paradoxes, parables, etc. in these texts are often not meant to *tell us*, the readers/translators, anything, rather, their meaning lies in what they do to us by *showing* us that converntional logic, language, and morality fail to capture the truth. Hence, the successful translation of these Taoist texts will also show as well as say what Taoist philosophy means, and will retain the impact which the original has on the reader.

If the texts known as the *Lao Tzu* and the *Chuang Tzu* "mean" anything at all, they

"mean" that we should give up our habitual, rigid, moralistic judgment of things as falling neatly into opposing categories such as good/bad, true (*shih*[a])/false (*fei*[b]), useful/useless, Being (*you*[c])/ Nonbeing (*wu*[d]), speech/silence, action/inaction, etc. which we mistakenly assume to be mutually exclusive, and together exhaustive. Taoist philosophy is a radical relativism/perspectivalism (metaphysically, epistemologically, ethically) as well as a mystical philosophy[5] which questions the validity of logico-linguistic dichotomies/distinctions such as the ones above, and which more than anything advocates a nonjudgmental, spontaneous, playful way of living. Like the *koans* of the Zen tradition, much of the language in these texts means to induce in readers a condition of amoral, arational quietude, equanimity and silence—an aptitude for seeing and adapting rather than always reasoning things through logically and then indulging in what Heidegger calls inauthentic (*Uneigentlich*) "idle chatter" (*Gerede*); the goal is a state of mind beyond simple-minded judging of things and people in terms of mutually exclusive "opposites."

What does all this have to do with the translator's job when tackling these Taoist texts? My general claim is that the strategies and guidelines for translation of philosophical texts may be influenced by the philosophy embodied in those texts. In the special case of Taoist texts, the Taoist philosophy of paradox and apparent self-contradiction calls for a special strategy differing from the strategy of translating Confucian texts (which lack such a paradoxical philosophy). Translators of Taoist philosophical texts should not violate the spirit and intent of this philosophy by trying to force its conceptual terms to have specific, definite, exclusive "meanings." Instead, they should try to preserve the contradiction and ambiguity intrinsic to the original Chinese terms and phrases being translated. Many terms such as *chih*[e] (knowledge), *yen*[f] (language), and *te*[g] ("virtue"), seem to have self-contradictory, inconsistent meanings. But, no concept in Taoist philosophy is more slippery (i. e. signifier and signified are loosely connected) and polysemous (ambigubus) than the concept of *Tao*, which is characterized as both Being and Nonbeing, as both transcendent and immanent, as a reservoir which cannot be depleted and yet can be neglected and damaged (through mindless moralizing), and which can and cannot be spoken of. So, the translator of these texts must try to avoid the pitfall of trying to provide consistent logical translations/interpretations of such key concepts, since in the original texts they lack such semantic precision and since such a translation would have an unintended impact on the reader—encouraging continued logical thinking and moral judging in terms of pairs of mutually exclusive opposites. To seek consistency and clarity where there is none is to distort the original text's "meaning" (i. e. intended impact on the reader's response). Taoism, as a philosophy which revels in contradiction, indeterminacy, and silence (the unsaid), should not be "charitably" reconstructed in translation/interpretation by forcing it artificially to be consistent and clear. Rather, as Wolfgang Iser[6] argued thirty years ago, readers need to "formulate the unformulated" for themselves.

To deny readers the opportunity to encounter and struggle with the contradictions and

ambiguities found in the original texts is to prevent the text from working on them and enabling them to experience Taoist perspectivalism and not merely understand it conceptually. The translated text should not be forced in a Procrustean fashion to say explictly, what the original text (perhaps) only implies.

In other words in translation of Taoist texts, the danger is not only that something is lost, but also that something is added. Where there are gaps/lacunae or seeming contradictions in the oroginal text, there should be gaps/lacunae and contradictions in the translated version. The indeterminate should remain indeterminate, the unsaid unsaid, the ambiguous and ambivalent, ambiguous and ambivalent. This is to nourish in the reader the irony, and "playfulness" (in the Gadamerian[7] sense) and to provide the reader with a "transitional space" (cf. Winnicot) wherein he can complete the text's meaning for himself. Heidegger was worried that the entire Western tradition of metaphysics forgot about "Being" (Sein). One might better worry that the entire Western philosophical tradition and our translators of Asian philosophy have forgotten about Nonbeing (*wu*).

To illustrate my point, I would like to compare how a typical Confucian text could be translated and how an important line from a Taoist text (the *Lao Tzu*) should be translated. Whereas a straightforward, literal, consistent translation of the opening line of the Analects by Confucius ("To have a friend come from afar, is this not a pleasure?") is permissible, no such nailve and simple-minded translation of the *Lao Tzu* is justifiable. The *Lao Tzu* begins with the sentence, "The *Tao* which can be taken to be the *Tao*, is not the constant *Tao*; the name which can be named is not the constant name;" these lines are followed by a couplet which in the original Chinese is, I would argue, intentionally ambiguous *wu ming T'ien-ti chih shih*, *you ming wan-wu chih mu*[h]. Both Chinese and Western translators have long disputed about whether these lines should be translated, "'on-Being' names the beginning of Heaven and Earth; 'Being' names the mother of the myriad things" (as Ch'en Ku-ying, Ames, and others do)[8], or as, "(Conceived of as) having no name, it is the Originator of heaven and earth (conceived of as) having a name, it is the Mother of all things" (as for example James Legge does).[9] The compound terms opening each parallel line (i. e. *wu-ming*[i], and *you-ming*[j]) may be translated/interpreted as either "Nonbeing" or "the Nameless" and as either "Being is the name." or as "the Named," respectively.[10] But, if one bears in mind the overall point of view of Taoist philosophy regarding paradox, then surely the translator should not feel it necessary to choose one or the other of these translations/interpretations. Rather, he should try to find a way to convey both seemingly inconsistent translations/interpretations.

Here I must confess that I'm not sure, in practice, how this is to be done, anymore than I'm sure I've not been tilting at windmills (i. e. arguing "straw-man" arguments) since in fact most translators/interpreters do in fact often retain contradiction and ambiguity found in the original.

However, I can offer the following concrete advice based on the Appendix by Wing

Tsitchan in his Source Book of *Chinese Philosophy* where he briefly discusses problems of translation of Chinese philosophical texts. He argues that often it is better to not translate, but only transliterate (into romanized phonetic form), such key terms as *Tao* (which of course is in fact what most translators already do).[11] This seems to me a particularly valid strategy since according to post-modernist literary theory influenced by de Saussure's structuralist linguistics, a signifier such as "*Tao*" only gains significance by fitting into a nexus/matrix of related signifiers which it is nor. It is such *differences* which are defining, and only by leaving these key terms (Heidegger's *Grundworte*, "Basic Words") untranslated that they are able to function much like algebraic variables, deriving their meaning from their context. Just as the *Tao* itself is characterized as the axis/pivot/hinge upon which all things depend in their cyclic rotation, so too the word/concept "*Tao*" is at the center of a constellation of other words/concepts (such as *te*[k] *ming*[l], *yin/yang*[m], etc.) all of which orbit around this central concept and gain their meaning by differing from each other.

Were there time, I would like to pursue other analogies regarding "translation" such as the "translation" of the unconscious (symptoms, symbols, etc.) into consciousness in psychoanalysis, or the "translation" of thought into action, or the "translation" of a musical score into a live performance we can hear, etc.[12] Especially intriguing and suggestive would be a comparison between translation and comparative philosophy, insofar as the latter involves a transference of an alien thought system into a more familiar one.[13] They share some problematics, such as what are the precise units of translation or interpretation (i. e. words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs in the one case, and particular thoughts, systems, traditions, etc. on the other). Also, as Heidegger pointed out in regard to translation, it brings one home to one's own language which is always undergoing a kind of internal "translation," so likewise does comparative philosophy open one's eyes to things in one's own philosophical tradition or perspective which one had not before noted. And, finally, a point perhaps of particular interest in this post-modern, post-colonial era of political correctness is that it is somewhat ironic that whereas many English-speaking translators or English-speaking comparative philosophers might seem to be trying to encourage pluralism and alterity through their introduction of non-English texts or philosophies, perhaps in fact there is an unfortunate unintended tendency of the English-speaking tradition/culture/ideology to dominate other minority traditions/cultures/ideologies and set itself up as the model in terms of which the "other" must define itself. Thus, for example, the translator who introduces a foreign text (or the philosopher who introduces a foreign philosophy through a comparison with a more familiar one) runs the risk of encouraging all concerned to view the target text (or philosophy) as derivative and secondary, requiring interpretation in terms of the more fundamental home language (or philosophy), in spite of their good intention.[14]

Notes:

1. In my own opinion, all language is metaphorical, even this sentence—a view I would attribute, by the way, to both Nietzsche and Chuang Tzu.
2. After all Wang Bi lived around 250 A. D. and Chu Hsi around 1200 A. D. —at least 500 years and 1400 years, respectively, after the most recent parts of the *I Ching* were composed.
3. Oxford University Press, 1992.
4. Scholar's Press, 1982, and SUNY Press, 1990, respectively.
5. By "mystical" philosophy, I mean a philosophy which denies that language and logic are capable of straightforwardly presenting the truth to us for example, the *Imo Tzu* says that, "Those who speak do not know, and those who know do not speak."
6. *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.
7. See the last thud of Gadamer's *Wuhrheit und Methode*.
8. See Ch'en Ku-ying's *Lao Tzu chin-chu chin-i chi p'ing-chieh*, Taipei: Shang-Wu YinShu Kuan, 1976, and the English translation of Ch'en Ku-ying's book by Rhett Y. W. Young and Roger Ames, *Lao Tzu: Text, Notesand Comments*, R. O. C. : Chinese Matcrials Center, 1981.
9. Wing-tsit Chan offers a similar translation/interpretation: "The Nameless is the origin of Heaven and Earth,/The Named is the mother of all things," *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
10. For a definitive discussion of a similarly ambiguous line from the *Lao Tzu* (ch. 25: *Tao fa tzu-jan*) see Gunter Wohlfart's "Truth lies in Translation. Philosophische Bemerkungen zu Wahrheit und Luege von Uebersetzungen am Beispiel einer Passage aus dem Laozi," presented at the 9th Symposium of the Academic du Midi, in Covilha, Portugal, May 24, 1997. Prof. Wohlfart's opinions regarding preservation of ambiguity in translation of Taoist texts seems not too different from my own (p. 12). "Koennte sich die Problematik der Uebersetzung nicht als eine Scheinproblematik erweisen, resultierend aus westlicher Entweder/Oder-Logik?"
11. In his Appendix, "On Translating Certain Chinese Philosophical Terms," Chan remarks: "Some terms are so complicated in their meanings, like *yin* (dark, negative, passive, or female principle, force, or element) and its opposite, *yang*, that they have to be transliterated."
12. For an indepth discussion of the parallels between translation of texts and "translation" of the unconscious into consciousness, see Andrew Benjamin's *Translation and the Nature of Philosophy*, (Routledge, 1989), chapter 5 "Psychoanalysis and Translation."
13. Of course, there are fascinating and illuminating comparisons to be made between comparative philosophy and comparative literature, both are attempts to "translate" some idea, image, symbol, etc. from one context into another. Both have a dangerous tendency to emphasize similarities at the cost of important differences, just as in "translation" the translator may seek to convey conceptual similarities and neglect important differences as though they didn't exist, thus deceiving the uninformed reader.
14. This point was suggested to me by two papers in *Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy*, edited by Gerald J. Larson and Eliot Deutsch, Princeton University Press, 1988; namely, "Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be," by Daya Krishna, and "What is Comparative Philosophy Comparing?" by Raimundo Panikkar.

Chinese Glossary

a 是

b 非
c 有
d 无
e 知
f 言
g 德
h 无名天地之始，有名万物之母
i 无名
j 有名
k 德
l 命
m 阴/阳

选文二　Problems of Translation

James Liu

导　言

本文选自刘若愚的 *The Poetry of Li Shang-Yin*, *Ninth Century Baroque*, *Chinese Poet* 序言，芝加哥大学出版社，1969 年。

刘若愚曾为美国斯坦福大学教授，专攻中西比较诗学，拥有多部著译作，其中包括《中国诗歌艺术》(*The Art of Chinese Poetry*)、《中国文学理论》(*Chinese Theories of Literature*)、《李商隐的诗歌》(*The Poetry of Li Shang-yin*)、《跨语言批评家》(*The Interlingual Critic*)、《中国游吟诗人》(*The Chinese Knight-Errant*)、《北宋主要词人》(*Major Liricists of the Northern Sung*)等。这里所选取的文章是他为自己英译的李商隐诗集《李商隐的诗歌》(*The Poetry of Li Shangyin*)中的前言。在文章中，刘若愚认为，翻译诗歌是要将原诗的语言结构再生出来，尽可能地让译入语的读者同译出语的读者获得相同的阅读效果，这是诗歌翻译的目的。但是，如同一幅画的两个观看者或是一首乐曲的两个演奏者那样，诗歌的翻译者很难取得同原诗人对一首诗相同的解读。从理论角度上讲，诗歌既不能直译也不能意译，需要在这两种翻译方法之间找到一个中间位置，但是在具体的翻译操作中，不同的译者所找的这个中间位置又不尽相同。如何准确地判断这个中间位置，刘若愚用自己对李商隐诗歌的英译给出了自己的说明。他在翻译过程中往往会穷尽所有译法的可能性，然后分析每种可能所带来的审美层面上的影响。比如用拉丁学名 *Sterculia platanifolia* 翻译“梧桐”会丧失掉“梧桐”在中国古诗中所特有的意象特征，而用音译的方式来翻译又会让译入语读者不知所云。因为文化差异造成的诗歌的不可译性问题往往可以通过变通的方式加以解决。例如，并未

将“月斜楼上五更钟”中的“楼”直译出来，而是用 roof 表达，这样既保留了原诗的意境，同时也避免了选择上的两难，因为“楼”在英语中可以理解为 tower，mansion 等；况且，如果直接音译为 *lou* 则会带来英语读者理解上的困难，原诗的意境也全失。

刘若愚也同叶威廉一样，对中国古典诗歌的意象非常重视，将其视为诗歌中“最重要的元素”，“应该以任何代价使其躲过翻译这一劫”。不过，翻译者需要注意的是，在处理意象的时候最好避免添加新的意象或最好让意象起死回生。当然，也有失之东隅收之桑榆的情况。比如将“秋波”翻译成 autumn waves 就被认为是歪打正着，同上一句的关于水的意象呼应了起来。强行把意象翻译出来后，势必会影响审美元素的传达，除了借助诗内进行补偿之外，有时还必须通过诗外的手段如注释来补偿，这种诗外补偿方式只能是诗歌翻译的下策。

Robert Frost's well-known quip that poetry is what disappears in translation is if we take it to mean that no translation of poetry can ever be a perfect-creation of the original: even if a translation succeeds in being a perfect poem, it is bound to be a different poem from the original. The remark is not true, however, if it is understood to imply a concept of "poetry" as a mysterious entity or substance distinct from the actual "poem." In fact, if the Coleridgean distinction between "poetry" and "poem" were true,[1] presumably one would be able to extract this substance called "poetry" and inject it into a new "poem" in another language. This, unfortunately, one cannot do. "Poetry" is simply a collective name for "poems," and each poem is a unique verbal symbol with its own polyphonic structure of sound, meaning, and imagery.[2] When a reader follows and responds to the development of this verbal structure, he re-creates the poem. In other words, a poem has no separate existence apart from the poet's experience of creating it in his mind, and the reader's of re-creating it in *his* mind. Of course, no two readers will respond to the same poem in exactly the same way, just as no two spectators of a painting will see exactly the same picture, and no two pianists will play the same piece of music in exactly the same manner. Nevertheless, among readers of similar linguistic and cultural backgrounds and comparable experience and sensibility, there should be sufficient common ground for them to talk about the same "poem." Similarly, the poem in the poet's own mind and that re-created by a reader immersed in the same cultural tradition and endowed with the requisite knowledge and sensibility should have sufficient in common to justify calling the latter the same poem. Therefore, to translate a poem is to try to reproduce the verbal structure of the original, so that the reader of the translation will respond to is, as far as possible, in the same way that the translator responded to the original poem, thereby re-creating, to some extent, what the poet original created. Such, I believe, is the aim of translating poetry.

In attempting to achieve this aim, every translator is faced with the eternal dilemma between "literal" and "literary" translation, and has to steer a dangerous course between the Scylla of dull pedantry and the Charybdis of irresponsible dilettantism. Absolute literalness

in translation is not only undesirable but at times impossible, as I shall endeavor to show below. On the other hand, excessive freedom will result in a new poem, good or bad as the case may be, which will bear little or no relation to the original and will have ceased to be a translation. In translating Chinese poetry, particularly Li Shang-yin's poetry, into English, one is faced with this dilemma at every turn—with regard to individual words, imagery, allusions, syntax, rhythm, and the like. Even if all would-be translators agreed in theory that one should aim at the "golden mean" between extreme literalness and free rendering, in practice probably no two translators would agree where precisely the golden mean lies in each given case, and every translators would have to decide for himself. I shall now discuss some of the problems involved in translating Li Shang-yin's poems, and explain how I tried to meet them.

To begin with individual words: one cannot draw easy equations between Chinese and English words even on the literal level, since the referents of Chinese words may not have precise counterparts in the West. That is to say, a Chinese word may refer to an object which does not exist in the West and for which there is therefore no English word. *Flora and fauna* provide obvious examples. Many Chinese flowers and trees have no English names, only Latin names, which, as Professor David Hawkes remarked, "no translator of any literary pretentions whatever could for a moment consider using."[3] One might add that even if one threw all aesthetic considerations to the winds, it is doubtful whether a Western reader would be familiar with such botanical terms. One might as well transliterate the Chinese word, and write *wu-t'ung*, for instance, instead of *Sterculia platanifolia* for this particular tree. However, transliteration should only be used as a last resort: if used too often, it will defeat the very purpose of translation. Another method (one of several used by Hawkes) is to translate the Chinese name literally. This can be applied only to a Chinese name with an obvious meaning but cannot be used for a word like *wu-t'ung*, which is simply the name of a tree with no other meaning. Moreover, in using this method one runs the risk of attracting undue attention to the literal meaning of what, to the Chinese, is no more than a name. For example, if we were to translate *mu-tan* as "male vermilion" instead of "peony," the reader would be intrigued by this fanciful name and distracted from the image of the flower. On the whole, when an approximate English equivalent exists, it is better to use it than to transliterate or to translate birds as well as to actual flora and fauna. It is true that *lung* and *feng* are not the same creatures as "dragon" and "phoenix" in Western mythology, but most Western readers are probably by now familiar with these words as translations from Chinese and may have seen pictorial representations of these fabulous creatures, so that there seems to be little danger that anyone would think of the kind of dragon killed by St. George or of the Egyptian phoenix when encountering these words in a translation of Chinese poetry.

Sometimes a Chinese word has more than one referent and therefore requires different translations in different contexts. A constant problem is the word *lou*, which is used for any

building of two or more stories and can refer to various objects, such as a turret on the city wall, a tower, an elaborate pleasure pavilion, or even the staircase in a building, one might use "tower;" if he seems to be emphasizing its splendor, one might use "mansion." And when Li Shang-yin writes, "moon slants over *lou*" (in Poem 4), since he is concerned with the effect of the moonlight on the roof of the *lou* rather than the shape of the *lou* itself, I think one is justified in translating this as "the moonlight slants over the roof."

Of course, the "meaning" of a word includes not only its referent but also its implications and associations.[4] The apparent English equivalent of a Chinese word may in fact carry quite different implications. For example, as I once pointed out, the word *tsui*, commonly translated as "drunk" or "intoxicated," generally implies, when used in poetry, not sensual enjoyment or gay conviviality but an escape from the sorrows of the world into a state of self-oblivion.[5] In my eagerness to correct any wrong impression that Western readers might have formed, I went too far in avoiding the word "drunk" and "intoxicated" altogether and translating *tsui* as "rapt with wine." I now realize that to translate the word this way in all contexts would be absurd, and have fallen back on "drunk" and "intoxicated" in my translations of Li Shang-yin, though I still feel that the reader should be warned that "drunkenness" in Chinese poetry is not quite the same thing as drunkenness in real life, in China or anywhere else.

Then, an English word which has the same referent as a Chinese one may not have the relevant associations, or may even have undesirable ones. The word *liu* refers to the willow tree, but it is often associated with parting, while the word "willow" is not. Faced with such a word, the translator has no choice, to my way of thinking, but to mention in a note that such an association exists. Ideally, of course, the reader should automatically associate the willow with parting, but how could a Western reader do so without being told of the connection between the two—that it was an ancient Chinese custom to break a willow twig when seeing a friend off? Take another example: The word *tu-chuan*, which refers to a bird identified as the cuckoo, has associations, due to a legend, with unhappy illicit love. One may hesitate to translate it as "cuckoo" because of the unfortunate associations of this word in English (although on the other hand the cuckoo features prominently in the first known English poem, "sumer is icumen in," not to mention Wordsworth's "To the Cuckoo"), but should one substitute a more "poetic" bird such as the nightingale, which has associations with the illicit love of Tereus for Philomela? In general, I think that when a translator has to choose between an English word which has the same referent as a Chinese word but lacks the relevant associations, and one which does have similar associations but refers to a different object, he should choose the former, while informing the reader of the associations that the original word evokes. After all, no object is intrinsically more "poetic" than another, and words acquire poetic associations only by usage. Is it too much to hope that the Western reader, having learnt that the willow is associated with parting and the cuckoo with unhappy love, and having encountered these words repeatedly in translations of Chinese poetry, will

eventually respond to them as a Chinese reader does to the original words?

The above discussion on the referents, implications, and associations of words also applies to the imagery evoked by the words. It is generally recognized that imagery is one of the most vital elements of poetry (some even call it the "soul of poetry") and the one that best survives the process of translation and should be kept at all costs. However, a translator has to guard against the danger of adding new imagery to the poem or reviving "dead metaphors" (which I prefer to call "fossilized imagery") in an attempt to improve upon the original. For instance, the expression *yun-pin*, literally "cloud [-like] hair-over-the-temples," is a cliché in Chinese. Originally it was meant to compare a woman's piled-up dark hair falling over the temples to clusters of clouds, but it has long become a fossilized image, as hackneyed as "reven locks" in English. When this expression occurs in one of Li Shang-yin's poems (Poem 6), one might simply translate it as "dark hair" and suppress the fossilized image, since to most readers and presumably to the poet himself it means little more than that. I realized that, in the original poem in line, so that not to translate the former literally is to miss this contrast, between "*dark* hair" and "moon*light.*" In any case, to translate *yun-pin* as "cloudy temples" would hardly convey the original image: would the Western reader realize that "cloudy" is meant to suggest dark color and thick clusters rather than murkiness?

In deciding whether an image is fossilized or not, one has to consider the date of the poem in relation to the earliest known usage of the image, as well as how it is used in the present context. This involves several further considerations, such as whether the image is given a new twist, and whether it is combined with another image. I have suggested elsewhere the criteria for judging imagery and the ways in which a hackneyed image can be given new life;[6] suffice it to give just one example here. In Li Shang-yin's poem *Chamber Music* (Poem 79), he uses the well-worn image "autumn waves" for a woman's eyes, but it is given a new lease of life by being fused with another water image suggested by the preceding line. In such cases, fossilized imagery is at least partially revived and may be preserved in translation.

Problems of translation also arise from allusion, the use of which is a common poetic device in Chinese and forms an essential part of Li Shang-yin's art as a poet. I have attempted previously to describe the various poetic functions of allusions[7] and will not repeat myself here. But, I wish to emphasize two points concerned with translating allusive poems. First, allusions in poetry, if properly used, are not merely substitutes for common nouns or abstract epithets but add something to the total meaning and effect of the poem. For instance, Li Shang-yin alludes many times to Ch'ang-o, who, according to legend, stole her husband King Yi's elixir of life and fled to the moon. Her name is not merely a synonym for "a goddess" or "an immortal" but suggests that the poet is comparing a Taoist nun to this goddess's renunciation of the human world, and Taoist were concerned with the search for the elixir of life. Such allusion, therefore, should be kept in the translation; otherwise many

lines or even whole poems may become pointless. Generally speaking, all allusions should be retained, unless they are so hackneyed that they become idiomatic expressions without any particular significance, comparable to the use of "Romeo" as a vulgar substitute for "lover" in English. They are then no more effective, poetically, than fossilized images, and need not be translated.

The second point about allusions that I wish to stress is that once they are recognized as poetically effective, one should explain them as fully as it is practical to do, since the more a reader knows about the person or story alluded to, the more fully he will understand its significance in the poetic context, and the more definite his response to it will be. The name Ch'ang-o means nothing to a Western reader; when he learns that this is the Chinese goddess of the moon, it means something; and when he is further told the story about her theft of the elixir of life from her husband and her flight to the moon, it becomes even more meaningful. Therefore, I believe it is worthwhile to give the reader as much information as is relevant. After all, reading poetry in one's own language also requires considerable extrapoetic knowledge—of history, cultural environment, previous literature, and so forth—except that this knowledge is assumed to have been assimilated beforehand. In reading translations of poetry which is the product of a different culture, one simply has to absorb such knowledge on an ad hoc basis. I do not see how a conscientious translator can avoid the task of providing such information or how a serious reader can avoid the trouble of reading it. It seems to me that to offer a translation of an allusive Chinese poem to the Western reader without any explanation is like showing a pieta to a Chinese who has never heard of Christianity and expecting him to respond to it, without telling him what it is all about. Nor need one feel undue misgivings that detailed explanations may kill the reader's enjoyment of Chinese poetry. No one whose response to poetry is more than a vague impression of "beauty," mixed with complacency at his own aesthetic sensibility and a sentimental identification with the poet, need fear that his enjoyment of poetry will be ruined by elaborate exegeses and detailed analyses.

Next, we may consider problems arising from grammatical differences between Chinese and English. First of all, the absence of inflections in Chinese often leaves the translator in doubt about what number, gender, case, etc., he should adopt in English. Unless he is content with pidgin English, he has to be more explicit than the original and to choose one of several possible meanings, and his choice has to be guided by the context.

Second, in Classical Chinese, there is great flexibility with regard to "pars of speech," and the same word can often function as noun, adjective, verb, and adverb. The greater rigidity of English often makes it necessary to paraphrase and thus lose some of the conciseness and concreteness of the original. In the following coupler (from Poem 71)

Ling yun ch'un chu-ju
Mountain-range cloud spring marshy
Chiang yueh yeh ch'ing ming

River moon night clear bright

the words for "spring" (*ch'un*) and "night" (*yeh*) are used adverbially. Unfortunately one cannot do so in English ("nightly" as an adverb would give the wrong meaning—"every night" instead of "at night") and one has to write something like:

Dank clouds hang over the mountain range in spring;
The river moon shines clear and bright at night.

The same couplet also illustrates how one may have to add verbs which are not in the original, since, in Chinese, words corresponding to English adjectives are used verbally (known as "stative verbs"), and to translate these always by the weak copula is not satisfactory ("the clouds *are* dank," "the moon *is* clear and bright," and so forth.)

Another grammatical feature of the language of Chinese poetry which differs strikingly from English grammatical usage is the frequent omission of the subject of a verb and of connective particles (the correlatives of "and," "but," "when," "if," ect.) the result is a kind of ambiguity which is taken for granted in Chinese but attracts attention if kept in English. I am inclined to think that a translator should supply the missing subject even though this may involve committing himself to one of several possible interpretations of a line, for to leave it out may send the reader on a wild goose chase after who the subject is and distract his attention from the immediate impact of the line. To a Chinese reader, the absence of the subject is a familiar phenomenon and causes no surprise: he responds to the situation and mood of the poem immediately, without asking who the subject is. Such a question will arise, if at all, only after the initial response, when the reader begins to analyze his response intellectually. This is not with a Western reader. Moreover, to use the first person pronoun is not necessarily to identify the speaker with the poet himself, for the "I" of the poem can be taken to represent a dramatis persona;[8] the second person pronoun can be used impersonally; and sometimes the use of the noncommittal "one" or the passive voice may provide further ways of dealing with the problem. On the other hand, to omit the subject in English may give a misleading impression. For instance, a line without a subject may be taken as imperative, when it is not intended to be.

Furthermore, in following too closely the grammatical structure of the original, a translator runs the risk of making a poem more ambiguous than it really is. Now, ambiguity in poetry does not mean confusion but multiplicity of meaning; an ambiguous line is one that can make sense in more than one way, but usually (even in Li Shang-yin's most ambiguous poems) it makes some kind of immediate sense. To keep all the grammatical ambiguities of Chinese in an English translation might turn a line that makes sense in more than one way into one that makes no sense at all. It seems to me better to choose one of several possible meanings, at the cost of losing the ambiguity, than to render the line meaningless or more enigmatic than it is in the original.

Even if a translation that leaves out all the subjects and conjunctions is not too obscure

and is technically English, it may give a wrong impression of the style of the original, since lines in English without subjects or conjunctions may sound like telegrams or newspaper headlines. If it should be asked: Since all Classical Chinese is written in a terse telegraphic style, why not reproduce it? The answer would be: Chinese poems do *not* sound like telegrams, not only because the former posses qualities (for example, rhythm, tone-pattern, rhyme) which the latter do not, but also because features common to both (such as omission of subject) are common to other kinds of writing as well and thus do not attract attention in Chinese the way they would in English. Granted that some readers may like this novel style in English, it would still be true that the translator had turned a common linguistic feature into rhetorical device—asyndeton—thus giving a false idea of the original style. Incidentally, the use of asyndeton also tends to break up a line into segments and produce a staccato effect. True, all Chinese poetry sounds rather staccato compared with English, as Chinese consists mainly of monosyllabic words and disyllabic compounds, but would anyone recommend that translations of Chinese poetry should be confined to English words of one or two syllables?

Let us now consider the ambiguous nature of Chinese syntax more closely. A line can usually be construed in various ways, but some ways of construing it, though grammatically possible, are automatically ruled out on the ground of sense. In the line

la	*chao*	*pan*	*lung*	*chin*	*fei-ts'ui*
candle	light	half	encircle	gold	kingfisher

we may take the word *chao*, commonly used as a verb ("to shine"), to be a noun ("light") in this instance, and the word *lung*, which usually means "cage," to be a verb, meaning "to encircle."[9] Thus the whole line is seen to mean

The candle's light half encircles the golden kingfishers.

That it is no arbitrary decision to take *chao* as a noun and *lung* as a verb and not vice versa can be shown by comparing this line with the next, with which it forms an antithetical couplet:

she	*hsun*	*wei*	*tu*	*hsiu*	*fu-jung*
musk	perfume	subtly	pass-through	embroidered	lotus

(The musk perfume subtly permeates the embroidered lotus flowers.)

Since, in an antithetical couplet, the corresponding syllables normally match each other syntactically, it is clear that "candle's light" contrasts with "musk perfume," "half encircles" with "subtly permeates," and "golden kingfishers" with "embroidered lotus flowers."

It may be worthwhile to add that, although Chinese word-order is generally similar to English, this is not always so. An obvious case is the use of postpositions in Chinese, where English would require prepositions. Thus *shan shang mu*, if translated word for word,

would be "mountain above tree," which is precisely the opposite of what the phrase means.

In short, if we pushed to the extreme the attempt to follow the grammatical structure of Chinese in English translations—to omit all subjects and conjunctions, and to do away with all inflections—the result would of course be a sort of pidgin English, which not only be aesthetically unsatisfactory but even unintelligible or misleading. After all, translation is not just turning individual words into words of another language (and even this is not always possible, as we have seen). A succession of English words is not necessarily English, and one cannot write English with Chinese grammar, which is what is amounts to if one tries to preserve the grammatical features of Chinese and totally disregard the demands of English grammar and idiom. Nor should one exaggerate the ambiguity of Chinese. The fact is, one automatically rejects irrelevant meanings which are grammatically possible; otherwise all language would be intolerably ambiguous. This happens in English too. For instance, the sentence "I saw a man with a telescope" could mean either "I saw a man, who was carrying a telescope," or "Using a telescope, I saw a man," but one in his right mind would take it to mean "I habitually use a telescope to *saw* a man," although I am told that a computer actually produced all three possible meanings. In translating Chinese, one would do well to avoid emulating the computer!

There remains one more aspect of poetry to be considered in connection with the difficulties of translation—the sound-pattern. It goes without saying that the tone-patterns of Chinese cannot be reproduced in English. As for rhyme, I formerly advocated reproducing the original rhyme schemes in translations of Chinese poetry and tried to put this into practice, with unfortunate results, for which I have been criticized by several reviewers. I now realize the virtual impossibility of keeping the rhymes without damage to the meaning, and no longer wish to insist on the use of rhymes. Thus, two of the most important elements of Chinese versification, tone-pattern and rhyme, have to go. However, something of the rhythmic pattern of the whole poem may be salvaged, based on the number of lines and of syllables in each line. Although English requires more syllables than Classical Chinese to say the same thing, so that one cannot keep the number of syllables unchanged, it is possible to have a corresponding number of stresses, which after all form the basis of rhythm in English verse. The practice of translating a poem line for line, giving as many stresses in each line as there are syllables in the original Chinese, was initiated by Arthur Waley and has been adopted by several other translators, including myself. This seems to me the best if not the only way of approaching the original rhythm. But even this is not always possible, especially when one is translating some of Li Shang-yin's highly complex and condensed lines, which require considerable expansion to make sense in English. In such cases I have sacrificed regularity of rhythm, rather than distorted or simplified the sense.

In brief, I believe that one should try to make the sound-pattern of the translation bear some resemblance to that of the original, rather than cast the translation into a conventional English meter or use free verse with complete disregard for the original verse form. To turn

a Chinese antithetical couplet into a Heroic Couplet or into several lines of free verse in English is to produce a totally different effect and to change drastically the sound-pattern, which is part of the complex verbal structure of the poem; and to change the order of the lines is to later the sequence of thought and pattern of imagery as well.

Apart from the total sound-pattern of a poem, there are specific auditory devices, such as alliteration, onomatopoeia, repetition, and reduplication. Of which a translator should not remain unaware. But any effort to reproduce such devices must be subject to considerations of meaning. An example of onomatopoeia may be given from Poem 5:

sa-sa[10]	*tung*	*feng*	*hsi*	*yu*	*lai*
sa-sa	east	wind	fine	rain	come

where the first two syllables imitate the sound of the wind. I have endeavored to preserve this effect by rendering the line as:

The east wind *soughs* and *sighs* as a fine drizzle falls.

Repetition occurs in the opening line of Poem 6:

hsiang	*chien*	*shih*	*nan*★	*pieh*	*yi*	*nan*★
mutual	see	time	hard	part	also	hard.

Leaving aside the tone-pattern, which cannot be reproduced, we may note that the line consists of seven syllables with a caesura after the fourth, and that the syllable *nan* ("hard") occurs at the end of each half of the line:

--- --- --- --- ★/--- --- ---★

Previously I translated this line as follows:

Hard it is for us to meet/ and hard to go away.[11]

This version contains seven stresses with a caesura after the fourth, but the word *pieh* ("to part") was rendered as "go away" for the sake of rhyme. I have tried to remove this inaccuracy in the revised version, which now stands:

It is hard for us to meet/and also hard to part.

This still has seven stresses with a caesura after the fourth, and the repeated syllable "hard" occurs in the same position in both halves of the line. As for the meaning, the only addition is "for us," which is implied by "mutual" in the original. This is the nearest I can get to the original both in meaning and in sound; whether it is the most satisfactory version as a line of English verse is, of course, a different question.

Reduplication of monosyllabic words (as distinct from repetition of words at intervals) in Chinese poetry may be a conscious device, but sometimes it is only idiomatic usage.[12] Hence, one should exercise caution, to avoid distorting the sense for the sake of the sound. For instance, the word for "day," *jih*, when reduplicated as *jih-jih*, means "every day," and to translate it as "day after day" may be closer to the original in sound but is less

accurate in meaning.

All the problems discussed above are closely interrelated, because the various linguistic elements from which such problems arise are integrated into an organic whole in the translating of the very first poem given in this volume, and since this is Li Shang-yin's most famous poem, I would like to use it as an illustration of the problems of translation. This will necessitate a lengthy discussion, for which I must ask the reader's forbearance.

The first two words of the poem are used as its title: *Chin se*. *Chin* is generally translated as "brocade," although, according to Professor E. H. Schafer, it really refers to "polychrome damask."[13] However, the word is here used adjectivally and may be translated as "ornamented."[14] The *se* is an ancient twenty-five-stringed instrument, placed horizontally on the table or across the knees. The nearest equivalent in English is "zither," and the instrument is described as such in Western works on Chinese music.[15] The word has been variously translated as "harp," "psaltery," and "lute," no doubt because of the poetic associations of these words, but it seems to me doubtful whether we have the right to change the key symbol of the poem. As we shall see later, the poet is using this musical instrument as a symbol of bygone years: the strings lying in a row, as if in an extending vista, remind him of the years of his life. I think the effect of this symbolic image is altered if we try to visualize, instead of a many-stringed instrument lying horizontally, one that is standing or being held upright. I have therefore translated the title as *The Ornamented Zither*. The opening line runs:

chin se wu tuan wu-shi hsuan vien[16]
ornamented zither no reason fifty strings

This may be rendered quite literally as:

The ornamented zither, for no reason, has fifty strings.

Why the poet wrote "fifty strings" instead of "twenty-five strings" will be discussed later, in the commentary on the poem, but does not concern us here, since it does not cause any problem of translation. The second line reads:

yi hsuan yi chu ssu hua nien[*nien*]
one string one bridge think flower year

the word *chu* has been translated as "peg" or "fret," though in fact it refers to a movable bridge attached to each string, as illustrated in Chinese books on music. The verb *ssu*, "think," is to be taken in the sense of "make one think." The phrase *hua nien*, literally "flowery years," is a conventional expression for "youthful years," and the metaphor had better be left out. The whole line, then, may be rendered:

Each string, each bridge, recalls a youthful year.

The third line,

Chuang Sheng hsiao meng mi hu-tieh
Chuang master morning dream confuse butterfly

alludes to the famous allegory in the *Chuang Tzu*, in which the philosopher Master Chuang (Chuang Tzu or Chuang Sheng) says that he dreamed of being a butterfly and then poses the question: was it really he who dreamed of being a butterfly or was it the butterfly that dreamed of being Master Chuang? The syntax of the line is ambiguous. The first four syllables could be interpreted variously as: "Master Chuang's morning dream," "Master Chuang in his morning dream," "Master Chuang, while dreaming in the morning," and so forth. The remaining syllables could mean, "confused a (or 'the') butterfly," "was confused by (or 'with') a (or 'the') butterfly." I have chosen to interpret the line as:

Master Chuang was confused by his morning dream of the butterfly.

The next line goes:

Wang Ti chu'un hsin t'o tu-chuan kiwen
Wang Emperor spring heart entrust cuckoo

This alludes to the story that a legendary ruler of Shu, named Tu Yu and also styled Emperor Wang, had a love affair with his prime minister's wife and died of shame, and that after his death his soul was metamorphosed into the cuckoo, called in Chines *tu-yu*, or *tu-chuan*, or *tzu-kuei*, which is said to cry and shed blood in late spring. The "spring heart," apart from its literal meaning of "heart in spring," could also mean "amorous heart," since in Chinese literature "spring" often means "amorous" or "erotic." Hence, the line may be translated as:

Emperor Wang's amorous heart in spring is entrusted to the cuckoo.

The next two lines are highly allusive:

Ts'ang hai yueh ming chu yu lei
vast sea moon bright pearl have tear

Lan- t'ien jih nuan yu sheng yen ien
Indigo-field sun warm jade produce smoke

Among the numerous possible allusions involved in these two lines, we may mention four here. First, it was believed that when the moon was full, pearls would appear, but when the moon waned, the oysters would become empty. Second, there is a story about a mermaid who, on leaving her human host, asked for a jade plate. On this she shed tears, which turned into pearls. Third, *Lan-t'ien* ("Indigo-field") is the name of a mountain famous for producing jade. Lastly, a daughter of the King of Wu (fifth century B. C.), named Jade (*Yu*), died of a broken heart when her father refused to let her marry the youth she loved. Afterward, her spirit appeared and disappeared like smoke. Literally, the two lines mean:

In the vast sea, under a bright moon, pearls have tears;
On Indigo Mountain, in the warm sun, jade engenders smoke.

The last two lines run:

tz'u ch'ing k'e tai ch'eng chui-yi
this feeling may await become memory

chih shih tang shih yi wang-jan nzian
only is that time alrealy bewildered

The work *k'e* can be taken to mean "may" or "might," or as an interrogative particle, so that line 7 could be rendered as

This feeling might have become a thing to be remembered

or as

How could this feeling wait to become a memory?

I have chosen the first alternative. The last line presents no particular problem:

Only, at the time you were already bewildered and lost.

So far, I have translated the poem fairly literally, to show what the original is like. I have also made a freer version, which I venture to give below for comparison:

The Ornamented Zither

Why should the ornamented zither have fifty strings?
Each reverberating with echoes of a bygone year?
How can you tell the dreamer from the dream, the man from the butterfly,
Or the Emperor's amorous heart in spring from the cuckoo's cry?
Go and see the moonlit mermaid shedding tears of pearls,
Then burn with the jade in the sun till you vanish in smoke.
All this could have become a memory to be cherished,
But for the bewilderment you felt even at the time.

While this freer version might create a more immediate impression on the Western reader, it unfortunately cannot be used as a basis for critical analysis and evaluation, since it departs considerably from the original poem. I have therefore used the more literal version in the main text. However, the two versions will, I hope, give some idea of the dilemma between literal and free translations. Since my primary concern is with critical discussions, I have often had to choose the more literal version even when fully aware of its inadequacy as poetry.

When all is said and done, translations of poetry are only compromises, between two different ways of thinking and feeling, and between the verbal structure of a poem in one language and what is poetic or at least tolerable in another. Ideally, a translator of poetry

should be perfectly bilingual and bicultural, as sensitive to the subtleties and nuances of one language as he is able to convey them in the other. In other words, he would have to be as good a critic in one language as he is a poet in the other. Since such a paragon does not seem to exist anywhere, we have to be content with translations which primarily aim at showing what the original poems in their own right. As long as the majority of Western readers cannot be expected to read Chinese, there will be need for translations of both kinds; and as long as there are people who can both read Chinese and write English, there will be new translations of Chinese poetry, just as there will always be new English versions of Homer and Dante.

Enough has been said to show that I have no illusions about translations of Chinese poetry, least of all my own, which naturally fall into the first category, since English is only my step-mother tongue, if I may coin phrase. With all their imperfections, the translations in this volume may give some idea of the works of a great Chinese poet. Someone who has reason to believe that he is unlikely ever to visit the Louvre or the Uffizii may be glad to receive illustrated catalogues of their rich collections. As such, I offer my translations.

Notes:

1. Cf. *Coleridge*, *Biographia Literaria* (ed. J. Shawcross), vol. 2, pp. II, 268; w. k. Wimsatt, Jr., *The Verbal Icon*, p. 61, footnote.
2. This point will be developed later in Part III, I.
3. *Ch'u Tz'u*, Songs of the South, p. vii.
4. See Liu, *The Art of Chinese Poetry*, pp. 9 - 13.
5. *Ibid*, pp. 58 - 60.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 114 - 123.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 132 - 136.
8. Cf. Rene Wellek and Austin Warren, *Theory of Literature*, p. 70.
9. It is possible to take *lung* as passive, "encircled by."
10. In Ancient Chinese, sap-sap.
11. Liu, *Chinese Poetry*, p. 28.
12. Ibid., pp 36 - 37.
13. Schafer, *The Golden Peaches of Samarkand*, p. 196.
14. The word has previously been translated as "inlaid," which is not accurate, since we know from Chinese works on music that an inlaid *se* was called *pao se* ("precious zither"), while the *chin se* was a zither painted with ornamental designs.
15. See *New Oxford History of Music*, I: 89 - 90; *Grove's Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, 2: 237 - 238; Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. 4, part I, p. 130.
16. The Ancient Chinese pronunciations of the rhyming syllables are given in square brackets.

选文三　唐诗英译文中的引述现象分析

黄国文

导　言

选文原刊载于《外语学刊》2002年第3期。

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选文从语言学的角度探讨了唐诗英译文中的“引述”问题。首先，研究根据翻译这种特定的语言转换形式对“引述”做了简单的理论探讨。在翻译这种特殊的语言转换活动中，不存在“原封不动地引用原话”的原话引述，因为翻译是通过把A语码转换成B语码来再现A语码所传递的信息。本文对原语（唐诗）的引述情况与目的语（译文）的情况作了比较，并归纳出几种情况。本文还通过分析一些形式不对等的例子来表明，如果译者对原文做太多的解释或把原先简练含蓄的诗句译得太明了，那留给读者的想象空间和再创造的余地就不多或没有了，因此也影响到诗的意境的传递。

1. 引　　言

本文拟从语言学的角度探讨唐诗的英译文中的“引述”（reporting）问题。我们将首先根据翻译这种特定的语言转换形式对“引述”做些简单的理论探讨，同时对原话引述（quote）、间接引述（report）、直接引语（direct speech）、间接引语（indirect speech）等做些简单的区分；接着对一些唐诗英译文中的引述现象进行分析；最后对分析中碰到的问题做些讨论，并提出我们不成熟的看法。

2. 有关引述的几个问题

在语言学研究中，“引述”是个值得进一步探讨的问题。本节将简单对一些基本的概念做些分析和区分，目的是为了更好地分析唐诗英译中的有关例子。

2.1　原话引述与间接引述

从语言学角度看，“原话引述”（即quote）指的是用别人的“措词”（wording）把别人的“意思”（meaning）转述出来（见Halliday，1994；Thompson，1996），这种引述既用人家已经用过的语言，又保持着人家的意思。“间接引述”（即report）指的是把别人说过的意思转述出来，少用或不用别人已经使用过的语言形式。例如，假如Catherine对我（黄国文）说“I enjoy talking

to you.",那我可以用下面五种形式把这个言语行为引述出来:

(1) Catherine said (to me),"I enjoy talking to you."

(2) Catherine said (to me) that she enjoyed talking to me.

(3) Catherine said (to me) that she liked talking to me.

(4) Catherine said (to me) that she liked having conversations with me.

(5) Catherine said(to me)that she liked my conversation with her.

上面五个例子中的引述情况只有(1)属于原话引述,其他四个例子都属于间接引述。例(2)把原话中的 I 改为 she,把 enjoy 改为 enjoyed,把 you 改为 me,而例(5)却没有一个词是 Catherine 在原话中使用过的。因此,例(1)中的"I enjoy talking to you"在措词和意思这两方面与原话是一样的,而例(2)—(5)中的引述情况就不是这样:在措词方面,例(2)和(3)与原话有明显的相同或对应之处,而例(4)和(5)则没有相同之处。

很多语言学者都会把例(1)中的引述看作是"直接引语",把例(2)—(5)中的引述看作是"间接引语"。这种区分的根据是看句中是否使用了"引号"(quotation marks)。关于这个问题,章振邦等(1997:1262)是这样说的:"引述某人的话一般采取两种方式:一是原封不动地引用原话,把它放在引号内,这叫做直接引语(direct speech);一是用自己的话加以转述,被转述的话语不放在引号内,这叫做间接引语(indirect speech 或者 reported speech)。"章振邦等的这种说法与 Quirk 等(1985:1021)的观点是一致的;关于"直接引语",Quirk 等是这样说的:"Direct speech purports to give the exact words that someone (who may be the reporter) utters or has uttered in speech or in writing."Quirk 等对直接引语的定义与章振邦等(1997:1262)的观点是相同的,都是说"原封不动地引用原话"。

如同根据标点符号(如句号、问号、感叹号)来判断某一结构是否可以算是句子一样,用是否使用引号来区分"直接引语"与"间接引语"这种做法目前还是被普遍认同的,尤其是在书面语言的分析中。

2.2 翻译作品中的引述问题

如果我们用"是否原封不动地引用原话"来作为区分原话引述和间接引述的根据,那么翻译作品中就不存在原话引述,因为翻译是通过把 A 语码转换成 B 语码来再现 A 语码所传递的信息的;这种语码与语码的转换的最基本点是变换语言形式。因此,可以认为,翻译作品中的引述都属于间接引述。

在间接引述中,可以根据是否使用了"引号"来区分直接引语与间接引语。但我们这里所说的直接引语与一般的语法论著(如章振邦等 1997:1262)所用的同样术语的含义是不同的。在翻译作品中,无论是直接引语还是间接引语,引用者都没有"原封不动地引用原话",因为原话(原语)与引述语(目的语)是通过不同的语码来表达的。

根据上面的观点,语言使用中的引述可用下面的系统网络图表示:

- 原话引述(quote)
- 间接引述(report)
  - 直接引语(direct speech)
  - 间接引语(indirect speech)

区分原话引述与间接引述的标准是看结构中是否存在"原封不动地使用原话"这种情况,

而区分直接引语与间接引语则是看结构中是否使用了引号。

在下面的讨论中，所涉及的引述都是间接引述，因为所讨论的例子都是从翻译作品中摘来的。为了便于下面的讨论，在这里简单区分“引述句”(reporting clause)和“被引述句”(reported clause)。“被引述句”指在引述时(前)已被别人说(或想、思考)过的内容(情形)，而用来转述已被别人说过的内容的结构是“引述句”。在前面例(1)中，Catherine said (to me)是引述句，“I enjoy talking to you.”是被引述句；引述句 Catherine said (to me) 中的 said 是“引述动词”(reporting verb)。

3. 唐诗英译文分析

在讨论唐诗英译文之前，有必要指出，当时诗人写诗时是不使用标点符号的，所以诗中自然也就没有引号。但是，在英译文中，译者根据自己的理解对诗中的一些“话”作了技术处理，要么译成直接引语，要么译成间接引语。但是，由于中国诗具有“诗无达诂”的特点，一首诗甚至一行诗都可能有多种解释，又由于翻译者的文化修养、语言能力等诸多原因，对有些诗句，不同译者的译文会相差很大。

3.1　直接引语与间接引语的选择

如前所述，古诗无标点，自然也没有引号。所以，译者根据自己的理解和翻译风格、技巧等在直接引语与间接引语之间做出选择。先看贾岛的《寻隐者不遇》一诗中头两行(松下问童子/言师采药去)的英译文：

(6) “Where is your Master?” under pines I ask a lad;
　　“He's gathering medicinal herbs,” so he says. (吴钧陶，1997：621)

译者在这里选择的是直接引语，因此也把原诗可能隐含的问句(如“你的师傅在家吗?”或“你的师傅去哪儿了?”)直接用引语表达出来，并把它当作直接引语。吴译的这种处理方法与我们所见到的其他六种译文(即：许渊冲，1988：308；王大濂，1997：129；孙大雨，1997：427；万昌盛、王佣中，1999：160；文殊，1989：166，167)都不一样。下面是原诗第一行的另一种英译文：

(7) When I questioned your pupil, under a pine tree(Witter Bynner 译，见文殊，1989：166)

就“松下问童子”的英译文而言，例(7)要比例(6)合适些，因为它比较隐含，与原文比较接近。原文“松下问童子”简练含蓄，将想象和再创造的余地留给了读者；例(7)中的译文基本上做到这一点，而例(6)相对说来就太直截了当，把话说得太白，没有给读者留下想象和再创造的空间。(关于贾岛的《寻隐者不遇》的英译文的功能语篇分析，可参见黄国文，2002a)

吴钧陶(见张保红，1996：30)在英译杜牧的《清明》的第三句(借问酒家何处有)时也采用了直接引语，这点与我们见到的其他五种译文(即：蔡廷干译，见文殊，1989：174；孙大雨，1997：435；杨宪益、戴乃迭，2000：266；万昌盛、王佣中，1999：166；许渊冲，2000：537；见黄国文，2002b)是不一样的。试比较：

(8) “Is there a public house somewhere, cowboy?”
　　He points at Apricot Bloom Village far-away. (吴钧陶译)

(9) When I ask a shepherd boy where I can find a tavern.

He points at a distant hamlet nestling amidst apricot blooms.（杨宪益、戴乃迭译）

我们认为，“借问酒家何处有”用直接引语或间接引语来翻译都各有特点，但可能用间接引语会好些，因为它把想象和再创造的余地留给了读者。顺便指出，吴译中的 cowboy 的使用似乎不妥当（见黄国文，2002b，2002c）。

王维的《送别》（下马饮君酒/问君何所之/君言不得意/归卧南山陲/但去莫复问/白云无尽时）的几种英译文对这首诗的引述的处理也不尽相同。下面先看一种译文：

(10) Goodbye to Meng Hao-jan

Dismounted o'er wine we had said our last say;

Then I whisper, "Dear friend, tell me whither away."

"Alas!" he replied. "I am sick of life's ills

"And I long for repose on the slumbering hills.

"But oh seek not to pierce where my footsteps may stray.

"The white clouds will soothe me for ever and ay."

（Herbert A. Giles 译，见吕叔湘，1980：148）

从上面的译文可以看出，除了第一行（Dismounted o'er wine we had said our last say）和第二行的引述句（Then I whisper）外，剩下部分全部是引述的内容，用直接引语表达。我们不妨把这个译文与下面的译文作比较：

(11) "So farewell. And if for ever, still for ever fare ye well."

Quitting my horse, a cup with you I drank.

And drinking, asked you whither you were bound.

Your hopes unprospered, said you,

turned you round.

You went. I asked no more. The white clouds pass,

And never yet have any limit found.

（W. J. B. Fletcher 译，见吕叔湘，1980：148）

在 Fletcher 的译文中，只有第二行和第三行含有引述成分，而且都是采用间接引语。杨宪益、戴乃迭（2001：88）的译文在这方面采用相似的处理方法，不赘述。

我国翻译家对王维《送别》的翻译也采用了不同的方法。例如，许渊冲（2000：87）把“问君何所之”译为间接引语，剩下四行译为直接引语，而孙大雨（1997：139）则把所有的话当作间接引语。用直接引语还是间接引语来翻译，这取决于译者对意境的理解和对表达的把握。

3.2 引述范围

如果我们比较前面例（10）和（11），便可看出，两位译者对原诗的理解是不一样的。在 Giles 的译文中，原诗的第二、三、四、五、六行都是被当作直接引语。而在 Fletcher 的译文中，只有原诗的第二和三行含有间接引语。在 Fletcher 看来，原诗的第四、五行并不是诗中的“君”所说的话语。从这里的比较可以看出，例（10）和（11）的译文对引述范围的确定是不一样的。

贾岛的《寻隐者不遇》（松下问童子/言师采药去/只在此山中/云深不知处）有多种英译文，许渊冲就先后提供了两种译文：

(12) I ask your lad'neath a pine-tree.

"My master's gone for herbs," says he,
"Amid the hill I know not where,
For clouds have veiled them here and there." (许渊冲,1988:308)

(13) I ask your lad'neath a pine tree.
"My master's gone for herbs,"says he,
You hide amid the mountains proud,
I know not where deep in the cloud. (许渊冲,2000:479)

在例(12)中,原诗的第三、四行被看作是"童子"说的话,所以被当作直接引语。但在例(13)中,第三、四行并不是"童子"说的话,而是叙述者(诗人)对寻而不见的隐者所说的话。同一个译者在很短的一段时间内对同一首诗的两种截然不同的解读,足以证明"诗无达诂"。

3.3 引述动词的使用

在引述别人的话语时,通常应指出被引述内容的来源,即消息的发出者。引述句的主语是信息的发出者,引述动词是信息的发出方式;在某些引述句中还有其他表示"环境意义"(circumstantial meaning,包括时间、地点、方式)的成分(状语)。前面例(6)中的第一行可以这样分析:

"Where is your master"	under pines	I	ask	a lad
被引述句	地点状语	主语	动词	补足语
	引述句			

引述动词在引述句中十分重要,它既表示引述句与被引述句之间的语义关系,又常常表示信息的发出方式。例如,前面例(1)中的 said 表示"给予信息"(giving information)的意义,即主语 Catherine 把被引述句的内容传递给另一个人,而在例(6)中,ask 表示"寻求信息"(seeking information),主语 I 希望(要求)另一个人向他提供信息。又例如,前面例(10)中的第二行译文(Then I whisper, "Dear friend, tell me whither away.")中的引述动词 whisper ("低声地说")表示说话这个行为,也表示说话的方式;尽管它后面的被引述句也是用来寻求信息,但在形式体现方面还是祈使句。如果我们把这一用法与例(11)中的第二行的相应部分[(I) asked you whither you were bound]做比较,那就可看出不同:asked 只表示说话这个行为,不包含像 whisper 那种"低声地"意义。

在翻译作品中,引述动词的选择和使用大致可分为四种情况:

原语↔目的语	
使　用	使　用
不使用	不使用
使　用	不使用
不使用	使　用

下面我们对这四种情况做些分析。

(1) 使用↔使用

如果原语和目的语都使用引述动词，那可看作是这方面的“形式对等”。前面例(6)的第二行的译文与原文在这方面是对等的。

原文：言师采药去

吴译：“He's gathering medical herbs,” so he says.

万昌盛、王佩中(1990:160)所提供的译文在形式上也是与原文对等：And he answers that his master is gone out into the mountains to gather herbs for medicine. 但吴译(吴钧陶，1997:621)用的是直接引语，而万、王译(万昌盛、王佩中，1990:160)用的却是间接引语。顺便指出，原诗句没有把“说话者”用语言体现出来，但英译文根据英语的语言习惯必须补上主语。

(2) 不使用↔不使用

如果原语和目的语都不使用引述动词，那也是形式上的对等。王昌龄的《芙蓉楼送辛渐》(寒雨连江夜入吴/平明送客楚山孤/洛阳亲友如相问/一片冰心在玉壶)中的第三、四句是引述语，是叙述者(诗人)自己引述自己说过的话，但诗中没有出现引述句。许渊冲(2000:83)在翻译这首诗时也不采用引述句：

(14) Farewell to Xin Jian at Lotus Tower

A cold rain mingled with East Stream invades the night;
At dawn you leave the Southern hills lonely in haze.
If my friends in the North should ask if I'm all right,
My heart is free of stain as ice in crystal vase.

王昌龄的这首诗有好几种英译文，我们见到的其他三种译文都采用引述句(见下面例(16)、(17)、(18))。

(3) 使用↔不使用

如果原语中有引述动词，而目的语中没有，则表明两种语篇在形式上是不对等的。杨宪益、戴乃迭(2000:266)在翻译杜牧的“借问酒家何处有”[见前面例(9)]时把引述句“借问”翻译出来，达到形式上的对等。但也有的人只译出问句，让读者自己去从上下文中寻找提问者。吴钧陶的译文就是采用这种方法(见前面例(8))。吴译用了一个直接引语(“Is there a public house somewhere, cowboy?”)把原文这一句译出，有关提问者的情况让读者从上一句中去寻找。尽管吴译没有出现引述句，但从意义方面看，译文是能传递原文的意义的，读者在阅读译文时也不会有任何困难。

但是，有的译文由于没有把原文引述句译出，所以很难确定谁是提问者。下面是许渊冲(2000:537)翻译的杜牧的《清明》：

(15) The Mourning Day

A drizzling rain falls like tears on the Mourning Day;
The mourner's heart is going to break on his way.
Where can a wineshop be found to drown his sad hours?
A cowherd points to a cot'mid apricot flowers.

从上面的译文可以看出，许译中只出现了两个人物，即 the mourner 和 a cowherd，按一般的理解，讲话人应该是 the mourner，听话人是 a cowherd。但是，第三行的疑问句(Where can a wineshop be found to drown his sad hours?)中的“his”又明确表示问话人不可能是上一句(The mourner's heart is going to break on his way)出现的 the mourner，因为 his sad hours

中的 his 指的是 the mourner's。不知道译者为什么会选择 his 而不是 my? 如果我们把 his 改为 my,那问话人应该就是 the mourner 了。当然,也许有人会把"Where can a wineshop be found to drown his sad hours?"当作"画外音",是叙述者说出的。(参见黄国文,2000b)。

(4) 不使用↔使用

前面我们谈到,王昌龄的《芙蓉楼送辛渐》中第三、四句(洛阳亲友如相问/一片冰心在玉壶)是引述语;由于这是叙述者引述自己说过的话,所以诗中没有出现引述句。但是,在我们见到的译文中,除了许渊冲(2000:83)[见上面例(14)]的译文外,其他[即王大濂,1997:23;陶洁(见吴钧陶,1997:119);万昌盛、王倜中,2000:37]都添上了引述句。下面是引述部分的几种译文:

(16) In Luoyang should my folks and friends ask after me,
Tell them a heart's in jade pot, pure as it can be. (王大濂,1997:23)

(17) If my kinsfolk in Luoyang should feel concerned,
Please tell them for my part,
Like a piece of ice in a crystal vessel,
Fore'er aloof and pure remains my heart. (陶洁译,见吴钧陶,1997:119)

(18) Oh, Friend, when folks in Luoyang inquires, let it be said,
My heart is as bright as crystal ice in the jar of jade. (万昌盛、王倜中,2000:37)

在例(16)中,第二行 tell them 是引述句,剩下部分是被引述句;在例(17)中,第二行的 Please tell them for my part 是引述句;在例(18)中,let it be said 也是引述句。原诗的引语不用引述句,译文却用了。从译文中是否有引述句这一点看,我们认为上面例(16)(17)和(18)不如前面例(14)好,因为译文中一旦出现了引述句,原诗的简练含蓄就消失了,原来留给读者的想象空间和再创造的余地就没有了。

4. 讨论

上面的分析表明,在翻译作品中,不存在原话引述这种情况,因为翻译过程是把一种语码转换成另一种语码的过程,所以目的语不可能原封不动地引用原语中的语言形式。从这一点看,翻译作品中的引语都属于间接引述。从形式的体现方面看,用引号标示出来的成分可称为直接引语,不用引号标示的成分称为间接引语。在我们的这种区分中,原话引述不等于直接引语,间接引述不等于间接引语。

由于古诗无标点符号,自然也没有引号。在坊间所见的古诗集中,诗词已有标点,这是后人加上的。但是,诗中的引语较少用引号标出,如果说形式是意义的体现的话,那不加上引号则表明引述成分是间接引语。

在翻译通过间接引语表现引述成分时,我们认为应尽量在译文中使用间接引语,这是"形式对等"的要求。如果用直接引语来翻译原文的间接引语,那常常有可能把原本简练含蓄的诗句译成过于明了、没有想象空间的口头语。例如,前面把贾岛的"松下问童子"译成"Where is your master?"under pines I ask a lad [见前面例(6)]显然破坏了原诗的意境;贾岛的原诗是"寓问于答","以答句包赅句"(沈熙乾,见萧涤非,1983:968),而前面例(6)的译文却把可能隐含的问句明明白白地译了出来,这样的译文无论在形式上还是意义上都与原文相去甚远。又如,把杜牧的《清明》中的"借问酒家何处有"译成直接引语[如前面例(8) "Is there a public

house somewhere, cowboy?"]可能没有译成间接引语那么贴切、合适;例(8)的译文还把引述句删去不译,所以这句译文与原文也是不够对等的。

在翻译引述成分时,引述动词的选择也是非常重要的。例如,前面例(10)中的第二行(Then I whisper,"Dear friend,tell me whither away.")用 whisper 来译原文中的"问"("问君何所之")就有画蛇添足之嫌,因为 whisper 不仅仅表示"说"这一意义,而且还把说话的方式(如"低声地"、"悄声地")也表示出来了。

5. 小结

本文探讨的是唐诗英译文中的引述现象。我们认为,有必要对"原话引述"和"间接引述"做些区分,也有必要把直接引语和间接引语与原话引述和间接引述区分开来。

我们的讨论表明,在翻译这种特殊的语言转换活动中,不存在"原封不动地引用原话"的原话引述,因为翻译是通过把 A 语码转换成 B 语码来再现 A 语码所传递的信息。由于翻译的基本活动是语码变换,所以把原语译为目的语后就不可能原封不动地引用原话。在本文的讨论中,我们提出了关于引述的系统网络图,对引述的情况进行了分类,先把引述分为"原话引述"和"间接引述",然后又根据翻译这种特殊的言语活动在"间接引述"中区分出"直接引语"和"间接引语"。

我们对原语(唐诗)的引述情况与目的语(译文)的情况做了比较,并归纳出四种情况,其中两种属于形式对等,另外两种在形式上是不对等的。通过分析译文,我们认为,在翻译唐诗中的引述成分时,首先应考虑"形式对等";同时尽量少使用直接引语。我们还通过分析一些形式不对等的例子来表明,如果译者对原文做太多的解释或把原先简练含蓄的诗句译得太明了,那留给读者的想象空间和再创造的余地就不多或没有了,因此也影响到诗的意境的传递。

选文四 《红楼梦》回目辞趣两种英译的比较研究

王宏印

导 言

本文最初刊载于《外语与外语教学》2002 年第 1 期。

王宏印为南开大学外国语学院教授,主要从事中外文化典籍翻译与研究,论著包括《中国传统译论经典诠释》、《文学翻译批评论稿》等。

选文从《红楼梦》120 回回目中选取 10 例作为 10 种辞趣类型,对照杨译与霍译进行比较研究,旨在探寻中国古典章回小说回目英文翻译的艺术,以及汉英翻译的可能性与翻译限度等问题。

中国古典章回小说《红楼梦》的回目结构，除了323基本句型（即按照汉语每句八字的词组音节数目的分段排列构成而言，例如：贾宝玉/神游/太虚境）和其他常见的基本句型之外，还有利用汉语数字、语义双关、词语重复、人物影射、象征隐喻等手段构成的辞趣，以及上述几种修辞手段的综合运用所取得的综合效果。这是单就创作方面而言，若就翻译的情况来看，还可以包括译者对于原文对子的对照关系的强调，对于原文回目乃至整章内容隐秘含义的挖掘，译文顺着自己的方向将一关系移就到另一关系上，以及利用原文和译文本身特点进一步造成错落有致的艺术效果等。由于这两个方面的共同特点都是利用语言内部的符号意义，即译出语或译入语的修辞手段造成回目的辞趣，故而一并称为"辞趣"，本文共列出10种，结合翻译分别加以界说，分析评论。

还有两点要说明的是：就《红楼梦》全书回目的总数而言，虽然辞趣所占比例甚小（仅占120回的1/12），而且只出现在曹雪芹原作的前80回回目中，但因辞趣别具一格的用词精巧，表现丰富，耐人寻味，在叙事描述基础之上更兼议论哲理的审美层面，便愈益显得重要和珍贵。另一方面，本文所引用的杨译和霍译，对于原文辞趣究竟如何关注不同，理解不同，处理不同，从而体现出不同的翻译风格和审美趣味，这正是我们所最为关注的。可见我们的翻译研究，虽然必须以原文特点作为逻辑起点，但关注的焦点毕竟在于译文本身。由此建立我们的翻译研究的基本观点，也是本文所持的基本观点。

1. 数字

数字成为辞趣主要体现为人物称谓，尤其是排行在构成对句时的运用。它所产生的汉语特有的辞趣正是英译时的困难。如第六十五回回目：

例句：贾二舍偷娶尤二姨　尤三姐思嫁柳二郎(65)

这里的"贾二舍"指的是贾琏，"尤二姨"指的是尤二姐，"柳二郎"指的是柳湘莲，只有"尤三姐"是尤三姐。霍译采用还原法只译贾琏和尤三姐，略去尤二姐和柳湘莲，变为用婚姻(marriage)的重复来对照述说本回内容：

霍译：Jia Lian's second marriage is celebrated in secret

And the future marriage of Sanjie becomes a matter of speculation

（回译：贾琏的二次婚姻在秘密进行　三姐的婚事正提上议事日程）

杨译则完全绕开对于具体人物称谓的提及，他运用形象化加概念化的手法重新构思回目，在叙事中对人物有所评论：

杨译：A hen-pecked young profligate takes a concubine in secret

A wanton girl mends her ways and picks herself a husband

（回译：怕老婆的浪荡子斗胆偷纳妾 惯放肆的野闺女心中自有夫）

二者的共同点是：在避开认为不可译的排行称谓时采用还原法或抽象法抓其特点，撮要叙事，兼具形象和评论。就行文的对称和泼辣而言，毋宁说杨译优于霍译。

2. 双关

双关辞趣的运用在于同一词语重复出现时的含义有别。一用其本义，一用其引申义，或一用

其泛指义，一用其特指义，从而使得第二次出现的词语带有一语双关意味。如第七十一回回目：

例句：嫌隙人有心生嫌隙　鸳鸯女无意遇鸳鸯(71)

句首的“嫌隙人”指的是邢夫人，生嫌隙的“嫌隙”指的是挑毛病，尤其是挑凤姐的毛病。“鸳鸯女”指的是贾母的贴身丫鬟鸳鸯，而“鸳鸯”则指鸳鸯偶遇司棋和她的姑舅兄弟幽会一事，称后者为“鸳鸯”。由于中国文化中鸳鸯以对鸟代人有象征情侣之义，尽管首句两种译文都用还原和实指，后一句的译文却大相径庭：

杨译：Lady Xing feeling wronged puts Xifeng in the wrong
Yuanyang happens upon two lovers

(回译：邢夫人觉受冤反冤了凤姐　鸳鸯女偶遇一对情人)

霍译：Lady Xing deliberately humiliates her daughter-in-law
And Faithful inadvertently interrupts a pair of love-birds

(回译：邢夫人有意辱没儿媳妇　鸳鸯女无意惊散情鸳鸯)

需要指出的是：霍译把人名鸳鸯译为 Faithful(忠仆)是他统一意译丫鬟名称的一部分，但此处与鸳鸯的本义兼引申义 a pair of love-birds(一对情侣鸟)很难构成辞趣。虽然如此，霍译 a pair of love-birds 比杨译 two lovers(一对情侣)要好得多，且不说杨译第二句的草率和两句比例的失衡。

3. 隐喻

隐喻是隐含的比喻，是语言艺术表情达意的基本手段。隐喻从具体的事物形象深入到内涵意味，产生形象大于思想、思想寓于形象的妙趣。翻译所要面对的正是这种只能意会不可言传的隐含的比喻。例如第四回回目：

例句：薄命女偏逢薄命郎　葫芦僧判断葫芦案(4)

杨译：An ill-fated girl meets an ill-fated man
A confounded monk ends a confounded case

杨译首句以 ill-fated(命运不佳)译“薄命”，不仅比较贴切而且兼顾了性别男女，但 girl 与 man 之间不如中文“女”“郎”语义对应。第二句的“葫芦”形象舍去，意译为 confounded(狼狈的)，一词兼修二词(僧，案)，语义略有不同，且 monk 与 ease 之间不易产生语义上的联想。

霍译：The Bottle-gourd girl meets an unfortunate young man
And the Bottle-gourd monk settles a protracted lawsuit

霍译的方法是以创造的英文复合词 bottle-gourd 极力保留中文的葫芦形象，将其与“女”和“僧”分别相连，而将“郎”与“案”用抽象化的形容词点出概念义，从而造成新的组合对仗句，可回译为：“葫芦女竟遇短命郎；葫芦僧了结糊涂案”。

4. 影射

影射辞趣产生的机制是：表面看来只是景物描写，但仔细阅读则可见出回目中隐藏深意，即小说人物的影子在回目的奇思妙想的文字中徘徊。这是《红楼梦》人物名称的象征意味所使然，如第十九回回目：

例句：情切切良宵花解语　意绵绵静日玉生香(19)

在读懂本回小说的故事情节以后不难发现："花解语"不仅是一般的写花，而且暗指花袭人对宝玉的忠心劝告；"玉生香"也不是所谓的蓝田玉生香，而是通过宝玉编造的故事影射林黛玉"才是真正的香玉呢"。

基于这样的理解，再看杨译、霍译就会有不小的遗憾，而对于"诗不可译"一类说法却很容易产生认同。

杨译：An eloquent maid offers earnest advice one fine night

A sweet girl shows deep feeling one quiet day

霍译：A very earnest young woman offers counsel by night

And a very endearing one is found to be a source of fragrance by day

杨译着重于"良宵"(one fine night)、"静日"(one quiet day)的对仗，和暗含的"解语"(an eloquent maid)、"生香"(a sweet girl)的意趣的传达。前一句取自小说内容兼顾了劝告情节，后一句则由"意绵绵"转化而来并形成了一句中文式的说法 shows deep feeling(除了 feelings 一般要用复数以外，连物主代词 her 也不要了)。

霍译的两个 very 恰好说明用词的不达不雅，is found to be a source of fragrance 又太具有逻辑化的虚饰。offers counsel 与杨译 offers advice 无异，而 by day 和 by night 则因丧失了汉语"静日"和"良宵"的诗化语言之趣而变得索然无味。

由此看来，影射和谶言一样，皆是《红楼梦》作者的拿手好戏，可就难为了英文的翻译。其实也不为怪：中国读者读其中文尚且需要仔细，何况要在英文中兼顾字面与深意呢？

5. 重复

重复是基本的修辞手段，英汉语言皆然，但重复手段的使用并不相同。单纯的重复句中的关键词使其出现在一定的节奏点上就已经是颇有兴趣的辞趣了。诚如第三十四回回目：

例句：情中情因情感妹妹　错里错以错劝哥哥(34)

杨译精心设计"情"(move)与"错"(wrong)两个关键词使其在英语中重复出现，但由于词类的不同无法照顾到句式的重复对应。

杨译：Moved by affection, Baoyu moves his cousin

A wrong report makes Baochai wrong her brother

(回译：宝玉为情所动，反感动了表妹　宝钗因错消息，倒错怪了哥哥)

平心而论，就本章内容宝玉挨打后黛玉来探，相互感动，又赠了旧手帕提诗定情，和薛蟠无端受屈，宝钗劝告等情况来看，杨译似乎已完美无缺了。可霍译偏不按此思路，而是有自己更加达意且雅致的译法：

霍译：A wordless message meets with silent understanding

And a groundless imputation leads to undeserved rebukes

(回译：无声消息更遇无言理解　无端灾祸导致无谓责怪)

就修辞而言，霍译用的是同义词(wordless, silent)和近义词(groundless, undeserved)的重复；就立意而言，霍译用的是抽象的概括但充满理趣。最重要的是，霍译巧妙地避开了很难翻译的"情"字和勉强可译的"错"字，淡化了原文中的人际关系。他采用英文常用的 message,

understanding 作中心词，groundless，undeserved 作限定词，构拟出文情并茂的英文对句。我们不得不说，就文字的对仗工整，立意的深刻贴切而言，霍译高出杨译一筹。

6. 综合

修辞手段的单独运用虽是常态，其中可见出作者或译者的匠心独运，但构成辞趣者又往往依赖于众多词格的搭配使用和巧妙配合，才能收到综合的艺术效果，使读者与作者同入艺术圣境。例如第四十五回回目：

例句：金兰契互剖金兰语　风雨夕闷制风雨词(45)

杨译：Two girls pledge friendship after a heart-to-heart talk

A plaintive poem is written one windy, rainy evening

"金"、"兰"在中国文化象征系统中各喻坚贞和芬芳，"契"可解为意气相投，故而"金兰契"常用来象征意气相投的知心朋友。《红楼梦》第四十五回讲的是宝钗(金锁之金)和黛玉(木石之木)的知心对话，故而杨译上句：Two girls pledge friendship after a heart-to-heart talk(倾心交谈二女盟誓友谊)，在叙事层面上是十分准确的，舍去的自然是译者认为无法表达的象征之物了。

下句的"风雨夕"说的是林黛玉在风雨交加的黄昏，烦闷中拟《春江花月夜》之格写出《秋窗风雨夕》一词。两个"风雨"，前者是情境，后者倒有影射在内了。在这个意义上，杨译后句：A plaintive poem is written one windy, rainy evening (风雨黄昏悲写悲哀之词)，也可以说是基本达意了。不过，前后两句的语态变换使其主题不够连贯一致。

综合效果的显示在于重复中含有象征(如前句)，重复中含有影射(如后句)，重复中富于变化(如前后两句："契"与"语")，重复中隐藏对照(如前后两句：一为相依，一为孤寂)。这种综合效果的艺术体现，就要求英文翻译不仅要概括故事使其富于人情味，而且要使语言本身达到审美层次。霍译正是朝向这一方向的可贵努力：

霍译：Sisterly understanding finds expression in words of sisterly frankness

And autumnal pluviousness is celebrated in verses of autumnal melancholy

(回译：姐妹情只在姐妹式的坦率中　秋风雨尽在秋风词的悲戚中)

7. 对照

一般说来，汉语章回小说回目每句八个字一共两句的对句模式本身就已经包含了对照关系，但是对照关系仍然有字面的明显的对照和非字面的不明显的对照两类。即便是字面对照不明显的第六十六回回目中，深层的人物性格的对照还是有足够的流露的，例如，将柳湘莲称为"冷二郎"就意味着与"尤三姐"的热情女相对照，但字面上却用了"情小妹耻情归地府"的说法。这样，不只是依据字面对照而是进一步深入到人物性格对照的霍译，便从中找到了翻译回目的钥匙。

例句：情小妹耻情归地府　冷二郎一冷入空门(66)

霍译：Shame drives a warm-hearted young woman to take her life

And shock leads a cold-hearted young gentleman to renounce the world

（回译：羞耻感让热情女自杀身亡　震惊事把冷面汉送入空门）

相比之下，拘泥于原文字面而未能找到深层对照关系的杨译，就只能依照故事情节敷演出一幅对子，其英文字面的不对照也沿袭了汉语字面的不对照：

杨译：A girl in love is rejected and kills herself

A cold-hearted man repents and turns to religion

其中的 turns to religion 包含有汉语式的对"宗教"一词的贬义应用，实际上并不能构成与英文中的"出家"（遁世）相对应的语义联想。

8. 意境

所谓意境当然不仅指汉语的句子的立意而言，而是作者进一步借助语言文字所营造的一种气氛，让读者和作者一起能够进入，能够分享。但由于英汉两种语言的基本特质不同，所代表的中西两种文化的基本精神不同，汉语句中的词语有时不能直接使用，甚至不能限于词典上的词语对应，而要经历脱胎换骨找到最贴切的英文特有的词语，才能产生相应的语义效果和氛围韵味。这便是以译文立意为基础，又体现某种程度的超逸精神的意境旨趣。

例句：享福人福深还祷福　多情女性重愈斟情(29)

且不说"享福人"暗指贾母，"祷福"指张道士献玉等世俗情节，单说那"福深"（福如东海）在英文中就不能用。"多情女"指林黛玉对贾宝玉的情爱而言，但情何谓重，在英文中也不通。若感悟通达到能用基督教的 blessings 和 pray 等词变儒家的福寿禄观念为西方的祈福祉观念，则前句可译。又若知英文以 passion（激情）理解爱情（而非中文的脉脉含情），则以 passion 勾连 string（紧张）便可与之相合。得此两点，则英译的立意不难，意境几近焉。

霍译：In which the greatly blessed pray for yet greater blessings

And the highly strung rise to new heights of passion

（回译：有福的祈求更大的福祉　有情的升华更高的情意）

杨译：Favorites of fortune pray for better fortune

An absurd, loving girl falls deeper in love

杨译的问题首先在于：所选用的 fortune 侧重于财富和命运，难以达到 blessings 的高度，而且与贾母的身份和年龄也不完全符合。但主要还是没有从更高的意境立意构思英文的句子，因而两句之间缺乏内在的照应和关联。

9. 移就

《红楼梦》第四十六回讲的是：儿孙满堂的贾赦欲纳贾母的丫鬟鸳鸯为妾，托邢夫人打通凤姐提亲，遭到鸳鸯死命的抗拒，终未成功。这就是著名的鸳鸯抗婚一回。故有回目以陈此事。

例句：尴尬人难免尴尬事　鸳鸯女誓绝鸳鸯偶(46)

仔细思量起来，鸳鸯女誓绝的岂是什么"鸳鸯偶"？倒是贾赦、邢夫人一干人不免处境尴尬。故杨译上句有斥责贾赦之意，下句则直写鸳鸯抗婚事。但若不见本章内容知两事实为一事，单看回目，则两句意思实不相干，且句长缺乏适当控制以至于失衡。

杨译：An old reprobate makes and unseemly proposal

Yuanyang vows never to marry

(回译:老混蛋提出荒唐议　鸳鸯女誓死不结婚)

霍译上句把焦点移回到当事人(贾赦、邢夫人、凤姐)身上,只用英文的 awkward(笨拙,难堪)重复成句;下句则利用鸳鸯英文译名 faithful(忠仆)的重复,把鸳鸯抗婚的行为归结到对主子贾母的忠贞不渝(事实上,贾母死后,忠仆鸳鸯殉主而去,故有第一百十一回"鸳鸯女殉主登太虚"一说)。这样,命名的意译就顺理成章地有了归宿和交代了。整个回目上下对应,语义贯通,唯一的缺憾是没有直接提及抗婚一事:

霍译:An awkward person is given an awkward mission

And a faithful maid vows faithfulness unto death

(回译:尴尬人难免尴尬事 忠诚女誓愿忠诚死)

10. 错落

从审美角度而言,所谓错落无非是整齐中的变化,有序中的无序而已。《红楼梦》回目共一百二十回,虽然全部是八字相对且大多数对仗工整,但仔细品味,也可看出工整中的不工。甚至可以说,曹雪芹为了表情达意,只求大体对应,决不以词害义。这一基本原则,也同样适用于翻译。例如,第四十八回回目:

例句:滥情人情误思游艺　幕雅女雅集苦吟诗(48)

此回故事情节告诉我们:上回薛蟠遭打之后回家,欲外出做生意(trade and travel),并非单纯旅游(journey)。其妻香菱虽搬入大观园,跟黛玉学诗,倒算得上是"苦吟诗"。就严格的对仗要求而言,"思游艺"和"苦吟诗"算不上工对,但并不妨碍整个回目的对仗效果。试比较杨译与霍译:

杨译:A rebuffed reprobate decides on a journey

An aspiring maid racks her brains to write poetry

霍译:The Love-Deluded One turns his thoughts to trade and travel

And the Poetry Enthusiast applies herself to making verses

显然,杨译霍译都没有追求不顾语义的死对。杨译的两个主语结构,一用过去分词结构,一用现在分词结构,大体对应。谓语部分结构同中见异,宾语略有韵尾。霍译的两个主语,中心词一用代词,一用名词。作谓语的两个短语,形式尽管有异,要求却也相近:在同一个介词 to 之后,一用名词并列,一用动名词加宾语。所有这一切同中有异,异中有同的语言现象,在英文这种无法像汉语精确对仗的语言运用中,实在是一种不得已的事。但若考虑到 trade and travel 的英文式韵味,更有英文贵变异的特点(汉语的特点是贵整一),则错落的运用,也未尝不是一种艺术呢?

关于《红楼梦》回目及两种英译的辞趣问题的讨论就此告一段落,但这一问题的研究远未结束。其中原因之一就是:本文所谓的辞趣实际上包括了语法手段(即基本句型)以外的众多修辞手法的应用,但并没能深入到所谓狭义的辞趣的详细探讨之中。即便是就汉语本身而言,单就汉字的音形义结合而言,辞趣也会涉及到辞的意味,辞的音调和辞的形貌等细节才行。更何况在英文中,作为拼音文字,在原理和表现上必然有不少有别于汉语汉字的地方。可见这一问题见诸于汉英翻译者,实乃一需要长期研究之领域。

选文五　典籍英译中的“东方情调化翻译倾向”研究

——以英美翻译家的汉籍英译为例

蒋骁华

导　言

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选文认为汉籍英译中有许多直译程度很高的译品，中国译评家对这些译作的主要评价是“文化陷阱”、“误读”、“死译”、“超额翻译”、“亏损”、“偏离”等。与中国译评家简单的“价值判断”不同，西方译界对这类直译进行了理论探讨。本文认为这种直译反映了译者的“东方情调化翻译倾向”，并通过大量实例分析总结了“东方情调化翻译倾向”的方法与特点，还从多维视角探讨了“东方情调化翻译倾向”背后的原因。

一、绪　言

汉籍英译中有许多直译程度很高的译品[1]，如，赛珍珠（P. S. Buck）的英译《水浒传》（*All Men Are Brothers*，1933）、理雅格（James Legge）的英译《中国经典》五卷本（*The Chinese Classics with a Translation, Critical and Exegetical Notes, Prolegomena, and Copious Indexes*，1960）、与理雅格同时代的英国翻译家麦克拦根（Patrick Johnston Maclagan）的英译《道德经》、翟理斯（Herbert A. Giles）的英译《三字经》、白之（Cyril Birch）的英译《牡丹亭》（*The Peony Pavilion*，2002）等，不胜枚举。其中最为中国译界熟知的当数赛译《水浒传》。自1933年赛译出版以来，其中大量的直译一直频遭中国译界的批评。中国译评家对赛译式的直译的主要评价是“硬译”、“歪译”、“死译”、“胡译”、“误译”、“文化陷阱”、“超额翻译”、“亏损”、“失真”、“偏离”、“语用失误”[2]等（余高峰，2001；郑延国，2002；等）。与中国译界几乎一边倒的贬损不同，西方译界对类似的直译在理论上进行了探讨，他们将它概括为一种“陌生化翻译策略”（defamiliarizing strategy）（Comes，1998：63），“异国情调化翻译”（倾向、结果、现象等）（exoticization）（Jacquemond，1992：150），“异国情调化翻译”（手段、策略、过程等）（exoticizing）（Venuti，2008：160），或将它描述为“充满异国情调的天空”（exotic space）（Carbonell，1996），等等。韦努蒂说，“异国情调化翻译的效果是产生一种表面的差异，一般涉及外国文化的一些特征，如地理、风俗、烹饪、历史人物和历史事件；保留外国地名和人名，或一些怪异的外国语汇。……这些译文并没有质疑或颠覆英美的文化价值观、信仰和语言表达方式。”（Venuti，2008：160，笔者译）顺着西方译界的思路，我们可以将汉籍英译中的“异国情调

化翻译倾向”(exoticization)更具体地称为“东方情调化翻译倾向”(orientalization)。本文视这种直译为一种“倾向”,因为它反映了众多译家共同的文化政治倾向、审美倾向、价值倾向、伦理倾向等。

二、“东方情调化翻译倾向”的主要体现

汉籍英译中的“东方情调化翻译倾向”主要体现在两个方面:① 在词语层体现为死喻“活”译,虚变实;② 在句法层体现为模仿中文结构。下面我们一一具体分析。

1. 词语层的“东方情调化翻译倾向”

为使文本分析更具说服力,词语层面的“东方情调化翻译倾向”例句全部从白之的《牡丹亭》英译中提取。

1.1 死喻“活”译

要讨论死喻“活”译,必须先要确定什么是“死喻”。我们先看“死喻”的几个定义:

1) Some metaphors have become so well established in popular use, that their metaphorical character is no longer used. (J. C. Nesfield: *Idiom, Grammar and Synthesis*, 1924)

2) When a metaphor becomes standardized as a way referring to something, it is called a dead metaphor since it no longer arouse the listener to think of the original meaning in connection with the new meaning—that is, it is no longer used for literacy effect. (Don L. F. Nilsen & Allen Pace Nilsen: *Language Play*, 1978)

3) Dead metaphor: A metaphor which has been so often used that it has become lifeless and lost its figurative strength. (J. A. Cuddon: *The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory*, 1991)

这些定义告诉我们,死喻既包括那些“完全死了”的比喻,也包括那些“半死不活”或生命力十分微弱的比喻。换言之,死喻的基本状态是:它已成为一种固定表达方式,失去了比喻的修辞力量,不能在读者或听者的脑海中呈现“意象”或引起形象联想。上述定义虽然没什么问题,但如果用作判断“死喻”的具体标准却根本行不通,因为我们无法客观判断一个比喻是否真正失去了修辞力量,是否完全不能在读者或听者的脑海中呈现“意象”或引起形象联想。我们认为,从鲜活的比喻到死喻是一个连续体,中间没有明确的界线;绝大部分常用比喻其实都是“半死不活”的;一个比喻能否在读者或听者脑海中呈现“意象”或引起形象联想取决于两个条件:一是上下文,二是读者本人对语言(词语)的敏感度。换言之,一个比喻是“死”是“活”,因上述两个条件的变化而变化。就《牡丹亭》而言,其中大量的比喻是否属于死喻也很难有一个统一的标准,但我们以汉语为母语的人可以作出一个大致的判断。笔者曾做过一个小小的问卷调查:将本文要讨论的《牡丹亭》中的“半死不活”的比喻,配上原有的上下文,制成问卷,发给北京语言大学与澳门理工学院联合办学的翻译研究生班的 12 个同学,请他们仔细阅读,认真判断“当你们读到这些划线的词语时,脑海中是否浮现词语所指的意象(包括模糊意象)”。结果显

示："饱学"、"云雨(之欢)"的正面回应率为1，"经史腹便便"的正面回应率为2，"龙颜"为1，"凿壁"、"悬梁"为3。问卷结果虽不能作为"死喻"的最终判断标准，但大致可以说明上述6个比喻已非常陈旧，基本属于"死喻"范畴。按翻译常规，死喻不需也不必直译，即无需将它们"复活"。但白之"复活"了《牡丹亭》中几乎所有的死喻，让整个译作弥漫着浓郁的"死"去"活"来的东方情调。他"复活"死喻，主要采取了如下翻译手段(以下例句中的中英文粗体均为笔者所加)：

1.1.1　移花接木

"移花接木"就是把发生在甲身上的事情嫁接到乙身上。例如：

凭依造化三分福，绍接诗书一脉香。

能凿壁，会悬梁，偷天妙手绣文章。

(《牡丹亭》第二出"言怀")

... and blessed to some slight extent by the Creator

I have inherited fragrance of classic books.

Drilling the wall for light,

hair tied to beam for fear of drowsing,

I wrest from nature excellence in letters ... (Birch, 2002: 3)

原文是书生柳梦梅的"言怀"诗，他说自己出身书香门第，读书非常刻苦，还写得一手好文章。中国人读这首诗，一般都知道"凿壁"者是汉代匡衡，"悬梁"者是汉代孙敬。柳梦梅只用其"学习刻苦"的喻义，而白之在英译中"偷偷地"将"凿壁"、"悬梁"者变成了"我"(柳梦梅)。"凿壁"、"悬梁"复活成了现实，东方情调洋溢字里行间。熟悉白之《牡丹亭》英译的学者可能会问：白之不是对"凿壁悬梁"做了脚注吗？怎么还说他"移花接木"呢？那我们不妨仔细看看这个脚注：

Classic examples of scholarly application: *Kuang Heng*, too poor to buy oil, bored a hole through his wall to use the neighbor's light for his reading; Sun Jing, fearful of nodding over his books, tied his hair to a beam. (Birch, 2002: 3)

这个注释并不能帮助读者消除柳梦梅是"凿壁"、"悬梁"者的认识，因为注释说匡衡、孙敬分别是用"凿壁"、"悬梁"方式刻苦学习的"经典例子"(classic examples of scholarly application)，并没说明柳梦梅只是用其喻义。这等于明显暗示英文读者：不那么经典或类似的例子还有不少，其中自然包括柳梦梅。白之应该知道柳梦梅本人没有"凿壁"或"悬梁"。他移花接木，弄"假"成"真"，应该是为制造东方情调而有意为之。类似例子在白之的《牡丹亭》英译中非常多。如，"则为这断鼓零钟金字经，叩动俺黄粱境"(第二十七出)，英译是 but all these random drumbeats, / striking of bells, / intonings of precious scriptures /break in upon **my yellow-millet dreams** (Birch, 2002: 152)。"黄粱境"即"黄粱美梦"，本来是说唐朝青年卢生在一家客店里向一道士诉说自己的贫困，道士送给他一个枕头，他趁还未开饭想先睡一会儿。睡着后做梦享尽了荣华富贵。卢生美梦醒来，店主的小米(黄粱)饭还未煮熟。白之将卢生的"黄粱"美梦嫁接到了杜丽娘的爱情美梦和思亲美梦上。

1.1.2　除根断源

《牡丹亭》中典故俯拾皆是。白之译典故，有时只直译典故的字面意思，不补译其来龙去

脉，也不做注释。我们不妨将这种死喻“活”译法称作“除根断源”式译法。请看例句：

正如此想间，只见那生向前说了几名伤心话儿，将奴搂抱去牡丹亭畔，芍药东边，共成**云雨之欢**。（《牡丹亭》第十出）

But just as this was in my mind he came close and began to speak fond words to me; then taking me into his arms he carried me to a spot beside the peony pavilion, beyond the railings lined with tree peonies, and there together we found the **“joys of cloud and rain.”** (Birch, 2002:51)

“云雨之欢”源自典故“巫山云雨”，是男欢女爱的隐讳说法，语出《文选》十九卷宋玉“高唐赋·序”：“昔者楚襄王与宋玉游于云梦之台，望高唐之观，其上独有云气，……玉曰：昔者先王尝游高唐，怠而昼寝，梦见一妇人曰：‘妾巫山之女也，为高唐之客，闻君游高唐，愿荐枕席。’王因幸之。去而辞曰：‘妾在巫山之阳，高丘之阻，旦为朝云，暮为行雨，朝朝暮暮，阳台之下。’”白之直译“云雨之欢”为 **joys of cloud and rain**，没有注释。这样翻译，英语读者能否看懂呢？为此，笔者将这段译文发给澳门理工学院的几位不懂中文，英语为母语的同事看，请他们告诉我读后的感觉。他们的回应，概括起来是：因为有上下文，能懂，也能接受；觉得“有趣”(interesting)、“怪异”(weird)、“充满异国情调”(exotic)。这说明白之的译文是成功的，他制造的东方情调是有效的。“巫山云雨”这个典故还以不同形式出现在《牡丹亭》的其它地方，如，“行来春色**三分雨**，睡去巫山**一片云**”（第十回）；“陡地荣华，敢则是梦中巫峡”（第二十八回）。对此，白之同样以“除根断源”法译之（见 Birch, 2002: 50, 164）。只译典故的字面意思，而不加说明或注释，可以让读者通过大胆、奇谲、出人意料的译文强烈感受到原文的神秘、怪异、有趣、甚至美妙；读者感受到了这些，就是感受到了异国情调或东方情调。值得一提的是，《红楼梦》第五回、第六回及第十二回中多次出现“云雨之欢”、“云雨之事”、“云雨情”、“云雨一番”这样的字眼。霍译均为意译；杨译在上下文充分时是直译，上下文不充分时是意译。（郝风雨、蒋骁华，2005）

1.1.3 隐变显

《牡丹亭》中大量的“半死不活”的死喻在我们中国人的脑海中一般只唤起朦胧的、忽隐忽现的意象；白之将它们直译后，它们在英语读者脑海中呈现的意象是明显的、鲜活的。这种差别就像沾满泥土、面目模糊、甚至有点残损的唐三彩被洗刷干净、修复一新一样。我们来看下面的例子：

1）一名癞生陈最良，年可六旬，从来**饱学**。（第五出）

... a scholar by the name of Chen Zuiliang. He **filled his belly with books.** (Birch, 2002: 12)

2）虽然是**饱学**名儒，腹中饥，峥嵘胀气。（第十三出）

Scholar of note, though **stuffed with learning**, still winds of hunger swirl in my belly. (Birch, 2002: 63)

3）**经史腹便便**，昼梦人还倦。（第六出）

... mine too/ **bulging with weight of Classics and histories.** (Birch, 2002: 20)

“饱学”的“饱”虽与“吃饱肚子”的“饱”密切相关，但只是借用其“满（满）的”之意。根据笔

者的调查，它已基本不能在中国人心目中唤起“肚子里塞满了书(学问)”的意象。白之“活生生”地将它译为 filled his belly with books(肚子里塞满了书)，sniffed with learning(肚子里塞满了学问)，隐隐约约的意象变得十分鲜活而打眼。这种译文的异国情调和生动表现力是显而易见的。“经史腹便便”是“饱学”的变体，白之同样译得充满异国情调。白之在其编译的《中国文学选集(第一卷)》的 Introduction 中说，中文语言精炼、含蓄委婉、意象丰富(包括视觉意象和听觉意象等)，只有千方百计译出这些特点，才“不至于糟蹋原作或给原作误加包装”(not in drab or ill-fitting garb) (Birch，1965) 。

1.2　虚变实

“虚变实”就是将“虚指”的意义译为“实指”的意义。请看例句：

(正如此想间，只见那生向前说了几句伤心话儿，将奴搂抱去牡丹亭畔，芍药阑边，共成云雨之欢。)两情和合，真个是**千般**爱惜，**万种**温存。(第十出)

... Passion was matched by passion, and indeed **a thousand** fond caresses, **a million** tendernesses passed between us. (Birch, 2002: 51)

仔细阅读译文，我们很容易感觉到，它与“云雨之欢”的英译一样，“有趣”、“怪异”、“充满异国情调”，因为 1) tenderness 是抽象名词，一般不用复数形式，而白之在这里偏离常规，用了复数形式；2)“千般爱惜”、“万种温存”中的“千”和“万”显然是虚指，而非实指，白之刻意将这两个“虚”的数字译为“实”的数字 a thousand (fond caresses)和 a million (tendernesses)[3]。两处故意采用“异国情调化”的表达方式[4]，他“显然是想向英文读者传达原文文化的独特性。他小心翼翼，生怕丢失任何文化因素。为做到这一点，他甚至不惜牺牲译文的通顺和流畅”(宁一中，2009，笔者译)。在这里，“文化独特性”就是这种充满东方味的表达方式。

白之高程度、大面积的直译使他的英译《牡丹亭》充满了五光十色的东方异彩；这些异彩，有些是原文本来就有的，有些是他刻意涂描或添加上去的。译文给我们的总体印象是，一幅重神轻形的写意画变成了秋毫毕现的工笔画；自然天成的优美与典雅变成了斧凿明显的夸张与渲染，甚至滑稽或怪异。值得我们探讨的是，“工笔画”也好，“夸张渲染”也好，“滑稽怪异”也罢，在西方人眼里，它们大都是充满东方情调的美。

2. 句法层的“东方情调化翻译倾向”模仿中文结构

英文与中文在句法结构方面差别很大，模仿中文句法结构一般会使英文佶屈聱牙，怪异难懂。可有趣的是，许多英美翻译家在汉籍英译时尽力模仿中文句法(参看蒋骁华，2008；祝朝伟，2005：208—209)。我们以美籍华裔翻译家陈张婉莘(Ellen Marie Chen，1933—　，纽约圣约翰大学哲学教授)的翻译为例：

无名，天地之始；有名，万物之母。故常无，欲以观其妙；常有，欲以观其微。(《老子》第一章)

Nameless (*wu-ming*), the origin (***shih***) of heaven and earth; / Named (*yu-ming*), the mother (*mu*) of ten thousand things. / ... Therefore, always (*ch'ang*) without desire (*wu-yü*), / In order to observe (*kuan*) the hidden mystery (*miao*); / always (*ch'ang*) with desire (*yu-yü*), / In order to observe the manifestations (*chiao*). (Chen, 1989: 3)

对照阅读，很容易发现陈张婉莘是按照中文句法亦步亦趋英译的，而且，这一段英文，四个句子，居然没有一个谓语。这显然不是“正常的”的英文。令人惊讶的是，陈张婉莘的整部英译《道德经》基本上都是这种佶屈聱牙的“不正常”英语[5]。这种“不正常”清晰地反映了译者的翻译倾向，即，要使英译“成为对汉字的直述，成为原文的镜像，而不是以‘翻译’的面目出现”（刘禾，2009：257）。换言之，译者既要让读者感觉到自己好像是在读原文，又要让读者通过这个“镜像”感觉到原文（中文）的异质性，或异国情调。说到译文的“镜像”效果，我们不能不提庞德的两个“创造”：在词语层他创造了“表意文字法”（ideogrammic method）或“拆字译法”，如，将“知其先后，则近道矣”（《大学》）中的“近道”译为 as good as having a head and feet，因为“道”由“首”和“走”（部首）组成（祝朝伟，2005：299；王辉，2006）；在句法层他创造了“意象叠加法”（juxtaposition of images）（祝朝伟，2005：255—262；蒋骁华，2003：99—106），如，将李白的诗句“荒城空大漠”、“惊沙乱海日”译为 Desolate castle, the sky, the wide desert 和 Surprised, desert turmoil. Sea sun. 这两句译文抛弃了英文句法的基本要素，只是将意象叠加在一起。西方翻译家刻意模仿中文句法，因为他们相信“（东方）语言结构本身就刻着‘复杂东方’的意象，这些意象，用戴高乐的话说，奇怪而殊异，简直不可救药”（Jacquemond, 1992：149，笔者译）；要传达东方情调，句法结构是一个不可忽视的因素。

三、“东方情调化翻译倾向”解读

“东方情调化翻译倾向”不是孤立的翻译现象。从更大范围看，汉籍之外的大量非西方文本，包括埃及、印度、中东阿拉伯国家等的文本，也曾被西方翻译家们在翻译时做过“东方情调化”处理。这方面的例子很多，如克尼普（Knipp, 1974：44—54）、雅克蒙（Jacquemond, 1992：149—152）、尼兰贾娜（Niranjana, 1992：9—55）等中有许多实例，此不详述，只举一个最有名的例子：19 世纪英国东方学家兼翻译家比尔东（Richard Francis Burton）在英译《天方夜谭》时，采用的手法与白之英译《牡丹亭》如出一辙[6]（详见 Knipp，1974：44—47）。仅从书名的翻译我们就可以看出些端倪，不用“Arabian Nights”（天方夜谭），也不用“One Thousand and One Nights”（一千零一夜），而用“The Thousand Nights and a Night”（一千夜加一夜），尽量凸显其“东方味”。著名美国学者法韦尔（Byron E. Farwell）评论说：

> 作为文学翻译，比尔东译文的迷人魅力在于他为整部作品蒙上了一层浪漫色彩和异国情调。他翻译时设想作者“是在用英文写作”，他在译文中竭尽全力保留中世纪阿拉伯的东方式怪异和天真。译文忠实传达了成千上万充满美感的阿拉伯语惯用语。这些惯用语，在西方人听来，极富创意，妙不可言，是世界上其它语言难以企及的。（Alvarez, 1996：80，笔者译）

长期以来，西方翻译家热衷于将东方文本东方情调化，其原因是多方面的。现举其要者，逐一讨论。

1. 从文化政治角度看，东方情调化是为了构建文化“他者”

翻开西方思想发展史，我们发现，“地理环境决定论”（environmental determinism）从古希腊希波克拉底（Hippocrates）、柏拉图（Platon）、亚里士多德（Aristoteles）开始，经 18 世纪孟德

斯鸠(Montesquieu)系统阐述,到19世纪巴克尔(H. T. Buckle)、达尔文(C. R Darwin)时达到鼎盛。在马克思、恩格斯对"地理环境决定论"作出全新解释之前,此论的核心思想是,一个人种和该人种创造的文明的强弱,是由该人种所处的地理环境决定的。再具体点说,就是"气候王国才是一切王国的第一位",热带地区通常为专制主义笼罩,温带地区形成强盛与自由之民族(孟德斯鸠,1961: 227—303)。随着欧洲的日益强盛,"地理环境决定论"与"白人至上论"、"欧洲中心论"等紧密结合起来,成为欧洲对外殖民扩张的思想利器。"地理环境决定论"源远流长,一度甚嚣尘上,它影响了一代代西方学人(包括翻译家),甚至沉淀为他们的集体无意识(collective unconscious)。这一点,我们可以从 Cortes 的有关译评管窥一豹:

> 事实上,18世纪初,当西方人将东方文学(Oriental literatures),如阿拉伯文学,梵文文学,特别是诗歌,译成西方文字时,他们有一种广泛共识,即东方文学好用复杂精美的比喻和渲染夸张的表达(overelaborate metaphors and bombastic expression)。这种特点是由东方语言的特点决定的,这种语言特点,归根结底,是由东方人的个性特点决定的,而这种个性特点,一般认为是由东方人所处的自然环境(如气候)决定的。(Cortes,1998:64,笔者译)

在西方翻译家看来,产生阿拉伯文学、梵文(印度)文学的地区属于孟德斯鸠所说的"热带地区",其文风的渲染夸张、比喻的复杂精美与"热"有着某种天然联系:一方面"热烘烘"的气候容易使人脑子发热,因而说话夸张渲染;另一方面,热带地区繁茂而多姿多彩的花草树木容易引发人们说出复杂精美的比喻。忠实传达这种文学语言的异质性可以为西方人构建文化"他者"。

如果说传达这种文学语言的异质性,表现的是一个"神奇的东方"(the magical Orient)(Jacquemond,1992:151),那么,下面这种情况传达的是一个"野蛮的东方"(the barbarian Orient)(ibid):阿拉伯经典中有一种语言现象,即,在表达一个重要概念时常用两个同义词来表达。如,al-qada wa' l-qadar(这两个词是同义词,意为"命运")、al-shatm wa'l-sabb(这两个词也是同义词,意为"侮辱");一般情况下,将其分别英译为 fate 和 insult 即可。但许多西方翻译家会刻意将其译为 fate and destiny 和 offence and insult (Cortes, 1998: 65;蒋骁华,2008)。这种译法给英语读者一种东方人"概念表达不清"(conceptual imprecision)和"文风浮华造作"(verbal mannerism)之感(ibid)。忠实传达这种语言特色也可以为西方人构建文化"他者"。另外,他们还通过刻意选译那些表现"东方"阴暗面的作品来构建文化"他者"。(蒋骁华,2008)

2. 从文化心理角度看,东方情调化是为了满足西方读者的文化心理预期

上文提到"地理环境决定论"已沉淀为许多西方人的集体无意识。不敏感的西方译者可能依然处于"无意识"状态,而敏感的西方译者会敏锐地捕捉到西方人潜意识里对"东方"文本的文化心理预期。我们继续以白之的《牡丹亭》英译为例。白之在"译序"中说,他的译文是为舞台演出而作。当1980年译本第一次问世时,人们似乎都怀疑这种显得有点怪异的直译是否适合舞台表演[7]。可事实上这个译本很受欢迎(Wang Rongpei,2000:843),以此为基础的舞台表演也大获成功,而且经久不衰(ibid.)。这说明白之抓住了西方人的心理需要,其充满东方情调的语言符合他们对"东方"作品的文化心理预期[8]。

3. 从审美角度看，东方情调化是为了延长审美过程，增加审美快感

文学语言是艺术语言，它不仅要传意传情，还要有形式美。语言形式美最忌讳陈词滥调(cliché)或能指与所指之间“符指过程”(semiosis)的透明[9](蒋骁华，2003：36)。东方情调化的译文是陌生化的译文，“陌生化”使译文避开了这两大忌讳，因而陌生化的译文在很多西方人眼里颇具美感。而且，因其符指过程的“半透明”(semi-transparency)，读者的语言审美过程被延长，审美快感也随之增加。正如什克洛夫斯基所言：

> 艺术的目的是让人感知审美对象的美，而不是深入理解这个对象。艺术的技巧是将审美对象“陌生化”，使其形式不易理解，以此增加审美的难度，延长审美的过程，因为审美的过程就是审美目的本身，所以延长这一过程很有必要。(Shklovsky，1994：264，笔者译)

至此，我们可以说，西方翻译家热衷于“将‘东方’文本东方情调化，异国文本异国情调化，将古代作品译出古风古韵”(Cortes，1998：65，笔者译)，在一定程度上是出于语言形式美的考虑。

另外，从学术传统角度看，译文东方情调化是由于绝大多数西方的东方学家兼翻译家们长期坚持独树一帜的翻译标准“科学的准确性”(scientific accuracy)(Jacquemond，1992：149；蒋骁华，2008)；再者，从文化交流角度看，译文东方情调化是为了文化传播(蒋骁华，2007)。此不赘述。

四、结语

值得指出的是，韦努蒂说，17 世纪以来，英美的外译英作品中“通顺”泛滥(Venuti，1995：i)，归化处理过度，剔除了“不和谐的”异国情调(ibid：5)，以致译者隐形，我族中心主义、种族歧视、文化自恋和帝国主义横行(ibid：20)。其实，我们应看到问题的另一面：17 世纪以来，英美翻译家(包括东方学家兼翻译家)的外译英作品中存在着大量直译程度很高的作品，即“异化”翻译或东方情调化翻译。而这些颇具特色的译文，正如雅克蒙在论述 19 世纪以来阿拉伯典籍的法语直译时所说，其“翻译技巧和翻译策略至今尚未被全面而系统地研究过”(Jacquemond，1992：149)。

注释

1. 这些直译作品的最显著特点是，稍有文化特色的词语一律字对字直译。如：那高皇才听了一篇，龙颜大喜。(《牡丹亭》第六出)By the time the Emperor Gaozu heard the first chapter, the dragon countenance wore an expression of delight. (Birch，2002：22)
2. 近些年少数学者对赛译提出了正面评价或进行了学术性分析(如，马红军的“为赛珍珠的‘误译’正名”，载《四川外语学院学报》2003 年第 3 期；张志强的“后殖民翻译理论观照下的赛珍珠《水浒传》译本”和董琇的“赛珍珠以汉语为基础的思维模式——谈赛译《水浒传》”，均载《中国翻译》2010 年第 2 期)。这是此类研究的一个新开端。补充一点相关信息：赛译在中国常遭诟病，可在美国却大受欢迎(蒋骁华，2008)。另外，至今仍被西方汉学家认为是儒经英译的巅峰之作的理译《中国经典》，在中国也时遭批评，如，辜鸿铭认为，理雅格的《中国经典》英译诘屈聱牙，令人很不满意(ibid)。

3. 类似的"虚变实"的例子在赛译《水浒传》中非常多。如：宋江道："倘若将军不弃微贱，就为山寨之主。"董平慌忙答礼："小将被擒之人，万死犹轻。若得容恕安身，实为万幸！"(《水浒传》第六十八回)This small warrior is but a captive, and though I died ten thousand deaths, yet would it be light punishment. If I am forgiven and given safety it is ten thousand fortunates. (Pearl. S. Buck,1957:1247)
4. 与之相比照，汪榕培译为 With mutual passion, we stuck to each other in tenderness. (Wang Rongpei, 2000:110)；张光前译为 What a time of endearing love when two souls are entwined! (Zhang Guangqian, 2001:74)，均为意译。
5. 模仿中文句法的例子不胜枚举。我们不妨再以白之的唐诗英译为例：晚年惟好静，万事不关心。自顾无长策，空知返旧林。……(王维《酬张少府》)In evening years given to quietude, / The world' s worries no concern of mine, / For my own needs making no other plan Than to unlearn, return to long-loved woods: ... (Birch, 1965)原文句法与常规英语句法相去甚远，"正常"英译应该是很难模仿的，可白之还是尽力而为。这四句模仿中文句法的"不正常"英文缺乏常规英文的基本要素：没有主语、谓语，甚至没有时态。
6. 这话倒过来说更有道理："白之英译《牡丹亭》采用的手法与 Burton 英译《天方夜谭》如出一辙"，因为 Burton 英译《天方夜谭》比白之英译《牡丹亭》早半个多世纪。文中想要表达的意思是，两人的"东方情调化"翻译手法基本一致。
7. 见 http://search. barnesandnoble. corn/The-Peony-Pavilion/Xianzu-Tang/e/9780253215277
8. 赛译《水浒传》的成功与此类似。赛珍珠通过语言刻意制造的"东方味"，也很符合西方人对"东方人"(中国人)的文化心理预期。(蒋骁华，2008)赛珍珠一生对中国心怀感激，她在感情上应该没有丑化中国人的意愿。她刻意求"异"主要是出于文化考虑。这在她的《水浒传》"译序"(Introduction)中说得很清楚。她传达的"异"碰巧符合西方人的文化心理预期。
9. 文学语言的符指过程是"半透明的"(semi-transparent)(蒋骁华，2003:35 - 39) 。"透明"(transparent)意味着语言寡淡无味；"不透明"(opaque)意味着语言费解或不通(ibid)。

【延伸阅读】

[1] Ames, R. T., & Henry Rosemont, Jr. *The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation*. Ann Arbor: The Ballantine Publishing Group, 1998.

[2] Ames, R. T., & Hall, D. L. *Daodejing: "Making This Life Significant": A philosophical Ttranslation*. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2003.

[3] Liu, J. Y. *The Poetry of Li Shang-Yin, Ninth Century Baroque, Chinese Poet*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press,1969.

[4] Yip, Wai-lim. *Chinese Poetry: Major Modes and Genres*. Durham and London: Duke University Press,1976.

【问题与思考】

1. 在 Flemming 看来，应该采取哪些翻译策略在译文中保持道家文本中的歧义性和矛盾性？

2. 在道家哲学文本的翻译中保持歧义性和矛盾性的语言哲学基础是什么？

4. 刘若愚介绍了哪些中国诗歌意象的英译处理方式？他是如何做出选择的？选择的理据是什么？

5. 刘若愚和叶威廉在对中国古典诗歌的认识和翻译上有何异同？

第五章　汉籍英译的跨学科研究

导　论

汉籍英译研究除了从翻译自身出发进行之外，还可以与其他研究视角相结合，从而获得不同侧面、不同维度的学科考察。典籍英译的跨学科研究模式可以分为两种。首先，典籍翻译的跨学科研究模式可以是外向型的。西方翻译研究界的文化转向其实就是一次外向型的跨学科研究模式。这一转向涉及到后现代主义、后殖民主义、女性主义、性别研究、意识形态理论等原本属于翻译研究领域之外的理论形态。在这些理论被引入到翻译探究领域之后，不仅拓展了翻译研究的理论视角，而且也丰富了理论研究范式。

另外，翻译研究还存在一种跨学科研究模式，就是内向型的研究模式。这种模式将注意力放置在翻译的具体过程之中，在翻译的各个阶段以及翻译的各要素中选择可以进行跨学科研究的对象。如从翻译者的意向性出发，运用现象学中的意向性理论对翻译者的主体性加以审视，以期挖掘出译者主体的意向性结构，揭示出翻译主体的意向性模式。再如，翻译过程总是伴随着阐释过程，作为翻译结果的译文从一定意义上讲就是阐释的结果。既然翻译有着这么一个过程，研究者就可以顺理成章地将阐释学的相关理论运用在翻译研究领域。而中国古代典籍尤其是哲学典籍的阐释源远流长，实际上伴随着经学的整个发展过程。文本的注疏和诠释实际上就是经学的治学模式。中国古代典籍的这个特点完全可以同它们在接受翻译时的阐释过程相互比照。这样，我们就有理由将中国的训诂学、经学诠释学同西方的阐释学结合在一起，借此审视典籍英译的阐释过程，从而建立具有跨学科性质的翻译诠释学。

上文提到过现象学在翻译研究中的可能性。其实从现象学美学当中派生出的接受理论和读者批评理论也可以运用到翻译研究中。如作为读者的译者期待视野与原文作者的期待视野的融合、原文文本空白点的填充等，都可以作为翻译跨学科研究的课题。

在翻译的内向型跨学科研究领域总还存在着与比较文学研究结合的可能性。文学翻译研究可以采纳比较文学的研究模式，其中包括影响研究，比如可以把中国古典诗歌的英译对美国意象主义运动所产生的影响加以考察，研究古典汉语诗歌是如何被吸收、融合进英语诗歌的创作之中的。翻译研究还可以采纳类同研究的模式，对比原文和译文之间的类同和差异，并且解释造成这些类同和差异的原因。

选　文

选文一　文字学与古籍的翻译

张德劭

导　言

选文原刊载于《上海交通大学学报》(社科版)2000年第2期。

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选文从汉字由古老的象形文字发展这一论点出发,认为汉字的字形直接显示字义的全部或部分。汉字的特点使汉语著作,特别是古代典籍的英译有着特别的困难。译者在翻译古代典籍的时候,必须具备一定的文字学知识。

众所周知,汉字是形音义密不可分的统一体。汉字的字形、字音在汉字体系中都有区别字义的作用。英语是一种表音文字。在这两种差别如此巨大的文字体系中进行翻译的转换工作,一定会遇到一些特殊的困难,有些甚至是难以克服的困难。下面我们选择一些翻译中遇到的问题来加以探讨。

汉字是从古老的象形文字演变过来的。不少现代汉字还保留着明显的象形性。汉字现在被称作表意文字,它的字形对字义有高度的导向性,"字形直接显示字义的全部或部分,并通过这种导向引发人们去理解造字的本义。"[1]所以汉字的字形、字义、字音是一体的,由字形知字义(据形系联),由字音知字义(因声求义)。而英语作为一种表音文字,是依靠声音求索字义的。汉字是一种图形文字,要把感知的图形复现出来,首先要从整个图形入手,然后才注意细节。汉字没有词形变化,要正确理解汉语的一句话,必须从整体结构入手,而不能只注意个别的词语。现在使用的标点在20世纪初才开始使用的。在这以前的古籍中是没有现在使用的标点的。所以只有理解了整篇文章后,才能正确地断句。这说明汉语是高度依赖上下文关系的语言。这也造成了中国人偏好综合思维,而英美人偏好分析思维。综合思维将对象的各个部分联合为整体,把它的各种属性特点等结合起来进行整体的考虑。综合思维虽然减少了片面性,但容易忽视局部,形成模糊直观的思维特点。[2]这种思维方式和汉字有很大关系,在文字学著作中有很好的体现。文字训诂著作应该说是最能体现汉字特点的,因此它们对翻译应最具抗拒性和挑战性。译者一定要非常小心,充分考虑到两种语言及两种思维方式的差别,以免犯下望文生义的毛病。

就以著名的文字学著作《说文解字》为例。《说文》释文时最常见的方式就是"某,某也。"如"门,闻也","户,护也","副,判也","天,颠也","元,始也"等。如果我们只是进行字面上的翻

译，那么西方的读者大概不会明白“门”怎么变成了“闻”，而“户”和“护”又是如何发生关系的。这对于一般的中国读者来说也存在同样的问题。所以，在翻译《说文》的时候，必须要解释清楚它所采用的不同的释义方式，这样读者才会知其所以然。《说文》常用的释义方式有以下几种。

1. 互训

所谓“元，始也”，“福，禄也”，用的是互为训释的方法，也就是说选择两个以上意义和用法相同或相近的字、词互为训释。段玉裁《说文解字注》中说“元、始可互言之”，即“元”可以训“始”，“始”可以训“元”。这种互训并不是想当然的，需要从实际语言中把语境相同、意义相同而用词不同的句子加以比较归纳。互训虽有一定的局限，但它却是解释词义的原始方法。许慎在《说文解字》中大量采用了这种方法。

2. 声训

“门，闻也”与“户，护也”用的是声训的方法来明确命名的由来。所谓声训就是用同音字或双声、叠韵字来进行训释。门与闻，户与护在古代是同音词。闻的意思是通达，而门一般都是安在城墙或院墙上，以供通行，是到达城市的必经之路，所以门的命名是源于闻的。

3. 标明义界

在《说文解字》中，有些“某，某也”用的是标明义界的释义方式。义界可以说就是词的定义，是词所指的客观事物的属性。比如说“暨，日颇见也”。“日颇见”就表明“暨”字的义界。“暨”字的意义是天刚蒙蒙亮，太阳未出之时，而景物初见。在许慎的释文中“颇”是偏颇、倾斜的意思，而天色微明正是太阳刚出地平线（日颇见）的时候。

4. 递训

《说文》释义中还有一种情况，不同于以上三种，这就是递训。递训并不标明词的义界，而是将一些字进行归属处理，标明其类属。比如，“杏，果也”，“桃，果也”，“樱，果也”，“李，果也”，都只是说“杏、桃、樱、李”都是树上结的果实，“果，木实也”。

所以单以《说文》释文中的一种“某，某也”来看，竟也有如此大的不同，需要认真地区别对待。在翻译时，不能只对它们进行字面上的翻译（literal translation），而必须要有许多必要的解释。这要求译者必须是个（至少是半个）《说文》专家，他不但要通晓《说文》本文，还要采纳参考说文学的研究成果，要精研段玉裁的《说文解字注》及其他说文大家的著作。要具备文字训诂学的基础知识，再加上上佳的英语，这样才有可能把《说文解字》翻译成对西方读者有意义的中国字书。

在实际的翻译过程中，碰到的问题远远要比这些复杂得多。中国古代典籍的英译工作任重道远，而翻译者的文字训诂知识在翻译这些著作的时候就是必不可少的了。比如说在翻译诸如《老子》之类的古代典籍时，涉及到中国所特有的概念时，就需要具备一些文字训诂的知识。

中国文化在几千年的发展过程中形成了一套独特同时又丰富的概念体系。这些概念又少有和西方的概念完全一一对应的。这样在翻译中，特别是在有些概念用字和其字形有密切关系时，就会遇到巨大的障碍。下面看几个常见的例子。

1. “道可道，非常道”

《道德经》作为中国哲学中的经典著作，历来为译者看重。迄今为止在国内外已有 100 多种译本。下面选几本有代表性的译本，看一看道、德在英语中变成了什么模样。

Nitter Bynner1944 年出版的译文中，《道德经》翻译成了 *The Way of Life*。首句“道可

道，非常道”翻译成了 existence is beyond the power of words to define(存在是难以名状的)，“道”变成了 existence(存在)。在 R. B. Blackney1955 年的译本中，这一句又变成了 There are ways but the way is uncharted (有许多条道路，但这条道路没有标明)。在 Victor H Main 1990 年出版的 *TAO TE CHING* 中，这一句译成了 The ways that can be walked are not the eternal way (可以行走的道路不是永恒之道)[3]。国内出版的任继愈的注释本的英译为 The Tao that can be spoken of is not the eternal Tao.

“道”是中国传统哲学中的一个核心范畴，具有丰富的内涵：道为本性，为自然法则，为事物的规律，为一，为无。道的本义是道路，同时道又用作道白之道。这几种意义同时出现在《老子》中，就需要译者仔细辨别，不能一看到“道”就译成 Tao 或 way。“道可道，非常道”中，第一个道是道德之道，第二个道是道白之道，第三个道又是道德之道。Main 的译文问题在于把第二个道理解成了“行走”。“道”一般翻译成 way 或 Tao。西方学者喜欢用 way 来译“道”，一个原因就是“道”的本文为道路，这恰好与 way 的本义相符，而 way 又有“方式、方法”等转义，这与道的转义(规律、事理)也有相通之处。所以当“道”指和道路有关的意义时，用 way 来翻译就十分妥帖；但 way 无法传达道为世界本体的意义，“道生一，一生二，二生三”(《老子》四十二章)中，用 way 来译“道”就有些不知所云了。

Tao 在 18 世纪以音译的方式进入了英语。《兰登书屋英语大词典》中 *Tao* 的定义是：1. (in philosophical Taoism) that in virtue of which all things happen or exist; 2. the rational basis of human activity or conduct; 3. a universal, regarded as an ideal attained to a greater or lesser degree by those embodying it.《朗曼英语词典》的解释是：1. the principle of creative harmony which Taoists believe orders the universe; 2. (tao) the path of virtuous conduct according to the teachings of the Chinese philosopher Confucius.

“道”译成 Tao 把它为世界本源的意义揭示了出来，但是“道”作为道路等其他用法又被掩盖掉了。汉字的“道”是各种意义都蕴含掩盖在字形中，而译成英语，无论是 way 还是 *Tao*，都只表示了它的意义的一个方面。“道”的多义性要求译者在翻译时首先要确定“道”在文章中的意义。如果是同时蕴含数义的话，翻译的时候就要充分考虑到各种意义的可能性，必要的时候要加注说明。

“德”在英语中没有完全对应的词，也没有像 Tao 一样的音译，只是偶然见于书名的翻译中。目前“德”大多用 virtue 来翻译。在表示德行、有德的时候，可以称得上对等的译名。virtue 的语源是 strength(力量)和 manliness(雄壮)，孔武有力，这或许可以说明 Arthur Waley(韦利)1934 出版的《道德经》的英译本中把“德”几乎都译成了 power，如“上德不德是以有德”(the man of highest power does not reveal him self as a possessor of power, therefore he keeps his power)(《老子》三十八章)。但考察一下德字的来历，我们可以发现德与道一样，同样取象于道路。德的古文由“彳”(行)符、“直”符结体构形，由“直”得声，表示“正道直行”、“直行有当”的字义。这或许可以解释“德”为什么多与“道”、“行”合成词语，如“道德”、“德行”等。而在英语中 way(道)和 virtue(德)是没什么关系的。这样在理解《道德经》及“道德”时，就会失去重要的语境及联想意义。

2. 易有三名

中国人辩证思维很早就成熟了，这也体现在汉字中。比如《周易》中的“易”就有三种含义。《易纬乾凿度》云：“易一名而含三义，所谓易也，变易也，不易也。”《周易》译成英语或音译为

iching，或为 *Book of Changes*。把“易”译成 change，仅道出了“易”的变易之义，而于其他二义，则未道及。章炳麟早就注意到了这一点，“变易、简易，义本绝殊，中国适为同字。他国虽明知其训，而无一字以兼此两义者，则于《周易》不得不译音也”[4]。虽然我们找不到完全对等的译名，但在翻译的时候却要注意辨析“易”字所侧重的意义究竟是什么。

在翻译典籍的时候，还要注意典籍的版本。古代典籍历经传抄，同一种书籍往往有数个甚至数十个版本流行于世。不同的版本之间良莠不齐，这样在翻译古代典籍的时候，要选择善本、精刻本为底本。

《老子》，韦利英译，陈鼓应今译，汉英对照兼文白对照。本书的汉语原文与今译选用了陈鼓应的《老子注译及评介》。陈本据说是以王弼本为蓝本，参看帛书等古本加以订正。但陈本在某些地方与王弼本有很大差异。如开篇第一章，陈本断句为：道可道，非常“道”；名可名，非常“名”。“无”，名天地之始；“有”，名万物之母。故常“无”，欲以观其妙；常“有”，欲以观其徼。第二、第三句句读与王弼本即有差异。王注为：无名天地之始，有名万物之母。故常无欲，以观其妙。常有欲，以观其徼。

不难看出，陈本是把“有”、“无”作为一对相对立的概念。相应的陈本的今译为：“无”是天地的开始，“有”是万物的根源。所以常从“无”中去观照“道”的奥妙，常从“有”中去观照“道”的端倪。而王弼本显然是把“有名”、“无名”作为一对概念的。第二句王注为：凡有名皆始于无，故未形无名之时则为万物之始。韦利的英译即以王弼本为基础。第二句译为：It was from the Nameless that Heaven and Earth sprang; The named is but the mother that rears the ten thousand creatures, each after its kind. “Nameless”即无名，“the named”即有名。“无名”、“有名”相对，而不是“有”、“无”相对。第三句英译为：Truly, only he that rids himself forever of desire can see the Secret Essence; He that has never rid himself of desire can see only the outcomes. “rids himself of desire”与“never rid himself of desire”即“无欲”、“有欲”之辨。[5]

钱锺书在《管锥编·老子王弼注》中说：“‘无名，天地之始’，复初守静，则道体浑然而莫可名也；‘有名，万物之母’，显迹赋形，则道用粲然而各具名也……道理之见于道白者，即‘名’也，道以‘有名’、‘无名’双承之。由道白之‘道’引入‘名’，如波之折，由‘名’分为‘有名’、‘无名’，如云之展。”[6]

作为哲学上的研究，对《老子》作出不同的解读原是非常必要的，但在把《老子》这样的古代典籍翻译介绍给外国读者的时候，以一家之言作为翻译的依据，这不利于外国读者准确地理解这些著作。所以在选择底本的时候，要注意选择通行本，选择为学术界普遍接受的版本。

另外在翻译中所经常碰到的问题是同音字、同音词的翻译问题。在世界上的各主要语种中，汉字的音节是最少的，只有 1 300 个。相比之下，英语有 4 300 个，法语有 2 800 个，俄语有 2 960 个。而所有的汉字都是由一个声母和一个韵母构成的，这就使汉字中不可避免地出现了许许多多的同音字和同音词。对于主要靠读音来区别词义的拼音文字来说，这些同音字和同音词是很容易产生迷惑和误解的。有关事物概念的同音字词在翻译中可以依靠相对应的英语概念来进行区分，比如说“东西”dōngxi 可以翻译为“thing”，而“东西”dōngxī 翻译为“east and west”。中国地名人名的翻译现在统一用现代汉语拼音进行音译，这样一些地名人名在英语中就无法区分了。比如山西是 shanxi，而陕西也是 shanxi，浑然无别（现在西方习用的陕西译名是 shaanxi）；晋是 jin，金也是 jin，合二为一。在姓名的翻译中，姜、江不分，王、汪不辨。在汉语拼音中，我们可以用调号来加以区分，但英语全无调号这个概念。如果说姓名的混淆不至于

产生大的误解，而“张冠章戴”也不会产生太坏的结果的话，地名的混淆在某些场合下可能会造成很大的损失。

目前还没有很好的办法来避免这些同音字词产生的混乱。如果必须加以区分的话，地名的翻译中可以附加地理方位的描述，而朝代的翻译可以附加起讫年代，但人名的翻译目前还没有很好的解决办法。有些英语著作在人名地名的音译后面加上汉字，比如“Numerous collections of inscribed bronze vessels from the ‘Three Periods’ sandai（三代）were compiled and published, including the very extensive imperial collection published by order of the emperor Hui 徽 zong(r. 1101—1125)under the title Bogu Tulu 博古图录”。[7]这或许是目前能避免误解的一个好办法。

选文二　对比语篇学与汉语典籍英译

杨自俭

导　言

选文原刊载于《外语与外语教学》2005 年第 7 期。

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选文讨论了两个问题：语篇学与翻译的关系，论及了语篇的定义、性质、结构、类型、特征以及语境和对比语篇学等问题；汉语典籍英译问题，论及了典籍的定义、翻译的标准与过程以及翻译中的语言学问题。

黄国文教授 1988 年编著了《语篇分析概要》，这本书大概是我国第一本系统介绍语篇分析的著作。我是从读他这本书知道他的。后来他去英国拿了应用语言学和功能语言学两个博士学位。回来后他写过不少高水平的论文，大都是关于系统功能语言学和语篇分析的。前两年读过他的《英语语言问题研究》(1999)一书，收获颇多。去年刚读过他的《语篇分析的理论与实践》(2001)，不久，他的书稿《翻译研究的语言学探索》就送到我的手上。由于我手中事情丛集，一直拖到今天才看完。他在上一本书中用系统功能语言学的理论与方法比较全面系统地研究了广告文体的语篇。在这个研究领域他是领先的，王宗炎先生在该书的《序》中说：“除黄先生外，国内现在尚无第二人。”他这本《翻译研究的语言学探索》又是对一个新的研究领域的开拓。他用系统功能语言学的理论与方法既探讨了汉语古诗词的英译问题，又做了汉英语篇的对比研究。他在本书《前言》中明确提出：“书中各章的分析主要围绕着两个目的：一是试图通过功能语言学分析来揭示一些翻译者没有注意到的问题，希望本书的分析可以给翻译研究带来一

些启示；二是通过对诗的英译文的分析检验功能语言学在翻译研究和语篇分析中的可操作性和可应用性。”看完书稿，我清楚地感到他设定的研究目标已经达到了。从理论上讲，这本书的主要贡献是提出了一个从语言学视角研究汉语古诗词英译的基本框架。这个框架包括经验功能、逻辑功能、人际功能、语篇功能、语篇结构、形式对等、静态与动态、引述、时态、人称与专有名词等方面的内容。从应用方面来说，这个框架既可作评价汉诗英译和语篇对比研究的参照标准，对这类研究也有方法论的价值。因此国文同志的这本新作无论对从事汉语古诗词英译实践与研究的学者，还是对从事英汉语篇对比研究的学者在理论与应用两方面都具有重要参考价值。我虽然没做过这个领域的研究，但读了书稿，我清楚地感到他在书中对古诗英译和语篇对比问题从 12 个方面进行的分析，是那么清新、切实、令人信服，充分体现了语言学方法的精确性特点。他在书中提出了一些用诗学方法研究古诗词英译不注意或想不到的问题，而且是一些难处理的问题。比如苏轼的《题西林壁》(横看成岭侧成峰，远近高低各不同。不识庐山真面目，只缘身在此山中)中的“岭”、“峰”和“山”是单数还是复数？英译文二者都有，孰优孰劣？这首诗从逻辑功能方面分析，它由两个小句复合体(clause complex)构成，前两句为并列关系(parataxis)，后两句为主从关系(hypotaxis)。但英译文有的不是这样处理的，甚至正好相反，如何评价这种不同选择的优劣？比如李商隐的《无题》中“晓镜但愁云鬓改/夜吟应觉月光寒”两个诗句中的人称问题，国文同志比较了 6 种英译文，发现了让人颇难回答的问题：① 谁愁？她、你、我；② 谁云鬓改？她、你；③ 谁吟？你、我；④ 谁觉月光寒？她、你。还有一种译文是模仿原诗没用人称代词。这些不同的选择有何异同与优劣？很值得我们研究。再比如时态问题，作者专章分类对不同英译文进行了比较分析，最后总结出了四条很有参考价值的规则(现在时和过去时都可用的时候如何选择，诗中明示将来或过去含义的时候如何选择，叙述和引语中的时态如何选择，变换或交替使用时态的时候如何选择)。不需要我赘述，只要你认真读一遍这本书，一定会有和我同样的认识和感觉。

这本书第一章“绪论”的构思颇不一般，表现出国文同志在学术研究上的功夫、智慧和高明。我们都知道吕叔湘先生在选择语料方面是特等高手，读过他的书和文章的都会有这种认识。比如在《通过对比研究语法》一文中，吕先生选了毛主席《别了，司徒雷登》中的两个句子：“多少一点困难怕什么。封锁吧，封锁十年八年，中国的一切问题都解决了。”然后拿它们与其英译文(What matter if we have to face some difficulties? Let them blockade us! Let them blockade us for eight or ten years! By that time all of China's problems will have been solved.)比较，一下子就提出了 8 个方面的不同。并在此基础上归纳出对比语言学的著名论断：“拿一种语言跟另一种语言比较，就会发现有 3 种情况：一种情况是彼此不同，第二种情况是此一彼多或者此多彼一，还有一种情况是此有彼无或者此无彼有。”(见杨自俭、李瑞华编《英汉对比研究论文集》，上海外语教育出版社，1990：21 - 22)国文同志的做法像吕先生的做法一样，只选了苏轼一首七绝《题西林壁》的 4 种英译文，从宏观和微观两个层面进行了分析比较，一下子就提出了本书要研究的 12 个问题，这 12 个问题既有“山中”(语篇内)的，也有“山外”(语篇外)的，涵盖的面很广。由此可见，学术研究中，理论思维的修养需要功夫，语料的收集与选择也同样需要功夫。面对国内学术界的现状，着实应大力倡导学者必须认真培养和追求这两种功夫。

还有一个值得倡导的问题，那就是王宗炎先生在《语言对比小议》中说的：“我们要的不是两张皮，而是一条龙——一条兴云作雨，灌溉整个学术王国的龙。”[见杨自俭主编《英汉语比较

与翻译》,(4):19]国文同志在《语篇分析的理论与实践》中已开始了英汉语篇的对比研究,在这本书中他做得更多更深入了一些。学外语的是不是一定要做外语与母语的对比研究,是不是一定要研究母语,这是值得学外语的学人认真思考的一个重要问题。回顾我国现代语言学的诞生和发展,100 年来基本上走的是中外结合的道路,就是学习、借鉴国外的语言学理论,同时跟母语研究与母语教学的研究相结合。历史证明,只有中外结合,才能更好地发展我们自己,特别是现在,只研究外语或只研究母语恐怕都很难做得更好。在我国解决"两张皮"的问题是一个长期而艰巨的任务,需要外语界和汉语界学人长期共同努力。沈家煊说:"汉语界和外语界两股力量的汇合,小有进步,成效不大。外语界的学人'搜集采购'功不可没,但是有不少人言必称外国,对国外的理论讲得头头是道,问到自己母语里的情形就一问三不知。近年来不少人在论文中也开始举一些汉语的例子,但是蜻蜓点水,不痛不痒,有的甚至削足适履,拿汉语的事实去迁就国外的理论。"(见 Roger T. Bell, *Translation and Translating: Theory and Practice*,外研社版:F32)汉语界学人也有类似的情况,外语好的研究母语有了较大的进步,非常可喜,他们在起着领路人的作用。外语不好或不懂外语的只能看翻译过来的外国语言学著作,受到很大的限制,其中有些学人,对外国语言学中的问题居然到了一问三不知的程度。现在最需要的是汉外两界学人端正态度,以大局为重,认真补课,取长补短,通力合作,为我国语言学的建设和发展作出自己的贡献。

我看到的把语篇语言学、对比语言学和翻译学三个学科放在一起进行综合研究的是 Basil Hatim 的 *Communication Across Cultures: Translation Theory and Contrastive Text Linguistics*。Hatim 在语域理论(register tehory)和 Beaugrande & Dressler 语篇语言学综合研究的基础上构建了一个语篇分析的理论框架。这个框架包括两大组成部分,第一部分是语篇本身的三个方面:语篇类型(text type)、语篇结构(text structure)和语篇特征(texture)。第二部分是从语域扩展出来的语境的三个领域:规约性交际(institutional-communicational transaction),主要是语域涉及的内容(语场、语式、话语方式等);语用行为(pragmatic action),主要涉及意图性(intentionality);符号互动(semiotic interaction),主要涉及互文性(intertextuality)。作者把语篇分成三个方面放在这个复杂的大语境中,通过对比与翻译去研究它们多层面、多角度的互动关系,从而揭示了语篇生成的机制和交际过程中重要因素之间相互影响的复杂关系,为翻译研究提供了一些新的思路与参照,证明了翻译为对比语篇学(contrastive textology)提供了一个很适用的研究框架。

要想把对比语篇学和翻译研究更好地结合起来,进一步推动这项研究的发展,就应该在 Hatim 和黄国文两人所建构的不同理论框架的基础上做更系统更全面的探讨。为此我在这儿提出几个问题供我自己和大家进一步思考。

(1) 什么是语篇?我在《语篇与语境》中曾说:"语篇是由两个以上交际单位构成的一个较复杂的交际系统。"(见张德禄等《语篇连贯与衔接理论的发展与应用》)这个定义揭示没揭示出语篇的本质属性?语篇的本质属性到底是什么?

(2) 语篇研究除 Hatim 提出的语篇类型、语篇结构和语篇特征三个方面以外还有哪些方面需要研究?Beaugrande & Dressler 在 *Introduction to Text Linguistics* 中提出的语篇的 7 条标准(intentionality, informativity, acceptablity, intertextuality, situationality, cohesion, coherence)对 Hatim 语篇分析框架有什么影响?

(3) Hatim 的三分法语境和王建华的三分法语境(言外、言伴和言内,见张德禄等《语篇连

贯与衔接理论的发展与应用》：XⅡ）有什么异同？对我们进一步研究语境有什么启发？

（4）黄国文的语篇对比分析框架中各组成部分之间是什么关系？这个框架应从哪些方面进一步研究与改进？这个分析框架和 Hatim 的分析框架有什么异同？

（5）什么是对比语篇学？为什么说翻译为语篇对比提供了一个很好的研究框架？

（6）语篇和语境究竟是什么关系？二者关系的研究对翻译研究有什么价值？

说到汉语典籍英译问题，我了解很少，只读过马祖毅、刘重德、楚至大、许渊冲、黄新渠、汪榕培、郭著章、蒋坚松、王宏印、潘文国、卓振英和黄国文等先生的文章或有关著作与译著。我的印象是绝大部分都是讲汉语古诗词英译的，讲诗以外典籍英译的很少。记得潘文国和他的研究生写过一篇《古籍英译当求明白、通畅、简洁》，提出了古籍英译的基本标准，并说这是信达雅的具体化做法[见杨自俭主编《英汉语比较与翻译》(3)：393－410]。2002 年 5 月在石家庄河北师范大学召开的“第一届全国典籍英译研讨会”上我们讨论了汉语典籍英译的理论与实践问题，同年 8 月在上海华东师范大学召开的中国英汉语比较研究会第五届全国学术研讨会上，我们决定在学会原有三个研究领域的基础上增设“汉语典籍英译研究”和“英汉语篇学”两个新的领域。此后我一直在思考如何推动这两个领域的研究，经过协商，我们在中国英汉语比较研究会第六届全国学术研讨会征文通知中列出了这两个领域的 8 个议题。前者为：① 汉语典籍英译中的翻译理论问题；② 汉语典籍英译中的语言学问题；③ 中国古典诗中意象的英译问题；④ 外国人翻译汉语典籍的动机与策略。后者为：① 英汉对比语篇学的理论与方法；② 英汉语篇生成比较研究；③ 英汉语篇与语言教学和翻译；④ 认知与语篇研究。这些议题和今年 10 月在苏州大学召开的“第二届全国典籍英译研讨会”的议题都是我们要不断研究和讨论的问题。这次苏州大学会议的交流明显有了新的进展，也为今年学会第六届大会做好了学术交流的准备。现在我想就汉语典籍英译研究中的三个问题谈一点我的看法，仅供大家在研究中进一步思考。

（1）关于汉语典籍的概念问题。首先我们应搞清楚什么是“典籍”这个问题。《现代汉语词典》(第 280 页)解释说：“记载古代法制的图书，也泛指古代图书。”1999 年版的《辞海》(上卷第 831 页)中有详细的解释：“国家重要文献。《孟子·告子下》：‘诸侯之地方百里；不百里，不足以守宗庙之典籍。’赵岐注：‘谓先祖常籍法度之文也。’亦统称各种典册、书籍。《尚书序》：‘及秦始皇灭先代典籍。’《后汉书·崔寔传》：‘少沈静，好典籍。’”另外《左传·昭公十五年》中也有“司晋之典籍”的说法。看来“典籍”主要有两个义项，一是古代重要文献、书籍；二是法典、制度。所以它的英译有 ancient codes and records 和 ancient books and records 两种。依据上述分析和我们要研究的这个领域，“典籍”似应界定为“中国清代末年(19 世纪中叶近现代汉语分界处)以前的重要文献和书籍”为宜。除诗词以外还包括其他各类文体的重要文献与书籍。这个定义还涉及两个问题，一是“重要”这个标准如何把握？二是用少数民族的文字记载的少数民族的典籍算不算？第一个问题可以一方面依惯例而定，尊重各学科专家(比如文学的、史学的、哲学的、医学的等)的意见，另一方面可依新的研究成果而定(比如有的过去认为不重要，后来发现很重要)。第二个问题，用少数民族文字记载的他们的重要文献和书籍也是中国的典籍，因为它们是中国文化的重要组成部分。为了准确起见，可用“汉语典籍”的说法，英译文用 ancient Chinese books and records 表示。少数民族的典籍比如藏族的可用“藏语典籍”表达，英译文用 ancient Tibetan books and records 表示。不知这样界定恰当不恰当？这儿还有两个问题，一是清代末年以后的重要文献和书籍算不算典籍？如果按定义外延的规定不应该算。

二是现代人用古汉语写的重要文献和书籍算不算典籍？同上理也不应该算。不算可以，但问题依然存在。要解决这两个问题就要把上述定义修改为“中国古今重要的文献和书籍”，并可按时间划分为“古代典籍”、“近代典籍”、“现代典籍”和“当代典籍”。不知这两种界定哪个更好些，特提出供大家思考和讨论。

(2) 关于汉语典籍英译的标准和过程问题。现在我们看到的汉语典籍英译作品中，其汉语大都是古代汉语，也有近代汉语(近代汉语一般说从晚唐五代前后到清代末年)，而英语都是现代英语。这种翻译和把现代汉语译成现代英语的翻译有很大不同。后者的转换从现代到现代，而前者的转换是从古代或近代汉语先到现代汉语再到现代英语，虽然没出现现代汉语的文本，但翻译过程中译者的脑子里是出现过一个内在的现代汉语文本的。这就给翻译研究提出了两个重要问题，一是现有的翻译标准是否还合适的问题，从内容到形式译文和原文都有了较大的距离，“忠实”、“通畅”和“得体”都会更难把握。这种翻译从某种程度上说更接近解释性翻译。二是翻译过程增加了一个语内翻译阶段，原文为古代或近代汉语，译文为现代英语，中间为现代汉语，无论理解还是表达都变得更加复杂。我想上述问题是这个研究领域中无法回避的两个重要理论问题，因此我们必须认真研究。

(3) 关于汉语典籍英译中的语言学问题。语言学对翻译研究做出的贡献，特别是语篇语言学做出的贡献是很大的，这种贡献是否定不了的。我们从 Nida，Catford，Newmark，Wiles 等人的研究中可以看到，他们重视语言的共性，强调语言规律与客观世界规律的一致性，努力寻求语义的对等和语言转换的规律，以求通过研究人类翻译活动的科学性来建立翻译科学。这种语言学翻译观对非文学翻译(尤其是科技翻译)实践与研究做出的贡献是不应低估的，而且应该进一步加强这一领域的研究，但在文学翻译中表现出了它的明显缺陷。由于它对不同语言之间的差异和人类翻译活动的艺术性重视不够，由于它对语言外的社会、历史、文化、意识形态、译者的目的等重要因素对翻译活动的影响研究不够，于是在翻译中表现出某种程度的程式化倾向，因此受到大文化派(我称 cultural turn 之后的各派叫大文化派)的批评。不过其中有的流派在走向自己的反面，它们赋予译者过大的权力，把翻译几乎等同于创作，显然这种派别没有很大的发展前途。现在看来，关于文学翻译的研究，特别是诗词翻译的研究除用语言学方法之外，尚须用诗学的方法，只用一种方法会有片面性，会影响对原作的理解、鉴赏和评价，当然也就会影响译文的选择与表达。我们应该看到这两种方法都有优缺点，只有二者相互补充，才能较好地指导翻译实践，并取得较好的研究成果。大文化派倡导的研究方法可叫文化学的方法，其核心内容是强调译者的主体性、翻译的功能、语言外社会文化与意识形态对翻译的影响以及文本意义的不确定性等。我们研究这些流派一定要把握一个适当的度，要看到它们适应社会需要的一面，但也要看到把翻译趋同于创作的一面。林纾的翻译和《鲁拜集》(Ruboiyat)等一类的翻译大文化派认为是翻译，我们现在也可以接受，但我们决不应倡导所有的译者都做这样的翻译。我想我们应该有这样清醒的认识。物极必反，这是真理。历史证明这个真理在为人为学等任何一个领域都是有效的。

选文三 Hermeneutics of Translation: A Critical Consideration of the Term Dao in Two Renderings of the *Analects*

Marc Andre Matten

导 言

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作者 Marc Andre Matten 是波恩大学中国研究系的教授。他的这篇文章从阐释学的角度分析了理雅各的《论语》英语译本和卫礼贤的《论语》德语译本中对"道"的翻译处理。文章从奎因所提出的"翻译的不确定性"这一观点出发,指出"翻译的不确定性"意味着一个句子的翻译有多种可能性。在文章作者看来,翻译的问题就是认识论的问题,而翻译认识论又是建立在形而上学基础之上的。翻译的认识论需要通过翻译的形而上学来验证,反之亦然。而为了解决翻译的这种不确定性有人提出了"类比"的方法。但是类比方法的有效性却受到了质疑,因为跨语使用"类比"容易导致原语的"错误再现(misrepresenting)"。既然"类比"的方法不能完全有效地转译原语的意义,那么文章认为译者还是应该在认识层面或是诠释层面下功夫。于是,既然理雅各和卫礼贤翻译的是儒家经典《论语》,儒家的认识论就应该适合翻译过程中的阐释过程。因此,文章就介绍了旅美华裔学者成中英所提出的儒家本体阐释学原则:综合观察原则、情感融合原则、实践与自我修养原则以及道德与理性原则。作者试图利用这四项本体诠释原则建构儒家文本的翻译阐释原则,因为,翻译也是一种儒家所谓的"正名"的过程,而"正名"的目的则是实现"名"与"实"之间的和谐而又恰当的关系。翻译者需要采取一种整体论的观点,在其中要将本体论和认识论整合在一起。实在的意义的确立是本体论问题,需要通过认识论意义上的诠释行为来完成,而诠释的意义的确立则要建立在本体论理解基础之上才能做到。文章在建立了儒家经典文本翻译的本体诠释学总原则之后,开始考察理雅各和卫礼贤的翻译诠释观。作者认为理雅各受到了苏格兰实在论的影响,他在翻译中常常是前理性的经验尝试性判断;卫礼贤在翻译中则倾向于对神学先验论的利用。尽管这两位译者的翻译有优劣之分,但是都是同翻译对象之间互动的结果,采取的是康德和伽达默尔的阐释观,即认为对一个客体的理解不可能不受阐释主体的影响,这不同于洛克等人的客观主义阐释观。

Introductory Remarks[1]

Since Hans-Georg Gadamer we know that whenever we are reading a text—no matter what kind or when it has been written—we will not be completely able to grasp the same idea of the text as the author formerly had intended. This is because we are looking at this text

from our own perspective and—mostly unconsciously—let our own (culturally biased) views influence the perception of this text. In the words of Gadamer, a "fusion of horizons" takes place—there is an inescapably dynamic present in any interpretive act between the historical conditions of consciousness and the self-conscious attempt to give an account of those conditions.[2] As a consequence, each reader will get a different impression of the text he or she has read and each act of translation will—more or less—alienate the text. In the following, I will illustrate this by comparing two translations of the Confucian *Analects* (*Lunyu*), namely those made by James Legge and Richard Wilhelm. The key term that shall be focused on is *dao*. Though *dao* is a very complex term for which no single, universally applicable translation exists, a translator has to choose a translation equivalent for *dao* or at least to explain what meaning it is supposed to have. It will be shown in this article that it is very difficult to find an adequate translation for *dao* as the translator will most probably always be influenced by his own hermeneutical background. The core question is, whether such an influence can—from the standpoint of hermeneutics—be avoided, and if so, what kind of translation technique should be used.

The Problem of Proper Translation—A Theoretical Approach

About the Problem of Translation in General

Dao is a term of distinctive Chinese origin and the Chinese use it every day variously, as, for example, in the sentences "*Wo zhidao.*" ("I know.") or "Ta *jiang daoli.*" ("She appeals to reason.") and so on. The character *dao* here takes a certain place in the whole sentence structure and plays a certain role in communication between individuals—just as any word being uttered does. If we, for example, talk about a red car, then we are very sure about what color that car is. We have learned to react to distinctive photochemical effects that are wrought in one's retina by the impact of red light by using "red" as the exact expression. To call "red" now "red" is a result of social training, and this social consensus is also indispensable for social communication. The art of communication is smooth insofar as such a consensus can be easily reached, but when we are crossing boundaries, it becomes more complex.

We can imagine a lot of boundaries in communication to be crossed, yet we will just talk about two of them in our further analysis. First, there are language boundaries to be mentioned. When crossing such boundaries, we have to translate our words ("*red*") into another language ("*hong*," "*rouge*," "*rosso*"...). This process can be very complicated and lead to many misunderstandings, because every word has different semantic meanings and different connotations, depending on its origin and application. But there are also structural problems that have to be considered. Let us take a negative formulated question in Chinese, for example: "Ta *bu shi Faguoren ma?*" ("Isn't he French?") If the answer is "*Bu shi*" then

we do have an ambiguity. A Chinese person would of course easily understand the answer, but a German or English person would now rather think that the person we are talking about is *not* French, just due to the fact that negative formulated questions are answered differently in German and English. These structural problems can also be a source of misunderstandings.

Another boundary is one that can even be found in a single language area. The translation examples mentioned above are quite concrete and it is easy to reach consensus about how to call things by their names. But if we are talking about matters that cannot be seen, heard, felt, or in any other way perceived by our senses, then a consensus most likely doesn't exist or is only believed to exist. This is especially the case for metaphysical terms just like *dao* or others as *shangdi*, *tian*, etc. The problem we will now have a look at is the question of what kind of translation technique can be used in order to obtain a verified rendering.

The Thesis of the Indeterminacy of Translation Formulated by Willard Van Orman Quine[3]

In his book *Word and Object*, Willard Van Orman Quine mentions the problem of making insensible things intelligibly describable. For example, the only way to describe insensible things like molecules is analogy, notably a special form of analogy called extrapolation. Molecules are too small to be seen by human eyes, smaller than any other sensible entity. Referring to the especially meaningful term of "smaller," one is able to understand what molecules are: the molecule has to be associated with observable contrasts as that of a bee to a bird, a fly to a bee, and a grain of sand to a fly. The extrapolation leading to an understanding of molecules can be represented as an analogy of relation: microbes, for example, are in the same way smaller than a grain of sand is to a fly. Once we have now understood (i. e. , imagined) molecules with the help of such size analogies, we are able to continue our research on molecules. But such an analogy is, of course, very limited; in fact, one learns only very little about molecules when just referring to analogies as shown above: "One must see the molecular doctrine at work in physical theory to get a proper notion of molecules, and this is not a matter of analogy, nor of description at all."[4] Thus, one is rather forced to learn the word and the meaning of "molecule" contextually, that is to say, through chemical experiments learn how molecules react to certain chemicals or other stimuli. The real nature of molecules can thus be better approached.

The same conclusion can be applied to the term *dao*. If a translator would solely rely on analogies when doing his job, he will definitely fail in presenting an acceptable translation that represents a proper understanding. First of all, one has to wonder what possible analogies may be referred to. The term is of strict Chinese origin and is very closely related to the Chinese tradition. Analogies that refer to elements of other cultures or other languages would take the risk of (neofigurist) misrepresenting. Quine states in the second chapter of his book *Word and Object* that the problem of understanding becomes even more

complicated when we are translating not only single words, but whole sentences and complex sentence structures. Here the linguist also needs to pay attention to the problem of whether what is said is true (i. e., his translated sentences are to fit prior translations). Furthermore, the translated sentences must also contain stimuli that correspond to the stimuli to be found in the original sentences. At last, questions of intrasubjective stimulus synonymy of sentences of even non-observational kind must be taken into account.

Although a linguist may now consider these four problematic issues, a translation may still not be perfect. Quine shows clearly that there remains an indeterminacy of translation. This indeterminacy means that there will always be several possibilities to translate a certain sentence (or text) into another language, because "... manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another."[5] In other words, we have to look carefully at the kind of epistemology we want to use in order to obtain justified knowledge about *dao*. The modern epistemology founded by Immanuel Kant is an intellectual project of extensive abstraction and extensive reconstruction of categories from what has already been known. Thus, his epistemology is grounded on the metaphysical which makes a transcendental deduction possible. As knowledge is regulatively defined by transcendental categories Kant has put up in advance, epistemology must be first metaphysically justified, just as metaphysics needs to be epistemologically justified. In the end, metaphysical and epistemological form a reciprocal circle of mutual presuppositions and reciprocal support.

Following now Quine, there can be different epistemologies compatible with the same metaphysics. As now no epistemology is equal or adequate to the same type of metaphysics, it is clear that metaphysics is founded on many possible epistemologies and can be said to be underdetermined by any single given epistemology. As a result thereof, translations that are based on only one single epistemological principle cannot be "correct." But this does not need to be understood in a purely negative sense; as Robert Barrett and Robert Gibson put it in their book about Quine: "Translation is important, often right, often wrong. The indeterminacy thesis denies none this, but tells us that right translations can sharply diverge."[6] Following now this argumentation, one is—when doing the translation—rather obliged to read as many commentaries and sources as possible and compare extensively contexts in which *dao* is used, in order to understand it in its totality. A holistic understanding of a term in regard to its relevance in reality, life, and practice may only be achieved by reconsidering several, differing epistemologies or epistemological principles—and not just a single one—which will be presented in the following section.

The Case of Confucian Onto-Hermeneutics and Its Epistemological Principles Presented by Chung-ying Cheng

In an article published in this journal in March 2000, Chung-ying Cheng presents four Confucian principles of knowledge that build the core and foundation of Confucian

epistemology which help to understand Confucian virtues and values.[7] These principles aim at understanding something in terms of the meaningful connections of basic notions in a certain text and, at the same time, take intended and factual references to a reality into account which can be experienced and appealed to independently of the text.

The first principle Cheng presents is the "Principle of Comprehensive Observation." Based on the cosmological thinking in the *Zhou Yi*, this principle allows man to establish knowledge of all the things in the world through a full comprehensive observation, which brings out a possible overlapping consensus on patterns or orders of the whole world and also a consensus on a holistic sense of the unity of things in the world. The second principle is called the "Principle of Congruence of Reciprocal Feelings." In Confucianism, what is relevant is not only knowledge that is gained through rational and logical cognition, but also knowledge that correctly describes reality as experienced through feelings by a person in a certain community. The third principle of knowledge for Confucius is the "Principle of Practice and Self-Cultivation." Knowledge may reflect self and reality, but as self grows and reality constantly changes, knowledge must change as well and this requires the individual knower to adapt to the growth of self and changes in the world. In other words, because knowledge itself has no value, it must always be applied in order to become significant. The fourth principle of knowledge for Confucius is the "Principle of Unity of Virtues and Reasons," which is based on his notion of the way (*dao*). It is the "Way," which penetrates into all virtues and reasons and which leads to the integration and unification of virtues and reasons under the virtue of humanity of benevolence (*ren*). In this sense, knowledge would bring the moral vision of humanity to fruition in a gradual and continuous process of transformation.

These four principles are now not only considered to constitute the core and basis of a Confucian epistemology allowing an understanding of Confucian virtues and values, but they also warrant and justify such an understanding. Taking into account the underlying preunderstanding or preepistemic understanding, which prevails in the Confucian thought, these principles can be used to gain insights into further specification and further interpretation, insofar as Confucian preunderstanding of humanity and understanding of human virtues and values are concerned. In this sense, the above-mentioned epistemological principles are also hermeneutical principles.

But before we are able to apply these four principles, we must reconsider the Confucian doctrine of the "rectification of names" (*zhengming*). The fact that *zheng* has a nominal meaning ("correct-ness"/"rectitude") as well as a verbal meaning ("to rectify") could lead us to see it as a state of harmony and adequate representation between names and reality of things. In connection with the four epistemological principles, this state of fitting harmony and adequate representation can be reached and can in fact be regarded as a state of reflective equilibrium of all the things in the world. In other words, in the act of *zhengming*, *ming* (name, which is used for referring to something) and *shi* (reality, which something being

referred to) have to meet halfway. *Ming* can refer to actuality, but what it refers to has to be made clear in a process of interdetermination and interaction. *Shi*, on the other hand, can be named but has to be determined in a process of reciprocal adjustment and harmonization.

An example may make this point of view clearer: in order to call a father "father," he must not only *be* a father in the biological sense through a single act of procreation (so that there is only a one-sided reference of the name *ming* to the reality *shi*), but also behave constantly as a father, that is, the reality *shi* has to adjust itself and harmonize to the name *ming* "father."[8] Thus, when naming things, both sides—reality and name—have to be brought into harmony in order to reach an adequate understanding. Simply naming (*ming*) a reality (*shi*) as we perceive it by our senses would not be holistic and so conflict with the epistemological principles discussed above. Chung-ying Cheng concludes here that ontology and interpretation are indeed working together to determine the meaning of reality by interpretation and in the same way to determine the meaning of interpretation by ontological understanding. He considers this to be the basic axiom of "onto-hermeneutical understanding,"[9] which would—by enabling our understanding to be both ontological and hermeneutical—allow a holistic understanding of reality, life, and practice.

The Hermeneutical Approach of Hans-Georg Gadamer

In his opus *Wahrheit und Methode* [*Truth and Method*, 1960], Hans-Georg Gadamer presents a set of arguments that show the impossibility of (historically) independent translations. The biggest problem in this context is that when we try to understand texts, we mostly presume that there are two clearly separated perspectives. For example, normally understanding and misunderstanding are taking place between "I" and "thou." But already the formulation "I" and "thou" shows an enormous alienation—there are no isolated, substantial entities like "I" and "thou" (which could be the object of our wish of understanding). Martin Buber[10] has shown excellently that "I" and "thou" can only exist in dialogue, that is, in an intensive relationship to each other that forms and characterizes the identity of "I" and "thou." When we are reading texts of any kind, then we face the same problem because texts are not isolated entities, but rather something that becomes alive through communication with it (i. e., through reading it). There are now two eminent problems to be mentioned: first, it is not sure if the author has been able to express successfully his or her own opinion within the text. Maybe the author has chosen the wrong words or unfortunately an ambiguous sentence structure that can lead to misunderstanding. Second, maybe our own use of language differs from the author's and so certain words have different connotations that lead to a different understanding. This is mainly the case with historic texts—language changes over time—and with texts written in foreign languages.

The problem is now how to overcome these differences in order to obtain a "correct" understanding of the text. Gadamer is here referring to the concept of horizon. Horizon is something that includes everything that is visible from a certain point, that is, it describes

the hermeneutic situation we are living in and that is linked to our tradition.[11] It seems that there are barriers that would prohibit an understanding of something that does not belong to our horizon. Consequently, a reproach often made in cultural exchange is that we are in no way able to understand the other one from his or her own perspective (horizon) just because we are firmly integrated in our own. The only way would be to give up our own horizon—but this horizon constitutes our own identity.[12] Thus, such an approach is neither possible nor wishful, and if we follow Gadamer, even futile. It is like the talk of a doctor with his patient about the illness the patient is suffering from. In fact, this is not really a talk ("Gesprach")—the doctor is just interested in facts that may explain the illness, but there is no longing for understanding in a hermeneutic sense between the patient and the doctor. In other words, after the patient has been diagnosed, the doctor only understands the illness itself without sympathizing ("verstehen") with the patient—what in this context normally would never be claimed. Furthermore, the present horizon itself is not rigid; it is rather constantly generating itself when we are trying our prejudices ("Vorurteile erproben"[13]). But as prejudices originate in the past, a distinct separation of past and present is not possible. Thus, the present horizon cannot be generated without the past.[14] Gadamer points out that the real power of hermeneutical consciousness is our ability to see what is questionable.

The so-called "wirkungsgeschichtliches BewuBtsein"[15] (consciousness that is effected by history) provides an initial schematization for all our possibilities of knowing.

In our case now, there are certain measures to approach the meaning of *dao* by allowing a fusion of horizons, but we will never be able to understand *dao* in exactly the same way as the author of the *Lunyu* has done, because an understanding of the term *dao* in the way that we can find an absolute truth being independent from our own (or any other) standpoint of understanding is not possible. Nevertheless, Gadamer understood the "fusion of horizons" in a positive sense, because it gave you the possibility to increase knowledge and create new views of the world. When reading a text, you will get a certain impression or a certain feeling of the text and its inherent meaning. This enables the reader to increase his knowledge and thus to create a new picture—though ultimate, precise knowledge (that would be equivalent to truth) cannot be obtained.

Hermeneutic Orientations of the Translators

In the next section, we will have a look at the hermeneutic orientations of James Legge and Richard Wilhelm, in order to understand their following translations better when comparing the renderings of some passages of the *Lunyu*. These will finally be judged by the above established hermeneutical standards if a holistic and adequate interpretation has been achieved or not.

Personal Background and Hermeneutic Orientation of James Legge

James Legge (1815—1897) was a missionary and Scottish scholar who spent nearly thirty years in Hong Kong and China working as a missionary and translator. As a child, he grew up in a pious Congregational home in Scotland, that is, he was a member of the non-conformist Presbyterian Church that separated itself from the State Church in Scotland.[16] Philosophically, Legge has been influenced mostly by Scottish Realism, which gave him the ability to have some deeper insights into the Confucian Classics.

Scottish Realism was trying to refute the radical empiricism and scepticism of David Hume (1711—1776). In Hume's opinion, the creative power of thinking only emanates from man's ability to combine, shift, enlarge, or diminish that which he has formerly perceived by his senses or what is coming out of his experiences. Therefore, there are no *a priori* ideas, all ideas—even that of God—are derived from human reason, which gains these ideas by extending human characteristics like wisdom and goodness into higher ideals. Ideas can furthermore—no matter where they come from—deliberately be combined. The highest aim of empiricist acting can only be to list up the reasons for phenomena we have perceived by our senses; but it is impossible to find at last the ultimate causes for ideas, those will forever be concealed to humankind and cannot be known. The causal law tells us in this context that everything that is happening surely has a reason, but this kind of law is only working within the limits of our sensation. Hume claimed that these limits came from the creative and unidentified combinations of sensations with imagination, but were ultimately reduced to individual sensate data. Transcendental things or beings like God, Heaven, etc., as a consequence cannot be known with certainty. In other words, religious truths can only be believed, but not be known with certainty. Moreover, we have to be very sceptical toward the world as there is no universal validity or truth existing.

In contrast, Scottish realists like Thomas Reid stated that man could generally rely on his common sense when perceiving all kinds of phenomenon in the world. They argued that there is a basic orientation in commonly held beliefs that is generally acceptable if not actually true, recognizably related to certain basic experiences of persons within their life worlds. Beliefs that derive from spontaneous sensate experiences are thus based on "contingent truths," and sensations are spontaneous events of embodiment that lead to inherent judgments about the basic nature of the way things are. Common sense therefore can be considered as a justifiable orienting factor in human experiences, and one that could also account for differences in beliefs and belief systems in various places among different people: the common sense serves here as a justification for beliefs. Because of this, Scottish realists were much better able to adjust their categories of understanding and interpretation in order to identify and analyze beliefs in other countries and cultures. This was very much needed in the case for China because the cultural dimensions of the Chinese world included the huge task of understanding the Ruist canonical literature. The fact that the Scottish

realists are rather relying on the so-called "common sense" implies a pre-rational judgement that can in fact be assessed analytically as a part of the sensations in and of themselves. I therefore perceive things in such a way that I will also become aware of their character that is lying underneath and that is not a part of my primary sensation.

Legge was always trying to utilize such basic hermeneutical principles of understanding by which he could present a reasonable and justifiable interpretation of any text. As a consequence, Legge was convinced that there were general beliefs held in various social contexts that could be weighed for their degree of validity, and furthermore rules of logic that could guide and delimit arguments over these matters so that persons could proceed to criticize, correct, and harmonize these more or less inaccurate beliefs. Preferring such a way of translating, that is, a very flexible method for seeking out common understandings, includes understanding China and Chinese Ruism by utilizing *their* justified views ("... basic principles of understanding [within the Chinese texts] which would lead to reasonable and justifiable interpretation of any text"[17]). Legge did so, and when he discovered that his basic hermeneutical principles were not proper, he corrected them.[18] Exactly this had not been expected by Edward Said who claimed that the orientalists' sensitivity for objectively perceiving another culture was very minimal, if not completely non-existent. Legge himself relied on a basic hermeneutical principle which he had found in the text of Mengzi and put on the flyleaf of each volume of the *Chinese Classics*:

> [Interpreters] may not insist on one term so as to do violence to a sentence, nor on a sentence so as to do violence to the general scope.
>
> They must try with their thoughts to meet that scope and then shall apprehend it.[19]

Legge thereby wanted to affirm self-consciously that evidence of the recognition of these first principles in logic and interpretation existed in the Ruist scholarly world.[20] To put it in a nutshell, the approach of Legge was a very fruitful one, especially because of the fact that he was aware that he may commit errors. If so, he was willing to correct them and if—as he would put it—there were misunderstandings between Europeans and Chinese, then both sides have to discuss that in order to get—if possible—a sufficient understanding. Only by such openness can understandings be achieved between different countries and cultures.

Personal Background and Hermeneutic Orientation of Richard Wilhelm[21]

Richard Wilhelm (1873—1930) was a Protestant theologian and working from 1899 until 1919 for the "Missionary Organisation of the Protestant Church (East Asia Mission)," who sent him to China as a missionary. As Arthur Rich points out, Wilhelm belonged to the Lutheran church in Germany, that is, a relatively liberal State church.[22] At the age of seventeen, Wilhelm already got the insight that creation is a never-ending process and that God is constantly creating new life. He could not agree with the idea that God once created

earth and humankind and then left.[23] He rather considered the world to be something living that is full of God's power and spirit. Apparently, this is contradictory to what most other German theologians were thinking at that time, but Wilhelm never changed his opinion. One of his idols was the theologian Christoph Blumhardt, whom he got to know in 1897 in Bad Boll (near Stuttgart in South-Germany) and later became Wilhelm's father-in-law. Blumhardt heavily influenced Wilhelm's opinions on missionary work, as their correspondence shows very clearly.[24] As for Blumhardt's theological standpoint, he was sometimes criticizing the Catholic Church for being too dogmatic; he himself rather preferred a free religious belief full of divine power[25] and considered the gospel to be a free, great, and character-creating love of God. In June 1899 Blumhardt wrote the following letter to Wilhelm:

> It is not the Church that is coming with you, but the Gospel. At first, it is not so important what you are doing, but that we are there ... They [the Chinese] don't have to become Christians at first, maybe they will never do so. The kingdom of Heaven shall come among them who are proletarians, humble beings; the pure contact with them in the name of *Heaven*, of the Father is of importance ...[26]

So we may say that there was no fundamental need to baptize Chinese people at any price, because the direct contact and exchange was considered to be much more important. As a matter of fact, both theologians were stressing the importance of peace among humankind. They were of the opinion that peace could only be reached when each individual would have respect for the Divine, that is, when there would be mutual understanding between the people. The Divine here is not considered to be a privilege or particularity of Christianity, but rather taken as an element of all religious beliefs in the world, including the Chinese. This may serve as a justification for missionary work: Blumhardt and Wilhelm consider the "religion of the divine" to be universal in the whole world and thus claim that there were no heathens at all—the Divine is omnipresent: "Who is acting according to the will of God, belongs to the kingdom of Heaven, no matter if he is coming from Confucius or the Early Fathers of the Church."[27] This statement—that is apparently in opposition to some parts of the Bible (e. g. , St. Matthew 10,5 - 6)—shows clearly that no dogma, theoretic discussion, or Christian message for the sake of itself was important. Wilhelm and Blumhardt are rather arguing for a very broad concept of the Divine. It is broad that it even embraces elements like *dao* as we will later show in the detailed analysis of several chapters of the *Lunyu*, and thus—though Wilhelm is respecting the Chinese Classics as great philosophical and religious works of their own value—his hermeneutical approach nevertheless led him to incorrect interpretations.

The Term *dao* in Some Core Passages of the *Lunyu*[28]

In *Lunyu* 1/12 Legge and Wilhelm generally agree on "way" as a translation for *dao*;

Legge only prefers the plural form ("In the ways prescribed by the ancient Kings, this is the excellent quality, ... " *Lunyu* 1/12). "Way" in this context has to be understood in its figurative sense, and means something like "course of life" or "principle. " There is only one slight difference in their translations as Richard Wilhelm here uses the expression "der alten Konige Pfad" ("the path of the old kings"), and not "Weg" ("way"). This may refer to the fact that such a way is supposed to be very small and narrow and so is hard to travel (e. g. , as described in St. Luke 18,25). Nevertheless, it functions as an example for every person in the state how to behave and to act (see also *Lunyu* 2/3 and 16/2).

James Legge is of the opinion that *dao* in this chapter is replacing the rites *li* and referring to the so-called "courses" or "ways" that shall be trodden by men. *Li* has the underlying meaning of "what is proper"[29] and describes how man shall behave and act in his world. The use of plural in the translation of *dao* ("ways") furnishes another proof for this interpretation: as there is not only one rule (of behavior etc.) existing (i. e. , the rites [*li*] are consisting of a number of single rules), Legge here consequently prefers the plural form. Wilhelm contrarily has chosen the singular form "Pfad" referring to *dao* as a single, more abstract principle.

Concerning *Lunyu* 3/24 (*you dao ... wu dao*), Legge's interpretation follows a comment to book 14 of the *Lunyu* made by the glossarist Xing Bing (932 - 1010):

> In this Book we have the characters of the *Three Kings* and *Two Chiefs*, the courses proper for princes and great officers, the practice of virtue, the knowledge of what is shameful, personal cultivation, and the tranquillizing of the people;—all subjects of great importance in government. [30]

Legge stresses here the need to know exactly what your moral obligations are—thus he translates *dao* as "principles of truth and right. "[31] In his annotations to this part he elaborates that Confucius should—being employed by heaven—proclaim the truth and right. These principles—presenting the real good—shall be spread so that each person will consider them as principles of action that have to be followed. Thus these principles can be understood as "duties" binding upon everybody. The reason why Legge is seemingly referring to "duty" in this context may have something to do with his nonconformist attitude. In the seventeenth century the Presbyterians in Scotland compiled a catalogue of duties called "107 questions of the Shorter Westminster catechism," which is partly an elaboration of the Ten Commandments in the Old Testament. This catalogue was not only used by the nonconformists (i. e. , those who did not belong to the English State church) then, but also until today. Further proof for Legge's emphasis on "principles" and especially "duties" can be found in his annotations to *Lunyu* 15/28, where *dao* is described as "the path of duty, which all men, in their various relations, have to pursue"[32].

Yet a translation of *dao* as "duty" or "doctrine" (like in *Lunyu* 4/15, 5/7, 14/38) is very problematic as those terms let one think of a certain set of beliefs containing explicit

rules that are determined by an (powerful) authority and that have to be obeyed. In fact, within the Christian context, the term "doctrine" is synonymous with catechesis and catechism when taken in the sense of "the act of teaching" and "the knowledge imparted by teaching."[33] In the eyes of a Christian believer, such an authority could only be God who is higher in authority than Confucius. But the ethical system of Confucius is, as Jacques Gernet pointed out, "devoid of any abstract imperative"[34] that resembles a doctrine. In a very pragmatic manner, Confucius is taking account of each of his disciples, just according to the particular circumstances and individual character of each of them, and he is not referring to or claiming to be an authority that is prescribing fixed doctrines for every individual. In contrary, Confucius sees himself only as a promoter of values of ancient times, and not as a creator.

In contrast to this, Richard Wilhelm does choose a very different translation for *dao*, namely "Wort Gottes" ["word of God", *Lunyu* 3/24]. This can undoubtedly be traced back to his Christian background as he is convinced that the Christian belief is something universally valid, which can be found in the whole "world." Another possible explanation could be made when referring to the beginning of the Gospel of St. John in the New Testament: "In the beginning was the Word." As the verbal meaning of *dao* is "to say, to speak, to mean," Wilhelm may have also understood *dao* here as "principle" or "truth" being revealed to humankind. But this would finally lead to an equation of *dao* = *logos*, which must also be regarded as highly problematic.[35] Therefore, the translation chosen by Wilhelm here deserves an orientalist critique in two respects: First—due to its highly symbolic value—the word "Gott" lets one think of a personal God, but *dao* does in no way imply such a meaning. It is even unsure if the terms *shangdi*, *tian*, *shen* can be translated as "Gott."[36] Secondly, the use of "Wort" seems to refer to a special revelation of God that—as we understand revelation in its Christian sense—has not taken place in China. This argument can be strengthened by the fact that the use of the word "Welt" ("world") here in this context also refers to the presumed universality of Christian belief, that is, Wilhelm wants to show that Christianity is something valid for the whole world, not only for one continent or one culture. Although these kind of translations appear only in very few places,[37] they show nevertheless that the Christian background of Wilhelm was a very strong influence in his translations, as also *Lunyu* 2/3 reveals which says: "If you would be leading through the Power of the Being "[38] Wilhelm here uses the term "Kraft des Wesens" ("Power of the Being"), whereas Legge here only refers to *de* as "virtue." In the case of Wilhelm, we have to ask who this "Wesen" ("being") is? Regarding his Christian background, we are rather led to understand this term as "God," or "divine being," and not as something that Legge is talking about. So this expression "Kraft des Wesens" seems to suggest a metaphysical meaning, which is not necessarily evident in the Chinese text and has thus been added by Wilhelm. The original version only mentions *de*, and nothing about a "Kraft" ("Power") acting here, and furthermore the use of the definite article ("des Wesens") emphasizing the

noun strengthens the metaphysical interpretation of this passage.

In contrast to this, Confucius usually tries to avoid discussions about (what Wilhelm calls) esoteric matters.[39] He only very seldom speaks about those matters, even the final questions of humankind are not put explicitly (Where does man come from? Why is man existing?). His comment in *Lunyu* 5/12 shows this undoubtedly and reads: "What the Master was often talking about were practical questions of profession. For Kung (i. e., Confucius), the last problems of philosophy of life were much too holy to be talked about much."[40] Wilhelm now again regards *dao* in *Lunyu* 5/12 as "heilig" ("holy"), which again suggests a religious and possibly metaphysical meaning, while Legge just refers to the "way of Heaven."

Final Considerations

As seen above, the problem of translating texts or single words is quite difficult, especially if you want to translate ancient texts whose original meaning and intention is unclear. Legge and Wilhelm have handled this problem with varying degrees of success. For the case of James Legge, Scottish realism gave him the possibility to look very openly at the *Lunyu*; he had no fixed standpoint from which he was analyzing and interpreting the Chinese Classics. Though being flexible he sought very carefully to choose the most adequate translation. This is also the reason why Legge presents more possibilities of translation than the others do, as a full comparison of all passages would show. Looking now at Legge's translations, we may conclude that it is less criticizable than Wilhelm's. There are three major reasons for it. First, he read more than thirty commentaries to the *Lunyu* when translating, enabling him to obtain a very comprehensive view. He compared these commentaries written in different dynasties and then—by giving reasons for his decision—chose the translation that was most adequate, most reasonable in his view. This enabled him to present a holistic view. Second, he named precisely the commentaries to each passage in the *Lunyu* he found significant. Third, the structure of his analysis is well thought out and includes several points of view: (1) the original text (or what was considered to be the original text), (2) translation (presents the view of Legge himself), (3) annotations of many Chinese scholars and interpreters that are discussed many times within the annotations and not just taken for granted. Nevertheless, his translation of *dao* as "principle" (*Lunyu* 3/24, 4/15, 5/7, 14/38) shows that even a translator like Legge commits errors, though he is keen on avoiding them.

When judging the translations of Richard Wilhelm, one may consider his translations to be intriguing and dangerous. In *Lunyu* 3/24 he translated *dao* as "the word [*logos*] of God" and so renders *dao* with a theistic meaning, encouraging a Christian religious conception of *dao* that is normally not the case for Chinese scholars. Thus, the orientalist critique of Said seems to be justified.[41] Nevertheless, to call Wilhelm here an imperialistic aggressor would

be too far-fetched when regarding his opinions about and behaviour toward Chinese people. But we have to differentiate clearly between his professed attitude on the one side and the translation work he did on the other side, especially because his translations are better known than his personal background and hermeneutic orientation.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis has shown that—no matter what your hermeneutical background or translation technique is—a fully adequate translation of the term *dao* in each respect cannot be realized. It may be possible to approach certain meanings of *dao* by choosing differing words that refer to differing philosophical concepts, but one-to-one translations like, for example, *shui—water—Wasser* as for concrete matters are not possible. Though there is now no single, universally valid applicable translation for the term *dao*, the translator has to choose an adequate rendering—he cannot renounce on it. But at the same time, he also cannot reduce the meaning of *dao* to a single one by constantly using only one translation like "way" or veiling it by confining himself to a transliteration like "*dao.*" A translator should rather try to obtain a holistic view when doing his job (see also "Principle of Comprehensive Observation" formulated by Chung-ying Cheng) and when rendering difficult terms such as *dao*, he should do it in a detailed way as Legge did.

Another problem that has finally to be mentioned is the fact that the cultural background and hermeneutical orientation of the translator to some extent do influence his renderings. If he neglects this, then mistakes or false translations easily happen, which can lead to illegitimate interpretations and misunderstandings. In this case, a translation would deserve critique in the sense of Edward Said. This can be avoided by taking into consideration now the second hermeneutical principle formulated by Chung-ying Cheng, which refers to a specialty in Chinese (ethical) thinking: the right behavior cannot be justified solely in a rational way, but has to take into consideration the fact that it also depends on human relationships. This is also the case for knowledge ("Principle of Congruence of Reciprocal Feelings"). Combined now with the third and fourth hermeneutical principles established by Chung-ying Cheng, the term *dao* can be determined in a process of reciprocal adjustment and harmonization. This is insofar quite important as in the Chinese context things—whether concrete or abstract—cannot be named one-sided. Only when an object we are naming is not considered as an object being parted from us, but regarded as something with which we form a relation, can a holistic and thus adequate understanding be achieved. In other words, ontology and hermeneutics have to work together and build a reciprocal circle. In classical European epistemology, such a problem has not been recognized by philosophers like Locke, for example, who have been of the opinion that the subject is able to understand the object without influencing it during the course of understanding. But such a point of view is false, as Immanuel Kant and Hans-

Georg Gadamer have proven convincingly. The only way to approach and understand any object would be to engage in an active relation and exchange with it, which would allow us to scrutinize continuously our own level of knowledge.

Note:

1. I am greatly indebted to Lauren Pfister and Chung-ying Cheng for their valuable suggestions and helpful comments. Of course, I am responsible for all remaining errors.
2. Nevertheless, Gadamer is of the opinion that a "fusion of horizons" would not hinder the two sides from communicating.
3. Willard Van Orman Quine (1908—2000), American logician and philosopher who has been advocating a systematic constructivist analysis of philosophy. Among the many books he has published, *Word and Object* (1960) is of special interest for our ongoing analysis.
4. Willard Van Orman Quine, *Word and Object* (New York/London: The Technology Press of The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 15.
5. Ibid., p. 27.
6. Robert B. Barrett and Robert F. Gibson, *Perspectives on Quine* (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 198.
7. Chung-ying Cheng, "Confucian Onto-Hermeneutics: Morality and Ontology," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* (March 2000, No. 1): 33 - 68.
8. See in this context also the corresponding chapter in the *Lunyu*, 12/11.
9. Cheng, p. 44.
10. Martin Buber was a Jewish author and philosopher (1878—1965) who wrote "I and Thou" in 1923.
11. As we are permanently living in a hermeneutic situation, we are not able to gain any objective knowledge of it. There is no distance to it that would allow an exact observation.
12. "... the great horizon of the past, out of which our culture and our present live, influences us in everything we want, hope for, or fear in the future," in David E. Linge, *Philosophical Hermeneutics: Hans-Georg Gadamer* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1976), p. 9.
13. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1960), p. 389.
14. "Vielmehr ist Verstehen immer der Vorgang der Verschmelzung solcher vermeintlich fur sich seiender Horizonte," in Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, p. 289.
15. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, p. 284ff.
16. Legge's membership in that church led to a profound nonconformist Christian theological training. The followers of congregationalism—one of their most important advocates was Robert Browne (ca. 1550—1633)—believed that the Kingdom of Heaven begins there where some believers come together and through a covenant commit themselves to each other and to God. They would lead their own lives, independent of any interference of the State. Being persecuted, many of them fled to the Netherlands and later to North America. In England they supported the army of Oliver Cromwell, but the "Act of Uniformity" (1662) labelled them as nonconformists. The "Act of Tolerance" (1689) secured their existence, but they were still expelled from universities and therefore established their own, the so-called "Dissenting Academies."
17. Lauren Pfister, *19th Century Ruist Metaphysical Terminology and the Sino-Scottish Connection* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Baptist University, 1999), p. 19. (Lecture held during the international conference

"Translating Western Knowledge into Late Imperial China," East Asian Department, University of Gottingen, December 6 - 9, 1999).

18. That Legge did so can be seen when comparing his different translations of the Ruist canon made in 1861, 1867, and 1892. Later versions do differ in some respect as Legge has carefully checked his former text of translation and notes.
19. Legge took this principle from *Mengzi* 5A4; see flyleaf in James Legge, *The Chinese Classics, Vol. I* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1969). [Reprint from the last editions of Oxford University Press]
20. See also the article "Mediating Word, Sentence and Scope without Violence: James Legge's (1815—1897) Understanding of 'Classical Confucian' Hermeneutics," by Lauren Pfister, in Ching-I Tu (ed.), *Classics and Interpretations—The Hermeneutic Traditions in Chinese Culture* (New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers, 2000), pp. 371 - 382.
21. Helpful sources included the following publications: Richard Wilhelm, *Kung-Tse.* (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommanns Verlag, 1925); Salome Wilhelm, *Richard Wilhelm—Der geistige Mittler zwischen China und Europa* (Dusseldorf/Koln: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1956); and Christoph Blumhardt, *Christus in der Welt—Briefe an Richard Wilhelm* (Zurich: Zwingli Verlag [publ. by Arthur Rich], 1958).
22. This argument is taken from the introduction in Blumhardt, pp. 5 - 21.
23. St. John 5,17: "My Father has been working until now, and I have been working," in *The Holy Bible—New King James Version* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1982), p. 1199.
24. See Blumhardt.
25. Blumhardt, pp. 43 - 44, 82 - 84.
26. Blumhardt, pp. 31 - 32 (my translation).
27. Blumhardt, p. 96 (my translation).
28. The original texts follow James Legge's *Chinese Classics—Vol.* 1. The two different translations have been taken from the following publications: (1) Legge *The Chinese Classics—Vol.* 1 and (2) Wilhelm, *Kungfutse—Gesprache/Lun Yu.* Other interesting passages in this context are *Lunyu* 15/41, 17/4, 19/2, and 19/4.
29. Legge, *The Chinese Classics—Vol.* 1, p. 143.
30. Legge, *The Chinese Classics—Vol.* 1, p. 275.
31. Legge, *The Chinese Classics—Vol.* 1, p. 164. The expression "of *truth and right*" has been printed in italic letters by Legge to show that these words do not appear in the original text. This technique clearly avoids misleading the reader and has already been used in the translation of the King James Bible in England.
32. Legge, *The Chinese Classics—Vol.* 1, p. 302. Legge has taken this statement from the commentary *Sishu yizhu lunwen* written by Zhang Zhentao (Ti An), a member of the Hanlin-College during the reign of emperor *Qianlong* (1736—1796).
33. This was considered to be one of the most important duties of a bishop, for example. See also I Tim., IV 13, 16; V 17; II Tim., IV 2 in the New Testament of the Bible.
34. Jacques Gernet, *A History of Chinese Civilization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 87 - 88.
35. Since the Ruist *dao* is rather something world-immanent and nothing that has been revealed to humankind through a metaphysical being like God or that is even *equal* to God, it must be questioned whether the metaphysical *logos* of Christianity can be translated as *dao* or not (as done, e. g., in various translations of

the Holy Bible). Though there may be structural similarities (*dao* and *logos* refer both to the highest truth of Confucianism resp. Christianity), their origin and characteristics differ fundamentally, and thus these two terms should not be considered as exchangeable or equal.

36. There have been many discussions about this question; see also *The Notions of the Chinese concerning with God and spirits*, compiled by William D. Boone and James Legge in Hong Kong in 1853. Legge indeed did agree that the "Lord on High" (*shangdi*) mentioned in the *Shujing* [*Book of Historical Documents*] and *Shijing* [*Book of Poetry*] is equivalent to the concept of "God" in monotheistic traditions.
37. Other problematic translations made by Wilhelm can be found in *Lunyu* 14/37 where he translates *tian* as "God" and in *Lunyu* 14/38 *tianming* as "the will of God" (Wilhelm, *Kungfutse—Gesprache/Lun Yu*, p. 149). In my opinion, *tian* cannot be understood as a kind of personal God or as a theistic concept because there has been no special revelation in the Ruist tradition and because *tian* is rather something impersonal like a certain natural, cosmic, or social order and does not resemble the Christian God who is creator and ruler of the world.
38. Wilhelm, *Kungfutse—Gesprache/Lun Yu*, p. 42 (my translation).
39. See Wilhelm's translations of *Lunyu* 9/1 and 17/19: Wilhelm, *Kungfutse—Gesprache/Lun Yu*, pp. 97, 175.
40. Wilhelm, *Kungfutse—Gesprache/Lun Yu*, p. 68 (my translation).
41. Yet we have to take into account that the former conditions of translators were very poor and that dictionaries like we have nowadays were not available. But this argument shall not be regarded as an excuse for inexact renderings—Wilhelm did his translations in 1909, but Legge published his first version of the *Lunyu* already in 1861.

选文四 The Maladjusted Messenger: Rezeptionsästhetik in Translation[1]

Eugene Eoyang

导 言

本文选自 Eugene Eoyang 所著 *The Transparent Eye: Translation, Chinese Literature, and Comparative Poetics*，美国夏威夷大学出版社，1993。

Eugene Eoyang(欧阳桢)是美国印第安纳大学比较文学及东亚语言文化终身教授，著有 *The Transparent Eye: Translation, Chinese Literature, and Comparative Poetics* (University of Hawaii Press, 1993), *Coat of Many Colors: Reflections on Diversity by a Minority of One* (Beacon Press, 1995)；与 Lin Yao-Fu 合作主编了 *Translating Chinese Literature* (Indiana University Press, 1995)；并且编辑并主译了艾青的诗集 *Selected Poems of Ai Qing* (Foreign Languages Press, Indiana University Press, 1982)。这里所选的欧阳

桢的文章将翻译者的身份聚焦在读者这个角色上面。文章从沃尔夫冈·伊瑟的读者反应批评理论出发，对翻译者的读者角色特别予以了界定，认为翻译者是“双视角读者(dual-perspective reader)”。这种读者身份让翻译者既是原文的读者，同时也是自己译文的读者。文章首先撷取了理雅各对《论语》的译名作为讨论的对象。理雅各根据当时西方流行使用拉丁语作为学术著作的书名的做法，也将《论语》翻译成 *Confucian Analecta*，力求让这部著作的西方读者的阅读视野同对牛顿的 *Principia*、莱布尼茨的 *Novissima Sinica*、罗素的 *Princia Mathematica* 和维特根斯坦的 *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* 这些著作的阅读视野重合。实际上，这种译法并未真正地实现译者作为读者所假定的期待视域同西方读者的阅读期待视域真正的重合，因为《论语》并不像一般的对话体文本那样具有连贯性、逻辑性和秩序性。

理雅各对《论语》的误读还表现在对“天”的翻译处理上。如他将“获罪于天无所祷也”译为“He who offends against Heaven has none to whom he can pray”。这样翻译，西方读者势必会解读为“不能忤逆上帝，否则就会无所祷告”这一宗教解释。实际上，理雅各没有意识到孔子拒绝对神灵的思考，以自己的传教士的角度在解读中强加给《论语》以宗教意涵。理雅各在译文中所透露出来的宗教意味贯穿于他对《论语》的英译中，导致了一种“系统性误导”。欧阳桢继续用“天”的翻译作为例子说明翻译者作为读者这一身份对翻译的影响。“天”出现在《论语》这段对话中：“子曰：‘予欲无言。’子贡曰：‘子如不言，则小子何述焉？’子曰：‘天何言哉？四时行焉，百物生焉，天何言哉？’”理雅各在这里依然将“天”译为 Heaven；相比较之下，陈荣捷(Wing-tsit Chan)则将其译为 Heaven(Nature)，有意识地将“天”同 Heaven 区别开了。翻译处理上的这一差异表明了两位译者作为读者身份的转换。

In my essay, “Translation as Excommunication,” which explored the ontological, phenomenological, and generic aspects of translation, I quoted Wolfgang Iser's comments about “the structure of the text” which “sets off a sequence of mental images which lead to the text translating itself into the reader's consciousness.” I suggested that, because “the translator is a reader of an original, as well as the author of the translation,” he “provides invaluable testimony ... on reader response, for he is an implied reader ...” with the advantage that, unlike other implied readers, he was explicit, and provided tangible evidence of how he read the original,[2] I argued that

> with the focus on the translator and his translation, there is accessible documentation on the reading of an entire text, where there is a possibility of examining every constituent in the whole. This comprehensive attention is necessary, because a prime factor in reader-response criticism is the “reader's role as a textual structure, and the reader's role as a structured act.” Structure may be adduced in fragments and excerpts, but the objective consideration of structure must take in the whole, even when selected structural elements are adduced. In short, translation provides at least one reader's complete “reader's response”

(Eoyang, p. 64).[3]

The present study is an exploration of the methodological perspectives suggested in those remarks, illustrating through an analysis of three examples of renderings from the Chinese the way translations and adaptations provide insights not only into the original and into the process of translation, but also into the "horizon of expectations" of each translator-reader-interpreter. The translation becomes a pivotal text, which comments on and interprets the original, and which in turn is commented upon and interpreted by the reader of the translation. The reader with access to both the original and the translator becomes, in fact, two readers: the interpreter of the original and the interpreter of the translation. Unlike the reader innocent of the original, however, the dual-perspective reader, i. e. , one with access to both the language of the original and the language of the translation, interprets the translation not only by comparing it with an imagined original, he must also take into account his own interpretation of the original, which may differ significantly from the translator's. One might consider the reading of a translation by a dual-perspective reader, therefore, to be a specially interesting case of "intertextuality"—what might be called "concurrent textuality": the dual-language reader, consciously or not, subsumes a specific original in his reading of the translation, even as he might (though less obviously) be susceptible to the influences of a translation when returning to the original text.

We take as our first instance James Legge's translation of the *Analects*, traditionally attributed to Confucius. Raised in Scotland, educated at King's College, Aberdeen, a staunch Presbyterian, Legge (1815—1897) traveled first to the London Missionary School in Malacca in 1839 where he became principal of the Anglo-Chinese College in 1840; later, he was instrumental in converting the Anglo-Chinese College into a Theological Seminary and arranging for its removal to Hong Kong in 1843. Legge translated many classics of Chinese literature and philosophy, including the "Four Books"—the *Analects* (*Lun-yu* 论语); the *Doctrine of the Mean* (*Zhong-yung* 中庸); the *Great Learning* (*Da Xue* 大学); and the *Mencius* (*Meng-zi* 孟子)—over a period of 56 years, from 1841 to 1897. His translations, which appeared in F. Max Müller's familiar Sacred Books of the East series, were decisive in establishing for two generations of English-speaking readers a particular view not only of the *Lun-yu*, of Confucius, of ancient Chinese philosophy, but also of Chinese culture in general.

Legge's version of the *Lun-yu* was first published under the title *Confucian Analecta* in 1861 (DNB, pp. 959 - 960). The publication of a translation of a Chinese classic under a Latin title in the nineteenth century was hardly unusual: works of learning or of science with some intellectual aspirations appeared either in Latin, or with a Latin title—the practice is a long-standing one: Newton's *Principia*, Leibniz's *Novissima Sinica* in the seventeenth century, Russell's *Principia Mathematica and Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* in the twentieth century are but the most famous examples. Yet, familiar as "The Analects" has become as a translation of the *Lun-yu*, it gives a misleading impression of both the title and the text in Chinese. First, "analects" is a far less familiar and accessible

word in English than "*Lun-yu*" is in Chinese, which could be (and has been on occasion) rendered informally as "Sayings" or "Conversations."[4] On the surface, the word "analects" appears semantically accurate as a description of the contents of the Lun-yu: it refers to "the extracts from the classical authors."[5] Yet, even in the nineteenth century, the "analects" sounded arcane and esoteric, in a way that *Lun-yu* in Chinese never has.

This excursus on the onomastics of titles is directly relevant to the way Legge read the *Lun-yu*: he saw it as a classic in the Chinese tradition, and hence treated it in translation as if it were a classic in the Western tradition, adorning it with an aura of classical learning. Certainly, there can be no fault to be found in this strategy. Still, deferential as it is, there is something awry in conceiving of the *Lun-yu* as "The Analects." If one goes to the *Lun-yu* with "the horizon of expectations" redolent of Plato's *Dialogues* and Descartes' *Discourse on Method* and latinate learning in general, one is bound to be disappointed: there appears to be no coherence, no logical development, no reasoned presentation of a point of view. The *Lun-yu* is nothing so much as a collection of unprepossessing, if profoundly insightful anecdotes and intuitive remarks on various subjects, arranged in no particularly conspicuous order, and governed by no discerniblecoherence.[6]

But what is misguided about Legge's rendering of the *Lun-yu* as a "sacred book," as we shall see, is that it misleads the reader of the translation(as no doubt Legge was himself misled) into seeing the Chinese text as a pale reflection of a truly sacred text, a repository of divine wisdom. Legge did not fully appreciate Confucius' resolute and emphatic refusal to speculate about the divine, or about the hereafter: "The topics the Master did not speak of were prodigies, force, disorder and gods" (7:21; Lau, p. 88), and when a disciple asked about death, the Master rebuked him with this admonishment:"You do not understand even life. How can you understand death?" (11:12; Lau, p. 107). The *Lun-yu* is, above all, secular, this-worldly. That is why a phrase such as 3:13,获罪与天无所祷也, though rendered with literal accuracy by Legge as "He who offends against Heaven has none to whom he can pray," is, nevertheless, "systematically misleading"(to use Gilbert Ryle's phrase). The Western reader cannot avoid reading this injunction except as an invocation to devoutness, a call to belief in the Almighty. "Heaven" in the Christian world is inextricably bound up in concepts of the hereafter, the dwelling place of God. In rendering this passage in what Legge must have thought as a self-evident reference to an omnipotent God ("Heaven" here is clearly a metonymy for God the Father), he was no doubt paying tribute to the Chinese by assuming that Confucius was a devout and profound, if unprofessed and unwitting, Christian. But this interpretation, inevitable as it was with Legge, cannot be justified by either the context of the passage or what we know about the secular mindset of Confucius. The dictum is in answer to the following question by Wang-sun Chia:

What is the meaning of the saying, "Is it better to pay court to the furnace than to the southwest corner?"

This translated version appears cryptic, whereas in the Chinese it is merely allusive:

Wing-tsit Chan's rendering supplies the context:

> "What is meant by the common saying, 'It is better to be on good terms with the God of the Kitchen [who cooks our food] than with the spirits of the shrine (ancestors) at the southwest corner of the house'?" Confucius said, "It is not true. He who commits a sin against Heaven has no god to pray to." (Chan, p. 25)

The question posed asks which is to be preferred, the "kitchen-gods" or the "ancestor-gods." There is no presumed monotheism. Here, though Chan also capitalizes the word "Heaven," it refers not to a divine and other worldly empyrean, nor even to the sky above, but generically to "the natural order of things."[7] In other words, "Heaven" is the right translation for "*tian*" 天, but it invokes the wrong theology and posits the wrong cosmology. And one notes that Chan refers to "god" with the lower case, as one of many, not "God," as the one and only, the Almighty.[8] It is not altogether a trivial linguistic detail that the original text leaves the object of worship unspecified: 无所祷也,[9] something which would be as theologically inconceivable as it would be grammatically awkward in most if not all Western languages.[10]

Book 17, Chapter 19 of the *Lun-yu* offers the following exchange:

> The Master said, "I would prefer not speaking."
>
> Tsze-kung said, "If you, Master, do not speak, what shall we, your disciples, have to record?" The Master said, "Does Heaven speak? The four seasons pursue their courses, and all things are continually being produced, but does Heaven say anything?"(Legge, p. 326)

From the context, the word "Heaven" refers to the natural world, to the phenomena of existence, to all creation. In the text, the words *tian* 天 "heaven," *sishi* 四时 "the four seasons," and *baiwu* 百物 "all creation" (literally, "the hundred things") are metonymies for the phenomena of nature. Confucius is saying no more than, like the phenomena of nature, he is mute and cannot put into words the mystery of being.[11] Wing-tsit Chan makes the distinction explicit in his version:

> Confucius said, "I do not wish to say anything."
>
> Tzu-kung said, "If you do not say anything, what can we little disciples ever learn to pass on to others?"
>
> Confucius said, "Does Heaven (Nature) say anything? The four seasons run their course and all things are produced. Does Heaven say anything?" (Chan, p. 47).

Legge's translation is accurate except for one crucial syntagmatic detail: the insertion of the negative conjunction "but" in "but does Heaven say anything?" This simple addition radically changes the cosmological context of the passage, for it implies that the seasons, all creation, are but the manifest workings of a divine intelligence, and that this intelligence is

metonymically referred to as "Heaven." The question for Legge is not whether there is an explanation, but whether Heaven chooses to divulge its explanation. Read in this way, Confucius appears to be playing the august and omniscient sage, suggesting to Legge that he claims the right to be silent, even as the Creator chooses to remain silent before his creations. Legge reads *tian* "Heaven" as metonymy for the Creator than for (His) Creation. That this was Legge's reading can be seen in a footnote he added to the translation of this passage: "it is not easy to defend Confucius from the charge of presumption in comparing himself to Heaven" (Legge, 326). But Legge has forgotten that, as Confucius has not speculated on the divine, positing neither the existence nor the non-existence of the Almighty, there is no one on whom to presume, and no one with whom to compare himself. Confucius was merely alluding to the generally recognized muteness of phenomenon; he was not arrogating for himself the status of a supreme being.[12]

Legge's view of Confucius is reminiscent of the "virtuous pagans" in the first circle of Dante's Inferno, who "were born without the light of Christ's revelation and ... cannot come into the light of God ... they are not tormented. Their only pain is that they have no hope" (Ciardi, p. 49). Yet there is a profound ambivalence in Legge's attitude toward the Confucian tradition: to the texts themselves, so commonsensical and rational, Legge is passionately impatient; to the commentaries, so often intuitive and mystical, Legge is positivistic and skeptical. On the Confucian texts themselves, and the comprehensive wisdom of Confucius, Legge is condescending:

> The reader will be prepared ... not to expect to find any light thrown by Confucius on the great problems of the human condition and destiny. He did not speculate on the creation of things or the end of them. He was not troubled to account for the origin of men, nor did he seek to know about his hereafter. He meddled neither with physics nor metaphysics ... (Legge, p. 98)

Legge shows his largesse and views Confucius with the same indulgence and pity that Dante felt for the denizens of Limbo:

> ... these were sinless. And still their merits fail, for they lacked Baptism's grace, which is the door of the true faith you were born to. Their birth fell before the age of the Christian mysteries, and so they did not worship God's Trinity in fullest duty. (Ciardi, pp. 50 - 51)

Legge's compassion for Confucius reflects the magnanimity of nineteenth-century Christianity to the less fortunate, to the unbaptized:

> Confucius is not to be blamed for his silence on the subjects here indicated. His ignorance of them was to a great extent his misfortune. He had not learned them. No report of them had come to him by the ear; no vision of them by the eye. And to his practical mind the toiling of thought and uncertainties seemed worse than

useless. (Legge, p. 98)

Yet, as benighted as Legge saw Confucius to be, he was no more receptive to neo-Confucian commentaries which did "meddle ... with metaphysics." He quotes Chu Hsi's exegesis of Confucius, and rather than being inspired by it, or finding that it satisfied his penchant for "revelation," or being impressed by its efforts to answer questions relating to "the human condition and destiny," Legge is sarcastic and derisive:

> Let the states of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, and a happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth, and all things will be nourished and flourish. "Here we pass into the sphere of mystery and mysticism. The language, according to Chu Hsi," describes the meritorious achievements and the transforming influence of sage and spiritual men in their highest extent. "From the path of duty, where we tread on solid ground, the writer suddenly raises us aloft on wings of air, and will carry us we know not where, and to we know not what." (Legge, p. 46)

One wonders if the commentator were Matthew and not Chu Hsi, and instead of such phrases as "equilibrium and harmony," Legge had read "the peace that passeth all understanding," he would have been quite so unsympathetic and unresponsive.

It would be churlish and unfair to dismiss Legge as a callous and uninformed interpreter of Chinese culture. He was, after all, someone who devoted his entire life to a disciplined and productive study of the Chinese classics, and his translations and commentaries still meet the highest standards of philological research. Nor was he entirely oblivious to the possibility of bias in his view of the Chinese, whose culture occupied him for so long, and whose people he had, no doubt, identified with in a period of nearly thirty years residence in China. Indeed, an inkling of this awareness can be seen in his coda to the Introduction to his translation of the Four Books:

> But I must now leave the sage. I hope I have not done him injustice; the more I have studied his character and opinions, the more highly have I come to regard him. He was a very great man, and his influence has been on the whole a great benefit to the Chinese, while his teachings suggest important lessons to ourselves who profess to belong to the school of Christ. (Legge, p. 111)

It is not Legge's own bias, but the bias inherent in a fundamentally Christian outlook which he could not escape, nor see objectively, that infuses his intemperate and inconsistent critiques of the Confucian canon.[13] He saw Confucius as a false prophet, a Messiah *manque*, whose practical wisdom was useful in developing moral character, but whose thought would be forever mired in unbaptized and unredeemed faithlessness.

Notes:

1. Paper presented at the second Sino-American Symposium on Comparative Literature, October-November 1987, at Princeton University, Indiana University, and Stanford University.
2. Iser, of course, reminds us that "the implied reader has his roots firmly planted in the structure of the text; he is a construct and in no way to be identified with any real reader" (Iser, p. 34). But surely a translator is a special case; he is an actual reader, and as the agent of meaning, a creator of the text structure in the target language, an implied (if often unacknowledged) author.
3. I am, of course, not the first to notice the fruitfulness of examining translations from the perspective of reader-response theory. Andre Lefevere has written: "Translation seems ... to be an almost foolproof basis for the study of reception aesthetics" (in Rose, 1981, 58).
4. "Discourse" might also be suitable, since it denotes oral exchanges of a serious intellectual bent; "dialogues" might be even more appropriate, suggesting as it does philosophical conversations—although both words now carry strong connotations of structured and systematic argumentation, traits not found in the *Lun-yu*.
5. It would appear from the *Glossarum mediae et infimae latinitatis*, however, that the word was not used as a title in classical Greek, classical Latin, or medieval Latin.
6. This is the one sense that is captured by "analects," which in its root meaning suggests miscellaneity.
7. Legge, in a footnote, cites Chu Hsi's interpretation of "Heaven" as principle: 天即理也。But he rejects this interpretation and sees principle as divine immanence: "But why should Heaven mean principle," Legge writes, "if there were notion such a use of the term an instinctive recognition of a supreme government of intelligence and righteousness?"(Legge, 1894, p. 159).
8. There can be no doubt that Legge believed that the Chinese knew "the true God": cf. his treatise, *The Notions of the Chinese Concerning God and Spirits*(Hong Kong, 1852), chapter 1.
9. The translation of the concepts of divinity was at the heart of the "Rites Controversy" which involved the question whether Chinese converts to Christianity should be allowed to observe the Confucian rituals. The controversy ended in 1742, when Pope Benedict XIV condemned the Confucian and ancestral rites: see George Minamiki, *The Chinese Rites Controversy*.
10. H. G. Creel, in his article "Was Confucius Agnostic?" (T'oung Pao, 29[1932]:55 - 99) argues that Confucius, like the Hebrews of the Old Testament, felt that "ethics, politics, and the whole of life were inseparable from their cosmic and religious background" (99). There can be no disagreement that Confucius harbored a reverence for life and an appreciation of its mysteries, or that he was "religious"—if being religious means being humbled by all creation. But this sense of reverence does not, by itself, predicate the personal anthropomorphic God that Legge imagined.
11. This passage mirrors the philosophy of language and the epistemology inherent in the first lines of the *Dao De Jing*: "That which can be said is not the universal/everlasting word; that which can be named is not the universal/everlasting name."("道可道非常道,名可名非常名。")
12. One cannot agree with Creel in his assertion that "Legge recognizes that the Chinese declare *Tien* and *Shang Ti* to be two names for the same entity, but he refuses to admit their testimony." Creel assumes that *Tien* does refer to a supreme being, and that it occurs four times as often as its synonym, *Ti* or *Shang-Ti*; cf. "Was Confucius Agnostic?"(T'oung Pao, 29[1929], pp. 74 - 75).
13. Creel cites Legge's 1867 statement, "I am unable to regard him as a great man" alongside his revision in 1893, "He was a very great man ... " and concludes that this revision reflects virtue on both Legge and Confucius: "These passages are a striking evidence of the greatness, not only of Confucius, but of Dr. Legge as well" (T'oung Pao, 29[1932], 58).

选文五 "Pieces of Eight": Reflections on Translating *The Story of the Stone*

John Minford

导 言

本文节选自 Eugene Eoyang 和 Lin Yao-fu 主编的论文集 *Translating Chinese Literature*，美国印第安纳大学出版社，1995。

作者 John Minford（闵福德）是《红楼梦》（*The Story of the Stone*）高鹗所续后四十回的译者，曹雪芹的前八十回由其岳父 David Hawkes 翻译。闵福德在这篇文章里对自己将《红楼梦》中"青埂峰"译为 Greensickness Peak 予以了说明。这篇文章有两个显著特点：一是从文学批评的角度讨论翻译问题，二是利用了中西方的相关文学批评，表明研究是从比较文学的角度展开的。

作者在文章的开始就用中国西晋时期的陆机《文赋》中的一段话描绘了翻译过程中寻求辞藻的困难。在译入语中寻找到合适的词语就好比上天入海，遍寻八极宇宙才可找到："浮天渊以安流，濯下泉而潜浸。于是沉辞怫悦，若游鱼衔钩，而出重渊之深；浮藻联翩，若翰鸟婴缴，而坠曾云之峻。"翻译者历尽千辛万苦试图要抵达的钱锺书所谓的"化境"更是混沌之海中的"永无之乡（never-never land）"。与陆机的这段话相呼应，闵福德又引用了德国学者柯蒂斯的一段对翻译的看法，指出精神财富无法兑换成没有国界的语言通货，诗人想要传达的信息只能用诗人自己的母语，这再次说明了翻译的不可能性。翻译虽然从某种程度上不可为，但翻译者必须知其不可为而为之。闵福德在文章中选取了《红楼梦》中"青埂峰"一词演示自己是如何克服这个词语的不可译性的。"青埂"与"情根"发音相似，又会引人联想起"病根"、"孽根"等。在对"青埂峰"的语义双关性有了充分认识之后，作者在英语语言中找到了与其语义接近并且也带有双关性的词语：Greensickness Peak。Greensickness 常被直译作"绿色贫血"，是一种常为青少年所罹患的疾病，症状是患者常常昏昏沉沉、无精打采，易生疲劳感，出现心悸等。文章引用西方文献对这一病症的描述，力求与"青埂"在《红楼梦》中所喻指的内容多有契合，从而获得了跨文化、跨语言的互文性支持；与此同时，翻译者还在原文中找到文本内的互文性支持，即小说第九十回出现的一个对句："心痛还得心药医，解铃还需系铃人。""青埂"与 Greensickness 的契合度越高，就越有理由把后者作为前者的对译词。这属于词汇层面的契合。不仅如此，翻译者还需要在更高的层面提高原文和译文之间的契合度，如贾宝玉和林黛玉的爱情与柏拉图式爱情的契合、爱情命定论与西方星象占卜术之间的契合等，都为原本不可译的作品创造了可译的条件。在文章的最后，闵福德依然运用了比较文学的方法，引用了莎士比亚《罗密欧与朱丽叶》中的几段诗句，其中出现了 you greensickness carrion，呼应了《红楼梦》英译本中的 Greensickness，也同时说明了这个英译本已经融入了西方文学经典宝库之中了。

In that never-never land of the mind which some translations (and their readers) inhabit, the language and symbols of one culture, the shapes, sounds, and sensations of one time and space, the structures of one consciousness merge with those of another, as in a dream. I picture this land as an island the midst of a Hundun Sea (Sea of Primordial Undifferentiated Chaos), its shores washed by the tides of the Collective Unconscious. If we may extend the scope of Lu Ji's *Phymeprose on Literature* to include translators, we can perhaps imagine strange islanders, to use his words,

> Distilling drops afresh from a sea of words since time out of mind ... now blithe as swimmers borne on celestial waters, now sinking like divers into a secret world, lost in subterranean currents ... Those arduously sought expressions, hitherto evasive and hidden, like stray fishes from the deepest ocean bed arise on the angler's "hook."[1]

The difference on this island is that the words are lowered down in one language and fished out in another.

I should like to journey to this translators' Atlantis and examine the sort of sea-change that *The Story of the Stone*, beloved of Chinese readers in its original shape and form for over two hundred years, has undergone. The island's Chinese name would surely be *Huajing* 化境, that Realm of Change, to which (as Qian Zhongshu said) all translations aspire. I shall look at a few examples of what happens in this process of change. But before setting sail, I think it would be wise to heed the following warning, a gale warning, as it were, issued by a great German scholar, E. R. Curtius, to all readers of *Literature in Translation*:

> Spiritual treasures cannot be concerted to the standard of a common currency. The best that the great classics hold in store for you will not pass into translation ... The message of the poet must be heard in his own tongue. If people are not prepared to do so, then they must do without the Pearl of Great Price.[2]

Having broadcast the warning, I still urge intending passengers to take heart; it may be possible, with a certain amount of diving, to come home from the island with a reflection at least of the luster of a pearl and—who knows—perhaps an inkling of what the Great One looks like?

Greensickness Peak

Root Of Love

On the first page of volume one of *The Story of the Stone*, we read:

> Long ago, when the goddess Nü-wa was repairing the sky, she melted down a great quantity of rock and, on the Incredible Crags of the Great Fable Mountains, moulded the amalgam into thirty-six thousand, five hundred and one large building blocks, each measuring seventy-two feet by a hundred and forty-four feet square. She used thirty-six thousand five hundred of these blocks in the course of her

building operations, leaving a single odd block unused, which lay, all on its own, at the foot of Greensickness Peak in the aforementioned mountains.

Greensickness Peak might at first sight seem an odd way to translate the name of the place where the stone "rejected by the builder" first lay. The Chinese expression 青埂峰 literally means Blue (or Green) Ridge Peak, and this is indeed how Yang Xianyi and Gladys Yang translate it. Where does sickness come into it?

Listen carefully to the opening words of the novel:

> Gentle reader, What, you may ask, was the origin of this book? Though the answer to this question may at first sight seem to border on the absurd, reflection will show that there is a good deal more in it than meets the eye.

While a few pages further on, the author describes his work as

> Pages full of idle words,
> Penned with hot and bitter tears:
> All men call the author fool;
> None his secret message hears.

What is this "secret message"? Probably no two readers will ever agree; but we are luckily to have some clues in the annotations written by various members of the author's family and included in the early handwritten copies of the novel. Sometimes the secret remains a secret, as when the notes merely say, "Ah what a marvellous likeness!" But sometimes we are actually told what the secret is.

Our friendly annotator, in this case the most prolific one, a relative with the pen name Red Inkstone, tell us that *qing-geng* (Green Ridge) is one of the many puns used by the author of *The Story of the Stone*, Cao Xue-qin, to hint at his message. It is homophonous with the expression *qing-gen* 情根 meaning literally Root of Love.[3] And because the Stone contained this Root of Love (we would more naturally say Seed of Love, I think) it was found unfit to repair the sky. Root of Love is an expression rather like *bing-gen* 病根 Root of Illness, which figuratively means Cause of Trouble; or *nie-gen* 孽根 Root of Retribution, often used of children. And indeed Love causes a great deal of the trouble in the novel, and children bring much of the Karmic retribution.

But love is also portrayed as a path to Enlightenment. In this sense the Root of Love is a Positive Root, like the Pancendriyani, or Five Roots of Moral Strength in Buddhism: the Roots of Faith, Energy, Memory, Meditation and Wisdom.

The novel is the personal testimony of the Loves, Disenchantment, and final Illumination of the Stone's earthly incarnation.

> Found unfit to repair the azure sky
> Long years a foolish mortal man was I.
> My life in both worlds on this stone is writ:

Pray who will copy out and publish it?

Vanitas the Taoist and copyist was so affected by this aspect of the story that he changed his own name to Brother Amor or the Passionate Monk, and changed the title of the book from *The Story of the Stone* to *The Tale of Brother Amor*. He had discovered Truth by way of Love. Starting off in the Void (which is Truth)—as a monk should—he came to the contemplation of Form (which is Illusion)—the Illusion or Fiction so lovingly depicted in the Inscription on the Stone; this Form engendered Love; and by communicating Love he entered again into Form; and from Form awoke once more to the Void, which is Truth. There is yet a third possible level of meaning in *qing-gen*. Coming as it does after the Incredible Crags of the Great Fable Mountains[4] *qing-gen* may have the further meaning of Real Basis of the Plot—taking *qing* in the sense of *qing-jie* 情节 and *gen* as in *wugenzhici* 无根之辞. In other words, although the whole mythical introduction in chapter 1 is Incredible, Fantastic, a Great Fable, an Invention for the Purposes of Fiction, it is also an allegorical representation of the True Origin of the Events, their psychological kernal in myth-form.

Green Ridge/Root of Love is in Chinese a pun with a riddling ring to it, as are many of the expressions in this first chapter. It is a play on words, but a play that indicates a key, a meaning. Greensickness has a similar ring. It is not a word in late twentieth century usage. But in order to recreate through translation the intricate fabric of this riddling first chapter, the translator has delved below the surface of everyday English, to angle for those "stray fish that rise from the ocean bed." He, the author, is playing his line.

Chlorosis, or Greensickness, is (so any curious reader can discover) an old-fashioned word for an old-fashioned condition: an anemic disease which affects mostly young people, usually young ladies, at the age of puberty, and which gives a pale or greenish tinge to the complexion. Dr. Robert Hooper, in his *Dictionary of Medicine and the Various Branches of Natural Philosophy Connected with It*, published at the beginning of the nineteenth century, tells us that this condition is characterized by "a heaviness, listlessness, fatigue on the least exercise, palpitations of the heart, pains in the back, loins and hips, and a peculiar craving for chalk, lime and various other absorbents, together with many dyspeptic symptoms. As it advances in its progress, the face becomes pale or assumes a yellowish hue ... the pulse is quick but small ... and the person is apt to be affected with many of the symptoms of hysteria." Not a bad description of the Ailing Naiad, Lin Dai-yu.

Greensickness, in other words, is a form of Lovesickness. Robert Louis Stevenson, in Virginibus Puerisque (1881, p. 104), writes: "There is some meaning in the old theory of Wild Oats; and a man who has not had his Greensickness and got done with it for good is as little to be depended on as an unvaccinated infant." Earlier in the seventeenth century, Thomas Brooks (a Puritan divine) used the expression figuratively, in his *Golden Keys to Open Hidden Treasures* (1867 edition, vol. V, p. 142): "Curiosity," he said, "is that greensickness of the soul, whereby it longs for novelties: and loathes sound and wholesome truths."

Greensickness, while meaning lovesickness, has the great advantage, for the translator of the

Chinese pun *qing-gen*, of not directly mentioning the word Love. Instead it preserves the surface Green of the original and sends the modern reader diving for a deeper meaning.

Incidentally, the treatment given for this ailment by Dr. Hooper is "to increase the tone of the system by a generous nutritive diet, with the moderate use of wine, by gentle daily exercise, particularly on horseback, by agreeable company, to amuse and quiet the mind, and by tonic medicines, especially the preparations of iron joined with myrrh." *The Stone's* views on the cure are perhaps most succinctly put in the saying quoted in chapter 90:

No remedy but love
Can make the lovesick well;
Only the hand that tied the knot
Can loose the tiger's bell.

Reincarnation

Root of Love not only implies a constitutional flaw in Bao-yu's character (what is elsewhere referred to as his *ai-hong-bing* 爱红病); it also refers to the karma which binds together the main characters in the story. As the Buddhist Mahasattva Impervioso somewhat flippantly puts it in Chapter One, "There is a batch of lovesick souls awaiting incarnation in the world below." To which his jokey sidekick, the Taoist Mysterioso, replies: "Well, well, so another lot of these amorous wretches is about to enter the vale of tears ... How did all this begin?" Impervioso goes on to tell him about the Stone's attachment to the Crimson Pearl Flower, "for which he conceived such a fancy that he took to watering her every day with sweet dew, thereby conferring on her the gift of life." The flower assumed the form of a girl, and this fairy girl wandered about outside the Realm of Separation, eating the Secret Passion Fruit when she was hungry and drinking from of the Pool of Sadness when she was thirsty (*Alice in Wonderland* and *the Pool of Tears*?). The thought that she owed the Stone something for his kindness in watering her began to prey on her mind and ended by becoming an obsession. "I have no sweet dew here that I can repay him with," she would say to herself. "The only way in which I could perhaps repay him would be with the tears shed during the whole of a mortal lifetime, if he and I were ever to be reborn as humans in the world below."

When Stone and Flower first meet in human form, as Bao-yu and Dai-yu, Bao-yu says with a laugh: "I have seen this cousin before!" "Nonesense," says his grandmother. "How could you possibly have met!" "Well," replies Bao-yu, "perhaps not; but her face seems so familiar that I have the impression of meeting her again after a long separation."

Although reincarnation is a characteristically Eastern belief, it has not been without its adherents in the West. Plato inherited it from the Orphic tradition. In the *Phaedrus* he explains the experience of love in this way:

> It is the past history of men in the other world that accounts for their destinies here, and also for the effect upon them of beauty. At the sight of it men fall in love. For it is a "copy" of the original beauty they saw elsewhere ... Whenever one

> who is fresh from those mysteries, who saw much of that heavenly vision, beholds in any godlike face or form a successful copy of original beauty, he first of all feels a shuddering chill, and terror creeps over him ... Afterwards follow the natural results of his chill—a sudden change, a sweating and glow of unwonted heat. For he has received through his eyes the emanation of beauty, and has been warmed thereby, and his native plumage is watered.

A French critic, Charles Commeaux, has described Cao Xue-qin as one of the great theoreticians of Platonic Love[5]. I think he meant Platonic in the broad sense of spiritual; I would go further. Plato and Cao share a concept of Love that is based on reincarnation. Love for Cao is karmic debt. In the payment of it (which may take many incarnations) lovers are drawn together as irresistibly as enemies at war. The process must continue until it is broken off by the force of Enlightenment, and the elimination of desire.

Affinity

The bond between Bao-yu and his cousin Bao-chai is commonly referred to as the Affinity of Gold and Jade—Bao-chai's golden locket matches Bao-yu's Jade Talisman—while the bond between Bao-yu and Dai-yu is called the Bond of Old by Stone and Flower Made. These elemental affinities have a close parallel in Western astrology and in the Elective Affinities of the Western alchemical tradition. I am not qualified to pursue this parallel in greater depth. I mention it as a further reason for my belief that to do full justice to a work such as *The Story of the Stone*, which represents the last flowering of Chinese culture in its entirety, we need, as translators, not only to immerse ourselves in Chinese culture but also to continue imbibing our own great European tradition, of which alchemy and astrology were intrinsic parts. To put it another way, the "island" should not be moored just off the South China coast: it should be somewhere, or nowhere, equidistant from both East and West.

Universal Culture

The translator from the Chinese must, at least during the process of translating, suspend any belief that East is East and West is West. He or she must somehow believe in the universality of the human spirit and the possibility of a universal culture. I once dreamed that I was standing in a Byzantine church, with shafts of colored light illuminating vivid little patches in an otherwise dark and claustrophobic interior. The air was heavy with incense and the scent of candles, The shadows had a purplish tinge. The overall effect was suffocating, and I felt a compelling need to escape. When I pushed open the great west door, I found myself at once bathed in light, and looking around me saw a square with on either side palaces built in a Moorish style out of golden stone. I was, I suppose, in Saint Mark's Square in Venice (although I have only seen it on postcards). Straight ahead of me, however, was no Venetian palace but a long, low-lying Chinese mansion, all airiness and light, grace and delicacy, in contrast to the Byzantine labyrinth I had just come from. It was predominantly a pale gray-blue, with touches of red and green. There were steps leading up

to the main entrance, and walking down the steps toward me was a tall elderly gentleman with white goatee and scholar's gown. He smiled at me, took me by the hand, and led me up the steps. As we walked together toward the entrance he introduced himself as Mr. Ito.

Ito Sohei, whom I have never had the pleasure of meeting, is the Japanese translator of *The Stone* and the possessor of one of the rare old manuscript transcriptions of the novel. But to me the enduring interest of this dream lies in the fact Venice is one of historical meeting places of East and West. Another is Macau. It is only a faith that such places also exist in the mind that can justify and sustain the attempts of translators, their endeavors to create a never-never land where Chinese aristocrats converse in the Queen's English, Latin and French, while their servants swear in Cockney.

Sometimes, it is true, the material for this alchemy has been lost nearly beyond recovery. As the result of the scientific, industrial, and electronic revolutions, the West has become over the past two hundred years more and more cut off from heritage. And this heritage is the translator's own Sea of Words, without which his endeavor will run aground.

Conclusion

Let me end this ramble by returning to Greensickness Peak, and by recalling in the shade of that ominous crag a short extract from *Romeo and Juliet*, one of the great tragedies of star-crossed love.

Juliet's mother, in Act 3, scene 5, has come to tell Juliet that she is to be married to Paris. Juliet replies:

I pray you tell my lord and father, madam,
I will not marry yet, and when I do, I swear
It shall be Romes, whom you know I hate,
Rather than Paris.

When her father arrives and is told of her refusal to comply with his plans, he starts to get into a rage:

How, will she none? Doth she not give us thanks?
Is she not pround? Doth she not count her blessed,
Unworthy as she is, that we have wrought
So worthy a gentleman to be her bride?

Juliet replies:

Not proud you have, but thankful that you have.
Proud can I never be of what I hate,
But thankful even for hate, that is meant love.

And Capulet replies:

How, how, how, how, chopt logic ... What is this?
"Proud" and "I thank you" and "I thank you no,"
And yet "not proud"... Mistress minion you,
Thank me no thankings, nor proud me no prouds,

But fettle your fine joints' gainst Thursday next,
To go with Paris to Saint Peter's Church,
Or I will drag thee on a hurdle thither.
Out you greensickness carrion, out you baggage,
You tallow-face!

"You greensickness Carrion" is a rather strong way of saying "you anemic, unmarried lovesick corpse." Greensickness is that aspect of love that "unmakes" the lover. It seems to me a nearly perfect way to translate *qing-geng*, hinting at some of the deeper meaning, the secret message, of the name of that Peak, where the Stone lay, and in whose shadow the story's theme of Love, Disenchantment, and Enlightenment was born.

In plays such as this, where verbal wit combines with literary allusion and philosophical depth, author and translator are as one.[6]

Notes:

1. Ch'en Shih-hsiang's translation, from Birch's *Anthology*.
2. See his Medieval Bases of Western Thought.
3. Cf. Inferno, Canto V, Ⅱ. 124 - 125: "Yet, if so dear desire thy heart possess / To know that root of love which wrought our fall" (Sayer's translation).
4. I should like to pay tribute to C. C Wang's "Nonesuch Bluff," one of his inspired strokes in that early version, which was all we had for so many years. The double entendre in *Bluff* and the teasing nomenclature of *nonesuch* are wonderful.
5. In *La Vie quotidienne en Chine sous les Mandchous*.
6. In this and following quotations, passages in italics are editorial additions or changes in the so-called Gao Draft manuscript. I believe a study of these changes to be of huge benefit to the translator searching for unnuenndo, or the "secret message." I have used Pan Chong-gui's excellent black and red edition.

选文六　华兹生英译《史记》的叙事结构特征

李秀英

导　言

选文原刊载于《外语与外语教学》2006年第9期。

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华兹生英译《史记》在向西方普通读者介绍《史记》方面取得了重要成就，40多年来，享誉学术界。探讨华译《史记》的叙事结构特征及其基础，并分析其社会历史渊源对于我国学界今天英译历史典籍的策略定位具有重要意义。

1. 引言

叙事学(narratology)也称叙述学,是受结构主义影响而产生的研究叙事的理论,可分为"经典"与"后经典"两个不同派别。经典叙事学旨在建构叙事语法或诗学,对叙事作品之构成成分、结构关系和运作规律等展开科学研究,并探讨在同一结构框架内作品之间在结构上的不同。后经典叙事学将注意力转向了结构特征与读者阐释相互作用的规律,转向了对具体叙事作品之意义的探讨,注重跨学科研究,关注作者、文本、读者与社会历史语境的交互作用(申丹,2003:60)。叙事学研究有3个重要角度:结构、时间、视角。本文从中西叙事的起源人手,分析了《史记》的叙事结构及由史诗发展而来的西方小说的基本叙事结构特征,阐述了华兹生如何调整《史记》原有的叙事结构并使华译《史记》呈现西方小说叙事基本结构形式,然后分析了这种翻译方式形成的社会历史背景。

2.《史记》及西方小说的叙事结构

2.1 "叙事结构"

所谓"叙事结构",浦安迪(1995:55—56)曾经指出,简单地说就是"小说家们在写作的时候,一定要在人类经验的大流上套上一个外形(shape),这个'外形'就是我们所谓的最广义的结构"。"叙事作品的结构可以接他们的外在的'外形'而加以区别。所谓'外形',指的是任何一个故事、一段话或者一个情节,无论'单元'大小,都有一个开始和结尾。在开始与结尾之间,由于所表达的人生经验和作者的讲述特征的不同,构成了一个并非任意的'外形'。换句话说,在某一段特定的叙事文的第一句话和最后一句话之间,存在着一种内在的形式规则和美学特征,也就是它的特定的'外形'。亚里士多德在分析史诗时,就认为在史诗的开头和结尾之间存在某种美学上和形式上的规定性,这种所谓'规定性'可以在某种程度上说明叙事的个性。一段情节、一个故事、一部小说,从开始提出问题到问题的最终解决,往往给人以一种'有道理'的感觉,从而达到对应和平衡,这就是规定性,就是'外形'。"

2.2 《史记》的叙事结构

南宋时朱熹的嫡传弟子真德秀编写了《文章正宗》一书,把文章分成4类,其中一类为叙事,这是叙事作为一种文类或文体出现的开始。真德秀曾经讲过,"叙事起于史官"。后来,章学诚也曾讲过"古文必推叙事,而叙事实出于史学",也就是说最早的叙事是和史学联系在一起的。(杨义,2003:27-28)

《史记》以人物为中心的纪传体叙事方法使之成为中国历史叙事的经典之作。司马迁通过本纪、世家、列传、书、表5种体例分门别类,通贯从上古到汉武帝以来3 000年来中国历史发展的政治、经济、文化等各个方面。本纪、世家、列传中数以百计的不同阶层、不同类型的人物造型展现了一幅波澜壮阔的历史画卷。可以说,《史记》是严格意义上的叙事文本。司马迁把不同的人物列入不同的本纪、世家、列传结构体现出了他对这些历史人物的一种评价。在人物塑造方面,司马迁紧紧围绕主题把人物置于波澜壮阔的历史情景中,然后通过情节编排,反映人物最突出的个性特征。《史记》叙事史诗般的特性构成了自身独特的叙事结构。

在浦安迪看来，中国史书的这种叙事结构是以史料为基础套上了特别的美学外形的一个代表性的例子。就《史记》诸列传而言，在介绍一个人的生平时，并不采用信手拈来之笔，而是有一种形式规则、一种“外形”在制约着。中国的历史叙事文一方面“把人生的经验流截成一个个小段，另一方面又把一段段单元性的人生经验组合连贯起来，营造成经验流的感觉。在这一过程中，‘史事’是截断的标准。也就是说，中国的史文藉‘事’来划定整篇叙事文从哪一点开始，经过怎样几个阶段，到哪里终止”(浦安迪，1995:59)。而且，《史记》各个单元之间的连贯性也很有特色。如果“把《史记》各个列传中的许多片断节取下来，就会发现，它们与虚构文学有许多相似的地方。列传往往以‘某某者某郡人也’开端，然后继之以传主的经历，再在‘危机’、‘大功’、‘大败’等一系列既定的美学外形中过渡，组成一种定型的模式。这种定型的叙事单元不仅是历史书，而且也是全部中国叙事文学的惯用单位”(浦安迪，1995:60)。

“《史记》既能‘笼万物于形内’，有类似于史诗的包罗万象的宏观感(sense of monumentality)，又醉心于经营一篇篇个人的‘列传’，而令人油然想起史诗中对一个个英雄的看法的描绘，从而无愧于古代文化大集成的浓缩体现。”(浦安迪，1995:30)浦安迪认为，“中国史书之所以成为叙事文的典范，是因为史书有同其他虚构文学一样的一系列定型的惯用叙事单元。人们把‘事’作为中国叙事文学的分段标准，其实与西方以史诗为代表的叙事文学惯用的 topos(叙事单元)分段方法是一脉相承的”(浦安迪，1995:59－60)。

可以说，《史记》是叙事文学的代表和发展高峰，是中国叙事文学，尤其是小说的鼻祖。《史记》具有小说形态。小说三要素即人物、事件、环境在《史记》诸多篇目中都明晰可见，如《项羽本纪》、《陈涉世家》、《留侯世家》、《李将军列传》、《廉颇蔺相如列传》等。(张利群，2003，3:139)

2.3　西方小说的叙事结构及其起源

“在欧洲文学史上，人们研究早期叙事文和后来的 novel 时，总是时时要回到史诗中去。”(浦安迪，1995:29)古希腊人强调诗与历史的本质联系。在古希腊人眼中，历史隶属于修辞学，合格的历史学家应该富有激情且充满想像力，以优美的言辞和逼真的叙述，使人们像阅读文学一样获得教益。因此，古希腊的早期神话作品，不论是史诗还是悲剧，都是诗与史的合成。《荷马史诗》是这方面的杰出代表。(李风亮，2004，4:114)它“被誉为西方文学的最初源头之一”，而且，“从 18 世纪末开始到今天，西方的文学理论家经常把‘史诗’看成是叙事文学的开山鼻祖，继之以中近世的‘罗曼史’(romance)，发展到 18 和 19 世纪的长篇小说(novel)而蔚为大观，从而构成了一个经由‘epic—romance—novel’一脉相承的主流叙事系统”(浦安迪，1995:9)。

西方的 novel 中的“头、身、尾这种‘整体感’或者‘统一性’，本是指故事情节(plot)的‘因果律’(causal relations)‘时间化’的标准而言的”(浦安迪，1995:56)。西方传统文论认为“小说体式的基本模式”一定是“时间性”的，因而强调故事在时间过程中的演变。“按照这种理论家和批评家的看法，一篇叙事文必须要遵循某种可辨识的时间性‘外形’或‘模式’，才会使全篇叙事文产生首尾一贯的印象(即具有‘起’、‘中’、‘结’三个段落的结构)。”(浦安迪，1995:57)

3. 华译《史记》的叙事结构

3.1　华译《史记》概述

华兹生英译《史记》主要分为 4 个阶段：第一阶段是从 1951 年英译《游侠列传》获得硕士学

位到 1956 年完成博士论文《中国伟大的历史学家：司马迁》(*Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Grand Historian of China*)而获得博士学位。该论文于 1958 年由哥伦比亚大学出版社出版。在这个时期，他的译介是与研究相结合的。第二阶段是从他获得博士学位到 1961 年哥伦比亚大学出版社正式出版他的主要译文 *Records of the Grand Historian of China: Translated from the Shih chi of Ssu-ma Ch'ien*。该译本内容主要涉及汉朝。第三阶段是此后一直到 1969 年哥伦比亚大学出版社出版他的另外一个译本 *Records of the Historian: Chapters from the Shih chi of Ssu-ma Ch'ien*，该译本是从 1961 年版本中选取与汉朝相关的 13 卷译文和一个节选译文，然后又增加 5 卷新的译文合成的。第四阶段是 20 世纪 90 年代初，华兹生重新修订 1961 年版的译本，1993 年由哥伦比亚大学出版社和香港中文大学出版社联合出版该书的修订本 *Records of the Grand Historian: Han Dynasty I & II* (revised edition)(two volumes)。同时出版的还有华兹生的新译本，《史记·秦朝》(*Records of the Grand Historian: Qin Dynasty*)。本文分析的材料主要集中在 1961 年版的译本，该译本被列为联合国教科文组织的中国翻译系列丛书"联合国代表性著作选集：中国系列"(*UNESCO Collection of Representative Works: Chinese Series*)之一。这是自沙畹以后《史记》西传的又一次重要尝试。它在促进西方普通读者对司马迁和《史记》的了解方面发挥了重要作用，至今享誉学术界。

3.2 华译《史记》选材范围及目录编排结构

华兹生认为，《史记》生动地描绘了过去伟大的历史人物，戏剧性地再现了故事情节，娴熟地记述了轶闻趣事。《史记》具有一种史诗性、歌剧性的特质：气势蓬勃的叙事方式，周而复始的兴衰节奏，雄健洪亮的语言。正是这些《史记》中史诗般的特质是华兹生在他的《史记》翻译中最想再现的。为了体现《史记》史诗般的叙事特质，华兹生集中翻译了《史记》中文学趣味浓厚、对后世文学影响巨大的那些内容，而对于其中一些涉及古代医学的章节，专业化性质比较突出的"书"、"表"等，他无意涉猎。他的选材侧重最能反映司马迁创造性天赋的那些内容，如秦汉时期个性鲜明的人物描写，司马迁生活的那个时代或接近于这个时代的那些起伏跌宕的历史事件等。在华兹生看来，正是这些内容构成了《史记》的核心。

1961 年版译本第 1 卷按汉朝立国初期和巩固统治两大阶段把全部译文分成两大组，分为 11 个小部分，分别加一个标题，在各个标题的下面再分别排列相关内容的章节，各部分的标题对于该部分的叙事内容起到了提纲挈领、直点主题的作用，且人物刻画与故事情节的展开趋于统一。如第一部分为 The Beginning of the Revolt，包括《史记》卷 48《陈涉世家》；第二部分为 The Vanquished，包括《史记》卷 7《项羽本纪》；第三部分为 The Victor，包括《史记》卷 8《高祖本纪》和卷 16《秦楚之际月表》(节选译高祖崛起之反思)；第四部分为 The Great Ministers，包括《史记》卷 53《萧相国世家》、卷 55《留侯世家》和卷 56《陈丞相世家》；第五部分为 The Disaffected，包括《史记》卷 89《张耳陈馀列传》至卷 94《田儋列传》；第六部分为 The Loyal Followers，包括《史记》卷 95《樊郦滕灌列传》至卷 100《季布栾布列传》；第七部分为 The Rulers，包括《史记》卷 9《吕太后本纪》至卷 12《孝武本纪》；第八部分为 The Empresses，包括《史记》卷 49《外戚世家》；第九部分为 The Great Families，包括《史记》卷 50《楚元王世家》至卷 54《曹相国世家》、卷 57《绛侯周勃世家》至卷 59《五宗世家》；第十部分为 The Leader of the Revolt (Some Remarks on the Han Peers: Ⅰ Ⅱ & Ⅲ)，包括《史记》卷 106《吴王濞列传》、卷 17《汉兴以来诸侯王年表》至卷 19《惠景间侯者年表》；第十一部分为 The Eminent Officials，包括

《史记》卷84《屈原贾生列传》、卷101《袁盎晁错列传》至卷104《田叔列传》。译本第2卷把全部译文分成4个部分，也是分别加一个标题，在各个标题的下面再分别排列相关内容的章节，如第一部分为Heaven，Earth，and Man，包括《史记》卷28《封禅书》至卷30《平准书》；第二部分为Statesmen，Generals，and Foreign Peoples，包括《史记》卷107《魏其武安侯列传》至卷117《司马相如列传》，卷20《建元以来侯者年表》、卷120《汲郑列传》和卷123《大宛列传》；第三部分为The Plotters of Revolt，包括《史记》卷118《淮南衡山列传》；第四部分为The Collective Biographies，包括《史记》卷119《循吏列传》、卷121《儒林列传》、卷122《酷吏列传》、卷124《游侠列传》、卷125《佞幸列传》、卷127《日者列传》和卷129《货殖列传》。

3.3　华译《史记》的叙事时空结构

西方的小说、神话、史诗，叙事总是从一人一事一景开始。中国人的叙事要从一个巨大的时空框架开始，然后写一个具体的叙事。（杨义，2003:30）为了在这种不同的中西叙事结构中取得平衡，华译《史记》在整体结构上作了调整。华兹生把《史记》的经验流套入一个固定的结构之中，并用西方的novel结构编排了原文的整体情节，在华译《史记》的整体结构上首先形成“头、身、尾”一以贯之的宏观时间框架结构，为整个叙事的展开奠定了基础，形成了一定的整体感。

华兹生在1961年版译本正文前，首先用了较大的篇幅概述了汉朝以前的中国历史，从而把译本《史记·汉朝》置入了特定的历史框架中，这有利于读者更好地把握《史记》叙事的时空结构，并形成一定的历史意识。然后，又把译本第1卷分成大汉朝立国初期和大汉朝巩固统治两大阶段。这就类似于历史叙事文学的时间结构。西方小说的“头、身、尾”整体结构致使华译《史记》颠倒了《史记》原文的结构顺序，打乱了本纪、世家、列传的界限，按照一般历史叙事文学情节展开的结构重新编排人物出场的顺序，使得人物塑造呈现小说中人物推进情节的轨迹。叙事从陈涉起义开始，叙述了失败者项羽、胜利者高祖，并选译高祖崛起之反思，这样就以时间、事件发展的大的顺序架构起故事展开的总体时间框架，然后叙述了故事中的各种人物：如功勋卓著的大臣们、反叛的人物、忠实的臣子、历代帝王、外戚、豪门世家、诸侯、显赫的官吏等，这就构成了比较典型的历史叙事小说的结构模式。

《史记》给了每一个历史人物一个特定的历史定位，这种定位包含了司马迁对这些历史人物功绩的一种道德评价。华兹生准确把握了这些历史人物活动的本质特征，并按照这些特征在打乱《史记》原文排列顺序的同时，依据司马迁人物定位的主要特征把它们分别编入起义者、失败者、胜利者、功勋卓著的大臣、反叛的人物、忠实的臣子、历代帝王、外戚、豪门世家、诸侯、显赫的官吏等新的小说叙事框架，以体现新的文学主题。在各个主题下，再保留原有的《陈涉世家》、《项羽本纪》、《淮阴侯列传》等原有的标题形式。可见，译本虽然保留了以人物为中心的叙事方式以及本纪、列传、世家等称呼方式，但是译本与原文在结构上呈现出很大的不同。这种不同的结构特征体现了译者在文本解读的过程中表现出来的叙事理解模式，以及在译本构建过程中体现出来的叙事文本构建模式。另外，在每一卷译文的开头，华兹生都把《太史公自序》中的相关说明性材料作为引言予以翻译呈现，使得故事情节更加趋于完整，并与该卷的核心主题相呼应，体现出叙事逻辑上的一致性。

很显然，人物描写的戏剧性特色构成了华兹生重新编排译文结构的基础，致使译文可以单独成篇来阅读和欣赏，似乎每一个人物都是一个独立的故事，同时衔接起来又构成一部完整的历史叙事文学画卷。正如华兹生自己所言，“目录可以作为该部戏剧性著作的主要人物的索

引，因为各个章节是由该章节叙述的传记人物的名字来命名”，非常具有可读性。

4. 华译《史记》的时代特征

“叙事技巧并非超时空，特定的叙事技巧是特定历史时期的产物。”（申丹，2002，2：43）华兹生在《史记》翻译过程中将之叙事化，然后结合《史记》的叙事性，按照西方小说叙事的结构特征把译本置于读者的“规约性认知框架”之内，把《史记》变成一部历史叙事小说。这种文本解读与叙事结构实际上体现了在当时的社会历史文化背景下读者认知的限度。当时普通的西方读者，尤其是美国读者对中国的历史著作很不熟悉，即使是司马迁和《史记》也都从未听说过。华兹生（Watson，1995：203）曾经提到，20 世纪五六七年代大多数受过教育的日本人都至少听说过《史记》，对其重要性有所了解，如果说 20 世纪 90 年代美国的情况是这样的话，那么在 20 世纪五六十年代的美国英语读者中却不是这样。对他们来说，《史记》的编写体例及其叙事内容之间的有机联系是很陌生的。华兹生在他的博士论文，后由哥伦比亚大学出版社出版的《中国伟大的历史学家：司马迁》（1958 年）一书中，曾运用《史记》的体例构写了美国历史的概貌，以此说明《史记》杰出的史学和文学价值。因此，一个新的《史记》译本，要为普通读者所接受，就必须尽可能地纳入他们的认知框架中。

就内容而言，华兹生认为，司马迁关于汉朝时期的皇帝、将军和政治家们的描写没有多少不是西方读者在阅读古典时期的西方历史时早已熟悉了的知识。在这样的前提下，华兹生侧重于《史记》的叙事特征，使情节叙事化，即“将叙事性这一特定的宏观框架运用于阅读，将《史记》解读成叙事文，并试图按照自然讲述、体验或目击叙事的方式来重新认识在《史记》这个文本里发现的东西，将不连贯的东西组合成最低程度的行动和事件结构”（申丹，2004：9，3）。然后，华兹生又依照西方小说的叙事规约，编排了各种具有审美价值的小说故事情节，并把这些情节通过司马迁《太史公自序》的相关内容有机地贯通起来，使读者在阅读过程中可以依据西方小说叙事规约来阐释这些文本现象。可以说译本中微观和宏观的叙事设计均构成认知策略。（申丹，2004，9：4）正如华兹生自己所言，“译本读者会不时地明确感受到他是在读一本小说而不是一部历史著作”（Watson，1961，总序：6）。

同时，这种翻译策略也与二战后美国的整个文化战略创造出来的文化氛围相一致。为了保持美国在世界范围内的霸权地位，美国在把自己的价值观念推向全世界的同时，在国内却创造了一种单语的、只接受满足美国人的期待的外来文化及其作品的氛围。这种期待不仅对于翻译作品的选择起了决定性的作用，而且也影响了翻译策略的定位。与 20 世纪 90 年代对异域文化和文学的认同相反，20 世纪 40 年代以来美国的主流翻译策略是归化法，讲究符合美国人所期待的流畅、自然。（Baker，2004：310—312）

华译《史记》的翻译方式迎合了这种需求，在当时取得了很大的成功。该译本所属的《文明的记载：资料与研究》（*Records of Civilization：Sources and Studies*）系列丛书主编狄百瑞（Wm. Theodore de Bary）在给华译《史记》撰写的前言中说，华译《史记》是为哥伦比亚大学东方经典翻译课程所准备的，是基于《史记》既可以作为历史著作来读，也可以作为文学著作来读，不仅可以被研究中国的汉学家来读，也可以被广大的普通读者来读这样的信念。《史记》是一部文学经典著作，人物刻画细腻深刻，宏伟壮观，悲怆哀婉，华译《史记》正好反映了这种文学特色。如果说受到儒家文化影响的人们往往读历史书籍就像今天西方人读小说一样，那么可

以说这是由于司马迁的作品使得他们以一种特定方式感到了历史的迷人之处。华兹生的译本也具有同样的魅力。直至 20 世纪 90 年代，从事《史记》新译的美国倪豪士（William H. Nienhauser，Jr.，1991，1996）博士也认为华兹生的《史记》译本文学性极浓，面向更为广大的读者，注重可读性，堪称文学杰作，是将近 40 年来最重要的《史记》研究资料。他的译本让西方读者了解了在中国尽人皆知的《史记》的文学价值及其对中国后来的传记文学产生的重要影响，同时，也激发了一大批年轻的美国学者研究《史记》的叙事风格和史学价值的兴趣。

5. 结语

华兹生对《史记》的解读和翻译是特定历史条件下的产物，并在特定的历史时期发挥了重要作用。探讨华译《史记》潜在的叙事结构特征及其基础，并分析这种解读和翻译的社会历史背景对于我国学界今天英译历史典籍的策略定位具有重要意义。

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【问题与思考】

1. 如何利用本体诠释学观照《论语》中“道”这一范畴的英译？

2. 伽达默尔的哲学阐释学和成中英的本体诠释学有何异同？对翻译研究的各自的适用性是什么？

3. 从历时性的角度如何看待作为中国古代重要哲学范畴的“天”的对译变化？发生变化的原因是什么？

4. 运用接受理论如何解释“天”这一范畴的英译变化？

5. 闵福德是如何从比较文学的角度审视“青埂峰”一词的翻译的？

6. 比较文学与翻译研究之间的关系应该如何展开？

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